The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Yuri
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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Yuri » 28 Jan 2017 09:36

Erwinn wrote:You have Eastern Front with top priority. You're fighting against your arch enemy. You're cornered and you send reinforcements to ill-fated North Africa. At the start you didn't even shown interest in there, not after Rommel had some success. Yet you still couldn't (or didn't) send sufficient troops for him when it's most needed and you decide to pour a lot of troops into NA after Torch and lose them after 5 months.

It should be noted as Smaller Stalingrad, after all you lost 230.000 troops after NA campaign ended.

Rommel had 116.000~ men during 2nd Battle of El Alamein and he lost almost the half of them. So yeah, sending 150.000 + troops to prolong NA Campaign is really something Hitler can do.

Which one is important? Losing NA and remaining Afrika Korps? Or losing 6th Army almost 5 times the size of AK and is in a very important sector.(In your eyes)


Send in Africa 50 or 100 or even 150 thousand a very sensible move from the perspective of Grand strategy. It is 0.5% - 1.0% of manpower Wehrmacht. Thus all ground of the Anglo-American forces were bound in the secondary direction. The danger of opening a front in France disappeared at least until the autumn of 1943. From the point of view of the Red Army, it would be better if the operation Torch would not be at all. No danger of opening the front in France allowed to transfer to the East from France and Germany a lot of effort, at this time manpower of Wehrmacht in the East had reached its peak, which allowed: 1) prevent the defeat of AG "South"; and 2) to organize the last strategic offensive "Citadel".

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Guaporense » 20 Mar 2017 20:21

Nickdfresh wrote:Comments like the above make me rather skeptical that either you've actually read Wages of Destruction in its entirety, or that if you did that you actually understood Tooze's premise and it didn't go sailing right over your head.

There's nothing about the Luftwaffe or Kriegsmarine being "supplementary" to the Heer. In fact, quite the contrary Tooze infers that that Nazi Germany blundered into war unprepared believing that was alright since the Allies were too unprepared and it was "destiny" based on Hitler's rather faulty conspiratorial-based manias. Overall Wehrmacht planning was that there would be no war until the middle-1940's when both the Luftwaffe would have a strategic air arm and the navy would have achieved some sort of parity with the Royal Navy and US Navy when in unison with other Axis partners. I question your intellectual competence and think you are just cherry-picking to build a sophistic, prosecutorial case based on a predetermined "panzer-fanboi" world view rather than any factual, historical basis.

The reason why the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were subsumed was the lack of German industrial capacity and the fact that they were an agrarian society pre-war and simply did not have the work force nor the industrial base to fully implement rearmament in a meaningful way to guarantee any sort of strategic victory in a "long war". It wasn't out of any sense of primacy for the ground forces but pragmatism to the reality of the situation...

There was to be nothing secondary about the efforts of the Luftwaffe. They simply could not produce a proper strategic force of four engined bombers because they lacked the industrial base to make them. So they were stuck with the twin engined bombers that would be effective enough against the French, but would begin to haunt them in the Battle of Britain and in the blundering incompetence and arrogance they showed in the planning of Operation Barbarossa...

Maybe you can look up the "Cliff Notes" version? :)


Well, the fact is that German controlled continental Europe had 3.5 times the GDP of Britain and a GDP 30% bigger than the US's. German stock of machine tools alone was 2.5 times Britain's while their labor force was twice the size. Therefore, with a much smaller economic and industrial resources Britain produced strategic bombers. Although they had oil supplies Germany did not have.

While Britain and the US did not field large ground armies capable of directly engaging the enormous 280 divisions of the German army. The UK only had 35 divisions in Europe by June 1945, compared to well over 100 in WW1. In fact in WW1 British production of artillery was over 3 times higher than in WW2, demonstrating the change in focus from ground forces to air forces.

The conclusion is clear: Germany focused its resources on the ground forces while the US and UK focused their resources on air force and navy. This is clear from the composition of military expenditures as expenditures on aircraft were a much larger fraction of British and American expenditures than Germany's (in terms of aircraft, in 1943 the US spent 15% of their budget on aircraft, Germany spent 5%). While German output of artillery shells was 4 times greater than Britain's in WW2 (in WW1 when both powers focused on ground armies Germany produced 350 million shells, the UK, 220 million shells and Germany had 240 divisions to the 110 divisions of the UK).

