The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 02 Dec 2019 22:37

Bad Intel certainly had a negative effect on the decisionmaking but it was not obvious for the Abwehr and FHO to have done much better .It was not easy to obtain correct information on the USSR.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 02 Dec 2019 22:41

ljadw wrote:
02 Dec 2019 21:22
This is not correct ; it is the usual blaming of some Germans for the German defeat and to bypass the existence of the Red Army . The Germans were defeated by the Red Army, not by mistakes of Intelligence or Logistics .
Better intelligence does not mean better logistics .
German logistics were limited. That is a fact . With better intelligence you will not have better logistics .
It was impossible to go with an army of 3 million men to the Volga in a few months . The existent roads and railways could not support the advance of 3 million men to the Volga and if they could support this, the advance would stall because of the Red Army .. Everyone knew it and thus the plan was changed .
The distance Berlin/Volga was as the distance Cologne/Madrid .The Germans could in May 1940 not advance to Madrid and the Wallies could not advance to Berlin in 1944,and the reason was not Intelligence.
You are confusing things here. If you have correct Intel,your planning Will be completely different which includes the logistical needs.

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Appleknocker27
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 03 Dec 2019 01:38

Aida1 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 22:41
You are confusing things here. If you have correct Intel,your planning Will be completely different which includes the logistical needs.
Exactly my point, as well as it is a fact.

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Appleknocker27
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 03 Dec 2019 02:08

Aida1 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 22:37
Bad Intel certainly had a negative effect on the decisionmaking but it was not obvious for the Abwehr and FHO to have done much better .It was not easy to obtain correct information on the USSR.
Regardless of how easy or not easy the job was, the Wehrmacht grossly neglected the Soviet Union/Red Army and they paid for it. The Imperial Army had literally walked the same ground just 23 years prior, yet the Wehrmacht lacked basic information about the terrain, weather, effects of weather on the terrain, maps, etc. The information that FHO compiled was purely open source or shallow recon flights, there was no clandestine effort made whatsoever. The Reichsheer and Wehrmacht completely neglected the Intel branch and Russia/Soviet Union since the Great War ended, at least not until 1938 and even then it was a token effort. By contrast, they knew everything about France, Belgium, etc. and had equipment designed to handle even the newest fortifications (railway guns, etc.).
OKH knew that Hitler's agenda was living space in the East and war with the Soviet Union, and they still failed to analyze and understand their prospective adversary and the chosen battleground. The Intel branch provided estimates based on estimates, and that is what the foundation of Barbarossa was built on. When your operational planners are building a concept based on guesses, the log planners have no chance of successfully supporting anything with certainty beyond the consumption of the initial combat load of the maneuver elements.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 03 Dec 2019 08:43

Aida1 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 22:41
ljadw wrote:
02 Dec 2019 21:22
This is not correct ; it is the usual blaming of some Germans for the German defeat and to bypass the existence of the Red Army . The Germans were defeated by the Red Army, not by mistakes of Intelligence or Logistics .
Better intelligence does not mean better logistics .
German logistics were limited. That is a fact . With better intelligence you will not have better logistics .
It was impossible to go with an army of 3 million men to the Volga in a few months . The existent roads and railways could not support the advance of 3 million men to the Volga and if they could support this, the advance would stall because of the Red Army .. Everyone knew it and thus the plan was changed .
The distance Berlin/Volga was as the distance Cologne/Madrid .The Germans could in May 1940 not advance to Madrid and the Wallies could not advance to Berlin in 1944,and the reason was not Intelligence.
You are confusing things here. If you have correct Intel,your planning Will be completely different which includes the logistical needs.
NO : better informations by FHO would not make the Soviet road and railway system capable to supply the advance of an army of 3 million men over a distance of more than 1000 km . And better informations from FHO would not make disappear the Red Army .
The Ostheer lost more than 200000 men in August 1941. Better informations would not prevent this .
In September 1944 the Wallies did not succeed to go to Berlin ,this was not caused by bad informations but by logistics and German resistance .
Every time an offensive fails the front generals blame intelligence/logistics,instead of admitting that they were stopped by the enemy .This is always so and will always be so .
Planning is not the decisive factor in victory,and different planning will not change logistical needs or logistical capacities . Logistical needs are determined by the enemy and by logistical capacities . Better informations will not give the Ostheer more tanks, more trucks, more fuel, more ammunition ...
As usual you are constructing a scenario where the Red Army is absent .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 03 Dec 2019 08:51

