#27
Post
by WSchneck » 20 Oct 2005, 21:19
Does anyone have information on how extensive the German antitank minefields were by the end of the war in France? I found a fascinating document on German mines prepared by the US Corps of Engineers and kept in the US National Archives. Regrettably, this document deals only with a small sector but does include some minefield maps. I am interested in how many were produced of each type, how these were employed on other portions of the front, and how many tanks they immobilized or destroyed.
Below is the information that I have:
Faced with the threat posed by the British and French designed tanks (discussed in the section on mechanized breaching) that first appeared in combat on 15 September 1915 (tanks entered combat for the first time at the battle of the Somme, with thirty-six British Mark 1 tanks from C and D companies attacked the Germans), the German pioneers began to manufacture improvised anti-tank mines in the field. The German pioniere (combat engineers) improvised the first Anti-Tank (AT) mines in response. Soon after the battle of Cambrai in November 1917, the Germans began to mass-produce antitank mines to increase their reliability.
The history of the British Royal Tank Corps noted, “of mines there was a considerable variety. They ranged from elaborate specially made pieces of apparatus to high explosive shells, buried and hastily fitted with a device by which the weight of a tank exploded them. They were sometimes buried in lines across roads, and sometimes extensive minefields were laid. Their singular ineffectiveness always seemed somewhat mysterious to members of the Tank Corps, the proportion of effort to result seeming always many tons of mine to each tank damaged. However; we always thought we might some day encounter a really effective type of mine, and possibly the Germans were satisfied if their efforts so much as made our monsters walk delicately, for in an elaborate document, giving every kind of anti-tank defence instructions, they somewhat pathetically conclude: “Every obstacle, even if it only checks the hostile tank temporarily, is of value.” To a British Royal Engineer, the Germans “do not appear to have treated the [tank] problem seriously until the last five months of the war, when they evinced a feverish activity in seeking counter-measures.”
World War I German Land Mines Found by US Combat Engineers
US Designation Description (dimensions in inches) Fuze Description Charge Remarks
Type A 40 X 15 X 10 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) 6” HE Shell
Type B 40 X 15 X 15 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) 6” HE Shell
Type C 18 X 14 X 6 sheet metal box Pressure (“yoke type”) 3 kg of Perdite German Flachmine 17
Type D 27 X 16 X 12 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) Perdite
Type E 144 X 10 X 10 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) 6” HE Shell
Type F 66 X 16 X 12 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) two 6” HE Shells A double Type A
Type G 60 X 18 X 15 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) 9.7” HE Shell
Type H 36 X 24 X 30 Pressure 12 kg of Perdite or 6” HE Shell Anti-disarming feature
Type I 19 X 13.5 X 16 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) 10” HE Shell
Type J HE Shell fitted with plunger igniter Pressure 6” or 8” HE Shell Cover w/ 4” wide board
Type K Wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) two or three 6” HE Shells
Type L 19 X 13 X 7 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) 20 kg HE
Type M1 45 X 20 X 20 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) 25cm HE Shell
Type M2 40 X 16 X 16 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) 15cm HE Shell
Type N 102 X 20 fuze coupled to the main charge Pressure 10 kg HE “pit mine,” two variants found
Type O antipersonnel mine
Type P A pit-type trap, 3ft deep, 8-12ft dia. pressure HE Shell
Type Q 68 X 15 X 10 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) 15-21cm HE Shell
Type R 120 X 7.5 X 9.5 wooden box Pressure (Shu mine type) 15-21cm HE Shell
Initially, the German pioneers used existing artillery and mortar shells with sensitive fuzes. They also employed command-detonated mines, which are the forerunners of modern full-width attack anti-tank mines. These earliest AT mines were scattered at random to reinforce wire obstacles and anti-tank ditches in front of the trench lines. Most of the early improvised antitank mines used by the Germans were very large with one dimension in excess of one meter, this required the pioneers to dig large holes to emplace the mines, consequently, it was usually relatively easy for allied sappers to locate where the mines were buried. The Germans also began to mass-produce the ‘Flachmine 17’ anti-tank mine in 1916. The Flachmine 17 normally consisted of a wooden box weighing about 12 lb and filled with 18 × 200 g explosive blocks. These were placed in boxes approximately 20 × 30 × 5 cm and were concealed about 25 cm deep. Detonation was caused by one of 4 ‘spring percussion lighters.’ It could function automatically as the tank passed over it or by command detonation (which was greatly facilitated by the use of electric detonators (? Nobel?) which first appeared in 1900).
