Your "numerical strength to AFV ratios" do not prove what you think they do. If, in any given engagement, the Germans were as understrength in infantry and artillery as they were in tanks, then of course their "numerical strength to AFV ratio" may appear similar to that of their opponents, but that certainly does not demonstrate that the Germans had enough tanks.
How do you demonstrate that historically the Germans had insufficient tanks relative to their opponents, or the number they actually needed? Better: How many tanks should they have produced?
The number of tanks stands in relation the tank crew personnel and when the number fits the assaulting infantry support ratio why would they need more tanks? People in here believe that tanks win you wars, that 90% of your army apparently need to be outfitted with tanks. Where does this believe come from? The Wehrmacht had on average a (maximum) 15% write-off figure, so they had to make up for that particular amount (except for heavy losses after the Winter of 42/43 and Summer 44, which took time) for the Soviets the number was above 40%.
To quote Müller Hillebrand:
In conclusion, and judging by the course of events after 1941, it may be regarded as an established fact that although tanks were subject to almost continuous commitment, the strength of the German tankforces could be maintained at a fixed level by monthly production of 10-15% of its over-all strength. A prerequisite for this, however, is that the tank forces have a repair service at their disposal to take care of all small and average repairs within the units themselves. A sufficient supply of spare parts and interchangeable units must be made available to unit repair installations to insure quick repair of damages sustained. Unless repair installations are able to work efficiently, the number of total losses quickly increases.
So it is more of a question of the actual situation they find themselves in and spare parts deliveries. If the front quickly collapses they will lose vehicles to the enemy, subsequent abandonment and blow up. Production went up to compensate for losses and to primarily equip new arriving formations. They had shortages during times of high attrition, this will result in delays. In all offensives that were undertaken (after the loss of the initative) the number of concentrated AFVs was mostly sufficient, while during their summer offensives before 43 they always enjoyed a better per capita AFV ratio than the Soviets.
the Germans were as understrength in infantry and artillery as they were in tanks, then of course their "numerical strength to AFV ratio" may appear similar
That makes absolutely no sense. If they were heavily battered then their number would be rather insufficient, it would be the opposite and should the number of units shrink, so will their demand. I compared desperate times figures, as well as imminent offensives (longer build up phases) with a large concentration of troops. The ratio is always similar, also note a defending unit does not need a high accumulation of tanks. The ratio of artillery to units and tanks to inf is not the same, it needs to be treated separately (and depends on each factions doctrines). All factions strive to reach their "goal", their "asymptote" of optimal strength. If they cannot reach it this is not necessarily imposed by insufficient production numbers. Overtime the Soviets actually managed to replenish their park, but only when you compare yearly and not weekly to monthly figures.
You could make a similar statement, an analogy: The Soviets produced 6 million SMGs, Germany 1 million. Conclusion: German troops were insufficiently supplied. However this is a general misunderstanding of tactics, numerical ratios and material losses: First of all mostly NCOs were wielding SMGs as their personal protection weapon. The German squad was based around the GPMG, while the Soviets were using the PPSH as their "assault rifle" so to speak, one of the reasons for their higher losses.
From Kursk Statistical Analysis https://books.google.de/books?id=lZb7AQ ... e&q&f=true
Guderian prophesied that Zitadelle would lead to tank losses that could not be replaced during 1943. In fact, German tank production during July alone surpassed the losses suffered during Zitadelle. In retrospect, it seems clear that he was wrong, unless of course one assumes that had
Zitadelle not been launched the Red Army would have stood idle during the rest of the summer. From what is known of the Soviet planning and operational considerations this seems implausible. For the Red Army the tank losses were worse than for the Germans. In fact, Soviet production did not suffice to keep up with losses. During the third quarter of 1943 production amounted to 5,761 tanks and assault guns. This can be compared with the fact that during six major operations alone, irretrievable losses amounted to 8,953 tanks and assault guns during the third quarter. During Zitadelle, the Orel and the Belgorod-Kharkov operations losses amounted to 6,064, according to Krivosheyev, thus during these 50 days of fighting around Kursk the Red Army lost 121 tanks, including assault guns, per day as write-offs. This trend continued for the rest of 1943. On 1 July, the Red Army had a tank strength of 9,888 in the front armies and 2,688 in Stavka reserves. Six months later the Red army had less than half that number in their field units and Stavka reserves. During those six months 11,890 tanks and assault guns had been produced. It must be emphasized that when a force suffers such extensive losses as the Red Army armoured forces did during the second half of 1943, production of tanks will not suffice to replace losses. There will also be delays before the new tanks are issued to combat units owing to the need for training new crews.
What is of importance is not high production numbers, but rather the ability to keep the combat units well provided with tanks. Principally, this can be done in two ways, either by producing and delivering many tanks or by producing vehicles that survive combat. In reality, the combination of the two is what matters
The Soviets always had a reserve park to compensate for their losses.
You see there are two problems which contradict your assertions: Tanks lower the casualties of the advancing infantry forces as well as penetrate in an armoured spearhead etc., while Artillery inflicts the majority of casualties.
Shouldn't by your theory, an undersupplied Army sustain higher losses? They inflicted on average 4.7 times greater casualties on their enemy.