German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Discussions on the economic history of the nations taking part in WW2, from the recovery after the depression until the economy at war.
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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 05 Mar 2015 08:58

T78 R391 FEDko 1944 f.jpg
T78 R391 FEDko 1944 g.jpg
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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 05 Mar 2015 09:15

Total comprises 130 officers, 11 Officials, 184 NCO and 294 men of whom 76 officers, 145 NCO and 152 men at least were Reichsbahn (grau eisenbahner) personnel.
43 vehicles (25 Personnel vehicles, 3 2t trucks 8 3t lorries,) 11 motorcycles 3 sidecars and 5 bicycles

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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 05 Mar 2015 09:19

Transport Kommandatur was the basic command unit for railways along the line, usually based at the smaller halts
T78 R391 Transport Kommanandtur April 42 a.jpg
while the Bahnhof Kommandatur provided the same function at major stations
T78 R391 Bahnhof Kommandanteur April 42.jpg
while in the field the unloading points at railheads were controlled by Auslade Kommisar
T78 R391 Aussladekommisar Nov 41.jpg
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Rebuilding of Bridge at Kiev Jan 1942

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 07 Mar 2015 19:16

T-78 Roll 609 (59) 26.01.42 bridge at Kiev.JPG
T-78 Roll 609 (62) Resources used to repair Kiev Bridge.JPG
T-78 Roll 609 (63).JPG
Letter from Fritz Todt's organisation
T-78 Roll 609 (64) letter from OT.JPG
T-78 Roll 609 (65) bridge diagram.JPG
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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 08 Mar 2015 15:45

Monthly summary of re-gauging of Soviet railways by German Eisenbahntruppe, HBD, Gedob, Reichsbahn and construction firms up to end of 1942.
HGruppe Sud
T-78 Roll 117 (27) Regauging Summary to end 1942.JPG
T-78 Roll 117 (28).JPG
T-78 Roll 117 (29).JPG
T-78 Roll 117 (30).JPG
T-78 Roll 117 (31).JPG
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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 08 Mar 2015 16:07

HGruppe Mitte
T-78 Roll 117 (32) Regauging Summary to end 42 HGr Mitte.JPG
T-78 Roll 117 (33).JPG
HGruppe Nord
T-78 Roll 117 (34) Regauging Summary to end 42 HGr Nord.JPG
T-78 Roll 117 (35).JPG
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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 08 Mar 2015 16:08

Rumanian Railways
T-78 Roll 117 (36) Rumanian.JPG
T-78 Roll 117 (37).JPG
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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 08 Mar 2015 16:23

By end of November 1941 the totals were:
T-78 Roll 117 (10).JPG
note that there are two efforts going on here:
1) The Eisenbahnpioniere changing the gauge at the front working with the FEDkos
2) Behind the front the HBD, Reichsbahn, etc changing the second tracks and carrying our further work to build the network.
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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 11 Mar 2015 15:33

T78 Roll 609 Chef des Transportwesens

Main – Railway Division South (HBD Sud) Head of Liaison Department
to the Railway Pioneer Construction Staff.

Lemberg, 15.11.1941

Proposal
to clarify and improve the working relationship with the Railway – Pioneer Constructions Staff.

The area of HBD South is located far away from the front, ie already in a "temperate zone". There is no law of the jungle here. A certain degree of order in the administration has been able to be established. With the HBD here a railway organization was created in the usual home model, and the German Reichsbahn has seconded their professionals. The difficulties that have arisen in railway operation and even now arise are due in substantially the extensive and thorough destruction of track systems. It was urgently needed to operate the reconstruction as soon as possible in order to cope especially before the winter. One has here limited to the bare essentials. The HBD has with it: assumed a construction organization of this task with the greatest energy. It has Head of Department and Office Director, a elder Kahl well trained Costruction Controller and about a hundred Railway Masters who are very able men for the most part. In the course of time about 25,000 local workers were hired to the carry out the labouring and who turned up. Thus, the HBD has with this their Construction Organisation not a "modest amount” of construction, but can claim and proven by the work done so far that it is able to meet large tasks.

