German industrial capacity
- hauptmannn
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German industrial capacity
We have all heard of Germany's lack of industrial capacity to produce tanks, trucks, weapons, aircraft, etc. And that the allies surpassed the axis in production of equipment and weapons. What i do not understand is why Germany could not build more factories for example, was it because of the lack of raw materials? manpower? resources to run them, e.g. oil?
It's a very complicated question. Here are some answers, in no particular order.
Firstly, Germany lacked an indigenous source of good-quality iron ore. Goering tried to make Germany self-sufficient in iron ore by a huge programme of building plant to process the low-grade ore from German mines, but this was never going to produce enough iron and steel for Germany's needs.
Secondly, Germany was hamstrung by fuel shortages. The synthetic oil programme was designed to be ready for war by 1943-4, and was never able to produce enough to satisfy Germany's needs. The Rumanian oil wells helped, but there was still a constant shortage.
Thirdly, resources were deployed very badly. Goering had little grasp of economic and industrial realities, and appointed people like Udet because he could dominate them, not because they had any particular talent or aptitude. The result was an extremely inefficient use of resources. For example, Udet allocate 9 tons of aluminium per aircraft manufactured, regardless of the aircraft type. As a result, Messerschmidt was inundated with surplus aluminium that could have been used elsewhere. Also, not enough attention was paid to what was purchased. The British and Americans, for example, tended to order two aero engines per mounted engine; the German ratio was nearer 1.4. Consequently, aircraft were often immobilised for lack of spares or replacement engines.
Fourthly, Germany suffered from severe manpower shortages. The initial mobilisation took little account of essential workers, and many men had to be returned to civilian life after enlistment in order to restore production. Even the widespread use of migrant and slave labour failed completely to address the issue. Goering's original plan was to mobilise far more women workers, but this met resistance from Hitler and others.
Also, the manpower that was available was often used inefficiently. Productivity in the German armaments industry, pre-1943, was far lower per worker than in Britain, let alone the USA.
When Speer got a grip of the problems, he demonstrated what was possible - German armaments production peaked in the third quarter of 1944, despite years of bombing, using the same resources that were used in 1940. Speer said after the war that if resources had been used properly from the outset, the Wehrmacht could easily have had twice as many tanks, trucks etc at the outset of Barbarossa as was actually the case.
Hope that helps - I'm sure other issues were involved too.
Prit
Firstly, Germany lacked an indigenous source of good-quality iron ore. Goering tried to make Germany self-sufficient in iron ore by a huge programme of building plant to process the low-grade ore from German mines, but this was never going to produce enough iron and steel for Germany's needs.
Secondly, Germany was hamstrung by fuel shortages. The synthetic oil programme was designed to be ready for war by 1943-4, and was never able to produce enough to satisfy Germany's needs. The Rumanian oil wells helped, but there was still a constant shortage.
Thirdly, resources were deployed very badly. Goering had little grasp of economic and industrial realities, and appointed people like Udet because he could dominate them, not because they had any particular talent or aptitude. The result was an extremely inefficient use of resources. For example, Udet allocate 9 tons of aluminium per aircraft manufactured, regardless of the aircraft type. As a result, Messerschmidt was inundated with surplus aluminium that could have been used elsewhere. Also, not enough attention was paid to what was purchased. The British and Americans, for example, tended to order two aero engines per mounted engine; the German ratio was nearer 1.4. Consequently, aircraft were often immobilised for lack of spares or replacement engines.
Fourthly, Germany suffered from severe manpower shortages. The initial mobilisation took little account of essential workers, and many men had to be returned to civilian life after enlistment in order to restore production. Even the widespread use of migrant and slave labour failed completely to address the issue. Goering's original plan was to mobilise far more women workers, but this met resistance from Hitler and others.
Also, the manpower that was available was often used inefficiently. Productivity in the German armaments industry, pre-1943, was far lower per worker than in Britain, let alone the USA.
When Speer got a grip of the problems, he demonstrated what was possible - German armaments production peaked in the third quarter of 1944, despite years of bombing, using the same resources that were used in 1940. Speer said after the war that if resources had been used properly from the outset, the Wehrmacht could easily have had twice as many tanks, trucks etc at the outset of Barbarossa as was actually the case.
Hope that helps - I'm sure other issues were involved too.
Prit
New production plants were build, but the problem was that those are long term programs, often needing years to complete. And like Prit said, there were unavoidable bottlenecks.
Few more of them:
Electricity: Maybe the most fixed commodity. There was just the amount of generating power available, and not a bit more in near future, as it takes literaly an decade and huge investment to significantly increase capacity. And every factory needed electricity.
Blackout: Mostly forgotten. US had an huge advantage here - there was not a chance to ever reach the efficiency of US production as long as there was blackout all over Europe. Just think: In Californian warm and dry weather every parking lot or other open space near aircraft factory could be used as production facility in case of factory floor shortage, or think about shipbuilding industry.... Blackout was the most important single factor limiting production in European countries during war.
Regards, Mark V
Few more of them:
Electricity: Maybe the most fixed commodity. There was just the amount of generating power available, and not a bit more in near future, as it takes literaly an decade and huge investment to significantly increase capacity. And every factory needed electricity.
Blackout: Mostly forgotten. US had an huge advantage here - there was not a chance to ever reach the efficiency of US production as long as there was blackout all over Europe. Just think: In Californian warm and dry weather every parking lot or other open space near aircraft factory could be used as production facility in case of factory floor shortage, or think about shipbuilding industry.... Blackout was the most important single factor limiting production in European countries during war.
