Just nitpicking. Romania never bought CR-42s.Jon G. wrote: For what it is worth, the CR 42 was a popular export article also prior to the war. Assuming that the Italians never built the CR 42, they would also lack the foreign currency brought in by exporting it to Sweden, Belgium, Romania etc.
Was the italien soldiers more worse soldiers then others?
Observations of Gen. von Senger
I missed most of the disccusion on this thread but I wanted to add an interesting history lesson, quoted from the following book:
"Neither Fear Nor Hope" by General Frido von Senger Und Etterlin, the defender of Cassino.
Italian soldiers are neither better nor worse than the soldiers of any other nation. All men are by nature fond of the family, of life and peace. To enjoy war is surely degenerate; it appeals more to the single, adventure-seeking man than to the father of a family. Yet in the life of a nation the father, as head of the smallest unit, is more important than the adventurous youth, who in war is the first to be sacrificed. This fact was even more significant to the Italian, who lives so much within the family, than to the German. If the father of a large and young family is killed in action, the only result is bitterness and woe.
Before the days of Mussolini, Italy was not averse to war. How otherwise could it have successfully borne the heavy and protracted battles of the Isonzo during the First World War? Piedmont is the cradle of Italy’s military prowess. With the exception of Prussia, no dynasty was ever as militant as the House of Savoy. It was the campaigns of the Piedmontese battalions that unified Italy, thereby fulfilling the dreams of many generations. Everywhere the memorials bore witness to this fact.
At Turin and in that neighborhood were a number of military schools. The Peidmontese nobility, like the Prussian one, put service in the army on a higher plane than any other service to the state. The discipline was good. In Piedmont there were also many alpine units, the best that the Italian Army could produce---proud, quiet, outwardly not very disciplined troops, but reliable types, brought up the heard way, accustomed to camping in the eternal snows with only the barest supplies. They were magnificent soldiers, to whose pride and modesty I paid tribute whenever I happened to encounter an Alpino. The Navy, too, was good, though I had few contacts with it.
Words of General Frido von Senger Und Etterlin, the commander of German XIV Panzer Corps in Italy and the defender of Cassino. Quoted from page 49.
Steve
"Neither Fear Nor Hope" by General Frido von Senger Und Etterlin, the defender of Cassino.
Italian soldiers are neither better nor worse than the soldiers of any other nation. All men are by nature fond of the family, of life and peace. To enjoy war is surely degenerate; it appeals more to the single, adventure-seeking man than to the father of a family. Yet in the life of a nation the father, as head of the smallest unit, is more important than the adventurous youth, who in war is the first to be sacrificed. This fact was even more significant to the Italian, who lives so much within the family, than to the German. If the father of a large and young family is killed in action, the only result is bitterness and woe.
Before the days of Mussolini, Italy was not averse to war. How otherwise could it have successfully borne the heavy and protracted battles of the Isonzo during the First World War? Piedmont is the cradle of Italy’s military prowess. With the exception of Prussia, no dynasty was ever as militant as the House of Savoy. It was the campaigns of the Piedmontese battalions that unified Italy, thereby fulfilling the dreams of many generations. Everywhere the memorials bore witness to this fact.
At Turin and in that neighborhood were a number of military schools. The Peidmontese nobility, like the Prussian one, put service in the army on a higher plane than any other service to the state. The discipline was good. In Piedmont there were also many alpine units, the best that the Italian Army could produce---proud, quiet, outwardly not very disciplined troops, but reliable types, brought up the heard way, accustomed to camping in the eternal snows with only the barest supplies. They were magnificent soldiers, to whose pride and modesty I paid tribute whenever I happened to encounter an Alpino. The Navy, too, was good, though I had few contacts with it.
Words of General Frido von Senger Und Etterlin, the commander of German XIV Panzer Corps in Italy and the defender of Cassino. Quoted from page 49.
Steve
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PanzerKing
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There were several main problems of the Italiam Army that made their infantry look bad.
