A Mediterranian Axis

[doogal]

Understandbly following 22nd June 1941 Hitlers focus would be on the main battlefield, but did he miss a good opportunity
to unite the Mediterranean against the British Empire in 1940.?? We know that there was emnity between Mussolini and the Vichy government but was it overcomeable.? Mussolini was a pragmatist and Petain an Oppurtunist who believed that he was fighting for a fair peace/armistic agreement, could there national rivalry have been superceeded by the possibility of a Pan-German Med Coalition.





(I am aware of members of the Vichy cabinet (Darlan & Laval especially)wanting some form of armed conflict past what had already occurred at:
Mers el Kebir / Dakar / Devonport on board the Surcouf.and other various incidents following the fall of France in 1940:
While true that the majority of events were seaborne there was definately a shift towards outright hostility with Darlan lookin at Britains surrender as a way of lightening the Germans economic and military presence in the occupied areas.
Hitler of course saw France as subjugated but usefull, refusing to allow re-patriation of her soldiers at any pace for fear of France becoming an renewed opponent and for use as slave labour. Considering that France would become a giant concentration area for any allied invasion of Germany, it would be foolish to arm French forces in metropolitan France but in her colonies where her soldiers were armed ( and prepared to shoot back)open armed resistance to Allied forces would surely have been a great help if a strategy to attack Britains middle eastern assest had been seriously undertaken As we know Hitler chose other options but never the less considerations of strategic neccessity should have over ridden these considerations for Hitler, he may have had a poor attitude concerning the French, but they were far more to his taste than the majority of volunteers for the SS foreigh legions. (It is interseting to note that operations could have been mounted to take over the French navy- although the success of the British doing so was not great).
I personally do not think so:

D

[[email protected]]

Hitler never had a Mediterranean Strategy. Admiral Raeder with the global vision of a naval man vainly tried to involve Hitler in the Med... After the failure of the Battle of Britain Hitler was inexorably drawn towards Russia.

[phylo_roadking]

Actually - he did; but it was more of a "peripheral" strategy I.E. deal with the periphery of the Med - see Directive 18 of 12th November 1940.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; bumping up this......AH had the occasion to play something: June 18, 1940.

Shortly before the end of the campaign in the West, in this case Fall Rot, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini came to the Bavarian capital to meet with Adolf Hitler. The Duce was accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Count Ciano; The intention was to discuss the immediate plans after the sure fall of France. Mortified by the late entry of Italy into the war against the Allies, and his rather tepid performance since then, Mussolini met with Hitler determined to convince his Axis partner to exploit the advantage he had in France by demanding total surrender and occupy the southern part is still free. The Italian dictator clearly wanted to "get in" the loot, and this was a way to reap rewards with a minimum of risk. However, the Duce did not get what he came for.

Ciano recorded in his diary that Mussolini left the meeting frustrated and feeling "that his role was secondary." Ciano also registers a new respect for Hitler: "Today he speaks with a reservation and insight that, after such a victory, they are really amazing."

Sources: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-his ... -in-munich
ILLUSTRIERTER BEOBACHTER 1940 Folge 20.

Is it for a what if? As for looking for an alternative in the Mediterranean as viewed by Raeder. Cheers. Raúl M .

[Peter89]

In theory, the Germans could disintegrate the British Empire (which disintegration was underway anyway), but only if they were not Nazis and if they realized that European supremacy (including colonial empires) had to be given up. /The two things are far from equal!/

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more: June 18, 1940.
Sources: https://www.catawiki.com/lots/27407419- ... d=1&pid=19
Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more: June 18, 1940.
Sources: Münchener Mosaik. Kulturelle Monatsschrift der Hauptstadt der Bewegung, 3. Jahrgang 1940
Cheers. Raúl M .

