The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 09 Oct 2019 18:21

Duncan_M wrote:
09 Oct 2019 16:24
Max Payload wrote:
01 Oct 2019 10:46
Duncan_M wrote:
30 Sep 2019 21:32
An August launch date towards Moscow for Army Group Center has to content with the following: ...
The description of Halder as an idiot is, however, glib. Clearly neither the hierarchy of the interwar Heer nor the postwar US military subscribed to that opinion and his supposed idiocy seems to have been well hidden during the planning of Weiß, Gelb and Rot.
Early war success had so much to do with other factors than Halder's supposed competence, especially when so many of the better decisions made ran counter to his recommendations. In my opinion, he was unfit for the job he held, if for no other reason than the chief of staff of the general staff cannot have an antagonistic relationship with the boss, regardless if that person is Hitler, Stalin, Jesus, or Lucifer, holding that position requires a team player with a good relationship with the commander in chief, obedience and loyalty, and an innate understanding of the commander's intent, all of which Halder was absolutely devoid of. Forgetting his political, economic, strategic, logistical foibles (which he had many), that above was enough that he should have been relieved far earlier than he was, but Hitler didn't have cause until it became apparent Halder was blatantly not right for the job, after botching two major offensives.

Postwar Halder came across to the Western Allies as an intelligent military professional that was anti-Hitler (to the point he later claimed that he'd wanted to assassinate Hitler earlier in the war) and was able and ready to tell US Army and British officers what they wanted to hear about basically everything (Liddell-Hart being the worst), but especially about being responsible for the history of the war from perspectives unknown to the Western Allies, the Eastern Front where the Germans fought the massive Asiatic hordes of evil Russkies. He literally wrote the history of the Eastern Front for the US Army, and helped create tactics, operational doctrine, and strategy based on his advice and knowledge, which is sad and hilarious at the same time, because it was not for many decades later that it became clear everyone had been duped by him (similarly to how so many had been duped, even to this day, by a certain facially scared SS lieutenant colonel leader of commandos, who turned out to be a fraud too).

The problem we still face today because of individuals like Halder is that so much of what they gave up as history was farce, as it was their highly sanitized version of events made to favor themselves, full of blame game against Hitler and others who were no longer alive, maligned the Red Army fully (postwar US Army tactics, operational doctrine, and strategy, based on Halder's, Manstein's, and other former general's accounts of the Red Army was framed on falsehoods and racism, and had they been implemented in actual fighting would have led to disaster). Worse, it was a literal conspiracy, since it was all done in concert with other surviving generals who used the opportunity to make money, revive their reputations, earn their pensions, remove the stigma of war crimes surrounding the Wehrmacht (they created the Clean Wehrmacht Myth). They even managed to become postwar mythical heroes, super competent captains of war who would have won easily against amazing odds if not for Hitler! Its scary what they managed to accomplish, all because the Cold War forced the US and British to remilitarize West Germany.

They lost the war, badly, often through their own incompetence, and then managed to be write the history of the war. So much for "history is written by the victors."

It was only fairly recently when scholars ignored their narratives and took a more indepth and unbiased examination of the records and found that, what a surprise, incompetent Nazi allied generals with massive egos have a tendency of lying. So for that to happen, again, in my opinion at least, Halder needs to be knocked off of any historical pedestal he exists on and the actual truth acknowledged.
This diatribe only illustrates your massive prejudice against German commanders. All of it is complete nonsense. Mostly the typical leftist prejudices about the imagined cold war conspiracy against poor red army. Makes me laugh. You are massively misrepresenting what German commanders wrote after the war.That they allegedly pretended to have been able to win the war,if not for Hitler is far from the truth. Good joke that they supposedly determined NATO doctrine.Not really. Had nothing to do with Mansteins ideas.
Scholars have always used memoirs by German commanders with the necessary critical sense,together with many other sources. Never was military history of WW2 written solely on the basis of memoirs.That recently these memoirs have been ignored is blatantly untrue.
Last edited by Aida1 on 09 Oct 2019 20:07, edited 5 times in total.