Appleknocker27 wrote:
03 Dec 2019 02:08
Aida1 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 22:37
Bad Intel certainly had a negative effect on the decisionmaking but it was not obvious for the Abwehr and FHO to have done much better .It was not easy to obtain correct information on the USSR.
Regardless of how easy or not easy the job was, the Wehrmacht grossly neglected the Soviet Union/Red Army and they paid for it. The Imperial Army had literally walked the same ground just 23 years prior, yet the Wehrmacht lacked basic information about the terrain, weather, effects of weather on the terrain, maps, etc. The information that FHO compiled was purely open source or shallow recon flights, there was no clandestine effort made whatsoever. The Reichsheer and Wehrmacht completely neglected the Intel branch and Russia/Soviet Union since the Great War ended, at least not until 1938 and even then it was a token effort. By contrast, they knew everything about France, Belgium, etc. and had equipment designed to handle even the newest fortifications (railway guns, etc.).
OKH knew that Hitler's agenda was living space in the East and war with the Soviet Union, and they still failed to analyze and understand their prospective adversary and the chosen battleground. The Intel branch provided estimates based on estimates, and that is what the foundation of Barbarossa was built on. When your operational planners are building a concept based on guesses, the log planners have no chance of successfully supporting anything with certainty beyond the consumption of the initial combat load of the maneuver elements.
NO : the chance of successfully supporting does not depend on the log planners,but on the capacity of the economy to produce enough to support the advance . The log planners produce nothing : supplies are produced by the economy .And there was no chance that the economy could produce more, that more supplies could give the Ostheer the possibility to go to the Volga : the stronger the army, the slower the advance . A batallion can advance faster than a division .
The foundation of Barbarossa was not built on estimates, but on what the Germans knew they could do .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 03 Dec 2019 09:25

Appleknocker27 wrote:
03 Dec 2019 02:08
Aida1 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 22:37
Bad Intel certainly had a negative effect on the decisionmaking but it was not obvious for the Abwehr and FHO to have done much better .It was not easy to obtain correct information on the USSR.
Regardless of how easy or not easy the job was, the Wehrmacht grossly neglected the Soviet Union/Red Army and they paid for it. The Imperial Army had literally walked the same ground just 23 years prior, yet the Wehrmacht lacked basic information about the terrain, weather, effects of weather on the terrain, maps, etc. The information that FHO compiled was purely open source or shallow recon flights, there was no clandestine effort made whatsoever. The Reichsheer and Wehrmacht completely neglected the Intel branch and Russia/Soviet Union since the Great War ended, at least not until 1938 and even then it was a token effort. By contrast, they knew everything about France, Belgium, etc. and had equipment designed to handle even the newest fortifications (railway guns, etc.).
OKH knew that Hitler's agenda was living space in the East and war with the Soviet Union, and they still failed to analyze and understand their prospective adversary and the chosen battleground. The Intel branch provided estimates based on estimates, and that is what the foundation of Barbarossa was built on. When your operational planners are building a concept based on guesses, the log planners have no chance of successfully supporting anything with certainty beyond the consumption of the initial combat load of the maneuver elements.
It is certainly true the Abwehr startend its effort late and its activities were more in the border area so there was no effort and no information on the strategic level. I do not know whether they could have succeeded in having informants at the higher level as that would not be
I do think they were aware of weather and terrain but were convinced it would all be over before weather affected operations.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 03 Dec 2019 09:31

ljadw wrote:
03 Dec 2019 08:43
Aida1 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 22:41
ljadw wrote:
02 Dec 2019 21:22
This is not correct ; it is the usual blaming of some Germans for the German defeat and to bypass the existence of the Red Army . The Germans were defeated by the Red Army, not by mistakes of Intelligence or Logistics .
Better intelligence does not mean better logistics .
German logistics were limited. That is a fact . With better intelligence you will not have better logistics .
It was impossible to go with an army of 3 million men to the Volga in a few months . The existent roads and railways could not support the advance of 3 million men to the Volga and if they could support this, the advance would stall because of the Red Army .. Everyone knew it and thus the plan was changed .
The distance Berlin/Volga was as the distance Cologne/Madrid .The Germans could in May 1940 not advance to Madrid and the Wallies could not advance to Berlin in 1944,and the reason was not Intelligence.
You are confusing things here. If you have correct Intel,your planning Will be completely different which includes the logistical needs.
NO : better informations by FHO would not make the Soviet road and railway system capable to supply the advance of an army of 3 million men over a distance of more than 1000 km . And better informations from FHO would not make disappear the Red Army .
The Ostheer lost more than 200000 men in August 1941. Better informations would not prevent this .
In September 1944 the Wallies did not succeed to go to Berlin ,this was not caused by bad informations but by logistics and German resistance .
Every time an offensive fails the front generals blame intelligence/logistics,instead of admitting that they were stopped by the enemy .This is always so and will always be so .
Planning is not the decisive factor in victory,and different planning will not change logistical needs or logistical capacities . Logistical needs are determined by the enemy and by logistical capacities . Better informations will not give the Ostheer more tanks, more trucks, more fuel, more ammunition ...
As usual you are constructing a scenario where the Red Army is absent .
You are ignoring again that if they had realistic intel, there would have been no pushing on after mid october. That was based on the conviction that the red army was on the verge of destruction.Also,from the beginning,planning would have been different as it would have been more difficult to assume that the red army could be defeated quickly.