The reason was strategic: Germany wanted to dominate Europe, to do so required ground forces, the US and the UK were supporting the USSR through the sea and air and in the end of the war with a small amphibious attack force. Germany was a ground army based power while the UK and the US were island nations.

Anyway, the strategies of the US and UK failed: airpower couldn't substitute for ground power and in the end the USSR won the war almost singlehandedly by inflicting 90% of German Kia and 90% of the ground combat. Still, in the end, the US/UK managed to salvage most of Europe from a Soviet occupation. Getting best of both worlds: winning the war and suffering low casualties by allowing the USSR to take on Germany virtually alone for 3 years.

WW2 and WW1 were caused by the same reason: Germany was to big and powerful for the rest of Europe to easily contain it. Luckily for the Allies they managed to win both wars at tremendous costs (mostly borne by the USSR in WW2).

Now, you shouldn't treat a book like Tooze's as "the Holy Bible" of WW2. I found that book very ideological and biased. For instance, it's plain incorrect to claim Germany was an "agrarian society" in 1938, in fact Germany was a large industrialized country, the second largest industrial power in the world and the foremost in Europe, with one of the highest life expectancies in the world (actually higher than the US or France) and the highest number of Nobel prize winning researchers in the world, being the world's foremost scientific power.

Of course, compared to 21st century countries, Germany in 1940 looks underdeveloped, but that's obvious: Living standards in Mexico or Iran in 2017 are much better than in the US in 1940. However, that doesn't mean that the US in 1940 was an "agrarian country", because standards back then were lower.

Also you shouldn't insult people with a different opinion than the one contained in your precious holy bible. History is not religion. You should learn to respect people with a different opinion.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Nickdfresh » 23 Mar 2017 12:11

Guaporense wrote:
Well, the fact is that German controlled continental Europe had 3.5 times the GDP of Britain and a GDP 30% bigger than the US's. German stock of machine tools alone was 2.5 times Britain's while their labor force was twice the size. Therefore, with a much smaller economic and industrial resources Britain produced strategic bombers. Although they had oil supplies Germany did not have.


Which miraculously gave Germany almost no production value whatsoever. No significant weapons system was ever produced in France (for instance) aside from a small trainer aircraft.

What did Germany gain from your uncited, tossed out figures? GDP based on what? Prewar figures prior to the devastating German attack that destroyed economic output?

Labor? LOL Can we talk about the windfall of coal production German got from France? Again, please cite the above...

While Britain and the US did not field large ground armies capable of directly engaging the enormous 280 divisions of the German army. The UK only had 35 divisions in Europe by June 1945, compared to well over 100 in WW1. In fact in WW1 British production of artillery was over 3 times higher than in WW2, demonstrating the change in focus from ground forces to air forces.


LOL Again with the "fake news". What sort of Heer/SS "divisions" were these? One thousand men a piece? Can you please provide clarification?

The conclusion is clear: Germany focused its resources on the ground forces while the US and UK focused their resources on air force and navy.


Which explains why the Americans vastly outproduced them in AFV's alone, how? Or the Wehrmacht was still reliant on horse transport for logistics and was a rail bound army while both the British and US, and most of their allies, were completely motorized. This despite the seizing of French trucks in 1940....

This is clear from the composition of military expenditures as expenditures on aircraft were a much larger fraction of British and American expenditures than Germany's (in terms of aircraft, in 1943 the US spent 15% of their budget on aircraft, Germany spent 5%). While German output of artillery shells was 4 times greater than Britain's in WW2 (in WW1 when both powers focused on ground armies Germany produced 350 million shells, the UK, 220 million shells and Germany had 240 divisions to the 110 divisions of the UK).


Where are you getting this tripe?

Divisions? So what? I have 100 men and I'm renaming them from Company D to the 80th Armored Division!

Germany was essentially a third world economy that was largely agrarian...

The reason was strategic: Germany wanted to dominate Europe, to do so required ground forces, the US and the UK were supporting the USSR through the sea and air and in the end of the war with a small amphibious attack force. Germany was a ground army based power while the UK and the US were island nations.


No, the above statement shows you have no idea what you are talking about and certainly didn't read Tooze. There was no "strategic reasoning" at all. Germany's Wehrmacht was meant largely to take on the French with little thought given to what was next. The German conquest of France was hardly planned that way and was as surprising to the Germans as anyone else. Germany's (the Wehrmacht's) "strategic reasoning" was to avoid war until 1948, 1945 at the earliest when they could achieve some sort of naval and industrial parity...

