German economic collapse in 1944-45

[Richard Anderson]

The only function of economic forecasting is to make astrology look respectable.

I can only point to Nicholas Taleb and his commentary re the Nobel prize in economics.

[histan]

Hi Guaporense

I would like to return to the original post you made, which I think contains some interesting points.

The key point that you make, I think, is that factory workers morale collapsed in late 1944 and 1945. Which resulted in fewer man-hours being worked by a largely stable numerical workforce. Your contention is that this loss of morale was caused by a realisation that the war was lost. You also state that the realisation that the war was lost also caused a loss of morale in the German Army in the west that resulted in the capture of a large number of PoWs.

One problem in this comparison is that there was not a loss of morale and "fighting spirit" among the German Army in the west in the autumn of 1944. There was a realisation that the war was lost (a large amount of contemporary anecdotal information supports this - diaries, letter, etc.) but this did not seem to have an impact on fighting ability. The front was stabilized in early September 1944 and allied attacks, such as at Arnhem, were held or defeated. The front remained relatively stable until the German winter counter offensive. The attitude of the German soldier in this period seemed to be "the war is lost but we have nothing else left to do but carry on fighting" - which they did.

Why should the realisation that the war is lost have a significantly different psychological outcome for the factory worker than the front line soldier? What were the experiences of the factory worker that were different from the front line soldier?
Could it be that the factory worker was surrounded by the devastation of his home city, his own home, his friends homes? Could it be that he saw not only no possibility of improvement to these conditions but only a future of more and more destruction and devastation? Could it be that after a bit of a respite whilst the bombers were focused on the invasion it was clear that the bombing campaign was now focused against him and at an even higher intensity than before?

It is well known that the biggest impact of air power on the land battle was psychological and disruptive rather the physical destruction of land forces. why shouldn't the same be true for industry?

Perhaps Harris and lindeman were right and bombing targeted at the worker's morale actually worked!!

Regards

john

[Guaporense]

You are one of those guys who is very obsessed about tank numbers, yet you do not realize what this thread is about. It is about finding out what caused the economic collapse. While we have the consensus that it had a disruptive effect, the USSBS showed the impact on industry by percent (and working-hours), either way it cannot be regarded as the decisive or only factor.

Apparently it's very hard for many people to understand things that might appear to be very obvious to others: the massive collapse in industrial production from mid 1944 to early 1945 cannot be explained by strategic bombing, which caused 2.8% loss in hours worked in may 1944 when strategic bombing intensity already reached near peak levels of 100,000 short tons of bombs per month and 3.9% losses in September 44 when in the 3rd quarter of 44, it reached the all time peak level of 130,000 tons a month. To cause the massive decline that happened after that it's effectiveness per ton of bombs would need to increase 15-20 times.

Whenever someone starts to disagree with you, you then switch to personal attacks. Just because you are more impertinent or cry louder than others, does not automatically improve the quality of your opinion.
Plot twist: If you would have paid attention then you would have realized that I did not come to a final conclusion yet. Scherner and Streb argued that the USSBS report might understate the effects, by how much is unkown as their work on this is not accessible. On the other hand, I doubt that there will be any groundbreaking revelation. My theory is that the occupied areas started to realize that Nazi Germany could not enforce their will onto them anymore (the closer the end) and they started to turn away (while the 3rd Reich was getting stripped of its territory by the Allies/Soviets gradually anyway). While bombing did have effect on the infrastructure, it primarily killed civilians and workers.

By late 1944, in terms of controlled territory, the Nazis had lost about 40-45% of the GDP they controlled in early 1944:



This only includes the countries for which I had the PPPs to compute GDPs. Other countries were also significant, Poland's GDP was, perhaps, about 1,250 million 1927 pounds, if we assume it's per capita income was at Maddison estimated's level relative to UK's.

They lost France, Belgium, parts of Poland, even parts of the Reich itself, besides territories with a lot of strategic raw materials. This obviously would have a major impact on German industrial production: since they imported a lot of industrial inputs and at undervalued local currencies (which underestated their costs and inflated the value of German industrial production). I read a paper that concludes that the apparent increase in German industrial production during WW2 was mostly distortion caused by inputs being under priced (and hence, overestimating, the value added which is the difference in value between output and inputs) since they were imported using undervalued local currencies.

