Rob Stuart wrote:For what it's worth, GDP in the other North American Allied country, Canada, doubled during the war, from $5.6 billion in 1939 to $11.8 billion in 1945.
I am just discussing this precise type of statistical distortion in this thread:
Why productivity apparently grew in WW2 while in WW1 there was a collapse?
I already noticed that the US's experience was not distinct in this post that people here apparently ignored completely:
Guaporense wrote:Estimating productivity change: WW1 versus WW2
All right, I (re)calculated the growth in GDP per worked from 1939 to 1943 in Germany, UK and from 1940 to 1944 in the USA and USSR. These are the figures:
Germany -- 27.7%
UK --------- 36.2%
USA -------- 30.4%
USSR ------- 29.4%
average --- 30.9%
US figures are Kendrick's (from the link above), Germany's figures are Klein (1957), UK figures are Maddison's and USSR's figures are Harrison's.
So, apparently, in all major powers (Japan was not major power, BTW), apparent or official productivity increased in a similar fashion in wartime. This contrasts with the experience of WW1 and apparently the distortions in WW2 are everywhere not only in the USA. Thing is, the USA had a bigger growth in GDP because it's civilian employment levels increased while in all other countries they decreased.
So I was wrong, USA productivity growth was similar to the other main belligerents.
The discrepancy in GDP growth is explained by manpower allocation:
Civilian employment levels in 1943-44 in proportion to pre-war levels in 1939-1940:
Germany -- 90.8%
UK --------- 92.3%
USA -------- 116.3%
USSR ------- 86.8%
WW1
Change in GDP per civilian worker 1913-1917:
France --------------- (11%)
Russia ---------------- (24%)
Austria-Hungary --- (13.3%)
Germany ----------- (22.3%)
Germany and Russia refer to industrial productivity (which tends to change more than aggregate productivity). Still WW1 was characterized by general collapse in economic activity among the major belligerents.
I think that the difference between the two wars was that in WW1, the degree of price control was smaller so that inflation could manifest itself more and since real GDP is equal to nominal GDP divided by inflation, in WW2 GDP growth was inflated, in WW1, GDP figures reflected reality.
Rob Stuart wrote:Canadian war production was fourth among the Allies, but only 30% of the output was used by Canadian forces. The rest was given to our Allies under the Mutual Aid program, the Canadian counterpart to Lend-Lease. (I note that German war production was not sufficient to provide significant materiel support to its allies. Would 6th Army have been surrounded so easily if the Romanian armies on its flanks had been given lots of Panzer IVs?)
Some more pro-Canadian nationalism here I see. :roll:
German tank production could have been easily increased if they wanted to. Also, there is a fact that continental Europe's industrial capacity was not remotely as intensively utilized as Canada, US or UK's.
I conjecture that the reason was that Wehrmacht's demand for equipment was satiated so there was no point in increasing output further. Or that their war effort was extremely inefficient.
And I don't think the Nazi ideology allowed for massive material support of their allies either, even if they could have supported them. There was also the fact that Germany had mobilized all it's labor force into the armed forces which was the inverse case of the WAllies who used Soviet manpower in the front while they used their own manpower in industry and then supplies other countries with munitions (such as the Brazilian division sent into Europe).
And no, lack of tanks was not the factor that made Romanian and Hungarian armies relatively ineffective vis the Wehrmacht. The main factors were the human factors: training, morale, endurance, etc. Also, the most important material factors in WW2 were not tanks or aircraft, but basic supplies of food, medical supplies and ammunition to maintain the armies operating in adequate conditions. Were the Hungarian, Romanian and Italian armies supplied adequately? I don't know but I don't think their logistical situation was below their own standards of adequacy. And no, it wasn't because the Romanians ran out of ammunition that the 6th army was encircled.
And no, the 6th army was not encircled "so easily", please, the Red Army lost just 7 million men in battle in that year, enormous sacrifices were made to encircle an army that was 2,000 KM inside that country's borders. Saying that their victory in Stalingrad was "easy", is like saying "the advance at the battle of Somme proceeded so easily". It's really a tremendously ignorant statement, in fact, I cannot even conceive of something more ignorant than the claim that "6th army was encircled so easily".
Of note in this context, Canada produced 707,000 military vehicles, not including armored vehicles, significantly more than Germany did. The Canadian vehicles were most assuredly produced on assembly lines, as was the case in the US.
Motor vehicles in the 1930's were produced in assembly lines everywhere.
German motor vehicle factory in 1936:
Or you do think that entrepreneurs outside of North America were simply unaware that assembly lines existed for 30 years?
Finally, German output of motor vehicles in WW2 was constrained by oil supplies.
Why you don't compare Canadian to German production of locomotives, instead? Locomotives were far more important for the German war effort because they were the basic means to supply armies.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz