The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

[jesk]

In the previous comment I confused, wanted to write the year 1942. The Soviet offensive was not dangerous when Hitler appointed Manstein to "save from a catastrophe." In September 1941, Hitler definitely did not want to take Leningrad. He even invented a distracting operation - a blow to Tikhvin forced the German command to cancel the plan of an offensive across the Neva for a complete blockade of Leningrad.

The Wehrmacht was completely impotent and inept at taking fixed positionen. They failed no only in front of Leningrad, but Oranienburg, Sevastopol 1941, Brest, Mogilev, Polotsk (although Polotsk was taken quicker than the others due to commitment of a large force), Tallinn, and 1942 Novorossiysk, Voronezh, Stalingrad.

Minsk, Riga, Smolensk, Voronezh, Vilnius, Kursk list can be continued. Your statement is just a flame.

Add to that Malta and Tobruk 1941 and, why not, the Groß-Daddy of Wehrmacht failures against fixed positionen, Dunquerque
(with its lesser known and appreciated sisters, Lille and Calais).

second, at the time the Tikhvin was attacked, no Tikhvin, no bauxite for Sovjet airplanes. Plus immediate linking with Finnish forces on the Svir. What is gained by attacking Leningrad? 2 million unnutze esser (as Germans were utterly incapable of using the conquered workforce, see Reichsfuhrer's confession at Posen in 1943)?

The capture of Leningrad released the German divisions for active operations. This is the main thing, bauxite later.

Ineptness of Fuhrer's overpromoted field exterminators and their subordinate murderers is glaring. If Panzerwaffe and Luftwaffe got it done, it got done. But German line infantry was only fit for judenfreying duty (killing women and children), and little else, clearly inferior to Romanian and Hungarian infantry.

Soviet infantry committed "the greatest mass rape in history." Criminals in the Red Army at the individual level were significantly higher.

[Stugbit]

I started this topic here to understand better why the Germans had compromised themselves so much in the Caucasus Mountains and secondary objectives when they simple could reach all of their main objectives from the steppes in the North. And I was wanting to know who was the responsible for those actions also.

At first, you could say that`s because the oilfields actually weren’t cited exactly on the cities, like Maikop, and instead they were located rather on it`s surroundings. But yet, they were still far from the mountains anyway. Not even to talk about Tuapse and such.

So, from the texts Bob have shown me here, I could see that the Germans had some sort of traffic problems with overcrowded roads when they began their advance inside Caucasus (they came along with no updated maps of the region and had no clear idea of how the routes actually worked there). Those traffic jams influenced Wilhelm List to disperse even more his already compromised forces, it seems, and Hitler, at least on the beginning, was ok with his orders.

Bad approach to the topic. In the first place a small number of divisions. Then only supply problems. November 15, 1942 6 German divisions in 1 panzer army. There are 11 divisions in the occupation service in Norway. In the Caucasus, an increase in the number of divisions was required.

Order of battle (15 Nov 1942)
At the disposal of the 1. Panzerarmee
- General-Kommando z.b.V.
- Befehls-Stab Steinbauer
- 50. Infanterie-Division (part)
III. Panzerkorps
- Romanian 2nd Mountain Division
- 23. Panzer-Division + SS-Division “Wiking” (part)
- 13. Panzer-Division + verstärktes Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99
LII. Armeekorps
- SS-Division “Wiking” (most) + 50. Infanterie-Division (part)
- 111. Infanterie-Division
- 370. Infanterie-Division
XXXX. Panzerkorps
- 3. Panzer-Division

Order of battle (22 Dec 1942)
At the disposal of Armee Norwegen
- 25. Panzer-Division
Höheres Kommando z.b.V. LXXI
- 230. Infanterie-Division
- 270. Infanterie-Division
- 199. Infanterie-Division
Höheres Kommando z.b.V. XXXIII
- 196. Infanterie-Division
- 702. Infanterie-Division
- 181. Infanterie-Division
Höheres Kommando z.b.V. LXX
- 269. Infanterie-Division
- 280. Infanterie-Division
- 2/3 214. Infanterie-Division
- 710. Infanterie-Division

The Caucasus Campaign was not a matter of troops number, Jesk. It was rather a matter of supply, logistics, priorities on units distribution, timing.. things like that. More troops would just give more problems than solutions.

