Why was Germany short on oil?

[mike peters]

[quote="Jon G
Thanks for that, Mike. It's certainly interesting, if just a liiittle hard on the eye to read all the detail. ![/quote]

Thanks Jon

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

Due to the length of this thread, I don't know if the following has been covered.

Romanian oil production was in overall decline and could never have supplied anything like all Germany's wartime oil requirements.

Therefore the Romanians, in pursuit of their own strategic national interests, were anxious to conserve stocks and were not overly co-operative with Germany's aim of over-exploiting their dwindling reserves during the war.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Patzinak]

[…] The "Axis exports%" figures are the percentage of Romanian refined oil products that are exported to the Axis. […]

Whose figures? What figures? You've lost me. All I see is that 62 is smaller than 72. Perhaps it's better if you just post the figures with a precise indication of their source and what they mean.

[…] My point is that the figures do not indicate that Romania didn't ration its economy, because it is normal for overall oil consumption to grow in wartime.

And my point was that it didn't grow enough.

We can debate whether it rationed its civilian economy enough, though this would raise the question of how much was enough given what was achievable, but until we get more precise figures we can't be sure either way. […]

Consider this back-of-the-envelope comparison for '41–'43. Population: Romania -- ~16M; Reich -- ~80M. Total per annum oil consumption: Romania -- ~2M tons; Reich -- ~11M tons (latter figure based on Eichholtz, 2005, p67). This suggests a per capita consumption of 0.137 (Reich) vs 0.125 (Ro). Given the wide disparity in industrial production, motorisation, and military commitments, the figures seem to me to be far too close, supporting Axworthy et al's assessment of Romanian consumption as 'extravagant'. But, I agree, absent the detailed figures, this is all speculation. It indicates not a conclusion, but something to look into.

[…] Purely commercial considerations were but a part of larger issues […]

My point exactly; moreover, in the issue of oil, I'd say, a small part.

[…] Germany held the whip hand [over Vichy] (far more than over Romania) […]

Here I disagree. Vichy might have wanted political concessions from Germany; but for Romania -- next door to the USSR -- Germany might held the key to its survival.

--Patzinak

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Patzinak,

Romania had to be humoured. Vichy didn't.

In WWI the British and Romanians demolished Romania's oil fields before the Gerrman Army could occupy them.

This remained a German fear throughout WWII. One of the first deployments of Brandenburgers was to the Romanian oil fields in 1940 to prevent this. Indeed, the second Brandenburger company formed consisted of Romanian Volksdeutsch precisely for this reason.

Romania couldn't supply anything like all German wartime oil needs, but lack of its oil would have been crippling.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Bronsky]

Whose figures? What figures? You've lost me. All I see is that 62 is smaller than 72. Perhaps it's better if you just post the figures with a precise indication of their source and what they mean.

All the figures that the ratios (e.g. 62%) were derived from have been posted along with an indication of their source. Jon posted a set of figures on Romanian oil exports from "Oil and War" in barrels per day, I posted the same set of figures from an article by Overy in the "Oxford WWII Companion" (I can't remember if this is at the article "oil" or "raw materials" or "statistics" but it should be easy enough to find). Both articles clearly draw from the same source ("Oil and War" may well be Overy's source).

I also explained what the percentages meant. Export% = total exports / refined runs.

Axis export% = exports to Axis country / refined runs. Axis countries = any country allied to or occupied by the Reich (so France doesn't count in 1940, but it does in 1941).

The breakdown of Romanian exports by destination can be derived from Jon's figures, since it's a ratio there's no point in converting these figures from barrels per day to tons per year or the other way around.

About the point about the percentage of Romanian exports that the Axis got, this can be easily derived from Jon's figures again. So looking up my post and Jon's you have all the data you need to check my math.



Regarding Romanian oil consumption per capita, there is no doubt that it was higher than German practices given that the ratio of fuel-burning vehicles per capita was higher in Germany than in Romania. The questions are: 1/ by how much, and 2/ how much of that extra consumption was actual waste i.e. all it would have taken to reduce it would have been a firmer attitude from the Romanian government, and how much was built-in. If the Romanian industry and infrastructure was built around abundant oil resources, then reducing oil consumption per capita would involve modifying boilers in power plants, factories, buildings (for central heating), locomotives etc.