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 09 Oct 2019 18:49

Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 18:08
From what i read it seems there was not enough data from these sources to come to a correct assessment.
If you are interested in what the FHO actually briefed - rather than making a guess that fits your preconceptions - it makes sense that you take the time and effort to read the FHO briefings and documents themselves.

FHO briefings were certainly not perfect, no intelligence briefing is. But your claim "The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated" cannot be taken seriously without evidence. And anybody who reads the evidence will see your claim is quite wrong.

Of course, if you are not interested in historically reality and only want to grandstand your inaccurate opinions, then don't bother.

Duncan_M
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Duncan_M » 09 Oct 2019 19:13

Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 18:21
This diatribe only illustrates your massive prejudice against German commanders.All of it is complete nonsense.Mostly the typical leftist prejudices about the imagined cold war conspiracy against poor red army.Makes me laugh.You are massively misrepresenting what German commanders wrote after the war.Good joke that they supposedly determined NATO doctrine.Not really.
Notice the lack of spacing between Aida1's sentences and General G, the same clipped responses, the same bombastic language:

"Says those that wrote about him.He could also easily have survived the war if he had accepted to be an intructor after Villers Bocage.That he did not says a lot about him.Same thing for commanding the attack in the action that killed him." viewtopic.php?p=1519840#p1519840

"Reading is clearly not your strongpoint.You know nothing about tanks hit and not damaged to the extent of having to abandon them.So no hit ratio can be calculated.
Your bias shows again." viewtopic.php?p=1520173#p1520173

The repeated use of "Makes me laugh":

"Your first phrase makes me laugh.There are posters who are always about creating pointless arguments and against those I buy ammunition. :) The information is relevant because at least one user has expressed doubts about the will of Manstein to relieve 6 army. And one user had a question about who wanted to attack mainly from Kotelnikovo." viewtopic.php?p=1514596#p1514596

"When somebody like you makes big statements about Manstein and Raus it makes me laugh. :lol:
Did you not consider that it is difficult recalling exact dates years after the fact?Raus' veracity is not in doubt.He simply remembered the dates like he did.
And putting the 57th corps where it was,was dangerous for the overall situation.The risk was taken because an atttempt had to made to save sixth army.
Hoths preference for the attack from Kotelnikovo comes from the history of the 6.Panzerdivision,W.Paul p.236.
On p.240 one finds Hoth insisting that the 57th panzercorps must keep together and focuse only on the determined advance to the Stalingrad pocket"
viewtopic.php?p=1510233#p1510233

Such a coincidence!

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 09 Oct 2019 19:36

Duncan_M wrote:
09 Oct 2019 19:13
Notice the lack of spacing between Aida1's sentences and General G, the same clipped responses, the same bombastic language:
So what?

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 09 Oct 2019 19:46

MarkN wrote:
09 Oct 2019 18:49
Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 18:08
From what i read it seems there was not enough data from these sources to come to a correct assessment.
If you are interested in what the FHO actually briefed - rather than making a guess that fits your preconceptions - it makes sense that you take the time and effort to read the FHO briefings and documents themselves.

FHO briefings were certainly not perfect, no intelligence briefing is. But your claim "The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated" cannot be taken seriously without evidence. And anybody who reads the evidence will see your claim is quite wrong.

Of course, if you are not interested in historically reality and only want to grandstand your inaccurate opinions, then don't bother.
OH really.That the military strength of the USSR was underestimated by the FHO and other intelligence services is not a strange personal opinion of mine but something you can read in any detailed work on operation barbarossa. Reading Pahls book gave me more background on the why of the underestimation. It is doubtfull one could have done much better.
Last edited by Aida1 on 09 Oct 2019 20:19, edited 1 time in total.

