Surviving Stalingrad

[BeeWac]

40 below zero, denim uniforms, a slice or two of bread per day -- I haven't read any books about this battle in particular, not yet, but could someone explain how those 90 thousand Germans survived, and in fact fought through, such extreme conditions? It's so hard for me to grasp. How can you operate a submachine gun when your hands are completely numb? How can you take shelter from the cold anywhere when every building is battered or in shambles? Wouldn't a fire attract too much attention from the enemy? If you tried to take refuge in the sewers, wouldn't you get discovered by Soviet patrols, since no able-bodied soldier could be spared to protect you down there?

[pintere]

I think Sun Tzu can answer your question.

Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.

[Sheldrake]

could someone explain how those 90 thousand Germans survived, and in fact fought through, such extreme conditions?

#1 Most did not. The 90,000 PW taken by the Red Army were what was left from some 265,000 in the pocket.

#2 It is quite possible that those who survived were disproportionately from rear echelon troops, such as HQ communications, supply, transportation and medical services. These chaps had the opportunity to take shelter and more opportunities to find food. e.g. Proportionately far more of von Paulus' HQ were taken PW than were the infantrymen.

[Art]

No 40 degrees below zero all the way:
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=71938
The period of severe cold came with the final agony of the pocket. Also keep in mind that encircled troops had a large number of horses which served as emergency rations, at least at the first phase.

[history1]

[...] Also keep in mind that encircled troops had a large number of horses which served as emergency rations, at least at the first phase.

How long can you feed 230.000 German Soldiers, including their Romanian allies (13000 men) and additionaly 19000 Soviet POW and Hiwis with this large number of horses? Is there a certain number in a file so that you can state they had so many horses availlable?

[Dann Falk]

Greetings,

It is thought the German VI Army had at its peak some 90,000 horses. But during the fall and early winter most had been evacuated further to the west, where they could be fed and taken care of. Leaving about 25,000 horses in the Stalingrad pocket in November 42. All these horses died and or were killed then eaten.

This info is from the book: Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism by R.L.Dinardo, p 61-65.

Hope this helps,

Dann

[Art]

How long can you feed 230.000 German Soldiers, including their Romanian allies (13000 men) and additionaly 19000 Soviet POW and Hiwis with this large number of horses? Is there a certain number in a file so that you can state they had so many horses availlable?

I'm not sure that I understand the question. It's a common knowledge that the German Army employed large numbers of horses. In particular in infantry divisions they were the main means of transport and the authorized ratio of horses to men was from 1:3 to 1:4. So a reasonable estimate is some tens of thousands of horses in the pocket. It seems that even German staff officers were not certain about exact numbers. In any case that was a large amount of potential rations.

[shamirnewell]

According to: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/HB/HB-6.html

(1) A butchery platoon can process the following number of animals per day.

40 beef cattle equal to 40,000 meat rations.
80 pigs equal to 24,000 meat rations.
240 sheep equal to 19,000 meat rations.

[history1]

Thanks for your replies, guys! Best thing to do: Ask questions and learn from the answers!

[drew345]

[...] Also keep in mind that encircled troops had a large number of horses which served as emergency rations, at least at the first phase.

How long can you feed 230.000 German Soldiers, including their Romanian allies (13000 men) and additionaly 19000 Soviet POW and Hiwis with this large number of horses? Is there a certain number in a file so that you can state they had so many horses availlable?

They stopped feeding the Russian POWs fairly early in the encirclement. There was talk of cannibalism among the POWs according to Antony Beevors book on Stalingrad. As far as horses go one problem was the cold froze them solid and there wasn't even fuel for a fire in the later stages.

[Denys]

At the beginning of december 1942 most of the horses of German Army VI were already been killed and then eaten. But most of the horses had been evacuated during the first half of november because it wasn´t able to feed the horses in Stalingrad.
At the beginning of december 42 it was reported by a consulted doctor of Highcommand that there were the first soldiers of 6th army who starved to death. When this report reached the German headquarters, the headquarters couldn´t believe such a situation inside the pocket of Stalingrad.They denied that such a thing could happened ... But at this time there were several division which had a lack of food for several weeks ...

[history1]

According to: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/HB/HB-6.html

(1) A butchery platoon can process the following number of animals per day.

40 beef cattle equal to 40,000 meat rations.
80 pigs equal to 24,000 meat rations.
240 sheep equal to 19,000 meat rations.

