101 Italian WW2 victories & counting

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ironmachine,

I have found the following from my old notes on the Malaga front.

The Nationalists had 14 battalions, but but were short of armour, artillery and mechanization. Given the usually small size of Spanish battalions, this may have amounted to ten thousand men.

Similarly, the 12-15,000 defending Republicans were over-extended, under-equipped, independent militia battalions in poor condition, having been largely starved of supplies and training by their government in favour of the more vital Madrid front. On 11 January they had only 8,132 rifles and sixteen guns on a front of some 150 miles, and no anti-tank or anti-aircraft artillery.

By contrast to both, the Italian force under General Roatta contained at least 10,000 men in three columns and a reserve. The central column was fully motorised and consisted of four Blackshirt battalions, a battery of 65/17 infantry guns, a company of L3/35 tankettes, a platoon of armoured cars, a company of motorised machine guns, a battery of 75/27 field guns, two batteries of 105/28 field guns, two batteries of 149/12 howitzers, a section of 20mm A/A guns and a platoon of engineers. The two flanking columns were only partially motorised, each consisting of three Blackshirt battalions, a battery of 75/27 field guns, a company or platoon of L3/35 tankettes, a battery of 105/28 field guns, a section or battery of 20mm A/A guns, a section of 47/35 A/T guns and a platoon of engineers. In reserve were three more Blackshirt battalions, a platoon of armoured cars, a battery of 105/28 field guns, a battery of 20mm A/A guns and a section of engineers. The armour totalled 35 L3/35s and 26 Ansaldo-Lancia IZM armoured cars.

The Italians were clearly the decisive factor that turned the Malaga front from a static to a mobile one.During the action, some 10,000 Republicans became prisoners, largely because they were swept up in the pursuit along the coast by the mechanized Italians.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ironmachine,

At Guadalajara, Italian losses included 415 (415) dead, 1,969 (1,832) wounded and 163 (496) captured. 25 artillery pieces, 67 trucks and three armoured cars were also lost.

The loss of the artillery pieces is particularly telling in the Italian defeat, as these are usually deployed well behind the front and covered by infantry.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Ironmachine]

I have found the following from my old notes on the Malaga front.
The Nationalists had 14 battalions, but but were short of armour artillery and mechanization. Given the usually small size of Spanish battalions, this may have amounted to ten thousand men.

IIRC, the Spanish columns that took part in the Málaga offensive amounted to 15 infantry battalions (including 3 tabores of Regulares) plus several independent companies. The number of men may be slightly higher. Regarding artillery, it would depend on what you call "short of"; they had about 40 guns, certainly less that the Italians but a good number for the standards of that time.

The Italians were clearly the decisive factor that turned the Malaga front from a static to a mobile one.

No. The presence of additional troops allowed the Nationals to launch a big offensive. But additional Spanish troops would have done it as well.
The Malaga front was not a static front previously to the arrival of the Italian troops. In fact, it had been a mobile front just days before the Italians began their offensive. On 14 January, with no Italians involved, the National troops launched an offensive in the coastal area that in several days captured Estepona, San Pedro de Alcántara and Marbella. Then, on 22 January, National troops from the Granada sector, again without Italian involvement, launched another offensive that conquered Alhama and the surrounding areas in the north of the province of Málaga, ending about 28 January.

During the action, some 10,000 Republicans became prisoners, largely because they were swept up in the pursuit along the coast by the mechanized Italians.

In that, certainly the motorized Italians were a great help. However, though it was a nice round up for the offensive, it has not a direct influence in it; the Republicans had already been defeated and even with a slower chase it would have been difficult that they could have reformed a front much in advance of where they did.

At Guadalajara, Italian losses included 415 (415) dead, 1,969 (1,832) wounded and 163 (496) captured. 25 artillery pieces, 67 trucks and three armoured cars were also lost.

AFAIK, there is no official data on Republican losses, only estimations. However, those estimations seem to be quite consistent, giving about 2,000/2,200 dead, 4,000 wounded and 400 captured/MIA (though some pro-republican authors that give these numbers then inflate the Italian losses to "compensate").

The loss of the artillery pieces is particularly telling in the Italian defeat, as these are usually deployed well behind the front and covered by infantry.

Most of these guns (about 20) were 65/17 pieces, that had advanced with the infantry to give direct support, so they were not "well behind the front and covered by infantry". Again, it should be remembered that the Republicans never reached the original frontline.

Regards.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ironmachine,

You write, "The presence of additional troops allowed the Nationals to launch a big offensive. But additional Spanish troops would have done it as well."

Perhaps, but don't you think that if additional Nationalist troops had been available, Franco wouldn't rather have used them?

The point about the CTV was that it very definitely existed, was available and was "additional" to the Spanish troops. It therefore extended Nationalist possibilities and this became first evident in the nearly annihilatory victory at Malaga.

As I understand it, the Nationalists opened their offensive with a frontal assault on Malaga from the west, which served to draw Republican attention away from the arriving CTV, and it was this that unhinged the Republicans' defences north of Malaga and led to their flight from the city for fear of being surrounded.

As you say, no detailed figures for Republican losses are available. However, whatever they were, they were expended to good effect in that they defeated the Italian offensive and with it the Italian aim of taking the Republican defenders of Madrid in the rear, which, if successful, might have shortened the war by two years.

The 65/17 artillery pieces formed the great majority of the CTV's park. Indeed, I think they may have been the only organic artillery pieces available to the Blackshirt divisions. They were regimental pieces with a range of nearly 7 kilometers. The loss of 25 guns (about 15% of the CTV's artillery park) was one measure of the Italian defeat at Gudalajara. No army likes to leave artillery pieces in enemy hands precisely because they are tangible evidence of defeat.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

I have just found the following from a Spanish source on the internet:

"El peso de la ofensiva, y así coinciden la mayoría de las fuentes, fue llevado por las tropas legionarias italianas. Sin embargo, la prensa y las autoridades nacionales silenciaron la presencia de estas tropas en la ofensiva sobre Málaga (26), y generalmente en la contienda, primero por las repercusiones que podría tener en el contexto internacional y, después, por no reconocer que la victoria se debió, casi prácticamente, a la ayuda italiana.

Podemos afirmar que la caída de Málaga se debió, principalmente, a los fuertes contingentes italianos, entre los que destacaban las unidades motorizadas y su aviación, unido a la falta de preparación, organización y unidad de los defensores republicanos."

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Here is a quite reasonable summary of Guadalajara:

Significado de la batalla

Medida en términos puramente tácticos y estratégicos, Guadalajara fue éxito relativamente menor de las fuerzas republicanas. Habían conseguido detener otro ataque sobre Madrid, como lo habían hecho en el otoño en la Ciudad Universitaria y en febrero en el Jarama; pero no habían sido capaces de realizar ningún avance importante, y ni tan sólo habían recuperado el terreno perdido en las etapas iniciales de la lucha. Por otra parte, las pérdidas republicanas parecen haber sido mayores que las que ellos infligieron a los italianos.

La verdadera importancia de Guadalajara no puede medirse, sin embargo, en términos puramente numéricos, ya que fue mucho más importante desde un punto de vista psicológico y moral, que desde un punto de vista táctico y estratégico. El régimen fascista se apoyaba fuertemente en el mito de la infalibilidad e invencibilidad del Duce. «Mussolini siempre tiene razón», era el slogan pintado en las paredes de todas las ciudades y pueblos italianos. Guadalajara proporcionó el material necesario para un contra-mito. El fascismo había lanzado sus tropas contra la República y había sido rechazado. La magnífica maquinaria de propaganda republicana se puso inmediatamente en acción para anunciar al mundo a bombo y platillo la derrota italiana. La batalla adquirió pronto proporciones épicas. Por ejemplo, Hemingway escribía: «He pasado cuatro días estudiando la batalla sobre el propio terreno con los mandos que la dirigieron y puedo afirmar con orgullo que Brihuega ocupará su lugar en la historia militar junto al resto de las batallas decisivas de todo el mundo.» La moral de los defensores de Madrid y sus simpatizantes en todo el mundo, se elevó considerablemente con este éxito.

La propaganda fascista no tardó en responder. Entre otras hubo una contribución no firmada de Mussolini que se publicó en Il Popolo d'Italia el día 17 de junio bajo el título de «Guadalajara», en la que no se contentaba con afirmar que el resultado de la batalla había sido incierto, sino que se atrevía a declarar que Guadalajara había sido una victoria italiana.

Dijeran lo que dijeran los propagandistas, los italianos sabían que en Guadalajara habían sufrido una vergonzosa derrota, y nadie lo sabía mejor que las tropas y oficiales que habían participado en la batalla. Antes de que el CTV pudiera volver a la acción, debería ser cuidadosamente purgado y reorganizado.

[Ironmachine]

The point about the CTV was that it very definitely existed, was available and was "additional" to the Spanish troops. It therefore extended Nationalist possibilities and this became first evident in the nearly annihilatory victory at Malaga.

The point is that had the Italians sent just the equipment, Spanish troops could have obtained the same results (or better ones, as became evident with their performance at Guadalajara). The CTV performance at Malaga was unimpressive .

The 65/17 artillery pieces formed the great majority of the CTV's park. Indeed, I think they may have been the only organic artillery pieces available to the Blackshirt divisions. They were regimental pieces with a range of nearly 7 kilometers. The loss of 25 guns (about 15% of the CTV's artillery park) was one measure of the Italian defeat at Gudalajara. No army likes to leave artillery pieces in enemy hands precisely because they are tangible evidence of defeat.

At the end of the battle the Italians had conquered an area of about twenty by forty kilometers. This was one measure of the Republican tactical defeat at Guadalajara. No army likes to leave the field in enemy hands precisely because it is tangible evidence of defeat.

[Ironmachine]

General Miaja's report about the battle of Guadalajara shows some interesting details:

En esta situación el día 20 se dan directivas para acentuar de noche la persecución del enemigo, ordenando la formación de dos destacamentos motorizados, a base cada uno de uno o dos batallones y que habrían de marchar el primero sobre Almadrones y Cerro de San Cristóbal y el otro a Alcolea del Pinar. Estas directivas no pudieron ser llevadas a la práctica por haberse comprobado la existencia de fuertes resistencias enemigas que pusieron de manifiesto que el contacto se había ya establecido, que nos encontrábamos delante de una línea fuerte y que para romper la cual se hacía preciso montar una nueva maniobra. Prueba elocuente de ello es el contraataque sufrido por nuestras fuerzas en dirección norte-sur hacia el pueblo de Muduex y alturas inmediatas, que fue ocupado por el adversario y que indicaba ya su propósito de mantenerse en posiciones ventajosas sobre el flanco izquierdo de nuestro avance. En su vista, se ordenó establecerse definitivamente sobre la línea vértice Palacios-linde norte del bosque del Cerro de la Hija-El Horcajo-Canto de los Mancebos-Alturas al sur de Yela, como posición principal de resistencia, manteniéndose como línea avanzada la de contacto con el enemigo[...]
Fundamentos de la decisión del mando de pasar a la defensiva. Si establecemos una comparación entre los medios empleados por el enemigo y la finalidad de su ataque por una parte, y por otra la constitución que tenían nuestas fuerzas en el frente de Guadalajara al iniciarse la actividad de aquél y los medios de todas clases que han podido ponerse en juego para contrarrestar la maniobra adversaria, este mando llega a la conclusión de que se ha obtenido un éxito verdaderamente franco.
La detención de nuestro ataque se imponía, a juicio del general que suscribe, por la siguientes razones:
Las fuerzas empeñadas en primera línea tenían completamente agotada su capacidad de penetración[...]
[...]No ha sido posible emplear más fuerzas[...]
[...]Nuestra acción ofensiva tenía que paralizarse por la razón fundamental de que nuestro flanco izquierdo no pudo progresar todo lo necesario para romper la amenaza que suponían las posiciones enemigas de aquel sector sobre las comunicaciones del resto de nuestro dispositivo. a abatir precisamente ese flanco se encaminaron nuestros ataques sobre Padilla de Hita y Copernal, que quedaron paralizados por la seria resistencia del enemigo[...]
[...]Estabilizado, al menos provisionalmente, el frente de Guadalajara, en el cual subsiste aún la amenaza sobre nuestro flanco izquierdo, este mando vuelve a preocuparse de la reorganización de sus fuerzas y de la constitución de nuevas reservas que permitan mirar al porvenir con confianza y optimismo.
Madrid, 30 de marzo de 1937.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ironmachine,

We are discussing the CTV, not an arbitrary group of thousands of Italians. You cannot artificially separate the CTV from its equipment. It came as a package and it did what it did as a package. At everywhere except Guadalajara it achieved its objectives as a package.

You seem to assume that the Nationalists had troops to spare for this re-equipment in early 1937. in fact the Nationalists were outnumbered until the last year of the war. At the time of Guadalajara, the Italians in the CTV contributed about 10% of Nationalist manpower.

Furthermore, the Italians did also massively re-equip the Nationalists. By the second half of 1937 some 70% of their artillery was Italian. It was never a matter of the CTV or Italian weaponry. The Nationalists got both.

Furthermore, as the war progressed, the CTV became increasingly hispanicized anyway, especially in the infantry.

You write, "At the end of the battle the Italians had conquered an area of about twenty by forty kilometers." So what? Was this the Italian objective? No! Madrid was the objective. As a consolation, did the area perhaps contain sites of strategic importance or significant population centres? Again, No! The ground the Italians gained had no particular significance. The Republicans were probably right not to make a fetish of getting all the ground back for its own sake. As Miaja wrote, "Estabilizado, al menos provisionalmente, el frente de Guadalajara, en el cual subsiste aún la amenaza sobre nuestro flanco izquierdo, este mando vuelve a preocuparse de la reorganización de sus fuerzas y de la constitución de nuevas reservas que permitan mirar al porvenir con confianza y optimismo."

When you write, "No army likes to leave the field in enemy hands precisely because it is tangible evidence of defeat" you are right. And not only did the Italians leave the scene of almost all the intense fighting in Republican hands, but part of their artillery as well.

You post "The CTV performance at Malaga was unimpressive." Yes but, given the weakness of the Republican opposition, it didn't have to be impressive to achieve its objectives, which it duly did.



Cheers,

Sid.

[Ironmachine]

We are discussing the CTV, not an arbitrary group of thousands of Italians. You cannot artificially separate the CTV from its equipment. It came as a package and it did what it did as a package. At everywhere except Guadalajara it achieved its objectives as a package.

I'm not artificially separating anything. Had the weapons arrived without men, Spanish units could have been formed that could have performed in a similar way. The Italian weapons were vital for the Nationals, the men of the CTV were unnecessary. I'm just stating that the CTV's performance was what should be expected of a superbly equipped, highly motorized unit (or worse that that in a few occasions). The same results could have (and were) obtained by other (Spanish) units with the same (or worse) level of equipment.

You seem to assume that the Nationalists had troops to spare for this re-equipment in early 1937. in fact the Nationalists were outnumbered until the last year of the war. At the time of Guadalajara, the Italians in the CTV contributed about 10% of Nationalist manpower.

As is evident, the fact that the Nationals were outnumbered was never a problema for them, and they could have called more replacements if needed (they actually called to arms less "quintas" than the Republicans). Again, had the equipment been available, the men would have been no problem. Still, even if the men would have not been available, this in no way relates to the CTV's performance. You are making an argument about troop availability, not about troop performance.