So you're saying they planned never to lose the war to Britain?

Anyway, the strategies of the US and UK failed:


They failed by winning the war?

...airpower couldn't substitute for ground power and in the end the USSR won the war almost singlehandedly by inflicting 90% of German Kia and 90% of the ground combat.


Mainly because Germany was dumb enough to invade them. They didn't "singlehandedly" do anything and only did so by becoming a highly mobile force based on Lend Lease US trucks. Germany also expended a great deal of airpower against the Soviets and killed more Soviets citizens via bombing than did the US/UK combined...

The US/UK defeated the Wehrmacht in every theater they fought. While certainly the scale was not as great as in the USSR, the localized actions were often every bit as intense and there were times when tactically the US and Brits were facing more and better Heer/SS divisions in Normandy than, say, Heer Army Group Centre could muster against the Soviets...

The Wehrmacht surrender in the Middle East/Africa was every bit as devastating as the surrender at Stalingrad!

Still, in the end, the US/UK managed to salvage most of Europe from a Soviet occupation. Getting best of both worlds: winning the war and suffering low casualties by allowing the USSR to take on Germany virtually alone for 3 years.


That wasn't by design, the US/UK were also fighting a two-front war against Japan sapping much in the way of naval assets and slowing the ability to make landings in Europe...

WW2 and WW1 were caused by the same reason: Germany was to big and powerful for the rest of Europe to easily contain it. Luckily for the Allies they managed to win both wars at tremendous costs (mostly borne by the USSR in WW2).


Germany had an economy on par with present day South Africa or Iran prior to WWII. But then, you would have had to actually read Tooze to have caught that!

Now, you shouldn't treat a book like Tooze's as "the Holy Bible" of WW2.


I don't. You mentioned him first, but you also can't cherrypick the validating parts what you want then denounce what you don't like...

I found that book very ideological and biased. For instance, it's plain incorrect to claim Germany was an "agrarian society" in 1938, in fact Germany was a large industrialized country, the second largest industrial power in the world and the foremost in Europe, with one of the highest life expectancies in the world (actually higher than the US or France) and the highest number of Nobel prize winning researchers in the world, being the world's foremost scientific power.


Why? Based on what? Tooze lays out specific statistical basis, unlike your random, cherrypicked "facts"...

Of course, compared to 21st century countries, Germany in 1940 looks underdeveloped, but that's obvious: Living standards in Mexico or Iran in 2017 are much better than in the US in 1940. However, that doesn't mean that the US in 1940 was an "agrarian country", because standards back then were lower.


They were underdeveloped in comparison to the United States in nearly every benchmark despite the US suffering greatly from the Crash of 1929!

Car ownership. Industrial output. Access to materials, etc...

Also you shouldn't insult people with a different opinion than the one contained in your precious holy bible. History is not religion. You should learn to respect people with a different opinion.


You're opinions are bizarre and not based on actual facts or context and seem to reveal a questionable ideological bias...
Last edited by Nickdfresh on 23 Mar 2017 12:20, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Nickdfresh » 23 Mar 2017 12:17

I agree that 'airpower is no substitute' for land forces, but no one said they were -save for a few air general lunatics. But the strategic airwar over Europe was a "Third Front" that sapped German technical and industrial resources and stymied German production. The Soviets simply didn't have the wherewithal to conduct such a campaign and maintain their vast tactical air armadas and knew the Western Allies would do this for them...

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Nickdfresh » 23 Mar 2017 14:06


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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Guaporense » 23 Mar 2017 20:30

If you insult people nobody will be willing to talk to you. You should learn to be civilized before you talk to people.

I guess it's time to use the ignore user function. Goodbye.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Nickdfresh » 24 Mar 2017 01:13

I'm sorry, I didn't mean to hurt your feelings...

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Guaporense » 26 Mar 2017 05:12

doogal wrote: one book among many, many disagree with elements of his analysis, his disproportionate weighting of Hitlers intentions based on the belief that America was Hitlers main motivating factor is irritating.