1. Organisation: Like everyone has mentioned before, a million man army looked better on paper and that's what they went for. Italy needed to totally reorganize their army in the 1930s if they were to fight a large modern war, not just local colonial wars. They should have built 20-25 infantry divisions of the 3-regiment type and increase the number of heavy artillery as well. 12 x 100mm guns just wasn't enough. They could have kept the 3 armored and motorized divisions, they would have complimented the infantry well.
2. Technology and Industry Rivalries: When the aircraft manufactures realized they couldn't build a decent inline engine of a 1000hp or more, they should of immediatly looked to importing a such an engine or for a license to build it themselves. Instead they were only worried about making their money and issued the air force inferior planes. This was also the case of with many of the vehicles and other infantry equipment. The industry was not looking out for the best interests of the army. They were only concerned with making their money and getting contracts before the other companies.
1. Organisation: Like everyone has mentioned before, a million man army looked better on paper and that's what they went for. Italy needed to totally reorganize their army in the 1930s if they were to fight a large modern war, not just local colonial wars. They should have built 20-25 infantry divisions of the 3-regiment type and increase the number of heavy artillery as well. 12 x 100mm guns just wasn't enough. They could have kept the 3 armored and motorized divisions, they would have complimented the infantry well.
2. Technology and Industry Rivalries: When the aircraft manufactures realized they couldn't build a decent inline engine of a 1000hp or more, they should of immediatly looked to importing a such an engine or for a license to build it themselves. Instead they were only worried about making their money and issued the air force inferior planes. This was also the case of with many of the vehicles and other infantry equipment. The industry was not looking out for the best interests of the army. They were only concerned with making their money and getting contracts before the other companies.
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Christian W.
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One doesnt have to go back very far in history to see Italians as some of the most prodigious warriors in the world, in fact, their martial history is probably more splendid over time than any other nation on earth (Roman Empire, city states of Milan, Genoa and Venice and so on). For centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire Italians were the most sought after mercenaries in the medieval world and individual Italian city states took on entire countries and won.
Apart strongly motivated elite or fascist- nazi units of RSI , italian army was composed of enlisted men and , patriotically speaking, they were individualist and (past first easy victory in abyssinia and albania ) not so much motivated by a war which was , mainly , Mussolini's war !
no comparision with Russians , Germans or Japanese , indoctrinated people
which fought with more or less fanatism till the end
"a good soldier is the one who knows what he is fighting for "
no comparision with Russians , Germans or Japanese , indoctrinated people
which fought with more or less fanatism till the end
"a good soldier is the one who knows what he is fighting for "
When you read books or magazines regarding Italian soldiers you can be forgiven for thinking that they all were cowards but you know that your not getting the whole picture.
As for being badly equipped yes it does play a big part in the ability to win a battle but there are also other factors involved too. Our boys on crete had almost no air protection, no shovels to even dig trenches, bugger all communications yet still wrecked havoc on the Germans who were crack troops with submachine guns against guys with outdated rifles.
As for being badly equipped yes it does play a big part in the ability to win a battle but there are also other factors involved too. Our boys on crete had almost no air protection, no shovels to even dig trenches, bugger all communications yet still wrecked havoc on the Germans who were crack troops with submachine guns against guys with outdated rifles.
dakota, the same happened to the Commonwealth troops fighting against Italians at Keren, el Alamein and often enough elsewhere, it happened to the Americans at Kesserine or at Gela, yet, the immage of the Italian soldier is bound with the idea of cowardice: I wonder why. British and americans too had their Compass and Caporetto in Burma, in Somaliland, in the Filippines, at Dunkirk but nobody says they were coward, but they too ran more than one time.
I saw recently a documentary on Discovery (or was it History channel?) about El Alamein: the message was that Montgomery never really had an issue with that: if some british unit was defeated it "panicked", the attack against the south (italian) flank never really was meant to get through and "surprisingly" the Italian Trieste division fought till the last instead of surrender "as it was to be expected"... well, I expected a little less bias.