Furthermore, the Italians did also massively re-equip the Nationalists. By the second half of 1937 some 70% of their artillery was Italian. It was never a matter of the CTV or Italian weaponry. The Nationalists got both.

Yes, the Italians did massively equip (not really re-equip) the Nationals. This is well known, and I never said otherwise. Italian material help was probably the most important factor in the Nationals' victory. And yes, the Nationals got both Italian weaponry and the Italian CTV, but the Italian weapons used by the CTV were Italian weapons that were not received by Spanish troops. The real question is whether the performance of the CTV could have been matched or even improved by Spanish units with that same level of equipment. My opinion is that it could have been.

Furthermore, as the war progressed, the CTV became increasingly hispanicized anyway, especially in the infantry.

Without any loss of efficacy, which again shows that the CTV's performance was nothing unexpected from any superbly equipped, highly motorized unit.

You write, "At the end of the battle the Italians had conquered an area of about twenty by forty kilometers." So what? Was this the Italian objective? No! Madrid was the objective.

Yes. But I never said that the CTV got a big victory at Guadalajara. They obtained a very small tactical victory, of no significance specially when compared with the strategic defeat, the moral defeat and the propaganda defeat. By the way, which were the Republican objectives in this battle?
And a little remark: Madrid was not the objective, the objective was to cut the Valencia-Madrid road which was the supply line for Madrid.

As a consolation, did the area perhaps contain sites of strategic importance or significant population centres? Again, No!

No, and for that Guadalajara was an Italian strategic defeat, which I never doubted. However, it should be noted that the conquered area posed a danger for the Republicans' right flank (Miaja dixit) that could have been exploited. The Republicans failed to eliminate this danger.

The ground the Italians gained had no particular significance. The Republicans were probably right not to make a fetish of getting all the ground back for its own sake.

Ah, but they did want to get all the ground back and they tried to recover it, only they couldn't. As Miaja's report states, the Republicans did not want to stop, they had to stop:

La detención de nuestro ataque se imponía, a juicio del general que suscribe, por la siguientes razones:
Las fuerzas empeñadas en primera línea tenían completamente agotada su capacidad de penetración[...]
[...]No ha sido posible emplear más fuerzas[...]
[...]Nuestra acción ofensiva tenía que paralizarse por la razón fundamental de que nuestro flanco izquierdo no pudo progresar todo lo necesario para romper la amenaza que suponían las posiciones enemigas de aquel sector sobre las comunicaciones del resto de nuestro dispositivo. a abatir precisamente ese flanco se encaminaron nuestros ataques sobre Padilla de Hita y Copernal, que quedaron paralizados por la seria resistencia del enemigo[...]

So talking about unachieved objectives...

As Miaja wrote, "Estabilizado, al menos provisionalmente, el frente de Guadalajara, en el cual subsiste aún la amenaza sobre nuestro flanco izquierdo, este mando vuelve a preocuparse de la reorganización de sus fuerzas y de la constitución de nuevas reservas que permitan mirar al porvenir con confianza y optimismo."

So at least the Italians obtained some advantageous positions that put in danger the left flank of the Republican deployment.

When you write, "No army likes to leave the field in enemy hands precisely because it is tangible evidence of defeat" you are right. And not only did the Italians leave the scene of almost all the intense fighting in Republican hands, but part of their artillery as well.

And not only did the Republicans lost about 800 square kilometers of terrain, but they presumably had higher losses than the Italians and they were left with their left flank exposed.

You post "The CTV performance at Malaga was unimpressive." Yes but, given the weakness of the Republican opposition, it didn't have to be impressive to achieve its objectives, which it duly did.

Yes, and as their performance was unimpressive, it could have been matched by any other similar unit. In fact, at Málaga Spanish units far worse equipped performed similarly to the CTV.

