Operation Sealion

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
glenn239
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by glenn239 » 02 Dec 2019 17:49

Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019 03:37
Seriously? :lol: :lol: :lol:
In the 13th November 1944 and 12th Jan 1945 engagements where an aggregate total of 11 Allied cruisers and destroyers attacked 11 small German escorts (nothing bigger than a minesweeper) and coastal artillery watching over 7 small cargo vessels in two convoys off the coast of Norway. Allied forces sank a total of 10 German vessels while 8 escaped. In the November 1944 action the coastal artillery did not deter the attack, and 7 out of 10 German vessels were sunk. In the Jan 1945 action the coastal artillery did deter the attackers from pressing home their pursuit, and only 3 out of 8 German vessels were sunk.

No Allied warship was damaged in either engagement, but I found records for ammunition expenditure for one Allied destroyer - 381 rounds. If the assumption is made that this is broadly indicative of the ammunition expenditure in the two engagements, then the total of 11 Allied warships might have expended in the order of 4,000 rounds to sink 10 German ships, or 400 rounds fired per vessel sunk. Now, don't forget that these totals were with 1944/45 radar fire control doctrine and systems, so might be 1/2 or 1/3rd the level required to sink a ship in a night action in 1940 without radar fire control.
Of those, 738., 769., 770., and 789. were Stellungs-Artillerie-Abteilungen probably already in the area during SEELÖWE. So 15 batteries of 10cm, 10.5cm, and 15.5cm guns...able to range out a maximum 19,500 meters for the 15.5cm, 12,000 meters for the 10.5cm, and 16,500 meters for the 10cm. Aside from that the Germans did man some of the French and Belgian coastal batteries that had not been spiked or were repaired.

In any case, in this period the German coastal artillery hindered pretty much nothing the RN did.
The ability of coastal artillery to hinder RN operations was a function of the range at which the RN warships were from the batteries. Beyond 10,000 yards a coastal battery was unlikely to even hit a warship. Under 10,000 yards the coastal artillery became increasingly lethal, even against fast moving destroyers. Without RN fire control radar firing at blacked out targets along a blacked out coast would be extremely difficult. German shipping within this 10,000 yard range of the coast would therefore benefiet from the protection of the coastal guns. Once German ships passed beyond 10,000 yards, coastal artillery could not help them, but in the case of steamers, (ie, 10kt or 12kt ships), they were fast enough that if they had an hour's warning, they might be able to return to the shelter of the coastal artillery. (Slow barge convoys could not do so).

glenn239
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by glenn239 » 02 Dec 2019 18:33

Richard Really? Name all those battles please. From what I can tell, there was one, Jervis Bay versus Scheer in November 1940.
I recorded 61 naval battles between German and Allied forces in the north in WW2. This is not the full list though. Getting ride of all engagements including battleships or heavy cruisers on either side, and getting ride of all battles including German destroyers, that leaves a total of 25 naval battles between 1940 and 1945.

In these 25 battles a total of 110 Allied light cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and torpedo boats fought 49 German torpedo boats, 90 ad hoc light escorts, and 27 supply ships. A total of 3 Allied warships were lost for 43 Germans sunk - 5 German torpedo boats, 28 ad hoc escorts and 10 supply ships.

The kill rate overall was .4 – one German ship sunk for every 2.5 Allied warships engaged. The average engagement size was 4.4 Allied warships engaging 1.96 German torpedo boats, 3.6 ad hoc escorts, and 1.08 supply ships, with 1.72 Germans ships sunk per engagement. If we were to use the historical data straight up - 4.4 Allied warships engaged sinking 1.72 German ships over the course of 25 sea engagements – do you think that this attritional effect on its own would be sufficient to stop Sealion?