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 03 Dec 2019 09:34

ljadw wrote:
03 Dec 2019 08:51
Appleknocker27 wrote:
03 Dec 2019 02:08
Aida1 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 22:37
Bad Intel certainly had a negative effect on the decisionmaking but it was not obvious for the Abwehr and FHO to have done much better .It was not easy to obtain correct information on the USSR.
Regardless of how easy or not easy the job was, the Wehrmacht grossly neglected the Soviet Union/Red Army and they paid for it. The Imperial Army had literally walked the same ground just 23 years prior, yet the Wehrmacht lacked basic information about the terrain, weather, effects of weather on the terrain, maps, etc. The information that FHO compiled was purely open source or shallow recon flights, there was no clandestine effort made whatsoever. The Reichsheer and Wehrmacht completely neglected the Intel branch and Russia/Soviet Union since the Great War ended, at least not until 1938 and even then it was a token effort. By contrast, they knew everything about France, Belgium, etc. and had equipment designed to handle even the newest fortifications (railway guns, etc.).
OKH knew that Hitler's agenda was living space in the East and war with the Soviet Union, and they still failed to analyze and understand their prospective adversary and the chosen battleground. The Intel branch provided estimates based on estimates, and that is what the foundation of Barbarossa was built on. When your operational planners are building a concept based on guesses, the log planners have no chance of successfully supporting anything with certainty beyond the consumption of the initial combat load of the maneuver elements.
NO : the chance of successfully supporting does not depend on the log planners,but on the capacity of the economy to produce enough to support the advance . The log planners produce nothing : supplies are produced by the economy .And there was no chance that the economy could produce more, that more supplies could give the Ostheer the possibility to go to the Volga : the stronger the army, the slower the advance . A batallion can advance faster than a division .
The foundation of Barbarossa was not built on estimates, but on what the Germans knew they could do .
You are ignoring that all planning would be different with realistic Intel on the strength of the red army. There would be less of a conviction that the red army could be defeated in 1941 and so there would be less of a hurry after the initial phrase.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 03 Dec 2019 09:52

Different planning would not give the Ostheer more trucks,tanks,divisions,fuel, etc,etc .
And there was no convicion that the SU could be defeated in 1941 : there was an agreement that the SU could only be defeated in 1941 and that it needed to be defeated in 1941 .
Besides, more intelligence would not result in different planning,as there was sufficient intelligence and as planning was mainly depending not on intelligence but on the German strength .

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 03 Dec 2019 10:01

Aida1 wrote:
03 Dec 2019 09:25
Appleknocker27 wrote:
03 Dec 2019 02:08
Aida1 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 22:37
Bad Intel certainly had a negative effect on the decisionmaking but it was not obvious for the Abwehr and FHO to have done much better .It was not easy to obtain correct information on the USSR.
Regardless of how easy or not easy the job was, the Wehrmacht grossly neglected the Soviet Union/Red Army and they paid for it. The Imperial Army had literally walked the same ground just 23 years prior, yet the Wehrmacht lacked basic information about the terrain, weather, effects of weather on the terrain, maps, etc. The information that FHO compiled was purely open source or shallow recon flights, there was no clandestine effort made whatsoever. The Reichsheer and Wehrmacht completely neglected the Intel branch and Russia/Soviet Union since the Great War ended, at least not until 1938 and even then it was a token effort. By contrast, they knew everything about France, Belgium, etc. and had equipment designed to handle even the newest fortifications (railway guns, etc.).
OKH knew that Hitler's agenda was living space in the East and war with the Soviet Union, and they still failed to analyze and understand their prospective adversary and the chosen battleground. The Intel branch provided estimates based on estimates, and that is what the foundation of Barbarossa was built on. When your operational planners are building a concept based on guesses, the log planners have no chance of successfully supporting anything with certainty beyond the consumption of the initial combat load of the maneuver elements.
It is certainly true the Abwehr startend its effort late and its activities were more in the border area so there was no effort and no information on the strategic level. I do not know whether they could have succeeded in having informants at the higher level as that would not be
I do think they were aware of weather and terrain but were convinced it would all be over before weather affected operations.
The conviction that it would be over before the weather affected operations was the result of the conviction that it HAD to be over before the weather affected operations .
The Germans usually started by eliminating what would be impossible ( which was a good reasoning ) ,but made the fault by assuming that what remained would be possible,because there was nothing else that could be done .
Three possibilities A,B,C
A : impossible
B impossible
thus C had to be possible .
Something which is wishful thinking .
C was also impossible, something no one in Rastenburg accepted . For the obvious reason that if C was impossible, Germany had lost the war .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 03 Dec 2019 11:54