Geography also played a role since there were many large rivers needed to get through. Latter on, they got stuck on them. If they arrived a little bit earlier, most of the Soviet resistance behind those rivers wouldn`t be ready enough to hold properly and bridgeheads would be made much easier. Yet, things are, they got there too late..

So, from what I read until now, the Germans could have done better even with what they got back then. Of course, they wouldn`t be able to reach Baku, but at least they could have represented a bigger threat to the Soviet forces in the area and, when the Soviet counter-offensive in the North started, they would be better positioned to stand where they were and maybe even help the AGB.

[jesk]

The Caucasus Campaign was not a matter of troops number, Jesk. It was rather a matter of supply, logistics, priorities on units distribution, timing.. things like that. More troops would just give more problems than solutions.

Geography also played a role since there were many large rivers needed to get through. Latter on, they got stuck on them. If they arrived a little bit earlier, most of the Soviet resistance behind those rivers wouldn`t be ready enough to hold properly and bridgeheads would be made much easier. Yet, things are, they got there too late..

So, from what I read until now, the Germans could have done better even with what they got back then. Of course, they wouldn`t be able to reach Baku, but at least they could have represented a bigger threat to the Soviet forces in the area and, when the Soviet counter-offensive in the North started, they would be better positioned to stand where they were and maybe even help the AGB.

By mid-August in the Caucasus and Stalingrad, it became apparent in the need for reinforcement. Hitler did not allocate any forces. Leningrad and Demyansk could free up 10-15 divisions, Hitler insisted on keeping the front line in an unchanged condition.

[Stugbit]

The Caucasus Campaign was not a matter of troops number, Jesk. It was rather a matter of supply, logistics, priorities on units distribution, timing.. things like that. More troops would just give more problems than solutions.

Geography also played a role since there were many large rivers needed to get through. Latter on, they got stuck on them. If they arrived a little bit earlier, most of the Soviet resistance behind those rivers wouldn`t be ready enough to hold properly and bridgeheads would be made much easier. Yet, things are, they got there too late..

So, from what I read until now, the Germans could have done better even with what they got back then. Of course, they wouldn`t be able to reach Baku, but at least they could have represented a bigger threat to the Soviet forces in the area and, when the Soviet counter-offensive in the North started, they would be better positioned to stand where they were and maybe even help the AGB.

By mid-August in the Caucasus and Stalingrad, it became apparent in the need for reinforcement. Hitler did not allocate any forces. Leningrad and Demyansk could free up 10-15 divisions, Hitler insisted on keeping the front line in an unchanged condition.

Just more supplies, fuel and accurate maps of the region would make much more difference than troops.

The Germans were looking for the oilfields and, as I said before, those were not situated in the huge mountains behind, but rather in the vicinities of the main cities they were going for. But yet, by mid-august, List had already compromised mobile troops deep into the South of the region instead of the place they should have been sent, helping the main advance Southeast, to Grozny and such.

For me, this was a mistake because the Soviet were in a large disadvantage in the Caucasus Campaign. It was one of the few places of the Ostfront where the Germans had numerical superiority, and this was possible at the moment the Germans were able to cripple the Soviet tanks and mobile forces in a battle before the city of Rostov to the North. The soviet troops could only manage to flee the area to the mountains South and the Germans began their pursuit. The only strategy possible for the Soviet after that was to reach strong positions behind rivers and on mountains and use artillery and things like that since they had very few armoured units. Basing on that, we can assume that a counter-attack from the mountains to the steppes would be quite improbable at least until November, when they received reinforces. Most tanks they had were Lend Lease ones coming from the Persian Corridor. Why going so after a useless battle over mountain passes?

Given this scenario, there was no real reason for such commitment to the south and within the mountains themselves. If they just freed the Kerch Straight for more troops coming by the Crimea would be enough. But if the Germans really wanted more troops to harm the Soviet for real, it would have been much better if they reached some sort of agreement with the Chechen forces fighting the Soviet.

