Oil war against CCCP

[Col_Kurtz_]

It's a well known fact, that the main limiting factor for every modern (mechanized) army is the amount of available supplies, especially fuel.

The Germans were well aware of that the vast majority of Soviet fuel supplies came from Azerbaijan. Now the German High Command should have known that - as their offensive progressed in the second half of '42 - the usual transport routes of azeri fuel were cut and the Caspian Sea remained it's only way. By sinking a few dozen vessels (using Ju88s as long range bombers and Me110s as their escort fighters), the Germans could have drain the Soviet fuel supplies, limiting their offensive capabilities drastically.

As far as I know the Germans didn't make any attempt to destroy all the Caspian fuel tankers. The question is why?

[jesk]

It's a well known fact, that the main limiting factor for every modern (mechanized) army is the amount of available supplies, especially fuel.

The Germans were well aware of that the vast majority of Soviet fuel supplies came from Azerbaijan. Now the German High Command should have known that - as their offensive progressed in the second half of '42 - the usual transport routes of azeri fuel were cut and the Caspian Sea remained it's only way. By sinking a few dozen vessels (using Ju88s as long range bombers and Me110s as their escort fighters), the Germans could have drain the Soviet fuel supplies, limiting their offensive capabilities drastically.

As far as I know the Germans didn't make any attempt to destroy all the Caspian fuel tankers. The question is why?

It's strange that the Germans did not cut production in the Caucasus. Apparently, Hitler wanted to keep it for himself. In another alternative, the German aviation was able to reach the factories of Western Siberia. But why did not it do it.



https://blogivg.wordpress.com/2016/10/2 ... ть-ссср-в/

[jesk]

35,45 thousand are all in the Caucasus is extracted, from them 15,70 in Azerbaijan. Soviet leadership, being afraid of capture of the Caucasus, evacuated the equipment to other regions. I don't think that loss of the Caucasus had critical character. Especially, on requirement of the Red Army only 20% of oil left.

http://www.museum-rogwu.ru/upload/ibloc ... 39d2e6.pdf

In 1942 oil industry workers of Azerbaijan have given to the country of 15,7 million t of oil.

[jesk]

the first table is incorrect. this one is better

[jesk]

One of the evidence. The Germans June 20, 1943 over Saratov, 800 km behind the front line. In August 1942 they approached Baku for a distance of 600 km.

http://d.rutlib4.com/book/4368/p/32

On the night of June 20, 1943, the bombers of the 4th and 6th Air Fleets made another raid on Saratov. The main blow was again inflicted on the cracking plant named after Kirov, as well as on oil tankers at the berths. As a result, according to German data, two ships were sunk and two more were damaged.

During the raid "Heinkels" from the squadron KG55 "Greif" were attacked by night fighters. As a result, on one plane from the 7th Squadron the left engine was disabled. A member of the German crew recalled: "We hang out over Saratov, 800 kilometers on the other side of the front. The "old man", in charge of the raid, changes course and height over this damned hole, as we feel like a stationary target for antiaircraft artillery in this clunker. It's only a matter of seconds - and that's already happened: the searchlight has seized us, and, as if it was required, at the same instant a bunch of yellow machine-gun tracers sweep over the plane. "Behind the night fighter!" - the call of the boarder aborts, as a deafening blow throws us at the corners. "Box" dives like a fiery comet.

The left engine burns, and the sheaves of tracers are still flying past us on the left and right. Shivering hands try to grope on the chest a parachute ring, but it fails. Before our eyes, the arrows of the devices are spinning. Around us there is an air stream. Every minute, an explosion can be heard in our ears. Suddenly, like a load in a centner, he presses us into his corners. This "old man" leveled our "box". The altimeter shows 1000 meters. Time could no longer be lost. What about the engine? It no longer burns, its screw only slowly rotates. The fire must have been knocked down during a furious dive. "

[ljadw]

It's a well known fact, that the main limiting factor for every modern (mechanized) army is the amount of available supplies, especially fuel.

The Germans were well aware of that the vast majority of Soviet fuel supplies came from Azerbaijan. Now the German High Command should have known that - as their offensive progressed in the second half of '42 - the usual transport routes of azeri fuel were cut and the Caspian Sea remained it's only way. By sinking a few dozen vessels (using Ju88s as long range bombers and Me110s as their escort fighters), the Germans could have drain the Soviet fuel supplies, limiting their offensive capabilities drastically.

This is ignoring the most important and obvious question : for how much was the USSR depending on its oil ?

[Col_Kurtz_]

OK, so the total output of the Soviet oil industry in 1942 was 21987.9 thousand tonnes of which 15739,2 thousand tonnes was the azeri production. In other words the German aviaton could - theoretically - knock out some 70% of the Soviet fuel supplies by sinking every ship outbound from Baku.