In mid-September the railway Pioneer Construction Staff was instructed, and to support the HBD in coping with the present building projects. It inherited a failed bridge works from Kodeis (Commander Railway Pioneers) and has started them anew, it has the expansion of the second track between Zlocsow and Volochisk (this is a stretch of track around 100 km long about 70 km east of Lemberg – so not very far into the Ukraine at all) to be driven forward and can perform track work by its subordinate Reichsbahn construction trains. Work of any other kind could only be afforded to a minimal extent. In the statement by the Pioneer Construction Staff to the Chef of Transport Service on 14.09.1941 regarding its requirements, to immediately take forward 11 different urgent project, to avoid any bureaucratic organization to make the human and material assistants of the country immediately mobile, etc. which the Pioneer Staff cannot meet.

With the Pioneer Staff a parallel organization has been created, which already exists in the HBD South. The need for this is not clear now, the subordination has been solved; So the Pioneer Staff has the right to work completely independently and that as the builder, after it begins to work gradually it will develop the right conditions in the field, on which there can only be one idea, evaluating the conditions in the field through known personal contacts. Intertwined work, pushing mutual responsibility, duplication, anger, lust falling labour will inevitable follow. As higher priority will appear so will start to bloom bureaucratic correspondence. An appeal to working together may perhaps help temporarily help a little in some places. That would be a miserable way. The right thing is to change an organization recognized as unsuitable.

The difficulty in field service are coping with the continuous tasks which are by no means represented in structural performance. The construction of locomotive sheds, signal box buildings and slag pits, and moving water cranes, moving and installation of switches etc. are really for our builder no problems. They are are able to instruct and supervise their construction company. The difficulties lie in another field. They lie in the procurement of construction materials. There are needed sand, gravel, cement, bricks, boards, beams, nails, roofing felt, glass. This must all be first sought and found and if you are lucky, can be done by overcoming the many obstacles of transportation. The demand, must be met whenever possible by obtaining these materials in their own area. Most are the works that are built from the above materials, has been more or less destroyed and their structure and re-commissioning is required. The difficulties are also in obtaining labour, in the negotiations with the different government agencies that are far apart and where often can be hard to enforce on the Blue Railway Workers, they are also in transportation, food, security, clothing and housing, in the labor force and the supply of equipment. Overcoming these difficulties will, it must be emphasized will be the task of the Work Force of our Railway Masters and Office Directors. It will be of interest in this connection that the track-laying trains to ensure their food supply spend continuously 15 v H of their best force, in most cases even including the construction train conductor himself, must use to travel around the area to purchase food. Everyone who comes into contact with the actual conditions, feels the existing building organization to be very unhappy. Its rapid change must be sought. I propose, therefore, that:

1. The railway Pioneer Construction Staff accepts that its main task is the acquisition, stimulus and operation of the key industries in the construction industry. So it would be for them to get under their control the necessary sawmills, cement factories, gravel plants, gravel plants, sand pits, nail factories, glass factories, etc. In some areas, as for example in Kiev, encouraging work has already been done in this regard, in some places is perhaps too late. Perhaps it is then necessary to deal with this by the Organisation Todt or other economic organizations enforce and oversee to secure a certain Production quota for the railways.

2. The railway Pioneer Staff sets up in each HBD a sufficiently sized external command of several officers or special leaders and the necessary assistants. At these posts each HBD will submit their building material requirements and these posts will satisfy them, removing all difficulties until the delivery to the routes. These field offices need to be in position and not in any subordinated to the HBD; they can be associated with them very loosely. They must be proficient only in close contact with the central office of the Pioneer Staff and the building materials market.

3. The branch of the Pioneer Staff is further reinforced by officers, whose mission should be to clarify the question of the labour market. These must at all times remain in touch with this authoritative post, holding all negotiations and any difficulties encountered in the provision, Army transportation, clothing, food, security and accommodation can be overcome by its use.

4. The Pioneer Staff remain building bridges. The HBD does not have the necessary number of bridge building technically qualified A-craftsmen, it is also missing in Dec. 48. If you were to eliminate this lack of personnel, the HBD would be in is able to build these structures alone.

5. Large, self-contained building tasks, such as Nr.3 extending the second track Zlocsow - Volochisk, cannot be carried out by the Pioneer Staff. Again, the HBD would be able to do it themselves, if you would split the Reichbahn Construction Trains that are now including Pioneer Staff working as a special guide.