HistoryGeek2019
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 03 Dec 2019 04:37

Knouterer wrote:
01 Dec 2019 10:29
Some notes about the RN at the same point in time:

The Royal Navy’s ships comfortably outnumbered the Kriegsmarine, which had suffered severe losses in the Norway campaign, but air power had added a new factor to the equation. Strong forces had to be kept in the Mediterranean to keep the Italian navy in check, and many ships were needed to escort convoys and to hunt German disguised merchant raiders or Hilfskreuzer, several of which were at large in the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. During September strong naval forces, including the Home Fleet's only modern aircraft carrier Ark Royal, were away on the unsuccessful expedition against Dakar (Operation Menace). As of 30 September, the RN worldwide numbered 28,143 officers and 239,037 men. The Royal Marines had 974 officers and 27,256 men; the two recently formed RM brigades were also assigned to Operation Menace. In addition, there were 1,820 Royal Marine Police (to guard naval installations, recruited from RM veterans) and 7,855 members of the Women’s Royal Naval Service (Wrens). The navies of the Commonwealth countries came under command of the British Admiralty.

A good part of the Home Fleet had been moved south to be closer to the expected scene of the action. Of the available battleships and battlecruisers only Repulse was at Scapa Flow, with the aircraft carrier Furious, four cruisers and four destroyers, while Nelson, Rodney and Hood were further south at Rosyth. The old Revenge was at Plymouth. Of the roughly 20 cruisers and 120 destroyers in home waters, including vessels refitting and under repair, 5 cruisers and 24 destroyers were in Nore Command (the Humber/Harwich/Sheerness/Chatham), 1 cruiser and 16 destroyers in Portsmouth Command, and 2 cruisers and 16 destroyers in Western Approaches Command (Plymouth/Milford Haven/Liverpool). After losses to air attack, and because it was within range of the recently installed German cross-channel guns near Cap Gris Nez, no destroyers were based at Dover, although it still was home to several dozen minesweeping trawlers and a few MTBs. The first of the fifty old American destroyers transferred to Britain arrived in British ports towards the end of September; RN crews had taken them over at Halifax but they still needed a lot of work done, such as the fitting of asdic and depth charge throwers.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, considered it excessively cautious to keep so many destroyers in readiness to defeat invasion, considering that there would be ample advance warning and that in any case no invasion could be attempted as long as the RAF remained undefeated, and wanted to free a number of them for more offensive action and convoy escort. Churchill and the Admiralty did not agree.

Many other vessels such as sloops and corvettes would also be thrown into the fray. Commander William Donald, at that time second in command or “Number One” of the sloop Black Swan, based at Rosyth, remembered the orders they received, under the heading of “Operation Purge”: “Briefly, the idea was that every available ship was to put to sea at once, continue firing till their ammunition was expended, and then sink the invasion craft by ramming them.” The corresponding orders of Portsmouth Command (Operation J.F.) specified that only ships with “strong bows” (such as larger minesweepers perhaps) should resort to ramming, but destroyers, being lightly built, should not. RN ships on convoy duty were to abandon their charges, directing them to the nearest port, and hurry to the sound of the guns.

Work on naval radar (RDF) had begun in 1935 and the first operational set, Type 79Y, was installed on the cruiser Sheffield in August 1938. The first production set, Type 79Z, was installed on the anti-aircraft cruiser Curlew a year later, and about a hundred were made. This was an aircraft warning set, but with some surface warning capability as well. Destroyers were (gradually) equipped with the Type 286 from mid-1940 (HMS Cossack had one installed in May), which had a fixed masthead antenna that scanned only forward of the ship and had a limited detection range of about 20 miles for aircraft and less than half that for surface targets. It was replaced by improved versions from 1941. Destroyers also had powerful searchlights and star shells (illuminating rounds) for their main guns. In the 1930s the Navy had spent much time training in night fighting, and this training paid off during nocturnal engagements with the Italian navy later in the war, such as the Battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941.

Coastal waters were patrolled by the Auxiliary Patrol, consisting of more than seven hundred requisitioned motor boats, yachts and other small vessels, with crews drawn from the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and armed with whatever could be found. Coastal forces, which would later fight many spectacular actions in the Narrow Seas, were still in an embryonal stage and consisted of about two dozen MTBs of various models, plus some fifty MASBs (anti-submarine motor boats, half of which were being converted to Motor Gun Boats) and armed motor launches or MLs. Most of the available MTBs were based at Harwich from where they could have intercepted the invasion convoys moving along the Dutch and Belgian coast.

The Submarine Service had about three dozen subs in in home waters (including four brand-new Dutch ones) and maintained patrol lines with a dozen boats in the North Sea, concentrating off the exits between known minefields. Other subs were watching the Channel ports. Their orders were that reporting was their most important task and that, if at all possible, they should send a sighting report immediately and attack afterwards.