[jesk]

OK, so the total output of the Soviet oil industry in 1942 was 21987.9 thousand tonnes of which 15739,2 thousand tonnes was the azeri production. In other words the German aviaton could - theoretically - knock out some 70% of the Soviet fuel supplies by sinking every ship outbound from Baku.

It remains unclear whether the question was discussed at the top of the Nazi leadership, what arguments at the same time sounded.

[ljadw]

OK, so the total output of the Soviet oil industry in 1942 was 21987.9 thousand tonnes of which 15739,2 thousand tonnes was the azeri production. In other words the German aviaton could - theoretically - knock out some 70% of the Soviet fuel supplies by sinking every ship outbound from Baku.

This is still ignoring the question : how much was oil important for the USSR during the war ?
1) It is not so that the LW could knock out 70 % of the Soviet oil supplies by sinking every ship outbound from Baku, because production is not the same as supply
2) The SU had a big oil reserve in june 1941 because before the war it produced more oil than it needed
3) The SU could and was using additional oil fields outside the Caucasus
4) The German oil experts warned for the illusion that a successful Fall Blau could eliminate the SU (source : Germany and WW II)
5) Only a small part of the Soviet oil was used by the Red Army during the war and it is more than possible that during the war the SU consumed and needed less oil than before the war .
6)As long as we don't know what the minimum of oil was that the SU needed to arrive at Berlin, all these claims are idle speculations ,thus: what would be the loss of 70 % of the 1942 oil production? besides : the LW could NOT knock out some 70 % unless it did this during a whole year, for which there is no proof .
7) WHAT we know is that the SU arrived at Berlin while its 1945 oil production was only some 55 % of its préwar oil production .

[Col_Kurtz_]

1) As I pointed out above some 70% of the soviet fuel production originated from Azerbaijan. Cutting its only way would mean cutting back the available fuel supplies by 70%.
2) Those fuel reserves were lost in Barbarossa.
3) Yepp, that's the remaining 30%.
4) I didn't mention the elimination of the SU neither.
5) Source?
6) Again, I didn't mention Berlin. Your are arguing with strawmen made by you. https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/strawman
7) Berlin again... Read again my original post and come back if you understood it.

[jesk]

In total for years of war the USSR consumed 24,6 million tons of the fuel (processed from oil). From them 16,4 million tons were spent by field army. Pre-war stocks of 1,2 million tons. If the figures provided below are right, loss of Baku oil forced the USSR to resort to Germany's methods in search of alternative sources. Though the same USA could increase deliveries on a lend-lease.

http://burneft.ru/archive/issues/2015-04/3

The general figure of supply of fuel the industry in the years of war has made more than 20 million tons. Plus the fuel and its components put on a lend-lease and import – 2,599 million tons, fuel of the plants of the European countries occupied with the Red Army – 0,816 million tons and also pre-war stocks of a narcomat of defense – 1,219 million tons. Everything, according to the chief of Service of fuel of Armed Forces of the USSR colonel general V.V. Nikitin, for years of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Armed forces during strategic, front and army operations have spent 16,4 different million tons of fuel.

[ljadw]

[quote="Col_Kurtz_"]1) As I pointed out above some 70% of the soviet fuel production originated from Azerbaijan. Cutting its only way would mean cutting back the available fuel supplies by 70%./quote]
This is not correct : production is not the same as supplies .
One simple example :
1/1 : supplies (= reserves) : 10 million
Between 1/1 and 31/12 : production = 20 million and consumption is 15 million
Result : on 31 /12 supplies are 15 million
It is impossible to calculate the supplies without knowing the reserves and the consumption .
Other point : your statement is also irrelevant, because if the production was going down by 70 % this does not mean that the armed forces would get 70 % less fuel, it does even not mean that the armed forces would get less fuel .
During the war the SU produced some 90 million ton of oil and its armed forces consumed some 15 million ton of oil .
Would the armed forces receive less oil (and how much ? ) if the production was down to 80 million, or to 70 million, 60 million ,etc ?

[ljadw]

It's a well known fact, that the main limiting factor for every modern (mechanized) army is the amount of available supplies, especially fuel.

There is a big difference between the today armies and the WWII armies .The WWII armies were less dependent on oil and consumed thus less oil .

[jesk]

During the war the SU produced some 90 million ton of oil and its armed forces consumed some 15 million ton of oil .

Nowadays, Russian refineries receive 150 liters of gasoline from one ton of oil. American 450 liters. In different ways, but the figures of 90 million tons mined, 15 million consumed are not true.

There is a big difference between the today armies and the WWII armies .The WWII armies were less dependent on oil and consumed thus less oil .

The operating army consumed 67% of the 24.6 million tons of fuel from the all-Soviet volume. The lack of fuel from the Germans led to the winter crisis of 1941/1942, when synthetic fuel did not work in the frost. Normal gasoline just was not there. The Russians did not even encounter such problems, they always had enough gas.

[jesk]

in one ton of gasoline 1370 liters, in a ton of oil 150 liters, for the production of tons of gasoline is spent 9 tons of oil