Indeed. Hitler did not care about the US. Their hated enemy always were the bolshevicks. While the US was a powerful country they were far away in another continent, the Nazis objectives were to conquer Eastern Lands and defeat the "bolshevicks":

Hitler wrote:Since the outbreak of the French Revolution, the world has been moving with ever increasing speed toward a new conflict, the most extreme solution of which is called Bolshevism, whose essence and aim, however, are solely the elimination of those strata of mankind which have hitherto provided the leadership and their replacement by worldwide Jewry. No state will be able to withdraw or even remain at a distance from this historical conflict...It is not the aim of this memorandum to prophesy the time when the untenable situation in Europe will become an open crisis. I only want, in these lines, to set down my conviction that this crisis cannot and will not fail to arrive and that it is Germany's duty to secure her own existence by every means in face of this catastrophe, and to protect herself against it, and that from this compulsion there arises a series of conclusions relating to the most important tasks that our people have ever been set. For a victory of Bolshevism over Germany would not lead to a Versailles treaty, but to the final destruction, indeed the annihilation of the German people...I consider it necessary for the Reichstag to pass the following two laws: 1) A law providing the death penalty for economic sabotage and 2) A law making the whole of Jewry liable for all damage inflicted by individual specimens of this community of criminals upon the German economy, and thus upon the German people.


That was Hitler back in 1936 explaining why it's important to prepare for WW2. It's not hard to understand that WW2 was in its essense a war between the two strongest powers in Europe: Germany and Russia.

That's why Germany focused on ground warfare and dedictated most of their resources against the Soviet Union in WW2, it's also not a coincidence that almost 90% of German KIA and also 90% of Allied KIA was Soviet (given Soviet KIA was 6.3 million while combined French, British and American, Canadian KIA in Europe was around 500,000).

WW2 was a war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, whIle the rest of the Allies helped their help was mostly indirect: material support for the USSR, logistical blockade of Europe, strategic bombing in a (failed) attempt to disrupt German morale and industrial production. By the time they opened up the Western front in June 1944, the war was already won and that was a relatively small scale mop up operation against German forces the size of one army group. The fighting in Italy was even smaller mobilizing 5-10% of the Werhmacht.

WW1 was more of a multi front war in that regard since the Western front, the Eastern front and the Italian front were all very important and decisive fronts. In WW2 only the Eastern front was actually decisive. The Western front in 1940 resulted in a quick one sided affair while in 44 it opened up well after the war was won, Italy in 1943 involved about 15 divisions out of the 280 the Germans had. In other words, WW1 was a multi front war, WW2 was essentially a monofront war with a lot of strategic weight to players whose direct participation in the war was mostly peripheric (US and UK).
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Michael Kenny » 26 Mar 2017 06:34

Guaporense wrote:
it's also not a coincidence that almost 90% of German KIA and also 90% of Allied KIA was Soviet (given Soviet KIA was 6.3 million while combined French, British and American, Canadian KIA in Europe was around 500,000.......... Western front..............was a relatively small scale mop up operation against German forces the size of one army group. The fighting in Italy was even smaller mobilizing 5-10% of the Werhmacht............ Italy in 1943 involved about 15 divisions out of the 280 the Germans had.


The usual mumbo-jumbo from a poster with a long history of falsification and distortion in order to make the 'facts' fit his myopic version of WW2.
His errors are legion but in a nutshell he subtracts the total of German forces in The West from the overall total of all German forces everywherein the hope the reader will be fooled into thinking a total Army of 280 divisions with 70 in the West means 210 are fighting in The East. It simply did not work that way. His other distortion is to disregard all German MIA/POW numbers because those totals were significantly higher in the West than the East. By concentrating on just KIA numbers he avoids showing
the Western Allies were hoovering up German POWs at double the numbers the Soviets could manage. GIGO writ large.

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Guaporense » 26 Mar 2017 08:03

To give a sense of perspective of how tiny the Western and Italian fronts were in WW2: combined German KIA+WIA in Italy and in the Western front from 1943 up to the end of 1944 was 450,000, while total Austria-Hungary KIA+WIA in the Italian front alone in WW1 was 1,610,000. Total German+Austria Hungary KIA+WIA losses in the Eastern front in WW1 were 3,535,000. And those two were considered secondary fronts in WW1 vis the Western front.

In other words, Italy in WW1 inflicted several times more bloody casualties: that is, killed in action and wounded in action against the Central Powers than the US and UK did combined against Germany in WW2.

That's because WW1 was a multi-front war were millions of soldiers were killed and wounded in each of the 3 major fronts. In WW2, only the Eastern front was a big front with millions of battle related casualties. The rest were relatively small engagements, hence, the reason why casualties were lower in WW2 vis WW1 for France, UK, US, Canada and Italy. The reason is simple: it's because their role in the war was smaller. Britain in WW1 played a decisive combat role, hence, suffered millions of battle casualties, in WW2, Britain played a supporting role for the USSR, providing logistical support, intelligence, blockading Nazi controlled Europe from imports, sending a few divisions here and there in some peripheral small scale engagements, etc.