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 09 Oct 2019 20:01

Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 19:46
OH really.That the military strength of the USSR was underestimated by the FHO and other intelligence services is not a strange personal opinion of mine but something you can read in any detailed work on operation barbarossa.Reading Pahls book gave me more background on the why of the underestimation.It is doubtfull one could have done much better.
Strange? Not at all. Posters peddling unsubstantiated opinions or (deliberate) misrepresentations of evidence is quite normal on AHF and seems to be welcomed by the site owners. So, your comments are far from strange.

It's the inaccuracy of your claims and opinions I'm highlighting. Your reluctance to evidence them is telling. So far all you have managed is to try and send readers down the Marcks blind alley and point to somebody else who shares your opinion and who also doesn't evidence that opinion.

If so many others have this opinion, which l am sure many do, it will be very easy for you to produce the evidence to support your claim. Not so? Surely at least one of the many detailed works that you have read will give you the details, the specifics of the "far overestimation" you claim. Surely?

Or are you evidencing how myths and historical falsehoods are so easily propagated?

PS.
FHO did far, far better than you give them credit.

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 09 Oct 2019 20:18

MarkN wrote:
09 Oct 2019 20:01
Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 19:46
OH really.That the military strength of the USSR was underestimated by the FHO and other intelligence services is not a strange personal opinion of mine but something you can read in any detailed work on operation barbarossa.Reading Pahls book gave me more background on the why of the underestimation.It is doubtfull one could have done much better.
Strange? Not at all. Posters peddling unsubstantiated opinions or (deliberate) misrepresentations of evidence is quite normal on AHF and seems to be welcomed by the site owners. So, your comments are far from strange.

It's the inaccuracy of your claims and opinions I'm highlighting. Your reluctance to evidence them is telling. So far all you have managed is to try and send readers down the Marcks blind alley and point to somebody else who shares your opinion and who also doesn't evidence that opinion.

If so many others have this opinion, which l am sure many do, it will be very easy for you to produce the evidence to support your claim. Not so? Surely at least one of the many detailed works that you have read will give you the details, the specifics of the "far overestimation" you claim. Surely?

Or are you evidencing how myths and historical falsehoods are so easily propagated?

PS.
FHO did far, far better than you give them credit.
FHO did as well as possible with the data available. I am not in the blaming game where FHO is concerned.
I am not going to be baited into evidencing something that should be common knowledge. Your statements about the content of German memoirs are so far from the truth you should climb down from your cloud and be a bit more modest.

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 09 Oct 2019 20:34

Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 20:18
FHO did as well as possible with the data available. I am not in the blaming game where FHO is concerned.
Yes you are....
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019 19:09
The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.
As well as mud, cold weather and Hitler, you blame FHO for the Heer's failure with BARBAROSSA.
Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 20:18
I am not going to be baited into evidencing something that should be common knowledge.
Don't be baited. Evidence your claim. You keep repeating this is common knowledge, but you cannot produce a single piece of evidence to support the claim. All you have done is mislead readers by sending them down Marcks and Pahl blind alleys. How can it be such common knowledge and yet you cannot produce a single piece of documentary evidence or data to support your claim?
Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 20:18
Your statements about the content of German memoirs are so far from the truth ...
What statements?

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 10 Oct 2019 09:01

MarkN wrote:
09 Oct 2019 20:34
Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 20:18
FHO did as well as possible with the data available. I am not in the blaming game where FHO is concerned.
Yes you are....
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019 19:09
The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.
As well as mud, cold weather and Hitler, you blame FHO for the Heer's failure with BARBAROSSA.
Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 20:18
I am not going to be baited into evidencing something that should be common knowledge.
Don't be baited. Evidence your claim. You keep repeating this is common knowledge, but you cannot produce a single piece of evidence to support the claim. All you have done is mislead readers by sending them down Marcks and Pahl blind alleys. How can it be such common knowledge and yet you cannot produce a single piece of documentary evidence or data to support your claim?
Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 20:18
Your statements about the content of German memoirs are so far from the truth ...
What statements?
You are in the misrepresenting business again. Nowhere did i put any blame on FHO.The data were insufficient so the estimate was off too. I made it very clear it would have been unlikely to correctly estimate red army military strength given the difficulty of getting information out of the USSR.
I blamed Hitler for the not getting to Moscow as his decision to go for Kiev first made the attack towards Moscow start too late and get stuck in mud.
I am not going to prove the underestimation of the USSR in 1941 and later. Should not even be an item of discussion as this is well established.
Last edited by Aida1 on 10 Oct 2019 17:03, edited 1 time in total.