Besides losing their own territory it's actually a fact that countries such as France, Netherlands, Denmark, Poland and Belgium, the fraction of their industrial output consumed by the Wehrmacht was between 60 to 65% (according to the World Economic Survey 1942-1944). The indexes of German munitions production included munitions produced in those countries included in the calculations as well: it's no surprise the index of German munitions production which peaked in July 1944, started to collapse just after they lost France, Belgium, large areas in the East.

[Guaporense]

Hi Guaporense

I would like to return to the original post you made, which I think contains some interesting points.

The key point that you make, I think, is that factory workers morale collapsed in late 1944 and 1945. Which resulted in fewer man-hours being worked by a largely stable numerical workforce. Your contention is that this loss of morale was caused by a realisation that the war was lost. You also state that the realisation that the war was lost also caused a loss of morale in the German Army in the west that resulted in the capture of a large number of PoWs.

One problem in this comparison is that there was not a loss of morale and "fighting spirit" among the German Army in the west in the autumn of 1944. There was a realisation that the war was lost (a large amount of contemporary anecdotal information supports this - diaries, letter, etc.) but this did not seem to have an impact on fighting ability. The front was stabilized in early September 1944 and allied attacks, such as at Arnhem, were held or defeated. The front remained relatively stable until the German winter counter offensive. The attitude of the German soldier in this period seemed to be "the war is lost but we have nothing else left to do but carry on fighting" - which they did.

However, the Allies captured enormous numbers of POWs in the West in 44: about 800,000, including hundreds of thousands during the months when the front was stable. While the combined number of German soldiers who were killed in action or wounded, as reported by the OKW reports by December 31 1944, was only about 240,000. Which suggests hundreds of thousands of German soldiers decided to surrender instead of fight already since mid 1944 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_pr ... est_Europe, in october, november and december, when the frontlines were more or less stable, the Western allies took 220,000 German POWs). The ratio of POWs to bloody casualties was unusually high in late 1944 by an extreme extent.

Why should the realisation that the war is lost have a significantly different psychological outcome for the factory worker than the front line soldier? What were the experiences of the factory worker that were different from the front line soldier?

One important difference in civilian society is that an individual's conduct is not as directly controlled and monitored like in the army where he responds to a superior according to military hierarchy. So in civil society the degree of influence his individual will has on his actions is higher.

Could it be that the factory worker was surrounded by the devastation of his home city, his own home, his friends homes? Could it be that he saw not only no possibility of improvement to these conditions but only a future of more and more destruction and devastation? Could it be that after a bit of a respite whilst the bombers were focused on the invasion it was clear that the bombing campaign was now focused against him and at an even higher intensity than before?

It is well known that the biggest impact of air power on the land battle was psychological and disruptive rather the physical destruction of land forces. why shouldn't the same be true for industry?

Perhaps Harris and lindeman were right and bombing targeted at the worker's morale actually worked!!

Indeed, I believe the main impact of strategic bombing was in terms of morale. I already articulated that point before in this very thread. However, I am not quite sure it's morale impact was large enough to justify the enormous resources the Allies poured into it: Total expenditures on strategic bombing in Europe were about 40% of the UK's military budget and 15% of the US's. Those resources, if redirected to other areas such as the ground forces, would have made winning the Western front much easier and quickly in my honest opinion.

[Michael Kenny]

Apparently it's very hard for many people to understand things that might appear to be very obvious to others:

It is not that hard to realise one thing. You lack decent references and are a Google-bound 'researcher'. Your data is either invented or falsified in order to conform to your childish 'Germany was not beaten they just gave up and let themselves be defeated'. fantasy

the massive collapse in industrial production from mid 1944 to early 1945 cannot be explained by strategic bombing, which caused 2.8% loss in hours worked in may 1944 when strategic bombing intensity already reached near peak levels of 100,000 short tons of bombs per month and 3.9% losses in September 44 when in the 3rd quarter of 44, it reached the all time peak level of 130,000 tons a month. To cause the massive decline that happened after that it's effectiveness per ton of bombs would need to increase 15-20 times.

I gave you aspecific example where 700 Stug at least were lost from production as a result of specific bombing raids. You don't have to increase tonnage if you increase accuracy and get (a chance) hit a major production facility. 1 ton of bombs on Alkett is worth 1000 tons at scattered on Berlin.