Various allied navies also contributed ships. The Free French Naval Forces, as of 21 September, consisted of 121 officers, 40 “aspirants” (midshipmen) and 2,171 ratings. Some 30 French officers and 600 ratings were serving in the Royal Navy, and were encouraged to transfer to the FF, which many were reluctant to do. In July, at the time of the attack on the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, French navy vessels in British ports had been boarded and seized but many of these were not yet in service with the RN. The most immediately useful ships were six fast and modern torpilleurs of 610 tons, comparable to the German Torpedoboote, based at Portsmouth. Four or five were operational with French, Dutch and British crews. The major part of the Royal Netherlands Navy was in the East Indies, but it did contribute, apart from the abovementioned submarines, a few useful vessels to the defence of Britain, such as minelayers, which the RN was short of. The contribution of the Polish Navy consisted of two submarines plus the destroyers Blyskawica and Burza, which were already acquiring a reputation for aggressive action. In addition, the destroyer Garland had been transferred from the RN.

Several squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm equipped with Swordfishes, Albacores and Skuas were based on land and available to repel invasion.

The fuel situation posed no problem. Like the other services, the Navy had been building up strategic fuel stocks for some time. In addition, since the start of the war, and even more so since May, many tankers bound for various European countries had been diverted to Britain. The arrival of petroleum products (mostly refined) jumped from a weekly average of 221,300 tons in April 1940 to 286,200 tons in May and 326,500 tons in June, after which it leveled off again. Storage tanks were full to the brim; the Navy had reserves of 2.3 million tons of fuel oil at home in June, which would be sufficient for more than a year at the current rate of operations, even without taking into account that Navy ships could refuel in other parts of the world.
Sources please.

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by pugsville » 03 Dec 2019 05:46

glenn239 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 18:33
Richard Really? Name all those battles please. From what I can tell, there was one, Jervis Bay versus Scheer in November 1940.
I recorded 61 naval battles between German and Allied forces in the north in WW2. This is not the full list though. Getting ride of all engagements including battleships or heavy cruisers on either side, and getting ride of all battles including German destroyers, that leaves a total of 25 naval battles between 1940 and 1945.

In these 25 battles a total of 110 Allied light cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and torpedo boats fought 49 German torpedo boats, 90 ad hoc light escorts, and 27 supply ships. A total of 3 Allied warships were lost for 43 Germans sunk - 5 German torpedo boats, 28 ad hoc escorts and 10 supply ships.

The kill rate overall was .4 – one German ship sunk for every 2.5 Allied warships engaged. The average engagement size was 4.4 Allied warships engaging 1.96 German torpedo boats, 3.6 ad hoc escorts, and 1.08 supply ships, with 1.72 Germans ships sunk per engagement. If we were to use the historical data straight up - 4.4 Allied warships engaged sinking 1.72 German ships over the course of 25 sea engagements – do you think that this attritional effect on its own would be sufficient to stop Sealion?
Any sort of equivalence between these battles and possible sea lion u battle as too remote as to useful in providing data to extrapolate from.

Richard Anderson
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Dec 2019 06:42

glenn239 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 18:33
I recorded 61 naval battles between German and Allied forces in the north in WW2. This is not the full list though. Getting ride of all engagements including battleships or heavy cruisers on either side, and getting ride of all battles including German destroyers, that leaves a total of 25 naval battles between 1940 and 1945.

In these 25 battles a total of 110 Allied light cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and torpedo boats fought 49 German torpedo boats, 90 ad hoc light escorts, and 27 supply ships. A total of 3 Allied warships were lost for 43 Germans sunk - 5 German torpedo boats, 28 ad hoc escorts and 10 supply ships.

The kill rate overall was .4 – one German ship sunk for every 2.5 Allied warships engaged. The average engagement size was 4.4 Allied warships engaging 1.96 German torpedo boats, 3.6 ad hoc escorts, and 1.08 supply ships, with 1.72 Germans ships sunk per engagement. If we were to use the historical data straight up - 4.4 Allied warships engaged sinking 1.72 German ships over the course of 25 sea engagements – do you think that this attritional effect on its own would be sufficient to stop Sealion?
You recorded? Really? Data please.