As you may know, coinciding with the Axis invasion, there was a huge uprising going on in Chechenia, but the Germans and the Chechens failed to achieve proper coordination against the Soviet Union. They were no actually allies, by the way.

[gracie4241]

The decisive error was Hitler Directive 45 on July 23, 1942.I strongly believe BLAU was a potential winner(later).Phase 3 of Blau had ALWAYS provided for a two pronged (Army groups A AND B) advance toward the Volga River crossings, encircling and destroying all Russian forces west of the Volga and the establishment of a strong river based defense line.Hitler prematurely aborted that plan and diverted A immediately to the South. Together it is clear that Stalingrad would have fallen and the Volga and Don interdicted. My altered Blau plan would be;STOP. There was no way Germany was ever going to GET Caucasus oil for itself. The Russians would blow the wells (see Maikopf);if not how was Germany going to transport said oil??? BLOCKING Russian access was the best and only bet.Let me quote an expert " Some stupid people calm themselves with talk that we can retreat further to the east as we have a lot of territory...that there will always be bread for us.But such talk is falsehood.. The territory the enemy has captured(ed note as of july 27)is bread for the army and people, metal and fuel for industry factories, plants supplying the army with arms and ammunition railroads....the losses so far ..much less people (70 million) bread, metal fuel...to retreat further means to waste ourselves and TO WASTE AT THE SAME TIME OUR MOTHERLAND. IF WE RETREAT FURTHER WE WILL BE WITHOUT BREAD, FUEL, WITHOUT METAL WITHOUT RAW MATERIAL. My expert;Joseph Stalin. Recall that at that time the Germans had not yet reached the Volga.An INTERDICTION strategy,as opposed to an ACQUISITION strategy relative to the Caucasus was a potential war winner and within german capability-Both army Groups could have held a firm river line indefinitely

[Peter89]

Not really, no. In 1942 all real military hope for Germany was lost, only miracles could have worked. You shouldn't just look at the map of the operational area of AGS, but rather the map of the whole globe.

Unprecedented amounts of men, resources and materiel were mobilised to face the Axis threat, and it was only the matter of time before the Axis would be crushed.

Before the attack on the Soviet Union the Axis could really hope to make peace on favourable terms, but after the Barbarossa - especially after the Battle of Moscow - the Germans could only prolong the war.

And they actually prolonged it to the bitter end, because in 1945 - with the introduction of the A-bomb - the Western powers would finish any conflict anyway. By dropping it on civilians they not just presented that they have such a formidable weapon at their disposal, but also the lack of moral restrictions to use it as a tool of mass murder of civilians.

[gracie4241]

That would be news to Stalin as he emphatically proclaimed to the army and Russian people in july 1942 that they faced imminent defeat, not in 41 but 42-i assume he's an expert , don't you? .It means As I quoted Stalin in an earlier reply on this topic "we have much less territory, people ,bread ,metal...to retreat further is to waste at the same time our motherland...we will be without bread, fuel, ,raw material, metal".At the time July 27, 1942 The germans had not reached the Volga and interdicted 9 million tons of north/south shipping to and from the Caucasus. Had the germans not foolishly overreached into the Caucasus with Army Group A and used it with B -as originally planned in Blau-they would easily have conquered Stalingrad and set up a firm blocking position long the Volga and Don.Having reserves now in place Uranus would fail-as did the stronger Mars- and Russia would have faced starvation by mid 43(worse than germany in 1918).My view is Stalin would have agreed to a second Brest-Litovsk as lenin did in 1918 to save his regime, perhaps hoping like 1918 that Germany would eventually lose to the west and the territory would be recovered.This notion that Moscow and 1941 was everything is regurgitation of the Halder, Guderian claims AFTER the war, that comes from people that as Hitler correctly stated knew nothing of economics-literally. I've read Halder's diary, and Von Bock's, and any recognition of the role of the economy in modern industrial war was VERY WELL HIDDEN.They were at core 19th century "decisive battle"devotees.Period

[Stugbit]

By 1942, things were already quite difficult for a German victory. Even if they have taken the city of Stalingrad and severed the very important oil supply line in the Volga river, and bombed the oilfields as well, which represented somewhere around 80% of the whole oil output of Soviet Union, it would just affect them for a while, as the Soviet had already found oil in other parts of the country, in the Far East. So, Soviet Union wouldn`t run out of it`s oil in the long run just by losing the Caucasus.