[Ironmachine]

As after such a convoluted discussion it is easy to lose sight of the initial points argued, I will explain mine here again:

1)The performance of the CTV owed most to being superbly equipped, motorized and armored (when considered in the SCW enviroment, of course), and was no better than was to be expected in these circumstances. There was no additional identifiable quality of "CTVedness" that enhanced their performance. Indeed, when they acted alone (as at Guadalajara) their performance was far worse than expected. After Guadalajara, reinforced by selective recruitment of volunteers and profesional soldiers, always motorized, with its own armour and extremely powerful artillery support, they performed well (but not significantly better than other Spanish units that operated with them). But wasn't this what one had reason to expect of pre-war regulars, reinforced by selected volunteers, always motorized and with its own armour? (This paragraph may sound familiar to you, because I have paraphrased your arguments in the "Why the Waffen-SS" thread).

2) I have never seen any serious military study about the Spanish Civil War in Spanish (I don't look much at SCW bibliography in English) in which it is said that the CTV performed worse in the Spanish Civil War than it really did. Its performance (but for Guadalajara) was as should be expected and thus it is recognized.

3) If there is some undervaluing of the CTV, it is to be found when talking about the battle of Guadalajara, where its performance was better than is generally acknowledged (but still far worse that should have been expected, specially regarding command and staff work). However, as it was the one battle where the CTV fought alone and the strategic failure was complete and the moral defeat was even worse, it is easy to focus on it to criticize the CTV's performance, though tactically it can not be considered an Italian defeat.

Regards.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ironmachine,

Had the CTV's equipment arrived without the men, the Nationalists would have to have found 35,000 extra men to use it. The CTV's men were a significant asset to the Nationalists in 1937, adding some 10% to their numerical strength when they were significantly outnumbered.

However, that is irrelevant. We are discussing the CTV as it existed, not as it did not exist. Doubtless 35,000 German regulars could have used the same equipment better, but they didn't exist either.

I have never contended that there was any particular quality of "CTV-edness". I have said from the start that the Blackshirts were generally poor, as many of them had enlisted to do labouring in Italian East Africa, and were surprised to end up as combatants in Spain. Thousands were repatriated as useless after Guadalajara.

My point is that the defeat of Guadalajara, and the effective propaganda use made of it by the Republicans, has dominated the image of the CTV ever since and has obscured its successes elsewhere in Spain. It was arguably decisive at Malaga, thereby being highly influential in securing the Nationalists their first major Mediterranean sea port. It was the force that entered Santander, the main seaport used by Republican blockade runners to supply their enclave in the north. It was an important component in the Nationalist drive to the Mediterranean which cut the Republic in two again. It also took a full part in the clearance of Catalonia until ordered to halt short of the French border for political reasons. Its artillery was influential beyond these offensive operations in supporting Nationalist defenders on the Ebro. Yer all of these combined get less coverage than the single reverse at Guadalajara, which was the nearest it got to an independent operation..

I agree that the CTV, or at least the Army elements of it, performed better than they are generally credited for at Guadalajara, but this doesn't stop it being a defeat.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Sorry, I missed a chunk of your earlier post.

You wrote, "You are making an argument about troop availability, not about troop performance." Yup. I never claimed the CTV was a military elite, just that, Guadalajara aside, its other, lesser known, operations were all successful. No major Nationalist offensive operations took place without it after Guadalajara and its availability earlier at Malaga may have been decisive.

I do not find it at all plausible that "the fact that the Nationals were outnumbered was never a problema for them." Particularly at the beginning, when they were largely reliant on the 35,000 man Army of Africa for the key offensive operation against Madrid, numbers were a real problem. The CTV, also 35,000 strong at its peak, arrived at just this time.

Although not of the professional quality of the Spanish regulares, the CTV represented an extra asset that may have been decisive at Malaga, It was deployed on the northern flank of the Malaga defences and threatened to cut the city off. This was arguably decisive in the Republican decision to abandon the city. Its mobility in the follow-up was also important in ensuring that only a small minority of the defenders escaped.