Regards, Mark V
The link provided by Bonzen was interesting, but it was not what I was searching for. What I want to know is how much production rised under Speer, not how many more of a specific artillery piece that were made. So, i repeat myself: Anyone have any stats on how much the German production was increased under Reichminister Speer?
Centurion,
What figures are you after?
Here are some more for you:
In May 1939, the German workforce was (millions):
German men: 24.5
German women: 14.6
Foreigners (inc POWs): 0.3
Armed forces active strength: 1.4
By May 1940, this had changed to:
German men: 20.4
German women: 14.4
Foreigners (inc POWs): 1.2
Armed forces active strength: 5.6
May 1944:
German men: 14.2
German women: 14.8
Foreigners (inc POWs): 7.1
Armed forces active strength: 9.1
Leaving aside the armed forces figures, this suggests that the total workforce in 1944 was 36.1 million, compared with 39.4 million in May 1939 - and yet military production was vastly greater.
Prit
What figures are you after?
Here are some more for you:
In May 1939, the German workforce was (millions):
German men: 24.5
German women: 14.6
Foreigners (inc POWs): 0.3
Armed forces active strength: 1.4
By May 1940, this had changed to:
German men: 20.4
German women: 14.4
Foreigners (inc POWs): 1.2
Armed forces active strength: 5.6
May 1944:
German men: 14.2
German women: 14.8
Foreigners (inc POWs): 7.1
Armed forces active strength: 9.1
Leaving aside the armed forces figures, this suggests that the total workforce in 1944 was 36.1 million, compared with 39.4 million in May 1939 - and yet military production was vastly greater.
Prit
Hmm, I was suprised by the low number of women woring in the factories.
How much the overall production rised. 200%, 300%...What figures are you after?
Yes, but Germany was not in a state of war economy in 1939. After all Toy factories aren't all that usefull for the war effort.Leaving aside the armed forces figures, this suggests that the total workforce in 1944 was 36.1 million, compared with 39.4 million in May 1939 - and yet military production was vastly greater.
I don't have figures for overall industrial output.
Even if you compare the workforce (men, women, foreigners) for industry, this speaks volumes:
May 39: 39.4 M
May 40: 36M
May 41: 36.1M
May 42: 35.5M
May 43: 36.6M
May 44: 35.1M
Sept 44: 35.9M
The workforce doesn't change hugely between May 40 and Sept 44, yet the overall output increased hugely.
Prit
Even if you compare the workforce (men, women, foreigners) for industry, this speaks volumes:
May 39: 39.4 M
May 40: 36M
May 41: 36.1M
May 42: 35.5M
May 43: 36.6M
May 44: 35.1M
Sept 44: 35.9M
The workforce doesn't change hugely between May 40 and Sept 44, yet the overall output increased hugely.
Prit
Part of Germany's (war) industrial problem was that Germany never truly had a war economy. A 'military' economy had been a theme since before the nazis came to power, but this focussed mainly on arming for quick blitzkriegs and presupposed long breaks inbetween wars.
Even well into the war, steel in quantity was still allocated for civilian purposes, and non-essential materials such as wallpaper and film for civilian use were still produced to peacetime level.
Part reason for this could be concern for public mood - leading nazis were aware that the war wasn't very popular with the Germans - but a total lack of direction, as well as some bureaucratic bungling seem prevalent reasons too.
Despite Germany's chronic shortage of rubber, manufacture of rubber-soled shoes was only stopped in 1941. Mercedes-Benz still made civilian cars in 1942.
Speer's initial measures to gear up production and efficiency didn't have to be very dramatic to achieve a higher war production output. Surely, what is remarkable about German armament production is not that the 1944 figures seem so high, but rather that the 1940 figures are so relatively low.
Even well into the war, steel in quantity was still allocated for civilian purposes, and non-essential materials such as wallpaper and film for civilian use were still produced to peacetime level.
Part reason for this could be concern for public mood - leading nazis were aware that the war wasn't very popular with the Germans - but a total lack of direction, as well as some bureaucratic bungling seem prevalent reasons too.
Despite Germany's chronic shortage of rubber, manufacture of rubber-soled shoes was only stopped in 1941. Mercedes-Benz still made civilian cars in 1942.
Speer's initial measures to gear up production and efficiency didn't have to be very dramatic to achieve a higher war production output. Surely, what is remarkable about German armament production is not that the 1944 figures seem so high, but rather that the 1940 figures are so relatively low.
Centurion:
According to Albert Speer himself in his biography "Inside the third Reich" page 295 in the 2002 english pocket version
"Within half a year after my taking office we had significantly increased production in all the areas within our scope. Production in August 1942 according to the Index Figures for German armaments End Products as compared with the february production had increased by 27 percent for guns by 25 percent for tanks, while ammunition production almost doubled rising 97 percent. The total productivity in armaments increased by 59.6 percent. Obviously we had mobilized reserves that had hitherto lain fallow. After twoand a half years in spite of the beginning of heavy bombing we had raised our entire armaments production from an avarage index of 98 for the year 1941 to a summit of 322 in July 1944."
According to Albert Speer himself in his biography "Inside the third Reich" page 295 in the 2002 english pocket version
"Within half a year after my taking office we had significantly increased production in all the areas within our scope. Production in August 1942 according to the Index Figures for German armaments End Products as compared with the february production had increased by 27 percent for guns by 25 percent for tanks, while ammunition production almost doubled rising 97 percent. The total productivity in armaments increased by 59.6 percent. Obviously we had mobilized reserves that had hitherto lain fallow. After twoand a half years in spite of the beginning of heavy bombing we had raised our entire armaments production from an avarage index of 98 for the year 1941 to a summit of 322 in July 1944."