But the point of this topic is not about if Germany could or not win the war in 1942. The focus here is the Caucasus Campaign itself as it was and what the Germans could have done with what they got. By the perspective of their commanders at the time, as I said, taking Baku would certainly be very improbable, but they could have managed to capture the city of Grozny, I think.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to gracie4241 and the community as a whole. Howdy gracie4241! Well sir OR madam, in deference to your point OR points-of-view as articulated within your postings of Monday - November 19, 2018 - 8:35am and Tuesday - November 20, 2018 -10:34am, the hyperbole of Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili not withstanding, it has been the relative "understanding" of old yours truly that the Anglo-Soviet invasion and occupation of IRAN under the guise of Operation Countenance (August 25, 1941 - September 17, 1941) was ostensibly designed to prevent the potential logistical strangulation of the Rodina as your alternative strategy of maneuver would theoretically suggest. Assuming that the Wehrmacht never reaches Azerbaijan, the Soviet Union will not only retain Azerbaijan's petroleum but it will now also have access both Iranian petroleum and the Iranian oil refinery located in the municipality of Abadan. In addition, after the all knowing Bohemian Corporal's inexplicable decision to declare war on the United States of America on December 11, 1941, the Soviet Union will now have access to the both the near limitless agricultural and mineral resources of the continent of North America. Again, like the not so isolated Soviet Azerbaijanian petroleum, these agricultural and mineral resources will transit through occupied IRAN into Soviet Turkmenistan. Now, as critically important as population might be for the Soviet Union's ability to prosecute its war effort, with the United States of America now openly involved in the European conflict, a significant degree of pressure will now be incrementally relieved on the Eastern Front. I would assert (rightly OR wrongly), that the loss of additional Soviet population at this stage of the War in the East would simply extend the period of time for the Red Army to ultimately reach the environs of the National Socialist Germany. My less than objective Yankee sentiments notwithstanding, the Soviet Union will inevitably prevail over National Socialist Germany thanks, in no small part, to American generalship - GENERAL MOTORS, GENERAL ELECTRIC and GENERAL MILLS! It's just sobering food for thought. Spam anyone? Well, that's my latest two cents, pence, pfennigs OR kopecks worth on this expansive topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day from sea to shining sea.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Stugbit]

Greetings to gracie4241 and the community as a whole. Howdy gracie4241! Well sir OR madam, in deference to your point OR points-of-view as articulated within your postings of Monday - November 19, 2018 - 8:35am and Tuesday - November 20, 2018 -10:34am, the hyperbole of Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili not withstanding, it has been the relative "understanding" of old yours truly that the Anglo-Soviet invasion and occupation of IRAN under the guise of Operation Countenance (August 25, 1941 - September 17, 1941) was ostensibly designed to prevent the potential logistical strangulation of the Rodina as your alternative strategy of maneuver would theoretically suggest. Assuming that the Wehrmacht never reaches Azerbaijan, the Soviet Union will not only retain Azerbaijan's petroleum but it will now also have access both Iranian petroleum and the Iranian oil refinery located in the municipality of Abadan. In addition, after the all knowing Bohemian Corporal's inexplicable decision to declare war on the United States of America on December 11, 1941, the Soviet Union will now have access to the both the near limitless agricultural and mineral resources of the continent of North America. Again, like the not so isolated Soviet Azerbaijanian petroleum, these agricultural and mineral resources will transit through occupied IRAN into Soviet Turkmenistan. Now, as critically important as population might be for the Soviet Union's ability to prosecute its war effort, with the United States of America now openly involved in the European conflict, a significant degree of pressure will now be incrementally relieved on the Eastern Front. I would assert (rightly OR wrongly), that the loss of additional Soviet population at this stage of the War in the East would simply extend the period of time for the Red Army to ultimately reach the environs of the National Socialist Germany. My less than objective Yankee sentiments notwithstanding, the Soviet Union will inevitably prevail over National Socialist Germany thanks, in no small part, to American generalship - GENERAL MOTORS, GENERAL ELECTRIC and GENERAL MILLS! It's just sobering food for thought. Spam anyone? Well, that's my latest two cents, pence, pfennigs OR kopecks worth on this expansive topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day from sea to shining sea.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