6. The Reichbahn Construction Trains work best of all in the hands of the HBD in that the HBD 's assigns the number of freely available and reserves the generous monitoring regarding their application rate. If the division of work is not entirely possible, it must in any case the HBD speak the authoritative Word.

7. Whether the recruitment and engagement of contractors and construction crews from the Reich continues to be operated by the Pioneer Staff or done by the HBD would be to examine its usefulness yet. That it should remain only in one place, is beyond question.

If the control is made in this way and it is desirable that it is made in the near future, then a clear, functional separation of powers has been reached and all the unavoidable confusion aforesaid be avoided. Mentioned in point 1 to 3 the tasks of the Pioneer Staff are currently of the utmost importance. They are in no way inferior, on the contrary, they require all the force of personalities and according to experience can be performed in Field-Grey uniform easier than in a Blue one.
In all else that is achieved our professionals with the appropriate training of their work can pursue with the utmost efficiency for the benefit of the whole.

A copy was handed over on 15.11.41 to the Commander of the Railway Pioneer Construction Staff by
Reichsbahn-Rat Dr of Engineering Hermann Meier personally.

Dr Meier was a track building expert from the DRB Central Office and was after the war a director of the Deutsches Bundesbahn. The HBD were usually run by a Reichsbahn Oberrat such as Karl Hahn in HBD Minsk. Within 6 months Dr Meiers chief would be in a Kz under a sentence of death, for raising similar issues with the military.
T-78 Roll 609 (125) 01.11.1941 relations between DRB and EBP.JPG
T-78 Roll 609 (126).JPG
T-78 Roll 609 (127).JPG
T-78 Roll 609 (128).JPG
T-78 Roll 609 (129) end report.JPG
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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 17 Mar 2015 23:15

Supply District South 1941
On four dates from August 1941 until November 1941. I have annotated the November version.
0538 Supp Distr South Aug 41 OOB.jpg
0537 Supply District South 12th Sept 1941 OOB.jpg
0523 Supp Distr South 15th Oct 41 OOB.jpg
0447 Supply District South 6th Nov 41 OOB Annotated.jpg
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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 11 May 2015 08:39

Search of Bundesarchiv using Invenio for Eastern Railways documents:

Under "Military"
RH4 Chef des Transportwesens
RH 4/17 Card Soviet Union railway network Remove 1942 - 1943

RH 4/18 Card Soviet Union railway network Removal March 1942

RH 4/360 Ostaufbau.- performance cards Remove December 1941 - December 1943
Ingredients include:
Ostbau "emergency program"
design "three years plan"

Railway tickets / Streckenleistungskarten.- Eastern Europe 1940 - 1944

RH 4/363 Vol. 1 Remove 1940 - 1944
Contains VA:
Poland
Soviet Union
Czech
protectorate
Also includes:
2 image plan maps of the Soviet Union

Expanding East 1936 - 1944

RH 4/9 Expanding East
Contains VA:
Schematic diagram with tonnage indication

RH 4/476 Expanding East Remove Sept. 1941 - March 1942
Contains VA:
plans and report to the expansion of railway Krakow - Lviv - Krasne
w
RH 4/468 Construction in the 2nd and 3rd wartime economy year Removing June 1941- Jan. 1944
Contains VA:
reports, maps and plans of various construction projects and building projects

RH 4/497 Route descriptions Removing June - Aug. 1941
Contains VA:
route descriptions and takeover regulations Soviet railways after the war began against the Soviet Union

RH 4/444 Superstructure, building materials, quotas Removing July 1941 - June 1944
Contains VA:
correspondence, material releases, guidelines, materials
orders and guidelines on the elimination of track materials in the eastern regions

Eisenbahnangelegenheiten.- General and Organization1 940 - 1943

RH 4/481 Vol. 1 Remove Aug. - October 1943
Contains VA:
plans, reports, results of equipment for destruction of railway tracks
orders, regulations, guidelines
and reports cards of Soviet Railroads
also contains:
Directive OKH "winter training" Preparing for the Winter War

RH 4/482 Vol. 2 Remove Mai - Aug. 1943
Contains VA:
track scheme "North"
reports, plans, studies of various technical equipment
air protection of railway junction
Aerial view of the station Stretenka
reports on Soviet railways
Leaflet for the restoration and development of standard-gauge railways to certain distance services
bases for determining the time and labor needs