WW1 - German and Austrian bloody casualties
Western Front --------------------- 3,878,000
Eastern Front --------------------- 3,535,000
Italian Front ---------------------- 1,611,000

That's was a proper multi-front war. Which is unlike WW2:

WW2 - Greater Germany bloody casualties from 1939 to 31st January 1944
Eastern Front ---------------------- 4,504,000
Western Front -------------------- 506,000 (from June 44, ca. 240,000)
North African and Italian Front --- 214,000

That's a mono-front war: about 90% of bloody casualties are on a single front out of 3. If you add Romenian, Hungarian and Italian losses to the German figures the fraction of the total in the Eastern front would increase.
Last edited by Guaporense on 26 Mar 2017 22:30, edited 2 times in total.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Michael Kenny » 26 Mar 2017 09:19

Note the way this poster continues to ignore POW/MIA numbers. The POW/MIA numbers must be ignored if he is to continue to peddle his fiction.

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Nickdfresh » 26 Mar 2017 21:48

Guaporense wrote:
doogal wrote: one book among many, many disagree with elements of his analysis, his disproportionate weighting of Hitlers intentions based on the belief that America was Hitlers main motivating factor is irritating.


Indeed. Hitler did not care about the US. Their hated enemy always were the bolshevicks. While the US was a powerful country they were far away in another continent, the Nazis objectives were to conquer Eastern Lands and defeat the "bolshevicks":


If you disagree with Tooze's main thesis, then why do you cite him? Is it because you're a disingenuous liar seeking to validate his own beliefs rather than actually present or inform himself about historical truths?

Tooze's thesis, while perhaps overstated, his grounded well into Hitler's largely unpublished and unread follow up to Mein Kampf...

Hitler hated anyone he perceived as a threat and the industrial power of the U.S. backing what he perceived in his conspiratorial worldview as the secret Jewish shadow gov't controlling the American gov't and culture was every bit as an anathema to him as the Soviets were. Perhaps more so since obvious Hitler never considered the "Bolsheviks" to be a serious long term threat once he "kicked the rotten door"..

Hitler wrote:Since the outbreak of the French Revolution, the world has been moving with ever increasing speed toward a new conflict, the most extreme solution of which is called Bolshevism, whose essence and aim, however, are solely the elimination of those strata of mankind which have hitherto provided the leadership and their replacement by worldwide Jewry. No state will be able to withdraw or even remain at a distance from this historical conflict...It is not the aim of this memorandum to prophesy the time when the untenable situation in Europe will become an open crisis. I only want, in these lines, to set down my conviction that this crisis cannot and will not fail to arrive and that it is Germany's duty to secure her own existence by every means in face of this catastrophe, and to protect herself against it, and that from this compulsion there arises a series of conclusions relating to the most important tasks that our people have ever been set. For a victory of Bolshevism over Germany would not lead to a Versailles treaty, but to the final destruction, indeed the annihilation of the German people...I consider it necessary for the Reichstag to pass the following two laws: 1) A law providing the death penalty for economic sabotage and 2) A law making the whole of Jewry liable for all damage inflicted by individual specimens of this community of criminals upon the German economy, and thus upon the German people.


That was Hitler back in 1936 explaining why it's important to prepare for WW2. It's not hard to understand that WW2 was in its essense a war between the two strongest powers in Europe: Germany and Russia.

That's why Germany focused on ground warfare and dedictated most of their resources against the Soviet Union in WW2, it's also not a coincidence that almost 90% of German KIA and also 90% of Allied KIA was Soviet (given Soviet KIA was 6.3 million while combined French, British and American, Canadian KIA in Europe was around 500,000).

WW2 was a war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, whIle the rest of the Allies helped their help was mostly indirect: material support for the USSR, logistical blockade of Europe, strategic bombing in a (failed) attempt to disrupt German morale and industrial production. By the time they opened up the Western front in June 1944, the war was already won and that was a relatively small scale mop up operation against German forces the size of one army group. The fighting in Italy was even smaller mobilizing 5-10% of the Werhmacht.