Dear Bob, you got a point here, but I would like to point out also that if Baku could have been captured by the Axis, it would be somehow difficult for the Lend Lease to have an effect as the Allies would also lose the Persian Corridor. The only place possible for the supplies to reach SU would then be the northernmost city ports like Murmansk and such.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Stugbit and the community as a whole. Howdy Stugbit! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Tuesday - November 20, 2018 - 2:08pm, old your truly is of the school of thought that a theoretical Axis campaign emanating from Azerbaijan against the allied Anglo-Soviet occupation forces in Iran is certainly worthy of exploration within the realm of the WHAT IF. However, quite frankly, given the stark logistical and manpower realities faced by the Wehrmacht as it approached the daunting mountains of Transcaucasia, the complete conquest of Azerbaijan would have been nothing short of miraculous. From my limited perspective on such matters, I have strong reservations about the Wehrmacht's wherewithal to breach the Terek River barrier with the degree and magnitude of force required for their continued advance to the much coveted Azerbaijani oil fields and the Provincial Capitol of Baku. Now with that said, at this juncture of the European conflict, given how thinly spread the collective forces of the AXIS were across the length and breadth of both continental Europe and the environs of North Africa, old Uncle Bob simply does not see where the disparate states of the Axis Alliance will conjure up the requisite number of experienced combat troops and associated military hardware to effectively challenge the Anglo-Soviet occupation force in Iran. As it is, the Wehrmacht is slowly dying a death of one thousand cuts in the primordial hinterlands of the Rodina. It is also my anecdotal opinion that the British Commonwealth and the United States of America will commit the necessary volume of combat power to keep the Iranian land bridge to the Soviet Union both secure and open EVEN if that ultimately means abandoning the projected OPERATION TORCH invasion of western North Africa. Finally, the theoretical Axis invasion force rolling into Iran just might even find itself trapped if there are any substantial Axis battlefield reverses between the Volga and Don Rivers far to their North. It's just some speculative food for thought. Gormeh Sabzi anyone? Well, that's my latest two cents, pence, pfennigs and kopecks worth on this expansive topic of interest - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day down in your corner of the ever exotic Federative Republic of Brazil.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Stugbit]

Hello, Bob.

I share your opinion about the miracle thing of reaching Baku. Still, since we`re on the grounds of the what if anyway, I would like to point out that if the Germans had manage to capture Baku and also hold operation Uranus in the north, it would be a bit difficult for the Allies to get through the Caucasus Mountains range from the south, specially if the Axis could count with the help of locals, like the Chechens and such.
Also, the Soviet may not find a good solution to see the British and the US advancing on it`s own territory, by the way. And still, if they cancelled the Operation Torch, the Allies wouldn`t be able to take the Axis presence out of North Africa as well.

