Falsehood. You claimed l wrote it. Twice. Falsehood followed by falsehood
That would appear to be a common trait of yours.
Excellent. Finally, perhaps, we can get a discussion going that actually helps understanding of historical reality.Aida1 wrote: ↑10 Oct 2019 16:15In the article 'Foreign armies east and German Military intelligence in Russia 1941-1945 'by David Thomas published in Journal of contemporary history vol 22, no 2, the following is stated on p 288 :" To conclude, the poor performance of FHO in evaluating the capabilities and the strength of the Red Army in connection with the planning of Barbarossa is beyond dispute."
On Page 279 it is written:" Between july and december 1941,FHO issued a number of inaccurate intelligence estimates , which nourished the overconfidence of OKH and the Fuhrer, and resulted in errors of German strategy and operational conduct at decisive moments in the campaign."
The article contains lots of details about the activities of FHO.The underestimation of red army strength in 1941 is in there too.
But first, a couple of points from my side.
Your claim(s) in this thread regarding FHO's "far underestimation" have come across referring to the planning of BARBAROSSA before it started. Briefings by FHO after 22 June 1941 are a different story. Remember, you excused their alleged failings referencing Pahl and limited intelligence gathering before the invasion had started.
Second, my argument will be that the FHO certainly did underestimate Red Army fighting capabilities after BARBAROSSA had commenced, but that this was down to an institutional attitude throughout the Heer officer clique. In effect, it was not an FHO failure to interpret data and the situation correctly, it was a Heer-wide failure.
Now, to your post.
Thomas writes - regarding planning prior to BARBAROSSA start - "To conclude, the poor performance of FHO in evaluating the capabilities and the strength of the Red Army in connection with the planning of Barbarossa is beyond dispute." Unfortunately, his own text contradicts this. His analysis of a FHO document dated 15 January 1941 produces a Red Army on 22 June 1941 6.2 million strong (p.276). Subsequent FHO documents over the next 6 months period prior to BARBAROSSA start increase that number further. In reality, the Red Army had about 5.5 million in uniform on 22 June 1941. Underestimate?
Similarly, Thomas notes that the Red Army could mobilize a further 11-12 million. In reality, before the winter, the Red Army had not mobilized that many. Underestimate?
He also describes the FHO assessment of Soviet military strategy. On close examination, the FHO analysis was rather accurate. However, one the battle had started the Red Army was not able to effect it satisfactorily so it looked like they were dping something different.
The failings of FHO analysis prior to 22 June 1941 were common failings thrpughput the Heer. The underestimated Red Army motives, desires and fighting spirit. This was analysis not based upon data but upon Heer group think.
Thomas also writes, "Between july and december 1941,FHO issued a number of inaccurate intelligence estimates , which nourished the overconfidence of OKH and the Fuhrer, and resulted in errors of German strategy and operational conduct at decisive moments in the campaign." Indeed they did. But all of these were the same failures as before, commentary based on Heer group think not data.
The failure of intelligence was a failure of the Heer collectively to grasp that the Soviet troupie was not a barbarous sub-human, that he was not going to turn against the Communist leadership at the first opportunity and that he was prepared to fight and die for his motherland.
Thomas writes, and l agree with this (pp.274-275),
For me, the failure to interpret and understand the information was not a failure of FHO intelligence analysis, it was a failure of Heer hubris, delusion, racist sense of superiority and group think.The planning and preparation of Barbarossa were influenced strongly by the traditional Russland-Bild of the Generalstab. Accord- ing to this picture, the Soviet Union, like Czarist Russia, was a 'colossus of clay', which would break asunder under a swift, strong blow from the outside. In the view of several leading German generals, the Red Army in 1940-41 was clumsy, incapable of operational initiative at all command levels, habituated to mechanical military planning and operational conduct, and in general unprepared to wage modern warfare. The poor performance of Soviet forces in Poland and Finland was adjudged prima facie evidence that the Red Army neither had recovered from the decimation of its officer corps in the purges, nor had assimilated the new military technologies that it was known, or suspected, to be developing. The swiftness and ease of the victory in 1940 over France (the strongest military power in Europe, according to the conventional wisdom) confirmed OKH in the belief that German military-technical superiority and leadership would ensure a swift, effective result against the Soviet Union. The planning documents for Barbarossa and the official statements and diary entries of ranking German generals regarding the feasibility of the undertaking combine to suggest that OKH, the WFST, and the Generalstab viewed the problem of an attack on the Soviet Union as essentially a matter of the correct operational preparation. In general, the evaluation of the Red Army by FHO before 22 June 1941 furnished no corrective to the erroneous Russland-Bild that informed German military thinking. On the contrary, the FHO assessment of Soviet military capabilities re-affirmed the traditional German picture and served up additional justification for the optimism prevailing in OKH.