This obviously would have a major impact on German industrial production:

However bombing the primary factory for Stug production (for example) and preventing the construction of some 700 vehicles has no impact?

it's no surprise the index of German munitions production which peaked in July 1944, started to collapse just after they lost France, Belgium, large areas in the East.

Given the massive increase in bombing, improved targeting and concentration on transport choke-points it is indeed no surprise that Germany collapsed in late 1944. Only a fool would conclude victory was instead gained by a sudden lemming like rush of Germans into western captivity. It is nothing more than another pathetic excuse in the long line of pathetic excuses used to explain away the total defeat of the German Army-on all fronts.

[Rob Stuart]

Apparently it's very hard for many people to understand things that might appear to be very obvious to others: the massive collapse in industrial production from mid 1944 to early 1945 cannot be explained by strategic bombing, which caused 2.8% loss in hours worked in may 1944 when strategic bombing intensity already reached near peak levels of 100,000 short tons of bombs per month and 3.9% losses in September 44 when in the 3rd quarter of 44, it reached the all time peak level of 130,000 tons a month. To cause the massive decline that happened after that it's effectiveness per ton of bombs would need to increase 15-20 times.

I have already pointed out twice, and am now doing so for the third time, that May 1944 was not a typical month in the bombing war. In that month most of the 100,000 tons you refer to was dropped on France and Belgium! It is obvious that bombs dropped on French railway marshalling yards will not damage factories located in Germany. Ditto for the 3rd quarter of 1944.

Other posters have commented in this thread that you tend to ignore information which contradicts your assertions. This is a perfect example. You've twice been told that May 1944 was an atypical month when the focus of the bombing effort was not on targets in Germany, a fact which you would know yourself if you had a thorough understanding of WW2, yet you continue to argue that the alleged loss of 2.8% of planned manhours in German plants in that month proves that the strategic bombing of Germany was a failure. That's like picking a month in which there were few tank versus tanks battles between the Germans and Russians and then claiming that the lack of German tank losses at the hands of T-34s proves that the latter was an ineffective tank killer.

[Michael Kenny]

the Allies captured enormous numbers of POWs in the West in 44: about 800,000, including hundreds of thousands during the months when the front was stable. While the combined number of German soldiers who were killed in action or died of wounds, as reported by the OKW reports by December 31 1944, was only about 240,000. Which suggests hundreds of thousands of German soldiers decided to surrender instead of fight already since mid 1944

This is a classic example of how you distort what the German reports actually say in the hope no one notices you deception.

You claim the German casualty reports say only 240,000 were KIA/WIA in NWE up to Jan 1945.

What they actually say is that 240,000 were known KIA/WIA and a further 393,000 missing with fate unknown.
It is obvious that some of the 393,000 MIA are really KIA.

You are trying to confuse the unwary into believing that 240,000 is the upper limit for KIA/WIA when it is in fact the minimum number.

Your POW claim is just as bogus. By September some 500,000 Germans were in Allied POW camps and 800,000 by December.

[Yoozername]

Rereading some of this thread...

What the US really did on WW2: awaited for the USSR to win the war and well after the war was already won by the Red Army (it was won since late 1943, after Kursk and the counteroffensives), quickly invaded Europe (in mid 1944, so about 8-9 months after Stalin had effectively won the war) to liberate the rich parts of Europe before the Red Army reached those and put them into their sphere of power. Pretend to help in the meanwhile by sacrificing a some tens of thousands of bomber crewmen in terrorist bombing attacks on German civilians and giving some money to help Stalin win the war. Oh yeah, and they fought a third world dictatorship called Japan too in some small scale engagements in some islands around the pacific before Stalin won the war. Some (American) people like call that "fighting in a two front war". That makes me laugh. OP

Amazing that you are focusing on the US. Obviously, the other Allies, specifically the British actually conducted night time bombing while the US strived for daylight precision bombing. To say you are not impartial would to be putting it nicely...

[Guaporense]

Meanwhile, I admit to getting a tad irritated when the OP decides to channel the late Trevor Dupuy and deliberately distorts his work to fit his own inane ideas. I WORKED for Trevor for nearly ten years and for TDI for more than another ten years doing the same work. I had extended daily DISCUSSIONS with him regarding this work. I ATTENDED his funeral at Arlington. I WORKED on the QJM/TNDM. I DID the work researching the new data and checking the original engagements. I UNDERSTAND the intent behind the QJM/TNDM.