RH 4/483Vol. 3 Remove from May to July 1943
Contains VA:
bases for determining the time and labor needs
rules of construction in the Eastern Army
handout the "Organisation Todt" -Central
top of Oberreichsbahnrat Erich Barz "Russian Wehrmacht transports, locks on Soviet railways and rapid construction of new routes"
captured Soviet magazine "gas protection of the railways'
business distribution plans

RH 4/501 Army Eisenbahndirektion center / field Eisenbahndirektion 2.- expansion program Remove Aug. - October 1941
Contains VA:
expanding demands in the East (with plans and blueprints)
Also includes:
route messages

4.4.5.3.2 roads
RH 4/297 Transportwege.- route descriptions and transport events
Contains VA:
Bulgaria
Romania
Hungary

4.4.5.3.3 Bridges (incl. Railway bridges)
RH 4/3 Overview railway bridges war Remove December 1943

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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 11 May 2015 08:43

Under "Foreign colonisation and occupation administration"
R6 Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories
R 6/424 Operation of Railways by the East Branch of the Ministry of Transport in Warsaw 1941 - 1942
Old signature EAP 99/81, 93 a
Place of use Berlin-Lichterfelde

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Re: German Railways in the East (Wartime Documents)

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 12 May 2015 11:46

RH 4/360
Druckansicht Ostaufbau.- Leistungskarten
Enthält u.a.: Ostbau "Sofortprogramm" Entwurf "3 Jahresplan"

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Railway transport issues with the armed forces in the East during the war against the Soviet Union (March 1941 - January

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 12 Mar 2016 11:16

Eisenbahntransportfragen bei der Wehrmacht im Osten anläßlich des Krieges gegen die UdSSR (März 1941 - Januar 1942).

http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/n ... rid/zoom/1

Railway transport issues in the Wehrmacht on the occasion of the war with Russia (the end of March 1941 until the beginning of January 1942).

A. Source
Below is described how essential questions of construction of the railway operations played in the operations administrative machinery in the Occupied Eastern territories. Some conclusions are then drawn there from.
As documents the perceptions for the establishment and use of FBD 3 of 26.3 to 17.7.1941. That this can serve as similar experience is shown to be on the other FBEen.

Then the observations in the upper management of Etra-East of 10.7 to 27. 9. 1941. The FBEen and HBDen for the entire Eastern area in operational terms came under this unit. (As it turned out later, the management between the Kodeisen and the Grey Railwaymen was initially exactly the same as in the West. This was due to several errors of Kodeis. However, the FBDen continued because of their military character and obviously greater self confidence in relation to the Kodeisen through strongly and quickly.)

Finally, the experience in the BLO of the Transport Chief from 27.9.41 until early 1942. The BLO is also the successor of the top management at the Etra-East for the entire Eastern territories, only with extended powers.

B. Objective
I. Purpose and aids of the FBDen and HBDen.


As the end of March 1941, the leader of the special FBD 3 arrived in Breslau, the new facility of Grey railwaymen was clarified first.
The FBDen called for now to act as future field railwaymen fulfilling the transport tasks of the army. Transport Chef needs them as professionals, so they had been convened as a Special Leader Group. Other provision of personnel by the RVM was not successful. (See also Appendix 1 footnote). (It was informed that the Transport Chief had had bad experiences with the use of blue railwaymen in western campaign, especially as the blue railwaymen did not immediately continue the operations after abandonment by the Railway Pioneers. It has rather been usual for several days break until use commenced. This should be avoided in future.)

All other aid would never be understood by the Wehrmacht, especially what structural or equipment was needed comparatively. (The official channels in the Wehrmacht, however, was consistently much slower than for all special cases rehearsed at the German Reichsbahn in the campaign. An exception was the Supply Staff.)

In this way, a faster conducting business as in the slow official channels of the RVM was assured. (The procurement should be by the Heereswaffenamt. It turned out later that that authority did not have the sufficient experience. therefore was yet again resorted after a short time to the procurement agencies of the DRB.)

Then, proven 2 duties as emergency programs

1. The military summary and education of FBD and
2. thus concurrently their organizational working through to a usable transport apparatus, about the future deployment could not be organised but was after some time as a kind of Phantom work with the Department requiring all considerations in Russia – from the present Palle to Ukraine. Maps were therefore procured.

II. Planning the use of research in building and procurement.

It has now been tried, this research to penetrate transportation technology by mobilizing the Vienna army archives, through documents from the Spandau Army Archives and by statements of participants of the last war, which had been employed as a transport specialist.
Since those documents were by their nature outdated, in part, Mineis (L) has been asked to update these documents.

It came to light that Mineis (L) did not have such available. They explained there that on this question occasionally colleagues obtained information through service contacts. Holiday intentions camouflaged espionage trips which allowed the location and performance of Bw to be estimated and determined.
"About other countries, we have collected material. But we have never thought that it would ever come to a war with Russia. Because about Russia we never got a hint from the political leadership".
Two unsuccessful relevant experiments by the Planning Department did not succeed on 30.04 and 27.05 ..
In the 2nd experiment by the Planning Department, they asked FBD 3 for a copy of their sparse documentation, since they had even less. (Annex 2, last paragraph) , For the rest, it was said, the main thing was that the FBDen were now the experts of DR.
In these circumstances, one had to finally settle for information from Russian publications on Freight Traffic, conclusions on the operational efficiency of routes. to draw junctions and to estimate what to be found there and possibly would be revealed.

As it is then a question of ensuring the supplies for this, it was found that also in procurement that virtually nothing was prepared. What little was done unilaterally or patchy. The responsible planning authorities had apparently insufficient notions of what was to be expected in such a case involving transport tasks and the way in which to address them.
Also meetings with them were not always fruitful as it sometimes lacked understanding of orders of magnitude and relationships and then absurd conclusions were drawn. For example, they apparently showed only a full understanding of providing provision for Bw-facilities (Engine sheds).

But then as expected, it turned out that SS quotas were needed to obtain this and the personal permission of General Brauchitsch, which explains why all of a sudden, you cannot make an approach for this sort of thing and to generalise, you already have quotas for 250,000 (or 1?) tonnes of rail which you have received. The most necessary items are obtained in this way. And, also this was the same for the MÄ. Each MA will get a coal train with a wagon 01.

Because the arguments for the rejection of Bw equipment could not be recognized and it was urgent, was obtained both in the Planning Department, and at the FBD the answer, that one must indeed reckon on finding the necessary facilities in enemy territory, and also railwaymen must now be soldiers.

As such they would rely on the fact that all fundamental problems had been considered correctly. When the railway professionals considered that the necessary preparations were not made ready, they could argue that Yes but, the war will not happen or will be very short.

This rejection of these professional judgements on the basis of the current military assessment had then to recognized the danger of the chosen form of organization for a neater clarity of responsibilities. Even later the concern was expressed repeatedly that for example a greater emphasis was placed on the interests of the Front rather than operating requirements by the command posts.

In the present case SS quotas in June already demonstrated (Appendix 3, 1 page) and the already requested early April procurements only arrived in June but only z.T., was tackled. The Deutches Reichsbahn had recommended the intended procurement at the end of January. (Appendix 2 point 2 2. para.). All facilities have come to use too late.

With state of affairs, it was felt by the railwaymen of the FBD that it would be correct to ask for a joint meeting with the Transport Chief (Gercke), this was then ordered to happen on the 8.5.1941 at Wroclaw (Breslau).

At this meeting all disciplines reported on their demands. They were recorded in writing. A copy of the operating equipment service is found in (Appendix 4). The previous measures that had been taken or planned for operating equipment and railway telephone equipment were agreed to have been insufficient by all parties at the meeting.

Some clarification was brought by the remarks of the representative of Bedeis (Commander Railway Troops) at this meeting. He noted that the railway troops had in the last war includes about 0. 4 million men and currently only had about 40, 000 men. It is therefore expected that the restoration work required to be done by the FBD men on the railway facilities would face difficulties. At this meeting on the 8.5.1941 nothing came of it in the field apart from the establishment of the Supply Staff.

So the FBD-3 was therefore, as the prospect of their use against Russia had emerged at the Planning Department, got ready for operations. It was informed that the technical equipment of the FBD was still insufficient for the operation, that the enemy facilities - as expected – would be left destroyed (Appendix 2 point 2, 1 paragraph), also that the Planning Department was advised against its intention to relocate and replace all the departments, offices, and including all FBD men.