You post, "The real question is whether the performance of the CTV could have been matched or even improved by Spanish units with that same level of equipment. My opinion is that it could have been." Well, no, that is your real question, not mine. It is entirely possible that Spanish troops could have used much of the CTV's equipment as well as the Italians fairly quickly, given how poor the Blackshirts often were. Indeed, the infantry of the three Flecha divisions became increasingly Spanish after Guadalajara.

But I again come back to the point that I, at least, am talking about the real world activities of the CTV as it actually existed, not your "what-if" alternative.

I can't really see Guadalajara as even "a small tactical victory" for the CTV. It made quick early progress over ground of no major significance against weak opposition, but when the two main forces clashed it lost half its early gains and about 15% of its artillery. Only the intervention of the Italian Army's Littorio Division prevented a complete rout of the Blackshirt divisions. If you are looking for a redeeming tactical feature within the overall defeat, this is probably it.

You ask "what were the Republican objectives in this battle"? The Republicans did not initiate the battle, so their main aim was to foil the Italian aims. This they did effectively. The Italians were not only stopped in their tracks, but pushed back with loss. Doubtless the Republicans would have liked to achieve more, but who wouldn't? They had every reason to be satisfied with the result as it stood and sensibly did not turn it into a long battle of attrition. Instead they regrouped nearer Madrid.

You post, "Madrid was not the objective, the objective was to cut the Valencia-Madrid road which was the supply line for Madrid." Yes. But what was the point of cutting the road? I would suggest that it was to bring about the fall of Madrid.

If the Nationalists considered the little bit of ground that the CT gained at Guadalajara to be a significant springboard for further operations, they certainly never exploited it. Similarly, the Republicans never felt so threatened by it that they tried to eliminate it.

Miaja does not say that the small Italian gain of ground represented a menace. He says the Guadalajara front was a menace. He is more concerned about stabilizing that front than where it stood.

Cheers,

Sid

[durb]

Checking the claims of Aviazione Legionaria (AL, Italian Aviation Legion) in Spanish Civil War. In total Italian pilots claimed 674 Republican planes in Spanish Civil War. And these are confirmed claims by 3.1.1939. Some of the claims are clearly exaggerated (as is usual with air victory claims). For example AL pilots claimed that 209 I-16 enemy fighters were shot down (+ 68 probables). At the same time Legion Condor (LC) pilots claimed 135 I-16 confirmed. To this one should add the claims of Aviación Nacional (Spanish Nationalist Air Force). But AL+LC claims were together 344 "Ratas" confimed - IIRC, 276 "Ratas" were delivered to Spain by Soviets. AL + LC could not have shot down more "Ratas" (344) than were in total (276) delivered to Spain.

I believe that AL was succesfull in Spain, but not as much as it claimed (the same can be said in some extent of air victory records of Legion Condor also). Interesting thing sometimes speculated is if the claim record of AL was a "Pyrrhic victory" because it showed too optimistic kill/loss -ratio for Fiat CR 32 biplane over more advanced I-16 monoplane. This could indeed have launched the mistaken Fiat CR 42 -project and delayed the necessary modernization of Italian fighter force.

[Ironmachine]

Well, despite their too optimistic kill/loss ratios (which every air force in the SCW made), the Italians actually got their facts right: the CR 32 was a worthy opponent for the I-16, and the CR 42 much more so. However, biplane development was reaching a dead end, while monoplane design had still to reach the "green fields beyond". In other words, the CR 42 may have been able to take on the I-16, but it simply was not on the same category of the Bf 109 or the Spitfire, for example. However, the Italians should not have made this mistake. Did the Italians fail to realize that, or decided to ignore it, or were other interests in play? The Spanish Air Force, for example, which had the same reasons to be satisfied with the performance of the CR 32 as the Italians (though certainly it had a more intimate knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages of the I-16, and had access to the Bf 109 for comparisons), decided after the war to reequip its fighter arm with monoplanes, namely the Bf 109.