I saw recently a documentary on Discovery (or was it History channel?) about El Alamein: the message was that Montgomery never really had an issue with that: if some british unit was defeated it "panicked", the attack against the south (italian) flank never really was meant to get through and "surprisingly" the Italian Trieste division fought till the last instead of surrender "as it was to be expected"... well, I expected a little less bias.
Undoubtably because Italy was on the other (and losing) side of the war they are not held in the same light as British or Americans in many books that you find. Many people know about the daring Dambusters raid but how many people have heard about the rescue mission of Mussolini by German special forces?
As I continue to read more of General von Senger's book, I find it interesting that he has a high regard for the Italian soldier and citizen, while showing disdain for many of those in the German high command.
In any discussion about the Italian soldier's performance in WW2, the question arises as to their loyalty to their ally and their own country. The Germans saw the Italians as traitors who lacked the will to fight. In a section of General von Senger's book that followed the battle of Sicily, he summarized the importance of that battle and the decision that Italy made to seek peace.
END OF THE COALITION
Through all accounts of the Sicilian campaign, there is a thread of mistrust, disappointment, treachery and even hatred against the Italians.
Italy’s decision to enter the war was no doubt mainly attributable to that optimistic and more susceptible stratum of Italians whose outlook on life was nearer to that of the Germans, but their attitude changed as the war progressed. The realization that the situation held no hope had spread among the people. The growing loss of prestige had undermined the self-confidence of the nation. The numerous humiliations imposed by the German ally had increased the weariness of war.
There was too a basic difference in the national mentality of the two nations. The Italian is by nature more critical and therefore politically more mature than the German. The idea that the war could be won by optimism and trustful resolution did not register with the Italians; the intellectuals already realized that it was lost when the offensive in Russia came to a standstill. When this conviction percolated to the man in the street, it was bound to lead to defeatism. After her humiliating experience in North Africa, Italy’s insistence on keeping the supreme command of the forces defending her native soil in her own hands can hardly be designated as a sign of intended treachery. It was the Fascists themselves who pressed for the energetic conduct of the war, who rejected the proposed sacrifice of Italian soil up to the Gothic Line and who wanted to continue the fight by the side of their ally. The only way to prevent the defection of Italy was to make the defense of her own soil the sacred cause of her people. To achieve this it was essential to eliminate any humiliation of the Italian Army leadership, and to avoid giving the impression that the continuance of the war now exclusively a German interest.
Hitler, who had ordered this command set-up or had agreed to it, might well have pondered over how the Italian leadership could be more or less blatantly brushed aside. Before the discussion on June 22, he had allowed me to see the report from a German general who had acted as a kind of liaison officer after Rommel’s recall from North Africa. Blowing his own trumpet, this general described how he had short-circuited and offended the Italian commander. Yet Rommel’s position in North Africa had long ago persuaded the Italians that the war had become a German affair, and not they wanted to be rid of this system.
Even after Mussolini had fallen from power and Italy’s defection was being prepared in Rome, the Italian 6th Army Command in Sicily continued to co-operate loyally with the Germans, because it was ordered to do so. Later, when the German-sponsored puppet Republican-Fascist Government wanted to execute General Guzzoni as a traitor, I was able with a clear conscience to bear witness to his loyalty to the Axis in Sicily.
It is amazing how little even the more important German leaders foresaw the consequences of the Italian collapse. They could not see that the two allies were like climbers on a precipice; if one should fall, he would so strain the rope that the other could make no further progress. Many German military men seemed to be aiming at cutting away the Italian ballast, and were loud in advocating this course.
To this political and military concept was added another factor. Like most of my Italian and German political friends, I had long realized that the war was lost. The O.K.W. had directed that the close ties with our Italian ally should be maintained. This engendered the hope that the fall of Mussolini would also bring down Hitler’s Nazi Government and thus spare the German people the last agony. Yet that people not only lacked the political instinct to produce such a result, but it possessed no sovereign state organization comparable to the Italian monarchy that would be capable of winding up the war. Historically speaking, and ignoring the resentful viewpoint of the German ally, Victor Emmanuel II rendered his country as great a service in the Second World War by his timely ending of it as he did in the first war by his determination to stand fast after Caporetto. That he could not openly take this step in agreement with his Nazi ally was due to the latter’s peculiar relations with other powers.