So the FBD-3 was therefore, as the prospect of their use against Russia had emerged at the Planning Department, got ready for operations. It was informed that the technical equipment of the FBD was still insufficient for the operation, that the enemy facilities - as expected – would be left destroyed (Appendix 2 point 2, 1 paragraph), also that the Planning Department was advised against its intention to relocate and replace all the departments, offices, and including all FBD men.

Thus, not only the interest in the recovery of the routes, but also the possibility of performing the work in minimal time plan, began to suffer. It turn this lost the local and sector knowledge of all involved. That meant a significant loss of time, which would become intolerable if the troops make rapid advances. (annex 2 sparks para 4, 11)

Major i.G. Heill as the representative of the head of the Planning Division, saw the allocation of the presented demands, however the engineering procurement through an inattention of Division IV had gone wrong, causing a 4 months delay. From now on they would be pursued vigorously.

And as regards the use of the FBDen, a personal wish of the Transport Chief, is a case in point here.
The Transport Chief want to have his own railway troops, which were intended to carry out all the tasks of rail transport in the area.

Now more and more the conviction formed, that the system made by him for this operation was too small for the landscape and - because more equipment had not have been made available, the Blue Railwaymen would have to be used, it was unacceptable for the Transport Chief to criticise his military Grey railwaymen, as well as the Blue railwaymen. When it was suggested to bring up the question of the Organization again, in order to move the head of the Planning Department a little more, to request even the most urgent things from the Transport Chief was so unpleasant to all. He himself was trying to get away from here.

The Commander of the FBD3 because of the handling of this operational matter went to the top. He arranged for a visit to the Planning Department and pointed out to the Planning Department and the Etra Ost (railway headquarters) in writing his concerns concerns. (Appendix 3.)

Later with the concurrance of the Blue railway men it was suspected, that there was a misguided idea of the area that a FBD could operate successfully (?). So it wanted to assign originally 2 Mä to an area of by 400 km wide and 1200 km length. Clarifying here to act, therefore the maximum expansion - and that was only under assigned conditions - recorded in writing (Appendix 1 to a) last paragraph). Also the limits of operational use were illustrated by comparative figures from the Organization of the DR and the FBD. The Planning Department was informed on 27.5.1941 (Appendix 2, penultimate paragraph).

As but on 5.7.1941 during a meeting in Breslau Colonel Göritz, Commander of Etra-East, a relevant transport request submitted (Appendix 5), became obvious, that all these efforts not had made any change to the planning of operating areas, the situation was therefore again raised with Colonel Göritz, and heads of departments later and at other transport issues, here the magnitude of the problems and their inner workings to be quickly clarified. He promised to try to remedy. After some time, it was then communicated that the areas to be operated would be reduced.