Sorry, but I disbelieve this data. Not only the claim that one Schlächtereizug/butchery platoon was able to process all those animals on a single day but also the claimed meat rations.
I found another source stating that a butchery platoon was able to process daily:

15 cattle
or
120 pigs
or
240 sheeps and to process up to 3000 kg sausage

.
Source: http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Zus ... nsteID.htm
This data is, IMHO [coming from a village were slaughtering pigs and cows was a common event in the 70/80ies], much more reliable and comprehensible.


1. At the time there were for sure no beef cattle known here, AFAIK. The less in the area of Stalingrad.
2. By a butchers formula it´s impossible to get so many meat portions from cattle or that the meat rations where insufficient.
I´ll show an example with one cow equals 1000 rations.
A Limousin cow from nowadays weights ~ 770kg, that´s her live weight. Minus bowels = 335 kg right after the slaughtering. Due cooling down of the animals body we have another loss of 3% = 324,95kg. That leaves us to the last waste, the bones with again ~25% = 243,71 kg: 1000 = 0,24 kg.
Remember, the example is based on this cow:

and not these speciemn from the Ukraine in 1942:
.

[bigmacglenn1966]

I knew several Ostfront Veterans when I was a younger man living in Germany, one of them lost his leg amputated at the hip in Stalingrad. He was lucky enough to be flown out...Another told me that they would use their entrenching tools to crack the skulls of dead frozen horses to make a broth from the boiled brains...The Russian POWS were left to freeze & starve to death within their open-air enclosures, often having first been stripped of their Valenki-Winter Boots...There were reports of Cannibalism among them...Later on there were reports of Cannibalism among Germans within the Pocket...It also appears that some German Units were better stocked with Winter-Clothing & Food than others and were able to stretch their supplies to last longer ...Of the 90,000 that surrendered, the overwhelming majority of these men fell prey to the Spotted Typhus Outbreak in the Russian POW Camps...
cheers, Glenn

[dgfred]

I think Sun Tzu can answer your question.

Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.

If there is no escape... how could they take 'flight' anyway? Should that be 'prefer death to surrender?

Just wondering.

[doogal]

Beewac wrote -
40 below zero, denim uniforms, a slice or two of bread per day -- I haven't read any books about this battle in particular, not yet, but could someone explain how those 90 thousand Germans survived, and in fact fought through, such extreme conditions? It's so hard for me to grasp. How can you operate a submachine gun when your hands are completely numb? How can you take shelter from the cold anywhere when every building is battered or in shambles? Wouldn't a fire attract too much attention from the enemy? If you tried to take refuge in the sewers, wouldn't you get discovered by Soviet patrols, since no able-bodied soldier could be spared to protect you down there?

Of some 250,000. (rough figure for illustration) 90,000, went into captivity, this meant that the majority fought and died at there positions. To survive both individually and as units Soldiers needed to be resourceful and adaptable. And the German army at least had experience from 1941 of fighting in all round defensive operations all be it not under such dire conditions. Training and experience provided an effective but not all encompassing tactical profile which they could attempt to achieve in the field, and while nothing can fully prepare a soldier for severe deprivation under enormous physical and psychological stress, they at least had experience with technically trained leaders who could attempt to counter the worse effects in the short term.

In combat operations many mitigating factors then come in to play. The structure and cohesiveness in each division depended on many factors. To begin with as they were in permanent combat conditions, the means that the effective fighting strength would reduce constantly but this is offset due to only a small number actually being in combat at any one time, this reduction would cause non combat roles to be folded into front line units. Soldiers from non combat roles can cause a drag on operations until they either perish or integrate. Certain units / Soldiers perform better than others, while certain units/soldiers always carry the fighting. Certain commanders who will have differing tactical approaches which can leave units less worn out than others.
Logistical knowledge and careful distribution of Available victuals across each unit and its even distribution or lack there of would have been critical. All of these factors can be seen as important when considering how the 6th army managed its dwindling resources and stay combat effective as long as they did.
Fighting on the defensive following the encirclement also allowed for the use of interior lines and the shifting of troops from sector to sector and effective management of the situation by junior ranked and experienced leaders is very important in keeping unit cohesiveness. NCO `s would have played a large role.
The above relates to technical moral and physical factors which are essential in keeping an army effective with its underlying structure ethos doctrine and leadership philosophy remaining intact, beyond these you just simply have to rely on the steadfast ness of the men and there willingness to endure, this Is an intangible which can only be measured by the length of resistance.