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 10 Oct 2019 12:14

What a deceitful and deceiving post!
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 09:01
You made the typical not very original statement about german commanders memoirs alledgedly pretending to have been able t.....
No I didn't. You are posting falsehoods.
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 09:01
You also made the often repeated not very original statement that the wr....
No I didn't. You are posting falsehoods.
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 09:01
Nowhere did i put any blame on FHO.The data were insufficient so the estimate was off too. I made it very clear it would have been unlikely to correctly estimate red army military strength given the difficulty of getting information out of the USSR.
You wrote...
Aida1 wrote:
05 Oct 2019 10:00
Once Hitler had decided to attack the USSR it had to be defeated in 1941 for strategic reasons already mentioned.The conviction that that could be done was based on the faulty intelligence picture concerning the USSR.
You wrote...
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019 15:43
If one had had a correct estimate of the Soviet military power one could 'not have believed that this could be destroyed in one blitzkrieg campaign.
You wrote...
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019 19:09
The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.
As part of your narrative to excuse the Heer's military failure, you blame mud, cold weather, Hitler and faulty intelligence provided by FHO. Rejigging the thrust of the latter by saying the FHO's failings were understandable does not cut the mustard.

Notwithstanding the above, you still have not evidenced where the (FHO) intelligence was in error. No intelligence is perfect, but the FHO briefs are broadly speaking accurate. So what is the basis of your "The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated" claim?

Your tiresome statement that is common knowledge appears to be evidence that you are a parrot in a long line of parrots parroting the same unsubstantiated, unevidenced claim. Is it common knowledge or oft repeated not very original myth?

Just like the claims about mud, now with the claims of "far underestimated" intelligence, you refuse to engage with historical evidence for fear it will upset the false narrative you wish to spread.

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 10 Oct 2019 14:21

MarkN wrote:
10 Oct 2019 12:14
What a deceitful and deceiving post!
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 09:01
You made the typical not very original statement about german commanders memoirs alledgedly pretending to have been able t.....
No I didn't. You are posting falsehoods.
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 09:01
You also made the often repeated not very original statement that the wr....
No I didn't. You are posting falsehoods.
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 09:01
Nowhere did i put any blame on FHO.The data were insufficient so the estimate was off too. I made it very clear it would have been unlikely to correctly estimate red army military strength given the difficulty of getting information out of the USSR.
You wrote...
Aida1 wrote:
05 Oct 2019 10:00
Once Hitler had decided to attack the USSR it had to be defeated in 1941 for strategic reasons already mentioned.The conviction that that could be done was based on the faulty intelligence picture concerning the USSR.
You wrote...
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019 15:43
If one had had a correct estimate of the Soviet military power one could 'not have believed that this could be destroyed in one blitzkrieg campaign.
You wrote...
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019 19:09
The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.
As part of your narrative to excuse the Heer's military failure, you blame mud, cold weather, Hitler and faulty intelligence provided by FHO. Rejigging the thrust of the latter by saying the FHO's failings were understandable does not cut the mustard.

Notwithstanding the above, you still have not evidenced where the (FHO) intelligence was in error. No intelligence is perfect, but the FHO briefs are broadly speaking accurate. So what is the basis of your "The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated" claim?

Your tiresome statement that is common knowledge appears to be evidence that you are a parrot in a long line of parrots parroting the same unsubstantiated, unevidenced claim. Is it common knowledge or oft repeated not very original myth?