Quoted from:
"Neither Fear Nor Hope" by General Frido von Senger Und Etterlin,
the defender of Cassino and the German liaison officer to Italian 6th Army at Sicily. {Page 152 – 153}
In any discussion about the Italian soldier's performance in WW2, the question arises as to their loyalty to their ally and their own country. The Germans saw the Italians as traitors who lacked the will to fight. In a section of General von Senger's book that followed the battle of Sicily, he summarized the importance of that battle and the decision that Italy made to seek peace.
END OF THE COALITION
Through all accounts of the Sicilian campaign, there is a thread of mistrust, disappointment, treachery and even hatred against the Italians.
Italy’s decision to enter the war was no doubt mainly attributable to that optimistic and more susceptible stratum of Italians whose outlook on life was nearer to that of the Germans, but their attitude changed as the war progressed. The realization that the situation held no hope had spread among the people. The growing loss of prestige had undermined the self-confidence of the nation. The numerous humiliations imposed by the German ally had increased the weariness of war.
There was too a basic difference in the national mentality of the two nations. The Italian is by nature more critical and therefore politically more mature than the German. The idea that the war could be won by optimism and trustful resolution did not register with the Italians; the intellectuals already realized that it was lost when the offensive in Russia came to a standstill. When this conviction percolated to the man in the street, it was bound to lead to defeatism. After her humiliating experience in North Africa, Italy’s insistence on keeping the supreme command of the forces defending her native soil in her own hands can hardly be designated as a sign of intended treachery. It was the Fascists themselves who pressed for the energetic conduct of the war, who rejected the proposed sacrifice of Italian soil up to the Gothic Line and who wanted to continue the fight by the side of their ally. The only way to prevent the defection of Italy was to make the defense of her own soil the sacred cause of her people. To achieve this it was essential to eliminate any humiliation of the Italian Army leadership, and to avoid giving the impression that the continuance of the war now exclusively a German interest.
Hitler, who had ordered this command set-up or had agreed to it, might well have pondered over how the Italian leadership could be more or less blatantly brushed aside. Before the discussion on June 22, he had allowed me to see the report from a German general who had acted as a kind of liaison officer after Rommel’s recall from North Africa. Blowing his own trumpet, this general described how he had short-circuited and offended the Italian commander. Yet Rommel’s position in North Africa had long ago persuaded the Italians that the war had become a German affair, and not they wanted to be rid of this system.
Even after Mussolini had fallen from power and Italy’s defection was being prepared in Rome, the Italian 6th Army Command in Sicily continued to co-operate loyally with the Germans, because it was ordered to do so. Later, when the German-sponsored puppet Republican-Fascist Government wanted to execute General Guzzoni as a traitor, I was able with a clear conscience to bear witness to his loyalty to the Axis in Sicily.
It is amazing how little even the more important German leaders foresaw the consequences of the Italian collapse. They could not see that the two allies were like climbers on a precipice; if one should fall, he would so strain the rope that the other could make no further progress. Many German military men seemed to be aiming at cutting away the Italian ballast, and were loud in advocating this course.
To this political and military concept was added another factor. Like most of my Italian and German political friends, I had long realized that the war was lost. The O.K.W. had directed that the close ties with our Italian ally should be maintained. This engendered the hope that the fall of Mussolini would also bring down Hitler’s Nazi Government and thus spare the German people the last agony. Yet that people not only lacked the political instinct to produce such a result, but it possessed no sovereign state organization comparable to the Italian monarchy that would be capable of winding up the war. Historically speaking, and ignoring the resentful viewpoint of the German ally, Victor Emmanuel II rendered his country as great a service in the Second World War by his timely ending of it as he did in the first war by his determination to stand fast after Caporetto. That he could not openly take this step in agreement with his Nazi ally was due to the latter’s peculiar relations with other powers.