“On the morning of the battle the engineers and pioneers with road tasks pushed out on their allotted routes as soon as the advance began. The 5th [Royal Australian Engineer] Field Company and the 5th Pioneer Battalion were responsible for the Roman road forward of Villers-Bretonneux: the 5th Company removed fourteen large anti-tank mines from its pavement and verges, and bridged the trenches which had been cut through it.” On 26 September near Arras, special parties of Royal Canadian Engineers “were assigned to move with the attacking troops to examine the ground for mines… It was expected that there would be a large number of buried charges set, especially to stop the tanks, and there were; over 200 tank mines had to be removed in one section alone. These normally consisted of a row of bombs with percussion caps set just below the surface under a heavy plank and covered with loose earth.”
By the end of the war, the German pioneers had developed row mining techniques and accounted for approximately 15 per cent (six out of 38 losses to known enemy weapons) of US tank casualties during the battles of St Mihiel, Catalet-Bony, Selle and Meuse/Argonne. Armor Corps historian Dale Wilson noted “field maintenance was no easy proposition, in part because of the physical condition of the battlefield -- muddy ground was a constant, hampering repair and combat operations alike -- but also because the vehicles were breaking down in such large numbers. In the Meuse-Argonne campaign, which continued to the cessation of hostilities on November 11th, the Tank Corps's vehicle attrition rate reached 123 percent, with only twenty-seven tanks lost to enemy action, chiefly artillery fire or mines -- the rest were breakdowns. By the end of the Meuse-Argonne campaign the Tank Corps was down to less than fifty operating vehicles, a figure that can only begin to indicate the extent to which maintenance and logistics troops were kept busy trying to ensure that the AEF was able to field an armored force through to the end of the war.”
However, a British source noted, “the German mine fields do not appear to have scored any great success against our tanks; in fact, the heaviest recorded allied tank casualties from mines occurred through tanks [British Mark Vs assigned to the American A Company, 301st Heavy Tank Battalion that had been formed from the 65th Engineer Regiment] running over one of our own mine fields laid before our retreat in March, 1918, and forgotten. [Ten of thirty-five were destroyed by mines in this incident.] This disaster occurred at the end of September, 1918. The mine field consisted of rows of buried trench-mortar bombs, each bomb containing 50 lbs. of ammonal. In spite of having been laid seven months previously, the efficacy of the minefield was demonstrated with unfortunate thoroughness. The weight of explosive used was sufficient to blow in the bottom of the machines and cause severe casualties among the crews.”
The British also produced at least two varieties of AT mines: one based on a pipe bomb (“improvised from lengths of metal pipe which were filled with explosive. Its elongated shape made it ideal for laying under roads. By adding sections any length of mine could be obtained. The mine was fired electrically, either by controlled detonation or by a contact switch.”) and the other on a trench mortar shell, mentioned above. “In early 1918 the Experimental Section of the Royal Engineers was asked to produce a mine for use against the German tanks that were beginning to appear on the battlefield. The design eventually used was a wooden box, 18in by 14in in the base and 8in high and containing 14lb of guncotton. It was initiated by depressing a hinged lid that operated a firing lever connected to a detonator. It appears that both the British and the German designs of anti-tank mine could be initiated with less than 100lb of pressure and therefore could be triggered by a man on foot. The Royal Engineers also laid anti-tank minefields ‘on a considerable part of the 3rd and 5th Army fronts, but it was subsequently impossible to obtain definite proof of their utility or otherwise’. The efforts of the Royal engineers were not, however, entirely in vain, on 22 March 1918 ‘the Germans began a methodical attack… but as they moved down the slope to Gouzeaucourt, their leading lines entered an anti-tank minefield and exploded some buried charges. A panic ensued and the advance was brought to a halt for a considerable time.”
