German Railways in the East

[GregSingh]

Great info and pictures…I was going to ask about the southern route, Rostov – Remontnaja – Stalingrad. Your post implies this route was open for some time, sending trains to the 4th Panzer Army area.

It was operational, single, normal wide track. Although I'm not sure when actually Don bridge at Rostov was repaired?
We had this map earlier -

Stalingrad area railroads 1942

[Der Alte Fritz]

Great info and pictures…I was going to ask about the southern route, Rostov – Remontnaja – Stalingrad. Your post implies this route was open for some time, sending trains to the 4th Panzer Army area.

The reports are by General des Transportwesens Heeren Gruppe B so they cover the area that is shown in the reports, ie. the northern half of the advance. There is nothing about the routes to Rostov, nor the river crossings there nor the route to the Caucauses. The only thing mentioned is the traffic arriving at Stalingrad. The records of Gen des Trnsp HGruppe A are not in the NARA collections.

[Dann Falk]

It makes sense to send a few trains via the southern route to take the strain off the Tchir station. So looking at the small bit of data provided:

The Donez -Tchir line handles 12 trains/day or less, depending on blockages.
The Rostov – Remontnaja – Stalingrad line handles 4 to 5 trains /day.

So the Axis forces in and around Stalingrad were living on something like 10-17 trains per day.

This is a quote from my recent writing on this topic:
“This single rail line, capable of supporting a maximum of 12 trains a day, first had to cross the newly repaired Donets River Bridge which was about 800 feet long. Then the rail line traveled east another 130 miles to the Chir River area. Because the Russians had completely destroyed the 2,500 foot rail bridge over the Don during the fall, the rail head was located at the Tschir station about 10 miles from the Don. At this point all supplies were unloaded and transferred to trucks or horse drawn wagons. The supplies were then driven northeast 24 miles to a pontoon bridge over the Don to the village of Kalach. At this point the supplies were again loaded onto trains, running on a section of restored Russian Broud gauge track, to cover the last 40 miles to the Stalingrad area. This entire transportation route was time consuming, inefficient and lacked sufficient carrying capacity. Because of this and other issues, the Germans and their Allies were barely supplied at Stalingrad. Bombs and bullets were reaching the front in adequate amounts, but food, clothing, POL, spare parts and a host of other supplies were lacking. During the summer months, minor deficiencies were not too difficult to overlook, but with the oncoming winter, and the unrelenting combat, things would only get worse.”

[Der Alte Fritz]

The line from Rostov to the south was a double tracked line which should have been capable of 24 trains a day, however the crossing over the Don was the limiting factor even if supported by the cable railway (if similar to the one used at Kerch late in 1942 it should have a capacity of around 1,000 tonnes a day). In the period between the start of the operation and end of September this had to support both Army Group A and B. The 5 odd trains a day sent via this route to the Stalingrad area represented their share of this route. So the opening of the single track line to Stalingrad (which even under the Soviets had not been a major route, Stalingrad traffic ran north west to Moscow, not west to the Don basin) represented an addition to this existing supply line.

We need to bear in mind from the other thread that in April 1942, AOK 6 was getting on perfectly well with 7 trains a day. The issue is that the line also had to support Pz.AOK 4 and the 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies as well. But for the period between July and October AOK 6 was living off its supplies and getting under 5 trains a day from the south which it had to share with Pz.AOK 4 and that even when the new line was opened along the northern route it was unable to provide sufficient capacity to replace this deficit.

During October traffic was sufficient to keep all these armies going for their current operations but it was unable to repair the deficit of the preceding three months and it was insufficient to build up supplies for the winter campaign to come. The 'Kessel' at Stalingrad was in trouble even before the Soviets attacked as they were unable to prepare for the winter and this is the reason that the horses were sent to the rear. With them gone, the army was trapped in the city for the winter as it had lost its mobility.

But this was a result of planning for a quick victory in the summer and a quiet winter. When the victory eluded the Ostheer in September, it lacked the transport infrastructure to support it through the winter in its advanced positions conducting operations. The Germans thought that a quick victory at Stalingrad would allow them to build a defence along the Don and Volga and pass the winter in a quiet area of the front. The transport was sufficient to meet this requirement.

