Guaporense wrote:From the military strategist standpoint it was a waste of resources.
Perhaps from your point of view, but then you are not a military strategist. However, from the point of view of actual military strategists, and in particular those directly affected - the Germans - it was an effective use of resources. Or didn't you bother to read the quotes provided by John?
Industrial targets are essentially all of these except Group IV targets: dropping bombs on transportation targets reduced the transport of raw materials and intermediate inputs between industries, for example. Dropping bombs on cities was classified as "industrial areas". So 80% of the bombing tonnage was dropped with the stated objective of reducing industrial production: which didn't happen.
Perhaps it would be best if you stop displaying your superficial understanding of the subject.
Transportation targets included canals struck by bombing and mines, harbors attacked by bombing and mines, coastal waterways attacked by bombing and mines, highways and highway bridges, railroad lines and railroad bridges, rail yards and marshaling areas, and railway repair depots.
Dropping bombs on cities was classified as "city" and was usually reserved for night missions by Bomber Command. "Industrial areas" were generic industrial districts within cities, but other industrial targets were specifically identified by type.
For example, for May 1944, there were a total of 222 missions directed against the Reich (Germany and Austria) with 12,629 bombers participating. They struck at "cities" 40 times, 39 by Bomber Command, and once by 15th AF during the day at Weiner Neustadt. Industrial areas were targeted 28 times. Airfields were targeted 28 times. Specific aircraft industrial targets were struck 22 times. AFV industry was struck once and chemical production eight times. Marshaling yards were struck 26 times and other rail targets once. Sea mining missions were executed 13 times.
Out of 972 missions by 37,882 aircraft.