Greg Singh wrote:I meant railroads were operational from Zarechnaya all the way down south to Caucasus, but Zarechnaya was as far as you could reach by rail traveling north from Caucasus, until the bridge was built over Don in Rostov.
So in case of supplying armies near Caucasus, they used road transport all the way from Rostov train station (over pontoon bridge) down south to Caucasus or trucks loaded at Rostov train station were unloaded to trains in Zarechnaya / Batajsk and goods were transported down south by railroads.
Thank you. That makes so much more sense.
I am really interested in exactly this topic: whether the Germans were able to maintain railroad operations on the far side of a river before the reconstruction of a railroad bridge.
Here you're indicating that the Germans ran trains in the Caucasus before the completion of the Rostov railroad bridge. Do you know whether the pre-bridge Caucasus railroad ops used German or Russian gauge and equipment? If German, then they must have had some way to ferry/carry rolling stock to the far side. That's why I'm interested in the topic of rail ferries. If Russian, it was probably a low-capacity operation improvised by the Army Group.
One reason I'm very interested in this topic is the contrast between the '41 trans-Dniepr advance by AGS and its '42 trans-Don analogue. In '41 it appears that AGS was unsupported by rail east of the Dniepr until very late in the year. Creveld mentions that AGC had to send 5,000 tons of Grosstransportraum to AGS in late September, just ahead of the critical Taifun offensive that lacked sorely for truck transport. AGS apparently experimented with running captured Russian stock east of the Dniepr during this period.
If the Germans were running Germans stock/gauge south of the Don prior to the Rostov bridge reconstruction, it demonstrates a significant logistical capacity deployed in '42 that wasn't in '41.