The start of this discussion was in the Italian "Allied" forces absent the 1943 invasion and co-belligerent status thread. During that discussion, the book War in Italy by Lamb was cited, discussing the Italian Co-belligerent Force. I have since obtained a copy of Lamb's book.
The key terms in the statement above that shaped my participation are ‘advisors’ and ‘British Imperial Model’. These two terms, when used together, connotate a different role for the advisors.Sheldrake wrote: ↑08 Feb 2020 09:13The light Italian divisions or legions fitted into the British Imperial model of "Native Troops", as Italian units and formations had British advisers absent from Free French or Polish forces. The Italian artillery was complemented by the abundant British artillery. In Autumn 1944 the British Army was very short of infantrymen. The two RHA Regiments of the disbanded 1st Armoured Division ended up supporting the Italians. In 1944-45 Italian partisans were an effective distraction for the German and RSI forces in Northern Italy.
Advisors. When the decision to use advisors is one taken willing without outside pressure/force, they offer experience and different points of view to the leader/commander/staffs. The significant point here is that their advice can be accepted or rejected and they have no command authority. When they act, they act under the authority given by the leader/commander. They don't have any authority of their own. They can be ignored/dismissed at will.
When I read the term coupled with British Imperial Model, I understand it in a different way. Here the advisors are not a voluntary aspect limited to offering experience and different points of view, but they have actual command authority that is outside the normal chain of command. In the British Imperial Model, these officers can/often occupy TO&E command/staff positions in the force.
The phrase British Imperial Model, by itself, implies a greater degree of control that is more than what is normal in a military superior/subordinate relationship. An example is how regular officers are senior to Indian officers of the same grade.
That is the crucial bit I am addressing.
If there has been a misunderstanding, I feel strongly that this is the source. But if the opposite position is that the British Liaisons did have authority outside the Co-belligerent Army’s chain of command, then that is what needs to be discussed.