The Russians also introduced anti-vehicle mines in the First World War, “Special mines for blowing up trucks and rolling stock were also developed, and the appearance of tanks prompted the creation of new types of mines, i.e. anti-tank (Dragomilov, Revenskiy, Salyayev) mines.”
Throughout the war, the Germans produced approximately 3,852,000 land mines, with an average monthly production rate of 108,000 in 1917 and 128,000 in 1918. Anti-tank mines almost certainly comprised the bulk of this effort. The Americans noted the effectiveness of various mines, “the following table gives data as to the disabling effect of various charges on certain types of tank used during the World War and suggestions as to the size of charges to be used against similar tanks:
Disabling effect of various charges on certain types of tank
Nature, size, and location of charge Degree of disablement
Mark V star Light Renault
One 3-inch high-explosive shell buried 6 inches under track None Permanent
One 3-inch Stokes mortar high-explosive shell buried 6 inches under track None. Very slight damage No test
One 6-inch high-explosive shell buried 6 inches under track Permanent No test
One 3-inch high-explosive shell on ground under belly No test Permanent
One 6-inch high-explosive shell on ground under belly Permanent Permanent. Complete destruction
2 pounds triton buried 6 inches under track No test Temporary. Considerable repair require
15 pounds of triton buried 6 inches under track Permanent No test
30 pounds of triton buried 6 inches under track Permanent. Very extensive destruction No test
15 pounds of triton buried 1 foot in ground 2 feet from tank No test Temporary
25 pounds of triton buried 1 foot in ground 2 feet from tank No test Permanent
15 pounds of triton buried 1 foot in ground 5 feet from tank No test None. No damage
50 pounds of triton buried 1 foot in ground 5 feet from tank No test Temporary
2 pounds of triton on ground under belly No test Temporary
Note- The Mark V star (British) is a heavy tank weighing about 33 tons and carrying a crew of 8.
The Renault is a light tank weighing 7 ¼ tons and carrying a crew of 2.
Minimum charges for antitank mines:
Against light tanks similar to the Renault- One 75-mm high-explosive artillery shell, or one 75-mm infantry howitzer shell,
or 5 pounds of triton or its equivalent in other loose explosive
Against medium tanks (15 to 20 in weight)-Two 75-mm high-explosive artillery shells, or two 75-mm infantry howitzer
shells, or one 155-mm high-explosive artillery shell, or 10 pounds of triton or its equivalent in other loose explosive.
Against heavy tanks similar to the Mark V star (British)-One 155-mm high-explosive artillery shell, 15 pounds of triton or
its equivalent in loose explosive.
In March 1918, “all [British tunnelling] companies received instruction in infantry training and in the duties of “investigation parties,” when removing booby traps, landmines and demolition charges… Delay action mines similar to those left by the Germans in their withdrawal at the beginning of 1917, were first found in the VIII Corps area, in the localities of Lens, Harnes, Dourge, and Henin Lietard, and later a series of mines was found throughout the railway system, chiefly at important stations and junctions… Eighty-four delay action mines were dealt with, including those subsequently reported by the enemy. Mines which were overdue to explode called for exceptional care in their removal; this was successfully carried out without casualties.” With the British Third Army, “Detachments of the units were at once detailed to the divisions to accompany the infantry for the purpose of locating and rendering harmless enemy land mines and traps… The British demolitions prepared on roads, culverts and wells in the Army area, after the March retirement, and the anti-tank minefields laid by certain divisions previously, were removed by the tunnelling companies during this period.” With the British Fourth Army, tunnelling companies also removed mines. “At Albert during two days 105 enemy mines were removed from the streets without a single accident… At Lempire, when the progress of tanks was checked by the old British anti-tank minefield, a Tunnelling officer succeeded under a heavy M.G. barrage in removing contact pins from the trench mortar bombs and opening a clear passage.” During the period 8 August 1918 to 11 November 1918, the British tunnelling companies supporting the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th armies removed 6,714 land mines, 315 delay action mines, 536 “other” traps, and 4,272 British antitank mines. In addition, they also removed 2,642,660 pounds of enemy explosives in 24,725 charges and 605,353 pounds of British explosives in 1,431 charges.” The Royal Canadian Engineers also assisted in locating neutralizing and removing a large number of German landmines near Arras on 19 September.