Quoted from:
"Neither Fear Nor Hope" by General Frido von Senger Und Etterlin,
the defender of Cassino and the German liaison officer to Italian 6th Army at Sicily. {Page 152 – 153}
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Truthseeker
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The reason that the Italian forces performed poorly in the war is actually very simple. It has nothing to with armaments, training, bad generals, etc. The Italians, by enlarge, detest the Germans - they simply hate them. It has been like this for centuries. The reasons are many, but one of the main ones is that the traditional oppressors of Italy were the German speaking Austrians, so that Germany was always associated with being an enemy of the Italian people. There are also memories of the sack of Rome in 1527 by Imperial troops, and the fall of the Roman Empire at the hands of Germanic tribes. There is also the fact that Protestantism was born in Germany, and this fact caused Germans to be demonised by Catholic zealots, in a country where religious feeling runs deep. However, in essence, the key issue is that there is a tremendous cultural and character difference between the two nations, a difference that cannot be bridged. Italians are generally loud, chaotic, cheerful, histrionic and talkative, while Germans tend to be quiet, serious, reserved, orderly and undemonstrative. To an Italian this behaviour is (wrongly) interpreted as coldness, even cruelty (!). Only one or two years ago, an Italian politician of the Northern League party called the Germans 'blond bastards' or something similar, and this started a lengthy diplomatic row. I don't think even the French or the Russians hate the Germans as much as the Italians. Maybe the Poles hate the Germans more.
Of course, not all Italians take this attitude towards Germans, but it is pretty widespread and ingrained. Mussolini went totally against the natural instincts of the Italian people by making them allies of the Germans. I am certain that if Italy had joined the Allies early on the Italian Army would have fought very well against the Wehrmacht.
Another key difference between the two countries is the mentality. The Italian is basically an individualist, an opportunist who is forever hoping for that elusive lottery win that will free him from the need to work. He will happily break the law whenever he can get away with it, if in so doing he can make some extra money; the 'black' economy thrives in Italy as nowhere else. The Italian hates rules and regulations and will always seek to find a way of circumventing them if they are at odds with his will. He is fundamentally cycnical and distrusts all forms of authority. However, on the positive side, he is more loyal to his family than any other European and will go to great lengths to ensure their well being. He is also not cruel by nature and dislikes situations that can result in suffering to himself or others.
The German, on the other hand, is rigorously law abiding, often to the point of pedantry, loves regulations and enjoys being regimented. German mentality empahsizes the community at the expense of the individual, and is therefore more liable to be seduced by charismatic dictators. Germans are idealistic and will readily go to war and even commit atrocities as long as these are sanctioned by the state and serve a 'higher' purpose, although in everyday life they detest violent behaviour of any kind.
Of course, not all Italians take this attitude towards Germans, but it is pretty widespread and ingrained. Mussolini went totally against the natural instincts of the Italian people by making them allies of the Germans. I am certain that if Italy had joined the Allies early on the Italian Army would have fought very well against the Wehrmacht.
Another key difference between the two countries is the mentality. The Italian is basically an individualist, an opportunist who is forever hoping for that elusive lottery win that will free him from the need to work. He will happily break the law whenever he can get away with it, if in so doing he can make some extra money; the 'black' economy thrives in Italy as nowhere else. The Italian hates rules and regulations and will always seek to find a way of circumventing them if they are at odds with his will. He is fundamentally cycnical and distrusts all forms of authority. However, on the positive side, he is more loyal to his family than any other European and will go to great lengths to ensure their well being. He is also not cruel by nature and dislikes situations that can result in suffering to himself or others.
The German, on the other hand, is rigorously law abiding, often to the point of pedantry, loves regulations and enjoys being regimented. German mentality empahsizes the community at the expense of the individual, and is therefore more liable to be seduced by charismatic dictators. Germans are idealistic and will readily go to war and even commit atrocities as long as these are sanctioned by the state and serve a 'higher' purpose, although in everyday life they detest violent behaviour of any kind.