High Seas Fleet strategy

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Berichter
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High Seas Fleet strategy

#1

Post by Berichter » 08 Oct 2004, 03:30

Hello,

I was curious. Was the main strategy of the German High Seas Fleet to detain a large part of the Home Fleet in blockade while commerce raiders and submarines destroyed British merchant traffic on the high seas? Also, why did the High Seas Fleet just sit in port watching the blockade and laying mine fields? Why didn't they just try to break up the blockade?

Admiral De Ruyter had trounced the allied English and French fleet three times by daring action, brought about the end of the French invasion threat and broke the allied blockade of Dutch ports. If the Kaiser was such a fan of Mahan's book, why didn't he take this example?

Cordially,

Berichter

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dmilford
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#2

Post by dmilford » 08 Oct 2004, 12:50

The High Seas Fleet was a bluff that was called. Its formation was an attempt to intimidate the British into peace with Germany on the basis that even if the British defeated it their losses would be so great that Britain would then be vulnerable to the third ranked naval power. Unfortunately for the Germans various political events scuppered this idea well before 1914 (the destruction of the Russian fleet by Japan, the Anglo-Japanese naval alliance, the entente cordial). These along with British naval reforms made the strategy obsolete.

There also appears to have been a misreading of what British strategy would be in the event of war i.e. it was expected the RN would turn up off German shores on day one to enforce a blockade and looking for the next Trafalgar. The Germans in this event planned to use torpedo craft and mines to even the odds before any fleet action. However for over a decade before the start of WW1 British naval policy had changed from a close blockade to a distant one, this had been fairly common knowledge for several years in Britain but appears to have been overlooked by Germany.

So when Britain went to war with Germany the HSF had failed in its primary role of a deterrent. It soon became apparent that the Royal Navy was not going to attempt a close blockade and a new strategy was looked for. This was to try a war of attrition by using raid to entice British vessels into mine/submarine traps and to attempt to isolate smaller part of the RN where they could be defeated. This brought very limited success and eventually the emphasis was switched to unrestricted submarine warfare with the HSF having a very limited role in the North Sea - effectively a coast defence role and to support the submarine campaign by enabling German minesweepers to go about their business against the increasing extensive British (and later US) mining campaign against U boats.


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Peter H
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#3

Post by Peter H » 08 Oct 2004, 16:00

Its said that the cost to build and deploy one German dreadnought was equivalent to the financial burden of raising a German army corps.The impression given is that the Kaiser did not want to risk the loss of too many of these expensive,prestigous weapon platforms.

Mad Zeppelin
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#4

Post by Mad Zeppelin » 10 Oct 2004, 11:17

There are several reasons for the inactivity of the HSF. First of all, there was never any co-ordination between army and navy, hence no planning to accompany the army's offensives by naval activities. Secondly, there were several admirals with influence on the HSF's activities (and as already Napoleon I. pointed out: "One bad general leading is much better than leadership by two able but quarreling generals." We have:
- the commanding admiral of the HSF: Adm v. Ingenohl
- the chief of staff of the amirality: Adm v. Pohl
- the commanding admiral of the Baltic fleet: HRH Adm. Prince Heinrich
- the state secretary of the naval office: Adm v. Tirpitz
- the chief of the naval cabinett: Adm. v. Müller.
Von Müller was only responsible for personnel questions, but he was closest to the Kaiser and had his ear constantly. And v. Müller was a very cautious men. His influence just served to strengthen the Kaiser's determination to do what he most wanted to do: Nothing.
The clearest ideas how to use the fleet can perhaps be found on Tirpitz' side, but Tirpitz neither had the ear nor the goodwill of the Kaiser and was considered an enemy by v. Müller. Müller is quoted by Tirpitz with the remark: "Maybe I can not get endorsement for all my ideas, but I can prevent everything from happening."
But as Adm Jellicoe (who also was surprised by German inactivity) later wrote: "If Germany adopted a defensive role with her fleet, it created by far the most difficult situation for us."
The HSF was just sitting there, and by her sheer existence spoiled all British plans for a narrow blockade (initally intended by Adm Lord Fisher), for arrays into the Baltic Sea or for landing operations on Helgoland or Borkum (all considered by Fisher and Churchill but found not feasible as long as the HSF sat in Wilhelmshaven - and could easily shift power to the Baltic via the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Kanal.)
If the connection to Russia via the Baltiv Sea was not possible, it had to be tried via the Black Sea - we know the results of that attempt.
Thus the HSF only by existing very well complied with the intentions of her creator, Tirpitz. She had never been built to attack the British navy but to deter Britain from attacking the German navy or projecting British naval power into Germany's home waters.
That this inactivity in the long run led to the naval mutiny of october and november 1918 is another subject.

Tullius
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#5

Post by Tullius » 11 Oct 2004, 17:03

Additionally to the above points the existence of the HSF kept the Baltic open for Swedish ore.

Actually Germany could win nothing in a naval battle (the strategic situation would remain unchanged afer a German victory), but it would risk losing the war.

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