Just like the claims about mud, now with the claims of "far underestimated" intelligence, you refuse to engage with historical evidence for fear it will upset the false narrative you wish to spread.
.You probably have a pet theory about allegedly Soviet strength not being underestimated and everybody else getting it wrong.
Last edited by Aida1 on 10 Oct 2019 17:01, edited 1 time in total.

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 10 Oct 2019 15:27

Another truely deceitful and deceiving post....
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 14:21
Your diatribe against German commanders was pretty explicit.You even succeeded in saying that Halder wrote the history of the war on the eastern front for the US army which is nonsense as most of the papers written for the US army historical division concern the western front.
I have written no such thing. You are posting falsehoods.
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 14:21
You are also into the mispresenting game again as you forgot to mention i blamed Hitler for deciding to go for Moscow too late.
You are posting falsehoods. Your blaming of Hitler is in the list l posted alongside mud, cold weather and alleged faulty intelligence presented by FHO.
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 14:21
And underestimating enemy strength does have an influence on planning.
It sure does. But, ...
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 14:21
You probably have a pet theory about allegedly Soviet strength not being underestimated and everybody else getting it wrong.
... you have failed to substantiate your repeated claim that the intelligence from FHO "far underestimated ... military strength and regenerative power".

Is it really common knowledge or oft repeated not very original myth?

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 10 Oct 2019 16:15

MarkN wrote:
10 Oct 2019 15:27
Another truely deceitful and deceiving post....
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 14:21
Your diatribe against German commanders was pretty explicit.You even succeeded in saying that Halder wrote the history of the war on the eastern front for the US army which is nonsense as most of the papers written for the US army historical division concern the western front.
I have written no such thing. You are posting falsehoods.
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 14:21
You are also into the mispresenting game again as you forgot to mention i blamed Hitler for deciding to go for Moscow too late.
You are posting falsehoods. Your blaming of Hitler is in the list l posted alongside mud, cold weather and alleged faulty intelligence presented by FHO.
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 14:21
And underestimating enemy strength does have an influence on planning.
It sure does. But, ...
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 14:21
You probably have a pet theory about allegedly Soviet strength not being underestimated and everybody else getting it wrong.
... you have failed to substantiate your repeated claim that the intelligence from FHO "far underestimated ... military strength and regenerative power".

Is it really common knowledge or oft repeated not very original myth?
In the article 'Foreign armies east and German Military intelligence in Russia 1941-1945 'by David Thomas published in Journal of contemporary history vol 22, no 2, the following is stated on p 288 :" To conclude, the poor performance of FHO in evaluating the capabilities and the strength of the Red Army in connection with the planning of Barbarossa is beyond dispute."
On Page 279 it is written:" Between july and december 1941,FHO issued a number of inaccurate intelligence estimates , which nourished the overconfidence of OKH and the Fuhrer, and resulted in errors of German strategy and operational conduct at decisive moments in the campaign."
The article contains lots of details about the activities of FHO.The underestimation of red army strength in 1941 is in there too.

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 10 Oct 2019 16:57

MarkN wrote:
10 Oct 2019 12:14
What a deceitful and deceiving post!
Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 09:01
You made the typical not very original statement about german commanders memoirs alledgedly pretending to have been able t.....
No I didn't. You are posting falsehoods.
No falsehood.Did not notice Duncan M inserting himself in the discussion.It was his diatribe.

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 10 Oct 2019 17:00

Duncan_M wrote:
09 Oct 2019 16:24
Max Payload wrote:
01 Oct 2019 10:46
Duncan_M wrote:
30 Sep 2019 21:32
An August launch date towards Moscow for Army Group Center has to content with the following: ...
The description of Halder as an idiot is, however, glib. Clearly neither the hierarchy of the interwar Heer nor the postwar US military subscribed to that opinion and his supposed idiocy seems to have been well hidden during the planning of Weiß, Gelb and Rot.
Early war success had so much to do with other factors than Halder's supposed competence, especially when so many of the better decisions made ran counter to his recommendations. In my opinion, he was unfit for the job he held, if for no other reason than the chief of staff of the general staff cannot have an antagonistic relationship with the boss, regardless if that person is Hitler, Stalin, Jesus, or Lucifer, holding that position requires a team player with a good relationship with the commander in chief, obedience and loyalty, and an innate understanding of the commander's intent, all of which Halder was absolutely devoid of. Forgetting his political, economic, strategic, logistical foibles (which he had many), that above was enough that he should have been relieved far earlier than he was, but Hitler didn't have cause until it became apparent Halder was blatantly not right for the job, after botching two major offensives.