My best Regards here from Brazil to you in California! An Excellent copacetic day to you there also. Your timezone is somehow similar to mine here, isn`t it? You`re a bit more to the West, so I assume today still remains a bit more for you there.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Stugbit and the community as a whole. Howdy Stugbit! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Wednesday - November 21, 2018 - 4:45pm, old yours truly must take a cautionary stance to the notion of either a projected Axis offensive aimed at IRAN or a projected Allied offensive aimed at Azerbaijan. I must assume that the Wehrmacht's Army Group 'A" is now a spent force after its grinding campaign in the alpine environment of Transcaucasia in the Summer and Autumn of year 1942. The concluding mission of the Wehrmacht's Army Group 'A' was the capture of the Azerbaijani oilfields. Geographically, this mission was technically achieved, but not without the subsequent demolition of those very same oilfields courtesy of withdrawing Red Army engineers. A daring attempt to seize the oilfields by COUP-DE-MAIN ended in catastrophe for the airborne troops of both the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica. After consolidating its conquest of Azerbaijan, the Wehrmacht's Army Group 'A' would assume a defensive posture along the Azerbaijani-Iranian frontier. Apart from resting and refitting, a substantial proportion of the Wehrmacht's Army Group 'A' s personnel will be diligently engaged in oil well fire fighting activities under the watchful supervision of the Organization Todt. THEY WILL HAVE THEIR WORK CUT OUT FOR THEM! Finally, in true National Socialist fashion, the disparate peoples of Transcaucasia will be subjected to the same "enlightened" treatment as their unfortunate brethren in the now occupied Western Soviet Union. In a fore night, guerilla warfare will become a cottage industry across greater Transcaucasia. Now, as far as the "ALLIES" are concerned, the Axis victory in Transcaucasia just might portend an invasion of Iran. With that in mind, there will be no thought about mounting any counteroffensive into greater Transcaucasia. Holding open the Iranian land bridge between the Persian Gulf and Soviet Turkmenistan will be THE paramount mission of the Anglo-Soviet occupation force. Since neither the British Commonwealth nor the Soviet Union can readily divert troops and resources from other hard pressed areas of their respective fronts, it will be up to the United States of America to either allocate or reallocate as many troops and resources as humanly possible to the Persian Gulf. This will certainly place the continued likelihood of Operation Torch into open question. One should not overlook the impact of the growing demands for troops and resources in the now expanding Pacific Theater of Operations. Incidentally, as you more than rightly point out, there is going to be more than a healthy dose of cultural suspicion and ideological enmity between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps. It should not be forgotten that both the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans were bona fide enemies during the course of the Russian Civil War (1917-1922) as a result of the ostensibly anti-Bolshevik Anglo-American intervention into that conflict in year 1918. However, as the old and battered adage goes, THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND - more or less! Finally, I am placing a great deal of faith in Operations Saturn, Uranus and especially STAR to reverse the situation in Transcaucasia since this would preclude any fruitless military operations that would inevitably result in pointless casualties. It's just some speculative food for thought. Bully beef anyone? Well, that's my latest two cents, pence, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this expansive topic of interest - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day down in your corner of ever the ever exotic AND erotic Federative Republic of Brazil.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Peter89]

But German line infantry was only fit for judenfreying duty (killing women and children), and little else, clearly inferior to Romanian and Hungarian infantry.

Well, the Romanian and Hungarian infantry began their judenfreying just as the war in the East has been started, having murdered tens of thousands in Iasi and Odessa, and in Kamianets-Podilsk, respectively.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iași_pogrom
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1941_Odessa_massacre
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamiane ... i_massacre

Axis allies took their filthy share of murdering civilians.

[Stugbit]

Oddly enough, the situation in Caucasus concerning the Axis and civilian population was a little different from the rest of Soviet Union.

Germany courted the Cossack population of the Caucasus, which, for their part, had many problems with the Soviet regime, like suffering with a process of “decossackinization” from the region after fighting with the White Army during the counter-revolutionary wars of the 20`s. So, in general, they had appreciated the arrival of the Wehrmacht there very much. The Axis hadn`t even to worry about their rearguards and long communication lines in the Caucasus region because the Cossack were watching it for them. The nazis also ordered for the customs of the Muslim population in the region to be respected by the invading force.

After the invasion failed, as much as 180000 Cossack troops fled together the region with the Axis forces.

Germany also tried to coordinate with the Chechens against the Soviet, but this failed for some reasons, specially the courting of the Cossacks as I said above. The Cossack were sworn enemies of the Chechens with many historical territorial disputes and conflicts. The Germans only manage to parachute some agents behind the lines looking for sabotaging with the help of Chechens.

About the Soviet exploding the oilfields as Bob said, if we pick Maykop oilfields as reference, they did not exploded them, but rather made them unfeasible by filling with concrete and twisted metal bars. After some months trying, the Germans still manage to take some oil from them.

Bob, by the way, when you say "erotic" Brazil, I hope you`re not meaning any kind of prejudice like Brazilian women are prostitutes and such. Because there`s a general stereotype among foreigners like these. We find it quite offensive, at least this is a word that can be very misundertood. Yet, we, as a liberal country, do appreciate freedom of sexuality like any other liberal country. Since you`re from California, Hollywood and all, I think you might understand that, right?

Best Regards.