danebrog wrote: ↑07 Mar 2022, 01:12
. . . Well, a tiny little bit more difficult it might be )
“
Not because things are difficult, we do not dare them, but because we do not dare them, they are difficult.”
(
Lucius Annaeus Seneca –
https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seneca_the_Younger)
06_Topographic Map of Marrupa District, Niassa Province, Mozambique
Original Source: (Full screen & Zoom) https://elevation.maplogs.com/poi/niass ... 55296.html
On April 4th, 1918,
Lt. Col. Charles Barton had occupied with three companies of the 3. Bat./1. Rgt. K.A.R. Mahua
and proceeded with the advance on the Main track to Nanungu Boma. On April 11th, the 4. S.- and 2. F.-Company
under
Sec. Lt. Erich Müller attacked these units at Kirowa and pushed these opponent companies back on Mahua.
Two machine guns with 6000 rounds were captured.
Meanwhile, the 2. Bat. /1. Rgt. K.A.R. also advanced towards Nanungu from the northwest, but was stopped by
Maj. Gen. Edward Northey on April 21th, 1918 and were used to reinforce the 3./1. K.A.R. at Mahua, while further
1 1/2 K.A.R. Battalions followed and advanced also towards Nanungu from the northwest. At the same time the two
companies of `Detachment Müller´ had made a foray against the British rear communications north-east of Mahua,
and had taken the post at Kanene. Here, 460 loads of food were captured, which were particularly valuable in view
of the feeding problems of the `Schutztruppe´ and which led to further delays on the advances of the opponent.
While on 26th April 1918 the 1./2. K.A.R., started together with the first parts of the 1. R.N.R. to march to Nanungu
from northwest positions,
Lt Col. Barton also advanced the next day with 2./1. and 3./1. K.A.R. from Korewa to the
north-eastern Nanungu, however, marched not on the main road to Nanungu, but on north-western native paths.
After the 2./1. and 3./1. K.A.R. came into contact with a German patrol during the advance on May 3th, west of the
Kireka Mountain,
Lt. Col. Barton set up a circular fortification at Makoti on May 4th, and only began to advance to
Mopelia on the morning of May 5th.
In the meantime, the Commando had received message from the patrols about the opponent at Makoti and had left
Nanungu on May 4th. At noon the next day,
Lt. Col. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, attacked the opponent north of Kireka
Mountain with five companies (9.-, 10.-, 14.-, 19.- and 21.- Field Companies) and threw him back on his fortification.
Due to double strength, however, it was not possible to throw the British opponent out of his fortified position despite
being surrounded on both sides.
Lt Col. Lettow-Vorbeck then withdrew his companies during the night.
Lt. Col. Barton
also ordered his units to withdraw back to Kirowa, but had to leave his battlefield-hospital with 100 seriously wounded.
Although both opponents had lost 25% of their combat strength,
Lt. Col. Lettow-Vorbeck managed to keep the opponent
away from Nanungu for another 2 weeks. A far-reaching success, however, was that
Lt.-Gen. Jacob L. van Deventer
made the big mistake of assuming the `Schutztruppe´ would march north again. All units were therefore drawn in a
semicircle around Nanungu to prevent escape. The British proceeded so slowly that Nanungu was not occupied until
the evening of May 19th, 1918, while the Schutztruppe had been on their way south for three days, meanwhile the 4./4.
K.A.R. are fishing at the Msalu River.
https://digitallibrary.usc.edu/asset-ma ... 1600&H=757
07_Transferred current geographic conditions based on the 02_battle sketch
Original Source AllTrails: https://www.alltrails.com/de/explore?b_ ... 9781516792“Day by day and almost minute by minute the past was brought up to date. . . . All History was a
palimpsest, scraped clean and reinscribed exactly as often as was necessary” – G. ORWELL 1984