Different people will reach different conclusions based on the same source. You are apparently unable to understand that fact: different people are different. You should to learn to accept that basic fact. Not everybody in the world will reach the same conclusions as you did from a book from a specific author. You shouldn't be angry about the fact that different people have different minds.

The fact is: in Dupuy's NPW book, the average fraction of airpower in the total firepower for 60 engagements Italy from 43-44 is 5.23% for the WAllies and 2.85% for the Germans. Considering that in the Eastern front the density of aerial sorties in the frontlines was much lower, the fraction of total firepower from the air in that front was still even lower than the level of 3-5%. That clearly suggests that airpower might not have been such a huge deal as one might get from reading some anglophone novels about WW2.

Also, some say airpower had a suppressant effect and an interdiction effect, meaning that allied airpower would have reduced the logistical supply of the German armed forces and hampered it's capacity to use their guns. Were those effects significant on the aggregate?

Well: considering the Wehrmacht fired a very similar tonnage of ammunition to the quantity produced and that quantity fired massively increased from 1941 to 1944:

Tonnage of projectiles fired by the German army from artillery guns, AT guns, mortars and rifles:

1942 - 763,941
1943 - 1,197,256
1944 - 1,647,546

Compare with the tonnage fired by artillery and mortars of an army of a country whose army was not as remotely harassed, both in the tactical and specially, strategic levels, as the German army Wwas, that is, the Soviet Army:

1942 - 446,113
1943 - 828,193
1944 - 1,000,962

Clearly, the aggregate behavior of the quantity of ammo fired by both armies was very similar. While their relative states of airpower superiprity shifted radically over these 3 years.

Which leads me to conclude that the aggregate effect of allied airpower in hampering the functioning of the German army was not very substantial, in fact and the effect of Luftwaffe's air superiority in 1941-1942 was also not very substantial for thev USSR's army as well.

Everyone in this forum should be able to realize that the EF was the decisive front in the vast Nazi-Soviet conflict. It was the suffereing of the slavic population that stands unprecedented.

No, everyone in this forum should be able to realize that the EF was A decisive front in the vast WORLDWIDE conflict. Yes, it was the decisive front in the vast Nazi-Soviet conflict..but there was rather more to the worldwide war then that. Hint: that is why it is called World War II rather than the "Nazi-Soviet War".

It's called world war because it involved a dramatic shift in the world's international relations. This shift was caused by the formation of a coalition with the objective of defeating Germany. WW2 was the war to defeat Germany. The governments of other minor countries such as Japan were countries that were hoping that Germany would win and so would reconfigure the world's international relations in their favor.

However, one country out of the dozens of different countries involved in that Anti-Hitler coalition played the decisive role of actually defeating Germany: the USSR. This is an obvious fact: they inflicted almost the totality of German losses in the critical years of the war, 1941-1942-1943, they, alone, defeated the Wehrmacht at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, when the Wehrmacht didn't need to allocate substantial forces to fight anybody else. They turned the tide in the Eastern front long before the WAllies opened up the Western front: by the time the GIs landed on France the German army was already DEFEATED. It's an obvious fact to anybody who knows history that the Soviet Union won the war, it's obvious their contribution is tremendously superior to the WAllies in winning the war among other countries. Like, to me, only persons ignorant in history or ethnocentric Anglo-American nationalists could think otherwise.

And the asymmetry between the relative economic size of the WAllies vis the USSR just proves that money is not the measure of all things. That WW2 was not won because of material superiority: the USSR did not have material superiority over Germany and won anyway. Just like Vietnam won their war against US a couple of decades later, despite tremendous US material superiority. While the Anglo-Americans like to think in linear terms when it comes to money: "side X has more money so they will always win!" But the reality is different: my GDP calculations show for instance that the Axis powers coalition controlled similar economic resources as the Allied powers and the Nazis had a substantial superiority over the USSR, yet, they lost.

All serious historians agree on that fact of WW2: the Soviet Union defeated Germany. For instance, Dupuy speaks of the USSR in NPW saying "they won the war, although with substantial logistics support from the US" as if the American lend-lease help was more substantial their their direct military contribution in winning WW2. Which is an obvious fact. Even historians who think of WW2 was being decided by American material power such as Niall Ferguson, think that the way American material power affected the outcome was primarily because of lend-lease to the Soviet Union and not due to anything else. While a general economic historian such as Robert Heilbroner even spoke that "the USSR's social and economic system failed, despite their great achievement in defeating Germany in WW2".