WW1 was more of a multi front war in that regard since the Western front, the Eastern front and the Italian front were all very important and decisive fronts. In WW2 only the Eastern front was actually decisive. The Western front in 1940 resulted in a quick one sided affair while in 44 it opened up well after the war was won, Italy in 1943 involved about 15 divisions out of the 280 the Germans had. In other words, WW1 was a multi front war, WW2 was essentially a monofront war with a lot of strategic weight to players whose direct participation in the war was mostly periphric (US and UK).


If you're going to cite speeches, cite the date and the source text, stop acting like a pedantic middle school child and this! A speech in 1936 means nothing in terms of Germany's industrial output. Show the order where Hitler chooses to ignore the Luftwaffe, as they are largely considered to be a purely Nazi creation. Secondly, if Hitler was concentration on the ground --and where you get your "90%" figure who knows?--then he was a complete idiot because it was the lack of a Luftwaffe strategic air arm that allowed the Soviets to relocate industry eastwards to begin with. Hitler was largely ignorant of details of Luftwaffe preparedness/unpreparedness because Goering lied to him continually, but they wanted a strategic bomber force, but were unable to build it so they chose to build more mediums because that's all they needed against France and the Low Countries anyways.....

And Hitler's contradictory speeches can be quoted to support any point of view as they provide no context to his actual beliefs or intentions...

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Nickdfresh » 26 Mar 2017 22:02

Guaporense wrote:To give a sense of perspective of how tiny the Western and Italian fronts were in WW2: combined German KIA+WIA in Italy and in the Western front from 1943 up to the end of 1944 was 450,000, while total Austria-Hungary KIA+WIA in the Italian front alone in WW1 was 1,610,000. Total German+Austria Hungary KIA+WIA losses in the Eastern front in WW1 were 3,535,000. And those two were considered secondary fronts in WW1 vis the Western front.

In other words, Italy in WW1 inflicted several times more bloody casualties: that is, killed in action and wounded in action against the Central Powers than the US and UK did combined against Germany in WW2.

That's because WW1 was a multi-front war were millions of soldiers were killed and wounded in each of the 3 major fronts. In WW2, only the Eastern front was a big front with millions of battle related casualties. The rest were relatively small engagements, hence, the reason why casualties were lower in WW2 vis WW1 for France, UK, US, Canada and Italy. The reason is simple: it's because their role in the war was smaller. Britain in WW1 played a decisive combat role, hence, suffered millions of battle casualties, in WW2, Britain played a supporting role for the USSR, providing logistical support, intelligence, blockading Nazi controlled Europe from imports, sending a few divisions here and there in some peripheral small scale engagements, etc.

WW1 - German and Austrian bloody casualties
Western Front --------------------- 3,878,000
Eastern Front --------------------- 3,535,000
Italian Front ---------------------- 1,611,000

That's was a proper multi-front war. Which is unlike WW2:

WW2 - Greater Germany bloody casualties from 1939 to 31st December 1944
Eastern Front ---------------------- 4,504,000
Western Front -------------------- 506,000 (from June 44, ca. 240,000)
North African and Italian Front --- 214,000

That's a mono-front war: about 90% of bloody casualties are on a single front out of 3. If you add Romenian, Hungarian and Italian losses to the German figures the fraction of the total in the Eastern front would increase.



So fu**ing what?! The Germans killed far less French in 1940 than they did in single battles in WWI. Like the Allies in 1944, they still took France in more or less six weeks! You're so fixated on casualties and silly comparisons that you can't comprehend the actual issues...

Instead of just staring at meaningless statistics and faulty logical comparisons, you could also perhaps consider the high level of Soviet incompetence in their command and control until late in the war, and the had that they were force to suffer -and try to inflict- heavy casualties to what amounted to severe disadvantages until later in the war...

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Michael Kenny » 27 Mar 2017 00:58

Might be worth mentioning that Germany had 1.2 million people in the Flak/Searchlight units protecting the homeland.
That the Flak arm had 11,000 guns and this compares to the Army total of 23,000 Artillery pieces.
That 20% of ammo production was for these AA guns.
The Flak army was overwhelmingly used against the western air forces.

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Re: The Strategic Importance of the Eastern front

Postby Guaporense » 30 Mar 2017 05:35

I made these pies for easy visualization of German bloody casualties:

By front:
Image

By country:
Image

I made those back in 2009.
Last edited by Guaporense on 31 Mar 2017 02:53, edited 1 time in total.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz


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