Italian combat effectiveness
Re: Italian combat effectiveness
I would imagine that the Italian Officer Corps was judged on loyalty to the Fascist Party along with other qualities. The fact about the Italian Economy was resource poor. Once the Royal Navy got started, there was really only rail transport available to Italy. The Germans also took over Italian suppliers. What was the chances that the Germans would allow Swedish Iron Ore to share the German rail system?
Mussolini was scared to death of a military coup. I remember a quote of his stating: "The King will never ask me how large our divisions are, just how many!". The Binary design created divisions that were two thirds the size of most Great War Divisions. The Artillery Park had a lot of 50 year old pieces, many taken from Austria. Most of the more modern pieces were Pack Artillery. The economy could not build more, in a faster manner. At least the Soviet Union had incountry sources of iron and other ores.
Mussolini was scared to death of a military coup. I remember a quote of his stating: "The King will never ask me how large our divisions are, just how many!". The Binary design created divisions that were two thirds the size of most Great War Divisions. The Artillery Park had a lot of 50 year old pieces, many taken from Austria. Most of the more modern pieces were Pack Artillery. The economy could not build more, in a faster manner. At least the Soviet Union had incountry sources of iron and other ores.
Re: Italian combat effectiveness
Hard facts and bean counting is part of the "analysis" but only one part since combat power is focused on many drivers. It is composed of both tangible and intangible elements. Glantz's books are essentially troop movements that require the reader to bring their mental models into the comprehension and read between the lines. The German divisions were clearly superior to the Soviet in 41/42 before the infantry crisis of 43-45. The Italian and axis allied divisions were largely used defensively in the offensives of 42 or in a supporting role, such as holding ground or helping compress pockets. Axis Allied formations played a major role in taking the Crimea in 1941 but took heavy losses. The Italian army quickly fell apart in the battle of Stalingrad.Stiltzkin wrote: ↑18 Oct 2018, 02:15That is completely irrelevant, hard facts are relevant. Consumption, aiming, leading, supplying, fighting, peng peng, boom boom, enemy soldiers die, fire back, your soldiers die. Based on posture, morale, logistics etc. you can quantify the performance. If you are stating that Italy was technologically inferior to the Soviet Union, well then I declare that this might be a myth, since Italy is more developed than Russia. Anecdotal evidence is the last thing I put under the magnifying glass.
From the tables you posted the 1941 Soviet division is better equipped than the Italian...
Re: Italian combat effectiveness
Well, if that is the case then this will translate into disparities on the battlefield. Then you can quantify it. Penalties increase losses and guess what: You can quantify it. However, I would not be so sure. The tables say nothing about quality, munitions supply and leadership. German Divisions were significantly more powerful than the average Soviet Division, you cannot necessarily derive this from the table.From the tables you posted the 1941 Soviet division is better equipped than the Italian...
To be perfectly honest, Glantz is totally overrated and he is no authority on the Italian forces.Glantz's books
Re: Italian combat effectiveness
He covers Italian troop movements on a day to day basis...
Would you put Italian divisions as the same value as Soviet in 43-45? Germans divisions later on in the war had lower value than earlier.
In finance we have a practice of valuing a business via spreadsheet as well. The flaw is that it's based on the cash flows of the past. It serves as a talking point and triangulation device more than anything else.
"Modeling" a military must by necessity, be based on "past" data and should suffer the same issues as any other spreadsheet forecasting.
Would you put Italian divisions as the same value as Soviet in 43-45? Germans divisions later on in the war had lower value than earlier.
In finance we have a practice of valuing a business via spreadsheet as well. The flaw is that it's based on the cash flows of the past. It serves as a talking point and triangulation device more than anything else.
"Modeling" a military must by necessity, be based on "past" data and should suffer the same issues as any other spreadsheet forecasting.
Re: Italian combat effectiveness
The Soviet Division is much better in Artillery and they are modern. The Soviet 76mm Regimental Gun by itself outperforms the Italian guns.
Re: Italian combat effectiveness
Then I am sure you can post a summary here.He covers Italian troop movements on a day to day basis...
If I remember correctly TDI had an analysis of Italian troops, their performance was rated in the range of Soviet and Japanese troops.
A correct analysis would take weeks, I do not have this time, but if someone had casualties, force strengths and committed unit data together with ammunition consumption for the listed operations that would significantly shorten the time.The Soviet Division is much better in Artillery and they are modern. The Soviet 76mm Regimental Gun by itself outperforms the Italian guns.
Re: Italian combat effectiveness
Heres more, as I expected it was a mortar heavy army.
http://www.regioesercito.it/reparti/art ... rvento.htm
http://www.regioesercito.it/reparti/art ... rvento.htm
Re: Italian combat effectiveness
I just did.
The late war soviet divisions became more like reinforced brigades attached to Rifle corps HQ. The whole rifle corps was really the unit- personnel size about equal to 1.5- 2 x Western divisions. The whole rifle corps itself was saturated with weapons, a very different situation than in 42 and 41.
The late war soviet divisions became more like reinforced brigades attached to Rifle corps HQ. The whole rifle corps was really the unit- personnel size about equal to 1.5- 2 x Western divisions. The whole rifle corps itself was saturated with weapons, a very different situation than in 42 and 41.
Re: Italian combat effectiveness
?I just did.
?He covers Italian troop movements on a day to day basis...
From which can be derived that....?
"Saturated with weapons" is actually a rather relative term and it does not seem that the Soviet weapon output was particularly low in 41 (or even before the war for that matter). It is not like Soviet performance improved drastically from 41 to 44 (in fact, the quality of their personnel was probably higher in 1941). The number of weapons is not exactly a measure for effectiveness either, it certainly can be, but does not have to be (it is a matter of organization and utilization). If it is larger, then it most likely has more men (i.e. more hands to feed), hence the requirement for more weapons, whether they have greater per capita munitions supply and or additional subtleties (such as artillery sound ranging, sophisticated communication lines) is a whole different question.The late war soviet divisions became more like reinforced brigades attached to Rifle corps HQ. The whole rifle corps was really the unit- personnel size about equal to 1.5- 2 x Western divisions. The whole rifle corps itself was saturated with weapons, a very different situation than in 42 and 41.
Anyway, I already calculated that the increase of firepower (theoretical) for a Soviet Division in 1944 was at about 190% of the prewar levels, resulting in an increase of 90% (actual) and both American and German firepower was greater and exceeded Soviet levels in 1944, still. Raising the Soviet munitions supply to German levels resulted in an increase of casualty infliction by a factor of 1.7 (raw).