Postwar Halder came across to the Western Allies as an intelligent military professional that was anti-Hitler (to the point he later claimed that he'd wanted to assassinate Hitler earlier in the war) and was able and ready to tell US Army and British officers what they wanted to hear about basically everything (Liddell-Hart being the worst), but especially about being responsible for the history of the war from perspectives unknown to the Western Allies, the Eastern Front where the Germans fought the massive Asiatic hordes of evil Russkies. He literally wrote the history of the Eastern Front for the US Army, and helped create tactics, operational doctrine, and strategy based on his advice and knowledge, which is sad and hilarious at the same time, because it was not for many decades later that it became clear everyone had been duped by him (similarly to how so many had been duped, even to this day, by a certain facially scared SS lieutenant colonel leader of commandos, who turned out to be a fraud too).

The problem we still face today because of individuals like Halder is that so much of what they gave up as history was farce, as it was their highly sanitized version of events made to favor themselves, full of blame game against Hitler and others who were no longer alive, maligned the Red Army fully (postwar US Army tactics, operational doctrine, and strategy, based on Halder's, Manstein's, and other former general's accounts of the Red Army was framed on falsehoods and racism, and had they been implemented in actual fighting would have led to disaster). Worse, it was a literal conspiracy, since it was all done in concert with other surviving generals who used the opportunity to make money, revive their reputations, earn their pensions, remove the stigma of war crimes surrounding the Wehrmacht (they created the Clean Wehrmacht Myth). They even managed to become postwar mythical heroes, super competent captains of war who would have won easily against amazing odds if not for Hitler! Its scary what they managed to accomplish, all because the Cold War forced the US and British to remilitarize West Germany.

They lost the war, badly, often through their own incompetence, and then managed to be write the history of the war. So much for "history is written by the victors."

It was only fairly recently when scholars ignored their narratives and took a more indepth and unbiased examination of the records and found that, what a surprise, incompetent Nazi allied generals with massive egos have a tendency of lying. So for that to happen, again, in my opinion at least, Halder needs to be knocked off of any historical pedestal he exists on and the actual truth acknowledged.
You make the typical not very original statement about german commanders memoirs alledgedly pretending to have been able to win the war without Hitlers meddling.They did not. General Westphal, for example wrote this on p 10 of his memoirs( Erinnerungen Haese und Koehler 1975):" Nobody has to be suspicious that I will try to prove by circuitous ways, that the German Reich could have ended the war with a stalemate or in certain circonstances even have won the war with better political or military leadership at the highest level. I have already pointed out this impossibility in 'Heer in Fesseln'. The general superiority of the opposing side in all aspects and it's determination to defeat the nazi regime were too great. I only want to explain things as I lived them.I do not want to diminish the merit of anybody in even the smallest way or make anybody's fault bigger. If I want to stay with the truth- and that is my firm decision- then I also have to show the errors committed. "
Halder did certanly not write the history of the war on the eastern front for the US Army historical division,
You also make the often repeated not very original statement that the writing of the military history of ww2 was for a long time based on german commanders memoirs and then at some point light shone from heaven and scholars started to disregard them. Historians have always and will always use ,among many other sources- the memoirs of german commanders with the necessary critical sense.
To prove that is is not a bad idea to be inspired by socalled German operational ideas,i would like to point out that in the midde east Arab armies operated by soviet army doctrine and the Israely army thrashed them using operational ideas which look very German.

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