With the entry of the United States into the First World War, the British and French governments requested that American Engineer troops deploy as a high priority. Indeed, US engineers from the 11th Engineer Regiment were the first American soldiers to see combat in the First World War. The First World War also marked the first war in which American combat engineers were closely integrated with the other combat arms (infantry, cavalry and artillery), with one engineer regiment allocated to each infantry division. The manuals available to the US engineer troops during this war finally recognized the need to emplace mines in some depth, as state in “Engineer Field Manual, Parts I-VII,” published in 1918. “The charges are placed deeply enough only to avoid artillery projectiles. If no artillery fire is expected they may be placed just under the surface. If a bore hole is sufficient the charge is placed at the bottom and the hole well tamped. If an open pit is dug the mine chamber should be in firm ground at one side and the hole back filled and well rammed.
The depth fixed, the charge may be adjusted to give a 2 or 3 line crater. The mines may be in one or more rows. Two rows, 30 or 40 yards apart are a good arrangement. The intervals between mines in a row should be such that craters will nearly but not quite join. The positions of the mines should be concealed as completely as possible and further sophisticated by disturbing the ground slightly at points where there are no mines and so situated as to suggest a systematic arrangement… Planting and operation of land mines will ordinarily be the work of technical troops supplied with approved apparatus.” Nevertheless, there is no evidence that US forces ever employed mines during the First World War. Indeed, despite American expertise in landmine warfare gained during the American Civil War, General Pershing’s forces lacked purpose-built landmine warfare materials.
However, the American engineers found that they had to deal with the extensive use of land mines and booby traps by the retreating Germans in the final months of the war. In one case, the US 111th Engineer Regiment (supported by the 317th Engineer Regiment and the 53rd Pioneer Infantry Regiment), reported that “the enemy retiring before the advance was extremely effective in his road demolition, besides numerous craters which had to be filled, many contact and time mines were left at strategic points in the roads. A detachment of the 111th Engineers assigned to mine searching, located and withdrew the charges from 72 mines on September 26 and 27, and from a total of 179 mines prior to October 10.” In another case, the US 316th Engineer Regiment cleared approximately 300 mines in the town of Audenard from 11-18 November 1918. “They were planted chiefly in the main arteries of travel leading out of the city, and at intersections within the city…More than 400 mines were removed from the road between Audenard and Wacken.” The French provided the Americans a report dated 31 August 1918 on another pressure-activated tank mine, primed with two friction fuses. This sheet-metal cased mine weighed 4.9 kilograms and contained 1.6 kilograms of Perdite.