To what extent do the preceeding posts relate to history and how much are they the opinions of 80 years of storytelling?

For example, is there any evidence to show us how the Heer operational planners and logistics experts dealt with the lack of intelligence? Is their any evidence to show us that anybody in Berlin applied the decision-making process presented by poster ljadw?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 03 Dec 2019 12:11

ljadw wrote:
03 Dec 2019 09:52
Different planning would not give the Ostheer more trucks,tanks,divisions,fuel, etc,etc .
And there was no convicion that the SU could be defeated in 1941 : there was an agreement that the SU could only be defeated in 1941 and that it needed to be defeated in 1941 .
Besides, more intelligence would not result in different planning,as there was sufficient intelligence and as planning was mainly depending not on intelligence but on the German strength .
You are conveniently ignoring that the red army was underestimated. There was a wrong conviction that the red army was near collapse which led to a stubborn continuing of offensive action in circonstances where it was better to stop.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 03 Dec 2019 12:14

ljadw wrote:
03 Dec 2019 10:01
Aida1 wrote:
03 Dec 2019 09:25
Appleknocker27 wrote:
03 Dec 2019 02:08
Aida1 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 22:37
Bad Intel certainly had a negative effect on the decisionmaking but it was not obvious for the Abwehr and FHO to have done much better .It was not easy to obtain correct information on the USSR.
Regardless of how easy or not easy the job was, the Wehrmacht grossly neglected the Soviet Union/Red Army and they paid for it. The Imperial Army had literally walked the same ground just 23 years prior, yet the Wehrmacht lacked basic information about the terrain, weather, effects of weather on the terrain, maps, etc. The information that FHO compiled was purely open source or shallow recon flights, there was no clandestine effort made whatsoever. The Reichsheer and Wehrmacht completely neglected the Intel branch and Russia/Soviet Union since the Great War ended, at least not until 1938 and even then it was a token effort. By contrast, they knew everything about France, Belgium, etc. and had equipment designed to handle even the newest fortifications (railway guns, etc.).
OKH knew that Hitler's agenda was living space in the East and war with the Soviet Union, and they still failed to analyze and understand their prospective adversary and the chosen battleground. The Intel branch provided estimates based on estimates, and that is what the foundation of Barbarossa was built on. When your operational planners are building a concept based on guesses, the log planners have no chance of successfully supporting anything with certainty beyond the consumption of the initial combat load of the maneuver elements.
It is certainly true the Abwehr startend its effort late and its activities were more in the border area so there was no effort and no information on the strategic level. I do not know whether they could have succeeded in having informants at the higher level as that would not be
I do think they were aware of weather and terrain but were convinced it would all be over before weather affected operations.
The conviction that it would be over before the weather affected operations was the result of the conviction that it HAD to be over before the weather affected operations .
The Germans usually started by eliminating what would be impossible ( which was a good reasoning ) ,but made the fault by assuming that what remained would be possible,because there was nothing else that could be done .
Three possibilities A,B,C
A : impossible
B impossible
thus C had to be possible .
Something which is wishful thinking .
C was also impossible, something no one in Rastenburg accepted . For the obvious reason that if C was impossible, Germany had lost the war .
It was considered possible to be successful before october because of the underestimating of red army strength.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 03 Dec 2019 12:21

There were two possibilities for Barbarossa
A A long war
B A short war
The Germans decided for a short war ,who would be decided west of the DD line, because they were rightly convinced that a long war could not be won . it was Halder who said that a Blitzkrieg east of the DD line would fail .
Thus if A was not possible, the choice would be B , and as B had to be decisive , it would be decisive .Besides, victory in the East after 1941 would not help Germany .

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