[Patzinak]

[…] One of the first deployments of Brandenburgers was to the Romanian oil fields in 1940 to prevent [destruction of the Romanian oil fields]. […]

Sure. But Romania in 1941 and later was not the same thing as Romania in early 1940. Check out when the Brandenburghers left; and see also http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=139269 . From 1941 onwards, there was no more question of Romanians destroying their own fields.

[…] Romania had to be humoured. Vichy didn't.

Mm. Let's see. On one side, Europe's hegemon, an advanced world industrial and military power. On the other, an agrarian, underdeveloped small (or, at best, medium) country. The latter has something the former wants very badly. And the proposition is that this puts the latter in a favourable position. That about the size of it? 'Cos I'm thinking Margarethe II.

--Patzinak

[Patzinak]

[…] I posted the same set of figures from an article by Overy in the "Oxford WWII Companion" (I can't remember if this is at the article "oil" or "raw materials" or "statistics" but it should be easy enough to find). […]

I see. I'm supposed to figure it out. Only to discover that, judging by the entry on Romania, the original source is Pearton.

[…] check my math […]

Sorry, check as I might, 62% still comes out as less than 72%.

--Patzinak

[Bronsky]

Ok, I've checked what I thought was my source, and it is indeed the source for some of the figures in the same spreadsheet where I had noted the Romanian export stuff but not that, sorry to have led you down a false track. I now need to figure out where I got these figures from (they're not in the books that I did note, sloppy of me to have forgotten one). But again, they match Jon's.

As to the 62% vs 72% I don't know what exactly you're referring to now.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Patzinak,

You have to remember that Romania was never occupied by the German Army. This meant that its oil fields remained essentially under its own control throughout the war. Because of this, Romanian oil was always vulnerable, even if the risk varied over time. This meant that Germany always had to humour the Romanians in a way that it did not have to humour the Vichy French. Hitler met Antonescu some three times a year over 1940-44. He only ever met Petain once in passing.

And as for the Margarethe plans, why do you think they were prepared by the Germans? Precisely because they felt they couldn't trust the Romanians or Hungary. They were proved right in both cases. The oil was always at risk.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Patzinak]

[…] You have to remember that Romania was never occupied by the German Army. This meant that its oil fields remained essentially under its own control throughout the war. […]

Did they? Who ensured their security? Why were the Brandenburghers withdrawn? Were was the greatest concentration of German armed forces in Romania itself?

[…] Romanian oil was always vulnerable, even if the risk varied over time. […]

Whether it was or not vulnerable is not the issue. The issue is, did Hitler perceive it to be vulnerable from that quarter? We know, for instance, that he thought -- or at least he said he thought -- it might be vulnerable to air attacks from the eastern Med or from Crimea. How much did he worry about the Romanians?

[…] Hitler met Antonescu some three times a year over 1940-44. He only ever met Petain once in passing.[…]

As a German general said, Romania was the Reich's "best ally" on the Eastern Front. IIRC, Vichy wasn't even at war with the USSR. Might that have anything to do with those meetings?

And as for the Margarethe plans, why do you think they were prepared by the Germans? Precisely because they felt they couldn't trust the Romanians or Hungary. They were proved right in both cases. The oil was always at risk.

One does not follow from the other. Moreover, Margarethe I (no muss, no fuss) shows in what kind of strong position oil put Romania in. But this is mere quibbling. The nub is,

(1) for Hitler, it was more convenient, for more reasons than one, to get Romanian oil with the co-operation of the Romanians; but if that was not forthcoming, or it came at too great a price, then he could do what he did in Italy, in France, and in Hungary;

(2) for Antonescu (if not necessarily for other Romanians), Romania's future was either in Hitler's or in Stalin's hands -- and guess which of the two he preferred.

--Patzinak

[Jon G.]