After the signing of the armistice, Captain Debeque, an American engineer inspected German defensive preparations and found, “While it was well known that the use of tanks by the Allies caused the Germans considerable concern it was not fully realized to what extent they had taken measures to cope with the problem until after the territory had been evacuated and the work of clearing the mine fields was begun. Besides the numerous tank defences and mines encountered a demonstration field was found near Briey [France] which had evidently been used as a school and field for testing various types of tank mines. 5. It appears that the scheme followed by the Germans was to prepare mine fields and auxiliary tank defences along logical avenues of approach for tanks, such as broad fields, valleys, mesas and in the fields adjoining roads. 6. The utilization of tank mines and barriers is typical of a defensive attitude and when these measures were taken by the Germans it is evident that they had little intention of going ahead but were preparing to hold the ground at all cost. 7. While in the majority of the mine fields the mines were connected up and ready for use there were some instances where the mines were placed but had not been equipped with detonating devices. In these cases it is possible that while preparations had been made for a strong defensive organization an opportunity had been left to assume an offensive attitude. 8. In other instances it is noted that the mine fields extending along the front alternate with open fields of similar length having no tank mines or barriers. Whether this arrangement was intended to allow the launching of attacks through the open spaces or whether the plan was to begin the construction of the tank defences at numerous points and eventually fill the intervening spaces is difficult to determine. [another possibility is that these were openings to kill sacks] 9. The Chambley 5-6 map attached hereto shows the organization of the tank mine field extending from Charey…across the open country to Lachausee Lake and it is fairly typical of the methods employed by the Germans in the area confronting the 2nd [US] Army. This field is approximately 4 kilometers in length. The mines consisted principally of Types “B”, “C” and “D” [see table above]. They were placed in one continuous line at intervals from 6 ft. to 10 ft. and at a distance varying from 100 meters to 400 meters in front of the first belt of German wire. The mines were equipped with detonating devices and were ready for firing. 10. An auxiliary tank defense consisting of a barrier of rails was constructed at a distance from 400-500 meters behind the minefield. 11. About one kilometer to the rear of the first mine field work had been started on a similar system of tank mines of the same types with a line of barriers 300 meters to the rear as an auxiliary defense. 12. It appears from this that the German plan was to organize the tank defenses to considerable extent in depth in a manner similar to that employed in siting different trench systems. 13. It is easy to realize the value of such an organization for defensive purposes but it appears that the principal disadvantage of this system is that it deprives the occupants of the ground of the opportunity of resuming the offensive on a scale of any considerable extent as it would be extremely difficult to go forward over tank mines and through barriers with even the light field guns.
14. From the great variety of mines discovered it is evident that the manufacture of tank mines had not become standard but was still in a state of development. It appears that the devising of the machines was, to a considerable extent, left to the ingenuity of the troops occupying the sector. The fact that at least one testing field (Briey) had been established would lead one to believe that it was intended to test the different types and decide upon certain ones as standards for manufacture. 15. While the different types of mines so far discovered are varied in details of construction they are, as a general rule, similar in methods of detonation. 16. The mines generally consist of a wood or metal box containing either a H.E. shell or a quantity of perdite. The mines are arranged to explode under the weight of a tank or even under the weight of a field gun. 17. The detonating device usually consisted of a spring fuse lighter…In some instances mines were equipped with friction fuse lighters. 18. In addition to the mines actuated by the spring and friction fuse lighters a few types were found consisting of H.E. shells placed vertically in boxes and equipped with the regulation instantaneous fuses which would explode under the weight of a tank. A type of mobile charge to be ignited and thrown in front of an approaching tank was also discovered at one place. 20. Of the entire number of mines removed there were discovered many ingenious types. Some of them were extremely dangerous to dismantle due to the fact that they would be exploded [by an improvised antihandling device] when the box was either closed or opened.
21. The system generally followed by the Germans in the placing of mines was to wrap each one in tar paper to protect it from moisture. The mine was then placed in a shallow hole so that the top of the box or container would be about level with the surface of the ground. It was then covered with a few inches of earth or sod as camouflage. After the mines had been placed the field was usually covered with a light belt of barbed wire or barbed wire concertina. This was probably done to protect the occupants of the ground from accidents that might occur. In some instances mines were placed in pits which were then covered with branches.”
[Although an economy of force weapon, mines must be used in sufficient mass (quantity), quote principal of war?]
Nevertheless, the near domination of infantry by artillery, barbed wire and machine guns meant that the development of antipersonnel mines received little attention from the warring powers. It was not until the Second World War that the antipersonnel mine matured enough to become a routine, integral part of warfare. They have been a facet of almost every conflict since.