III. a) Planning the operation according to usage;

Issues of management, technical aids for this purpose.
According to the facts above, it is very likely that the preparatory work was not carried out properly with expertise and determination. The impression grew when the various attempts of the operational management to use improvised measures turned into inappropriate measures.
For example, as in April, the Planning Department demanded the formation of simplified operating rules. Since, as expected a useful result did not materialize, on the 26.7.1941 it repeated this demand again to the Etra (Appendix 6).
The demand was based on the belief that operational reliability and operating flexibility were mutually exclusive. The repeated remonstrances, on the contrary were not understood by Etra, he objected, as well that it was impossible to change the Commanders regulations, so he could not recognise that the railway workers operating regulations could not be altered.
Also of note it did seemed that the scattered employment of railwaymen made it almost impossible to capture by service teaching.
This wrong attitude towards its operating regulations was dropped only when the accidents accumulated during the summer, so that the laymen could not think of a relaxation of safety regulations.
The red cap of the inspectors, despite its recognised benefits, especially to the field grey railwaymen was rejected because the Transport Chief made it a joke.
Even more difficult it was to get through with the demands for sufficient number and capacity of telephone facilities. Although operated from the outset, the necessary concessions could be achieved herein in December 1941. However, even then only verbally and non-binding
(Examples of the demand of telephone communication system 1, 1 plant 2nd point, 3. Appendix 4 point 9 Appendix 5 injured para.)
Although it was stated that the telephone for transmission of commands is necessary, and that it had to control the sequence of moves. For the rest, it was asserted, the railwaymen telephone too much and the phone was in the railways more one of convenience, serving as essential means necessary.
Since this view should come from the Transportation Chief himself, a contrary view was not expected from the Planning Division, according to previous experiences.
That a substantial improvement in telephone communications would have been feasible looks certain.
So it was decided that the large Commands apparatus of the Divisions with its specialists remained in glaring disproportion to the possibility of cooperation with the branch offices.
What was found at FBD 3 for example was that the workforce of Department V was used at an efficiency of only 10 to 20% due to the poor telephone connections.
So in this way already the transmission and the collection of Command and Executive messages was insufficient, so it was completely impossible to monitor the staff properly. Failure of outlying units could be diagnosed by the central headquarters and not corrected by clarifying, discipline or if need be by detachment.
Page 10
Thus was the culprit almost never identified. Explaining this it was noticed that in the East, in contrast to the West due to the road situation and distances, the use of motor vehicles for the visit of the service was not very effective, especially as not enough were available (the requirement according to Appendix 4 Point 6 had not been approved).
The staff was in this way literally used by a powerless and uninstructed management.
It ended in the fact that the trains were haltingly advanced from Block Signal to Block Signal. The travel speed remained low. The vehicle operating costs were correspondingly too large and in and of itself insufficient technical equipment allowed no increased traffic load. The operational maintenance of vehicles therefore had to fall more and more behind. Until instructions of Head of Service to correct utilization and enhancing their assets remained unhelpful.
Until then the instructions of Traffic Leaders to correct utilization and enhancing their equipment remained unhelpful.
The previously described business treatment in mechanical engineering and telephone issues. prompted the Head of Department V of FBD 3, to announce in a management meeting in Breslau it would have to have its regiments die after his previous observations to compensate for these shortcomings.
His urgent expression however was interpreted as anxiety over the tasks set.
For the rest, they took the view that anyway the war would end in the autumn so that further action was superfluous.

As often in such cases only the actual events seemed to give the superficial right judgment in the end.
The presentation of the concerns put forward could not initially be confirmed by operational difficulties.

For a while the operation ran over small distances and service in good weather. Irregularities were recovered by extraordinary staff efforts. And when the first serious operational difficulties threatened to become inevitable, the known 2-month halt of the front stepped in and saved them.
With the elimination of these favourable circumstances the operation difficulties for anyone were recognizable.
P11
It would probably have become clear earlier when planning from the outset and would have dealt with the question of the number of train moves to accomplish. Instead more of the events drifted.
In April the establishment of FBDen did not receive an indication of numbers. It was stressed that it was already a great success, when an Army Group receives several thousand tons of supplies a day. All the rest will done by the motorized troops. Since these claims appeared then too low, it was assumed that the personnel allocated to the FBDen are correctly chosen for their establishment. Accordingly it was investigated, what could be done with in certain operational areas with the staff of the FBD. (annex 1, calculation on the last page).
End of May the tempo was 12 then respectively 24 (Appendix 5, paragraph 4, last paragraph). At the end of July this matter could be addressed by interviewing the officers of the Transport Line East to the clarify the engine dispositions, the expected demand of trains, it became evident that they were informed about this.
The Etra-East had at that time not only operational supervision of the FBDen and HBDen, but with the BvTO talking directly to customers of the railway.
A discussion of the questions with the Etra-East then led to about 30 trains per day per Army Group, on the basis of past experience.
As the Commander of the Etra-East on 16.9.1941, had finished a work for the differentiation of Standard and Union gauge on the basis of this increased this numbers as a precaution to 50 trains per day per Army Group, to stock pile for future campaigns.
In December, the demand changed again for the winter campaign and the renewal of the first equipment. It rose to a high point for a shot time of 220 trains for the entire Eastern Territories and then fell back to 180 trains, as doubts about the possibility of driving through the Reich and the Gedob were heard. At the same time began a planned acquisition of existing operating facilities.
To carry out the rehabilitation and construction work in the rearward areas, the Organisation Todt and Organisation Speer were used.
According to this method, which was to allow the size of transport itself, delivering the coal which looked uncertain. This was achieved only after a disproportionately long time (Ann. 7). Only at the end of December was the provision of coal reasonably in order. The much-needed winter stockpiling was no longer achievable.
For about 3 months, the workers of the Machinery operating department had to spend hours every day compiling useless reports, accounts and operational claimsnad were kept from doing their actual operating and planning work. Similar difficulties were encountered with regard to the fuel supply with the distribution of the coal allocation. (Appendix 8)