Oh, BTW, where are all the AMC in these engagements involving "110 Allied light cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and torpedo boats"? You know, the ones you claimed did so well at discombobulating the German forces,
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Dec 2019 06:46

glenn239 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 17:49
Once German ships passed beyond 10,000 yards, coastal artillery could not help them, but in the case of steamers, (ie, 10kt or 12kt ships), they were fast enough that if they had an hour's warning, they might be able to return to the shelter of the coastal artillery. (Slow barge convoys could not do so).
Well, yeah, of course, which is kinda the point. The "steamers" are not a game piece that will move to Dover and unload a Panzer division because you sacrificed the "slow barge convoys" as a soak off. The entire structure of the German Transportflotille works against that.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Dec 2019 06:48

pugsville wrote:
03 Dec 2019 05:46
Any sort of equivalence between these battles and possible sea lion u battle as too remote as to useful in providing data to extrapolate from.
Yeah, pretty much. Except he has 61 engagements and an exchange ratio...Christ wept.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

pugsville
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by pugsville » 03 Dec 2019 12:17

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Dec 2019 06:48
pugsville wrote:
03 Dec 2019 05:46
Any sort of equivalence between these battles and possible sea lion u battle as too remote as to useful in providing data to extrapolate from.
Yeah, pretty much. Except he has 61 engagements and an exchange ratio...Christ wept.
They were not engagement against barely escort barges. You are simply not comparing things that are even remotely similar. We also talking about convoys 10kms long we're talking a very target rich environment.

And it;s not necessary to sink everything, scatter a invasion convoy is going to serious reduce the effectiveness of the invasion. Barely trained crews in barley seaworthy ships. Dark confusion, the convoy scattered hopelessly losses of 10% could lead to the loss of force landing well beyond that,

It was going to take 3 days to unload the first wave.

pugsville
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by pugsville » 03 Dec 2019 12:26

glenn239 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 18:33
[
I recorded 61 naval battles between German and Allied forces in the north in WW2. This is not the full list though. Getting ride of all engagements including battleships or heavy cruisers on either side, and getting ride of all battles including German destroyers, that leaves a total of 25 naval battles between 1940 and 1945.

In these 25 battles a total of 110 Allied light cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and torpedo boats fought 49 German torpedo boats, 90 ad hoc light escorts, and 27 supply ships. A total of 3 Allied warships were lost for 43 Germans sunk - 5 German torpedo boats, 28 ad hoc escorts and 10 supply ships.

The kill rate overall was .4 – one German ship sunk for every 2.5 Allied warships engaged. The average engagement size was 4.4 Allied warships engaging 1.96 German torpedo boats, 3.6 ad hoc escorts, and 1.08 supply ships, with 1.72 Germans ships sunk per engagement. If we were to use the historical data straight up - 4.4 Allied warships engaged sinking 1.72 German ships over the course of 25 sea engagements – do you think that this attritional effect on its own would be sufficient to stop Sealion?
Yeah 139 escorts for 27 supply ships, 5 escorts per supply ships,. In sea lion they would not even be 1 escorts for every supply.ship barge. The difference is massive. To draw a parallel between these encounters and possible sea lion invasion convoys simply is not way similar,

Escort ratio, Speed of targets, cluster of targats, tragets evasion ability, the parameters are just so diffident these just is no similarity what so ever.

Knouterer
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Knouterer » 03 Dec 2019 15:04

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
03 Dec 2019 04:37
Knouterer wrote:
01 Dec 2019 10:29
Some notes about the RN at the same point in time:

Sources please.

With a little trouble you should be able to find the same data. Or you can buy my book on the subject if I ever get it finished; it will have footnotes and endnotes, and technical annexes, I promise.
For starters, you can read:
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hitlers-Armada ... oks&sr=1-1

For a detailed OOB of the RN as of 30 Sept. 1940, see Alan Philson, Order of Battle of the Land and Sea Forces of the United Kingdom 30th September 1940, Volume I, part 2 (sadly not in print).