I think you should mention the field railway around the Don steppe that kept the troops along the Don supplied.

[Der Alte Fritz]

The problems seem to have been much earlier and more widespread across the entire Ukraine network.
There is this document from T311 R264 Frame 540 Gen des Transportwesens Sud

It says that from 10th June 1942 new orders are in place as the network has reached its capacity and then goes on to list orders to do with limiting traffic in the front direction. If someone would be so kind as to translate this, I am struggling a bit as it is not well reproduced.

[Der Alte Fritz]

Report to all agencies across Ukraine Frame 540
publish by H.Gr.South Ia
1. ) From 10. 6. valid Train Despatchers utilized almost all routes up to the limit of their operational performance and speed. Therefore following arrangement have been adopted:
a) west of the line Dnieper estuary to Dnepropetrovsk Krementschug- Lyubotin (line Kremenchug-Lyubotin auschl.) -Kursk (incl.) Incoming entire trains can not be driven in the direction of the front, in addition the despatchers must not use extended-loads. Immediately upon the transportation departments. incoming REQUESTS must be rejected applicants at OKH (Op-Abt. Gen.Qu., Wi In East) and on Ob.dL to refer.
b) east of the above line, incoming blocking trains can also be gotten forward in the direction of the front in exceptional cases of urgency and with favourable operating conditions. In any case, this requires the approval of the Gen.d.Trspw.Süd.
2.) The Bv.TO obtains the authority to drive Army trains within each of the allotted numerical limitations, the commanders position accordingly remains in its own control.
3.) The above arrangement is effective immediately. Authorizations already issued and handed down transport commands remain valid.
4.) On approval of individual vehicles. is to take the difficult transport situation into account and to take the strictest measures.
5.) The need for adequate protection of railways against air and ground attacks is recalled, as was made apparent it is particularly susceptible in the strong track interruption and interference in railway operations. The Bv.T.O. have to check the security measures and then again, if necessary to make representations to the relevant authorities. W.Trsp.Ltg.Ost is asked for appropriate action on their part.
6.) The Bv.T.O. keep the Chief of Gen.St. Army informed about the new train despatchers and the resulting delays in the transport position.
7.) Commanders are requested to inform their subordinate units about the above scheme and ensure through centralization of applications that the transport requirements are as limited as possible.

[Der Alte Fritz]

Gen des Transportwesens Traffic Reports June 1942 showing blockages in HBD Ost and Sud

[Dann Falk]

To clarify the issue...

Before September, the Donez-Tchir-Kalach-Stalingrad supply line to support Army Group B was by road and a bit by air, total tonnage unknown via this route. But something had to be moving along this direct route to Stalingrad.

At the same time, the southern route via Rostov – Remontnaja – Stalingrad was supplying Army Group B with 4-5 trains/day 4,800 to 6,000 tons per day. Each train carried 1,200+ tons with about 40 cars and 30-45 tons per car?

Then on or about Sept 26, the new rail bridge over the Donez opens, allowing additional rail movements directly to Tchir station. This new rail route at first was having safety issues and was under Russian air attack. So the number of trains on this line was low, some 5-9 trains per day. But this would have increase the efficiency of moving supplies along the Donez-Tchir section of the supply line, which in turn should have increased the total tonnage arriving to Army Group B.

These are my thought on the Army Group B, Aug-Sept-Oct-Nov supply situation.

[Der Alte Fritz]

Dan
Your train statistics are way out.
German military train sizes are given on page 1 of this thread