III. b) personnel and organizational issues

The operation can no longer suffer, however under these technical and operational difficulties. It interfered with personnel and organizational issues.
The preparation the HBDen staff was not adequately prepared. On hand of the working through of emergencies should have shown early on, that the conscription of the FBDen should have been extended. This was required, as the issuing authorities in the Home area did not provide these people in sufficient numbers, and immediate training for the new recruits.
Since this did not take place, a large number of special posts were occupied by people who had never practiced that activity. An earlier draft of the blue railwaymen had to be investigated, as services were prevented from operating because the officials were unknown to one another. Such missions could not be fully operational immediately.
Further, various staff questions remained in limbo. Who was at the HBDen? Only after long back and forth in the month of November / December a vigorous improvement in the care of the railway workers was initiated by using their own support officers. A related report, about the conditions here, is attached (Appendix 9).
page 13
The sickness was already risen sharply and the self-help of the staff had taken on unwanted forms.
The FBDen disturbed the repeated strengthening of the position of the unit leader to the Office Board. The complaints of the difficulties in the service settlement however were very frequent. In the appendix such a transaction is attached (Appendix 10).
Operational difficulties, always tended to to look for improvements in military and organisational changes, jurisdiction changes or use of commissions or addition of Special Envoy. These organizational changes were unwelcome because they blurred the responsibilities, where necessary made explanations and justifications, where simple commands would have enough and because it threatened to delay the resolution of the real sources of interference. Because they were so often so used, because the reasons reported by the local and competent authorities were not believed.
Examples of this type are the telephonic and the coal difficulties, the impossibility of the locomotive maintenance, the quite delayed deployment of forces, construction or the better care of the blue railwaymen.
It is obvious that the ability to improvise is necessary in war and must be used in particular.
The described organizational changes, however, had nothing to do with it. There were manifest to them only too little informed and insufficiently thoughtful initial underlying planning.

C. In summary, the following can be said:

1) When the war broke out, the transportation problem for the Eastern Territories neither the nature nor the length of time after was sufficiently clarified respectively. Contingencies must be examined by hand. The planning must be able to overlook the orders of magnitude of each of these problems in a few days.
2) The fundamental mismatch between command and operation apparatus on the one hand and the possible message transfer on the other hand made the usage weak. It has also hampered the expansion of the operating system. An effective help had to and could be carried out.
3) The detachment system between grey and blue railway workers brought losses of time in operational leadership and in the expansion of the operation.
4) The necessary technical and personnel assistance were too slow. At the time they should be accelerated.
5) The importance of organizational changes was the cause - and their harmful effect underestimated. You are compromising.
These abuses were primarily time losses. With each overlooked planning, weeks of preparatory building completion were lost, with each sluggish phone conversation, lost the supervisory staff minutes or hours.
With each failed question or instruction of a subordinates time due to inappropriate execution of his duties.
These delays have been increasing sums and have become overwhelming in the end.
It is estimated that, that half of the available time for improvements and proactive work had unused since mid-July.
At least 30-40% more trains could have driven at same cost and a correspondingly smaller effort would have been needed for the driven trains. The current difficulties of the winter were undoubtedly have been much lower.
In December the urgent use of 0.T. And 0.SP. Faced a difficult task not only because of the winter difficulties, but also because of the lack of preparation. For the prevention of frost damage, the measures were essentially too late.
It is necessary for railway workers to look ahead to say what needs to be done, but then always to remember their recommendations not only from a business point of view but also from a time perspective.
The fastest army in the world can be served by transport technical methods, that will work as normal at speeds used on the home network. If the loss of time in the future be eliminated, so will the effectiveness of this expenditure will increase, the front helped and home front made to compete unnecessarily.

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Der Alte Fritz
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References within Bundesarchiv

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 23 Mar 2016 11:33

The folios dealing with the Ministry of Transport (R5) are only partially cataloged digitally and the Sarter (R5/I) and Kreidler (R5/II) archives are not cataloged at all online. However Schuler in his book gives a number of references which might be of use covering the period 1941.
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