CAB 79-80 – Minutes of the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, June 1940 - March 1941, also contains much interesting information. Available from the National Archives.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

Peter89
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Peter89 » 03 Dec 2019 15:20

Before you really start to plan your combined arms operation against Britain :D

I'd like to remind you of Operation Wikinger. While the Heer and the Luftwaffe were working well together, the first KM + LW action resulted in the destruction of 10% of the KM's destroyers. Even by mid-1940, the Axis (Germans and Italians too) had a hard time to coordinate aerial and naval attacks, and as a result of the lack of practice, friendly fire was commonplace (see the Battle of Calabria). The Royal Navy on the other hand, was training its crews (Fleet Air Arm) for air-to-fleet actions: they sunk the light cruiser Königsberg and devastated the Italian fleet at the Battle of Taranto. But the inexperience plagued them as well: when the freshly activated HMS Victorious launched her planes with inexperienced crews, they almost attacked HMS Norfolk. It leads me to a number of conclusions: first, had the Germans achieve aerial superiority, they would still have had a hard time to coordinate attacks with the KM. Second, the naval strength ratio was not nearly as important as the aerial supremacy and aircrew training. Third: had the Germans have more capital ships than the British, they still couldn't engage them in an upfront naval battle without air superiority, or at least, air cover.

Another thing that keeps coming up is the "repairs", "overhauls", "sea trials", etc. or in general, capital ships out of active duty, which is a slippery subject.
Most of the capital ships of WW2 spent a lot of time out of action, undergoing repairs, refits and such. Just some examples: the HMS Queen Elizabeth and the HMS Valiant spent 0.5 and 1.5 years under repair. By the time they were back operational, the naval war around Europe was nearly over. After the Battle of Taranto, the Conte di Cavour never became seaworthy again. But it doesn't mean that a capital ship out of action means it is not seaworthy or even combat ready, when necessary.

The actual state of the KM at 1940 September 15 (the planned date for Operation Sealion):
Light cruisers: the Leipzig was seaworthy and nearly battle-ready, and the Nürnberg, Köln and Emden were ready for action
Heavy cruisers: the Deutschland was heavily damaged and under repairs, but Scheer was ready for action. The Prinz Eugen was on sea trials at the Baltic Sea, but the Admiral Hipper was ready for action.
Battlecruisers: both the Scharnhorst and the Gnisenau were battered but seaworthy
Battleships: the Bismarck was seaworthy, (steamed out from port on Sept 15) running sea trials with convincing results, the Tirpitz was under construction

So in a case of an all-in attack against Britain, most of them could have at least appeared on the battlefield.

Richard Anderson
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Dec 2019 17:12

glenn239 wrote:
02 Dec 2019 17:20
Because if the RN bites hard on the diversion, then it is possible that many of those carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers are going to sail into the North Sea and not the Channel. You listed 2 carriers, 5 battleships, and nearly 100 CL's and DD's. They cannot be in two places at once. What was the RN's planning factor for ships we know were not available, but they did not? For example, I just read that the RN assumed Graf Zeppelin was operational in their planning in the summer of 1940. If they allowed for a ship that never commissioned in WW2 and never had an operational air wing, did they also allow for Bismarck, Eugen, Scharnhorst, etc?

You listed these resources earlier, within the context of Sealion in the Channel. Now you're listing the same resources as available to go after the German diversionary forces in the North Sea. Which is it? Sealion or the North Sea? They cannot do both in the key 24 hours of the battle.
Er, no Glenn, look again. Scapa, Dundee, the Tyne, Rosyth, the Humber, and Blyth are not the same places or the same forces as Lowestoft, Harwich, London, the Nore, Portsmouth, Southampton, and Portland. On 16 September:

Scapa - 1 BC, 1 CV, 2 CA, 1 CL, 1 CLAA, 6 DD, 1 DE, 1 SS
Dundee - 3 TB, 3 SS
Tyne - 2 CL
Rosyth - 2 BB, 1 BC, 3 CLAA, 14 DD, 4 DE, 1 TB, 2 SS
Blyth - 3 SS
Humber - 3 CL, 10 DD
Lowestoft - 1 TB, 1 MTB
Harwich - 6 DD, 1 SS, 11 MTB
London - 1 DD, 1 MTB
Sheerness/Chatham - 3 CL, 10 DD, 12 DE
Dover - 2 MTB
Portsmouth - 1 CL, 12 DD, 2 DE, 5 TB, 2 SS
Southampton - 2 DD
Portland - 2 MTB
Plymouth - 1 BB, 2 CL, 11 DD, 2 TB
Milford Haven - 1 TB
Liverpool - 3 DD
Firth of Clyde - 1 CA, 1 CL,1 CLAA, 12 DD, 6 SS
Greenock - 2 CL, 1 DD
Glasgow - 1 CA, 1 DD
Oban - 3 SS
Belfast - 3 DD
Halifax - 3 DD
Gibraltar - 1 BC, 8 DD
Freetown - 2 BB, 2 CV, 3 CA, 11 DD
Durban - 1 BB
Lagos - 1 CL
Bermuda - 1 CL
Tortola - 1 CL

At Sea - 1 CA, 3 CL, 8 DD, 2 DE, 1 TB, 1 SS
On Patrol - 17 SS
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 Dec 2019 01:10

pugsville wrote:
03 Dec 2019 12:17
They were not engagement against barely escort barges. You are simply not comparing things that are even remotely similar. We also talking about convoys 10kms long we're talking a very target rich environment.
I hate to point this out, but you're arguing with the wrong person on this one, since I never made any such comparison. :lol:
And it;s not necessary to sink everything, scatter a invasion convoy is going to serious reduce the effectiveness of the invasion. Barely trained crews in barley seaworthy ships. Dark confusion, the convoy scattered hopelessly losses of 10% could lead to the loss of force landing well beyond that,

It was going to take 3 days to unload the first wave.
Exactly. The only way the German plan could be successful is if one or more of the Transportflotille were able to cross relatively unmolested...and that was going to require a miracle to happen. And even then the problematic bits like limited crew training and - more important - practice would work against success even if a couple of the Flotille were somehow not molested.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 Dec 2019 19:04

Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019 06:08
German coastal batteries:

24 August 1940 - 3./Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 367...Namsos Norway.
1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 570...three batteries of 10cm guns at Villerville, Benerville, and Houlgate
15 October 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 778...two batteries of 10.5cm guns at Le Havre
24 October 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 738...three batteries, probably all 15.5cm guns at Fort Mahon and Le Touquet
18 November 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 769...probably three batteries
23 November 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 770...three batteries of 10.5cm guns at Cayeux and Le Tréport
23 November 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 789...probably three batteries
27 December 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 823 (mot)...three batteries of 15.5cm guns at Nieuport, La Panne, and Fort Mardik
27 December 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 826...three batteries of 15.5cm guns at Nieuport, La Panne, and Midelkerke
27 December 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 827...three batteries

Of those, 738., 769., 770., and 789. were Stellungs-Artillerie-Abteilungen probably already in the area during SEELÖWE. So 15 batteries of 10cm, 10.5cm, and 15.5cm guns...able to range out a maximum 19,500 meters for the 15.5cm, 12,000 meters for the 10.5cm, and 16,500 meters for the 10cm. Aside from that the Germans did man some of the French and Belgian coastal batteries that had not been spiked or were repaired.
I probably should have looked. According to Assmann's postwar analysis by 31 August the Heer had set up 35 heavy and medium batteries, plus seven batteries of captured guns. I suspect that some of the Heer heavy batteries would also include captured guns, since only the 10cm K18 and 15cm K39 were readily available and there were on 15 of the latter.

And I forgot the Siegried, Grosser Kurfürst, Prinz Heinrich, and Oldenbourg batteries were in operation, along with the four "M" batteries, so four 38cm, three 30.5cm, six 28cm, two 24cm, and fourteen 17cm guns, from roughly Wimereux to Calais.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

glenn239
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by glenn239 » 04 Dec 2019 22:15

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Dec 2019 06:42
You recorded? Really? Data please.

Oh, BTW, where are all the AMC in these engagements involving "110 Allied light cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and torpedo boats"? You know, the ones you claimed did so well at discombobulating the German forces,
I can send you the file (Excel) if you want. It's not a complete listing of battles, (the Med is entirely missing, for example), but it's still interesting. Date, ships on each side, combat value, outcome, conditions. Contact me with your email offline.

I'm not understanding the AMC request.

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