...If the Romanian industry and infrastructure was built around abundant oil resources, then reducing oil consumption per capita would involve modifying boilers in power plants, factories, buildings (for central heating), locomotives etc.

Just as a brief but hopefully illuminating aside, German BR52* locomotives supplied to Romania in 1943 were equipped for oil-firing. Oil-firing steam locomotives is perverse on several levels, especially from a 1943 Axis resource management point of view. But of course the Romanians wanted train engines which could run on domestic fuel. I don't know how much of the Romanian industrial sector was running on oil, but oil-firing locomotives suggest higher oil use all-round than Germany, where a conscious effort had been made to cut back civilian oil use.

*The famous 'war locomotive' churned out by the thousands from September 1942 and on. Some of the first BR52s which were exported were the oil-fired models which went to Romania.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

A few stats and a quote from Third Axis, Fourth Ally, Hailer Publishing, Florida, 2007.


Romanian Oil Production and Supply to Germany, 1939-1944:

Year/Romanian Production/of which to Germany
1936/8,701,000t/?
1939/6,240,000t/1,556,000t
1940/5,815,000t/1,304,800t
1941/5,577,000t/3,173,700t
1942/5,665,000t/2,302,400t
1943/5,330,000t/2,472,000t
1944/3,525,000t/1,078,900t


p.20:

“The Germans had ambitious plans to expand Romanian oil production, but Romanian output had peaked at 8,701,000t in 1936 and the Romanians preferred to conserve what was now a declining resource. Deliveries to the Reich peaked in 1941. In June 1942 Mihai Antonescu warned Carl Clodius, the Deputy Director of the Economic Department of the German Foreign Ministry, “Romania is exhausting her oil reserves… if oil output is expanded this will exclusively benefit the Reich”. Over-exploitation and increasing Romanian efforts to stem the uncontrolled haemorrhaging of their most valuable natural resource therefore led to a stabilization of Romanian oil production and a decline in deliveries after 1941…….. In 1943 Romanian oil deliveries amounted to only 43% of those planned by the Germans.”

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Patzinak,

In answer to your questions:

Most of the security of the oil fields was always Romanian. Not only was nearly half the flak Romanian, but the Romanian 18th Security Detachment was also allocated to ground defence. It had no German equivalent. On top of this the Romanian 5th Territorial Corps had 5th and 13th Training Divisions in the area, while the Romanian Armoured School was ar nearby Tirgoviste, etc, etc.

I was unaware that the Brandenburgers were withdrawn. When did this occur?

The greatest (actually only long term) concentration of German armed forces in Romania was in the oil fields. It consisted of a division of Luftwaffe flak troops.

Hitler was always worried about Romanian oil, even from internal threats. Obviously this declined when it looked as though Germany was winning and increased when it was losing. Look at the area of deployment of the German military mission in 1940, or the Margarethe Plan of late 1943. In between you will see from the figures I posted above, Romanian oil deliveries to the Reich actually fell and in 1943 were well below half what Germany wanted. Even Antonescu's Foreign Minister warned the Germans about over exploitation of oil.

Yup. Romania's importance on the Eastern Front certainly did have something to do with the far larger number of meetings between Hitler and Antonescu than between Hitler and Petain. I would suggest that this only serves to emphasise my earlier point that Romania had to be humoured but Vichy didn't.

I can only agree with you final two points, which don't seem contentious, although I would suggest that for Antonescu the Western Allies were also preferable to Stalin, but not a practical possibility.

Cheers,

Sid.

[cortodanzigese]

I wonder why actually Hitler didn't send 20-30 divisions to Africa immediately in summer of 1940 when Britain was in disarray. His soldiers would conquer Middle East in few months, and the Germany would be secure for the rest of the war.

[Andy H]

I wonder why actually Hitler didn't send 20-30 divisions to Africa immediately in summer of 1940 when Britain was in disarray. His soldiers would conquer Middle East in few months, and the Germany would be secure for the rest of the war.

Logistics, Logistics, Logistics is the answer, along with a dose of political will.

Regards

Andy H