Let's Build - the CSIR July 41 to March 42

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a complement..........................

The war on the Russian front

Railway movements began on July 11, 1941: the landing zone in Hungary was reached in 25 days; the assembly station, located 300 kilometers from the detrained stations, had been established in northern Romania.

Meanwhile, the operations had began on June 22 with the German attack from the Baltic to the Black Sea with three army groups commanded respectively by Marshals von Leeb, von Bock and von Rundstedt, had fought and won the battle of the borders, despite the fierce resistance offered by the Red Army.

The CSIR had to join the German 11th Army of the Rundstedt Group, which was deployed along the lower reaches of the Dnjester and was about to act on the left to envelop the enemy troops located between the Dnjester and the Bug.

Already after the first contact between the general in command of the expeditionary force and the higher command, elements of friction appeared: the former tended to use his troops massively only after complete concentration, the German command faced with the needs of the ongoing battle, also proposed its use in parts.

On August 6, General Messe recognized the need for the Superior Commander to commit the only available division, the Pasubio, which could move entirely by trucks. With this, however, the mirage of road transport of the second division, Torino, which was to continue on foot, vanished; The "Celere", once complete, was to surpass the Torino. The Pasubio, adequately reinforced with motorized troops from the Army Corps, successfully participated in the army's first enveloping action.

Subsequently, the CSIR came under the control of the Armored Group v. Kleist for the jump from the Bug to the Dnjeper, from where it had a defensive task on a vast stretch of the river, a task carried out by the only two existing divisions, the Pasubio and the Celere.

Here the Author intersperses reflections that he detailed in a report for Rome on the policy of Germany at war that was developed through the activity of military and economic organizations, in the form of total hoarding of all kinds. Two social measures were going to have serious repercussions: the mobilization of the labor force and agrarian reform. The mirage of immediate achievements often had the advantage over organic and programmatic plans.

Regarding the attitude of the Italian troops towards the Russian population and towards the prisoners, the author writes that no one could ever prevent our soldier from demonstrating towards the Russian population all his kindness, his innate generosity, the deep sensitivity of his soul, to the point of point that, it is estimated, a "scale of evil" of the different foreigners was established among the Russians that placed the White Russians at the top, then the Germans, the Romanians, the Finns, the Hungarians and, finally , the Italians.

Source: Le esperienze della guerra : la guerra al fronte russo. Messe, Giovanni. Rivista Militare Ticinese. Band(Jahr): 19(1947). Heft 6.
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... II0941.jpg

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a complement..........................

The war on the Russian front

In the subsequent operations for the breakthrough of the Dnieper line, the expeditionary corps had greater activity and was given the opportunity to fight, finally reunited, the battle of Petrikowa, in the victorious epilogue of which the two divisions Pasubio and Torino contributed with a pincer maneuver, and the Celere head-on with the passage of the great river. Over 10 thousand prisoners were taken in these operations which lasted three days. The two Bridging battalions distinguished themselves especially by ensuring communications on the river for the Italian and German troops.

In a special chapter the Author makes some interesting considerations on the logistical situation and on the first serious conflicts with the Germans. He claims that it was above all the logistical insufficiency, due to the lack of mastery of the Mediterranean, which determined the halt and defeat of EI Alamein and that it was again due to a logistical crisis that the armored army of v. Kleist was forced to stop at the threshold of the Caucasus. For the needs of the expeditionary corps, an agreement was drawn up with the Germans, so that a very harmful double logistical dependence resulted.

The Italian administration had insufficient means, especially vehicles, in relation to the needs and the length of the stage lines; the German did not always provide what it was supposed to provide and skimped on means of transport. All the vehicles were suffering from excessive strain, which only a stop in operations could have alleviated. Instead, a new operational change at Donetz was in sight, and winter was also in sight.

It was necessary to march despite the feeling of being at the limit logistical possibilities; the armored group forged ahead towards Rostow and increasingly required the protection of its northern flank. What followed, between October 8 and mid-November, was a series of operations culminating in the capture of Gorlowka, in which, in addition to fighting with the Russian rearguards, it was necessary to contend with shortages of supplies and adverse weather. On November 20, Rostow was occupied, but nine days later the Germans were driven out by a desperate Russian effort.

Now comes the imposed winter break, incessantly disturbed by Russian attacks which gave rise to a series of harsh battles to achieve and maintain a solid winter line corresponding to operational needs. The expeditionary corps sustained a bloody defensive battle between Christmas and New Year's Eve, and another from the third ten days of January to the whole of February and March, always to protect the seriously threatened flank of the army von Kleist.

The Italian administration, better than the German one, had promptly taken steps to equip the troops for the winter campaign. Despite this, the meteorological elements put the resistance of the units to the test; the acts of valor were numerous, the sufferings were great also.

Source: Le esperienze della guerra : la guerra al fronte russo. Messe, Giovanni. Rivista Militare Ticinese. Band(Jahr): 19(1947). Heft 6.

Cheers. Raúl M .