So, you obviously have a different opinion on this matters. Which is understandable: you are a nationalistic American guy, so you like to believe America to be more important to the world than it actually was historically (most Americans do). However, not everybody in the world is a nationalistic American like you are. In fact, 96% of the world is not even American much less American followers of the 19th century style nationalism you appear to be a part of. However, I don't feel like insulting you just because your brain works in the way it does. I understand that it's futile and a really stupid thing to do and you should understand that it's also futile and stupid on your part to try to force my opinions to conform to your opinion by force. There is no justification for your aggression and hostility. It's ignorant and barbaric of your part.

You should lean to accept the fact that different people have different minds and hence different thoughts from your's. Goodbye.

[Stiltzkin]

Also, some say airpower had a suppressant effect and an interdiction effect

Yes, this most likely translates to tactical engagements, it is very situational, the overall value however will be swallowed and dwarfed by the total amount of contigencies.

Luftwaffe's air superiority in 1941-1942 was also not very substantial for thev USSR's army as well.

In fact, the OKW realized that the Luftwaffe had too much personnel in 42 and shifted it to the ground forces. Furthermore, air-ground forces coordination was abysmal during 1940, combat reports show that they improved to an acceptable level during the summer campaign in 42.

On the Eastern Front, there was one plane for 2500 enemies. Each German plane had to cover an area of 500km². In Normandy, there was 1 plane for 100 Axis soldiers, so one Allied aircraft for every 1km².

[Michael Kenny]

You should lean to accept the fact that different people have different minds and hence different thoughts from your's.

You constantly fabricate figures because the real numbers do not chime with your fiction. That is not 'different thought' but a different truth. Alternate facts in order to create alternate history.

[Michael Kenny]

In fact, the OKW realized that the Luftwaffe had too much personnel in 42 and shifted it to the ground forces.

In the same way they 'realised' there were too many 12 year olds in school in 1945 and shifted then into HJ Units.

[Yoozername]

One important difference in civilian society is that an individual's conduct is not as directly controlled and monitored like in the army where he responds to a superior according to military hierarchy. So in civil society the degree of influence his individual will has on his actions is higher.

Another important, and factual, thing is that slave and POW labor can be 'persuaded' not to run off.

[Yoozername]

Collapse of the transportation system and fuel industry of course had nothing to do with anything.

This subject is dealt with in depth using primary sources from the period.
See A.C. Mierzejewski: "The Collapse of the German War Economy 1944-45: Allied Air Power and the German National Railway"; Chapel Hill.

The author makes a rather strong case that had this effort been applied in a focused manner starting from the earliest point possible, this same effect may have been achievable far sooner than per the historical. Regardless, the numbers are all there and they show exactly how "the wheels stopped turning" in the historical case. He explains how the German economy functioned under Speer. He also exposes the bureaucratic infighting behind the scenes on the Allied side (regarding bombing strategies) and this is very interesting, in and of itself.
Well worth reading IMO.

This seems like a good read from some excerpts. I also have a couple of books coming...any opinion of...

The Bombers and the Bombed
Allied Air War Over Europe 1940-1945
By Overy, R. J.

[histan]

The German PoWs in the autumn campaign didn't just surrender because the believed the war was lost.

The view that the German PoWs would have low morale because they knew that the war was lost was that initially held by their allied interrogators, who were very surprised when this turned out not be the case and that their fighting spirit was remarkably good.

Many reasons for this - fighting now at the borders of the Homeland (first job of a soldier is to defend the Homeland), young soldiers (18 to 19) and young NCOs and officers (in their 20s) didn't think "big thoughts" they just carried on fighting, fear of a Russian occupation (they were well aware that would mean payback time), summed up in soldier's humour - "enjoy the war, the peace will be terrible"

Not just the trained ground troops that carried on fighting. Writing about Arnhem Walther Harzer says:
"It is with personal pride that I regard this German victory, because it was achieved not by regular units, but by railway workers, Arbeitsdienst, and Luftwaffe personnel as well, who had never been trained for infantry work and were actually unsuitable for house to house fighting"

Of course, the Hiwis, were always viewed as likely to desert at the first opportunity.

It' not all about the figures - they only tell a part of the story - you need to get at the story behind them to really understand what happened.

Regards

John