Handbook on German Military Forces: TM-E-30-431

6. Supply Movement
a. RAILROAD SUPPLY TRAINS. 
(1) Standard supply trains. German logistical manuals outline the use of standard rations, ammunition, and fuel supply trains with a maximum net load of 450 metric tons (or approximately 500 short tons)
on a standard gauge (4 feet 8 1/2 inches) railway. The text-book theory has generally been followed out in practice, although in some cases two or more locomotives have been sighted pulling unusually long fuel trains, and in some areas standard rations trains seldom are used. Standard equipment supply trains, with great variations in net loading weights, also are employed. In most cases, however, equipment of all kinds is loaded on the same train.
(2) Rations supply trains (Verpflegungszüge), with an average of 40 cars per train may be composed as follows:
(a) Iron rations: 300,000 full and 300,000 half iron rations, totalling 442 metric tons.
(b) Full rations with fodder: 180.000 human and 40,000 animal rations, amounting to 454 metric tons. These may be loaded into three parts, each containing 3 days' supplies for 20,000 men and 4,000 animals.
(c) Full human rations with no bread but only baking materials: 300,000 rations, totaling 450 metric tons.
(d) Flour train (Mehlzug): 833,000 rations, amounting to 450 metric tons.
(e) Oat train (Hafersug): 90,000 rations, totaling 450 metric tons.
(f) Animal trains (Viekzüge): 360 cattle weighing 180 metric tons, 1200 pigs weighing 120 metric tons, or 1800 sheep weighing 72 metric tons.
(3) Ammunition supply trains (Munitionszüge), with an average of 30 cars per train, are of three types:
(a) Unit-loaded trains, loaded according to the proportion of different types of ammunition needed by a particular division.
(b) Caliber unit trains, in which each car is loaded with approximately 15 metric tons (161/2 short tons) of ammunition of a specific caliber.
(c) Single caliber unit trains, in which all cars are loaded with ammunition of the same caliber.
(4) Fuel supply trains (Betriehstoffzüge) of two types are used:
(a) 20 gasoline tank cars, holding between 340 cubic meters (around 89,800 gallons) and 440 cubic meters (around 116,200 gallons) of fuel.
(b) 25 cars, holding gasoline in 200-liter (53-gallon) and 20-liter (5-gallon) cans and carrying 400 cubic meters (105,600 gallons) of gasoline, and five cars with oil, engine oil, gear oil, paraffin, and (in winter) anti-freeze barrels and cans.
(5) Horse supply trains (Pferdersatzzüge) consist of 55 cars, each holding eight riding or light draft horses per car or 440 horses per train; six heavy draft horses per car or 330 horses per train; or four very heavy horses per car or 220 horses per train.
(6) Signals and engineer construction materials trains (Baustoffzüge) average 40 cars, of which 39 are open cars, with a net tonnage of about 820 metric tons (900 short tons).
(7) Tank trains carrying up to 25 medium tanks or up to 8 heavy tanks have also been reported. The average number of cars per tank train is about 33, with widely varying net loads.
(8) Mixed equipment trains are very frequent and may contain from 25 to 60 cars with a total net tonnage of up to 850 metric tons.

[Dann Falk]

Sorry, my oversight at not starting at page #1.

I was taking train statistics from a similar but older post:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/s ... ics&page=2

My problem is that I’m trying to reconcile German train use during Stalingrad vs Russian train use. This is in terms of size (# of cars), load, speed and number of trains needed to deliver X amount of tonnage to a rail head. As we all know it can be somewhat confusing.

My research, German vs Russian supplies do not add up, during Stalingrad. For the number of Russian supply trains needed, accounts are good and make the most sense. But for the number of trains that are reportedly reaching Army Group B, they are not able to deliver the amount of supplies needed. A large gap exists that I have not been able to account for.

[Der Alte Fritz]

Dann
I think the best thing for you to do is to lay out your case and information here and then we can see where the gaps are and where there are areas that the thread can help. But we already have a huge amount on railway operations around Stalingrad so I would ask that you read the thread first.

[Der Alte Fritz]

So if a report is issued on the 10.06.1942 saying that the network has reached maximum capacity then this would be a good place to look at traffic flow acriss the network. The report for the 11.06.1942 is given below:

[Der Alte Fritz]

Situation Report 11th June 1942
North route increased backlog resulting from a bad accident at Putivl. Distance Kremenchug - Poltava beset by strong inflow and long-stay in Locomotive sheds in Kharkov. Backflow towards the front, towards home somewhat reduced in HBD East consistently increased by 12 trains at HBD south.

Kazatin: through Fastow 43, through Christinowka 10, through Shmerinka 1,
Fastow: through Mironovka 22 through Kiev 25
Snamenka: through Koristowka 41, through Dolinskaja 7 through Kremenchug 20, Dnepropetrovsk / Usel 29, Postyschewo 25, Zaporozhye direction Crimea 12, Volnovakha 2, Kiev-Darnitsa 0 Bakhmach 23, Woroshba direction Kharkov 9, Kursk 18

Route Batmatsch-Woroshba since 1. 45 o'clock closed near Putiwl because of an ammunition-train blown up on a mine. Explodes 7 cars, several dead and injured soldiers. Hindrance of repair work, since accident-place is under M. G. - fire. Single-track operation from 13. 00 hours resumed, 2 track one probably from 20 hours. HBD Mitte diverts trains for Kursk over Brjansk.

Temporary stoppage of the routes Pjatichatki bezw. Werchowzewo - Dolginzewo, there found mines and explosive-devices which must be gotten rid of.

By bomb-landing on Station at Simferopol's 2 tracks for 12 hours been closed; this hinders the removal of trains from Dshankoj. Further plane-attacks in the Donez command with main focus on Artemowsk, have not reported larger operational effects until now.

In the railway station Kursk operations are strongly hindered because of a break in the water-stantion; it is expected that operations will be repaired during the night.

Loco-situation: unchanged
Coal-situation; sufficient
Weather-situation: isolated easy precipitations

Returns:
Through Dnepropetrowsk / Usel 28, through Snamenka 43, through Kasatin 45 = 14 empty, 1 ores, 8 grains, 2 Ukranian. Workers, 3 prisoners, 3 Wehrmacht-goods, 1 motor vehicles & old-rubber, 2 laz, 1 collective, 5 servings, 1 Nahgüter, 3 people, 1 SF.
Empty trains:
F.E.K.3 handed over to F.E.K.2: 4 trains mit 224 Wagen
….......................to HBD Ost: 32 trains mit 1701 Wagen
….......................to HBD Süd; 8 trains mit 453 Wagen
HBD Ost handed over to HBD Süd; 34 trains mit 1529 Wagen
HBD Süd handed over to Gedob : 30 trains mit 1458 Wagen
….......................to C.F.R.; 4 trains mit 198 Wagen




On route:
Between border and Kasatin:
Army: 7 m, 7 B, 13 V, 11 troops, 1 Laz, 11 other ones, 1 verbs.
Air: 2 m, 5 B, 4 other one, 5 troops
= 67 out of 105 trains
Kasatin - Snamenka:
Army: 10 m, 3 B, 11 V, 10 troops, 5 Laz, 7 former inputs
Air: 3 LI, 2B, 1 other one, 4 troops
= 56 out of 73 trains
Snamenka - Dnepropetrowsk:
Army: 6 M, 3 B, 16 V, 5 troops, 2 laz, 6 other ones, 3 Verb.
Air: 1 M, 1B, 3 other ones, 3 troops
= 49 out of 58 trains
In direction of Stalino from Dnepropetrowsk:
Army: 9 M, 8 B, 19 V, 5 troops, 6 other, 3 verbs.
Air: 1 M, 3 other, 4 troops
= 57 out of 66 trains
In direction of Krim from Dnepropetrowsk:
Army: 2M, 1B, 6 V, 1 troops, 1 other one, 1 verbs.
Air: 1 M, 2 B, 3 other ones, 3 troops
= 21 out of 23 trains
In direction of Charkow bezw. Kursk from Kiev over Woroshba:
Army: 2 m, 1B, 2V, 3 troops, 1 other supplies
Air: without
= 9 out of 14 trains
In direction of Charkow bezw. Kursk from Makoschino;
Army: 9 M, 6 B, 13 V, 8 troops, 7 former inputs
Air: 3 M, 1B, 12 troops
= 59 out of 67 trains
In direction of Charkow from Krementschug:
Army: 1B, 2V, 12 troops, 2 Laz, 2 former inputs
Air: 8 M, 2 B, 1 troops
= 30 out of 39 trains

[Der Alte Fritz]

[Der Alte Fritz]

In these situation reports, the first paragraph is a general summary conditions
while I believe that the second paragraph (in this case starting: "Kazatin: through Fastow 43," is the number of trains passing through the station.

At the end there is a summary of the different trains type en route: "Kasatin - Snamenka: Army: 10 m, "

have I got this right or do these numbers mean something else?