[Urmel]

In theory, the Germans could disintegrate the British Empire (which disintegration was underway anyway), but only if they were not Nazis and if they realized that European supremacy (including colonial empires) had to be given up. /The two things are far from equal!/

The strategy was there, it just took a backseat to destroying the Soviet Union. Directive 32 sets out the overall plan:

http://rommelsriposte.com/2020/06/11/mi ... june-1941/

[Peter89]

In theory, the Germans could disintegrate the British Empire (which disintegration was underway anyway), but only if they were not Nazis and if they realized that European supremacy (including colonial empires) had to be given up. /The two things are far from equal!/

The strategy was there, it just took a backseat to destroying the Soviet Union. Directive 32 sets out the overall plan:

http://rommelsriposte.com/2020/06/11/mi ... june-1941/

I am sorry, but this directive (issued after the window of opportunity vanished anyway), using the Hitlerian terms and rhetoric flowers, is not a strategy at all. First it boasts about "needing less army units than now", then goes on and describes the occupation of millions of square kilometers with a population thrice that of Germany with no allies or collaborators named. It makes no mention of the practically immobilized German surface fleet or the sorry state of the naval aviation arm, or the Luftwaffe that was soundly and one-sidedly defeated in the Battle of Britain.

It also does not address the issue of the Red Army - or the vast distances and areas involved -, that might take a toll on the Luftwaffe. It also doesn't clarify how the operations in the East will be ceased. Because in other documents they conceptualized an advance to the A-A line, and beyond that, the Luftwaffe was to destroy what remained of the Soviet industry (estimated to be 25% by Georg Thomas). So how is the Luftwaffe, suffering inevitable losses during the campaign in the East, engaged in a major area bombing campaign across the Urals, patrolling 2-3 million extra kms of frontiers is going to put unbearable pressure on the British with an already lower production? The shift of production emphasis from army to the already crippled navy and the overcommitted air force? But then again, how could Germany defeat and occupy Turkey, Iberia, Iraq/Middle East on top of the Soviet territories west of the A-A line - with an army already suffering inevitable losses and getting less and less funds?

There is no telling of this, because this is not a plan. It was rather a reflection on the reactive nature how Hitler percieved the MTO.

A short but thorough critique of the "Axis strategy in the Mediterranean" and specifically the Führerweisung 32. can be read in one of the books (Irak 1941) of probably the best German author on the subject, Bernd Philipp Schröder.

[Urmel]

I'm happy to call it a 'Wooly concept'. The point is that some people were thinking about this, so it wasn't completely ignored. That the underlying assumptions for this to happen (the Soviet Union collapsing without much of a fight) were slightly less realistic than Marvel's Multiverse is another discussion altogether.

[Peter89]

I'm happy to call it a 'Wooly concept'. The point is that some people were thinking about this, so it wasn't completely ignored. That the underlying assumptions for this to happen (the Soviet Union collapsing without much of a fight) were slightly less realistic than Marvel's Multiverse is another discussion altogether.

In any case, this wasn't a strategy.

A strategy must name the goals and the resources & actions to meet those goals.

If I'd write a strategy as Hitler in June 1941, the end of the "goals" part would be: then the British are done. Not like: "after the Soviets are done, we do this and this and that". That's just nonsense.

The "resources" part would begin with what we have and what they have. Like allies. Not like: "we'll do everything we can, and if someone doesn't comply, he'll regret it".

The "actions" part would consist of "how can we get more, better and what advantages we should use". Not like: "we send a motorised expeditionary corps from a position that is not in our possession into a position that is not in our possession". Because that can raise questions, like how that corps is going to be supported from the air or serviced 4-5000 km from the nearest AFV repair facility?

[Urmel]

I think you're too hung up on the terminology, and I don't agree that for a strategy to be a strategy it needs such detail. A Supreme Commander's Directive doesn't need to concern itself with AFV repair centres. That's done several levels below. If you look at the Casablanca Directive which underlay Operation POINTBLANK, it doesn't mention resources at all, and the actions part isn't particularly detailed either.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casablanca_directive

[Peter89]

I think you're too hung up on the terminology, and I don't agree that for a strategy to be a strategy it needs such detail. A Supreme Commander's Directive doesn't need to concern itself with AFV repair centres. That's done several levels below. If you look at the Casablanca Directive which underlay Operation POINTBLANK, it doesn't mention resources at all, and the actions part isn't particularly detailed either.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casablanca_directive

That's exactly why I wrote I wouldn't specify such idiotic details Hitler did.

[Tom from Cornwall]

I don't agree that for a strategy to be a strategy it needs such detail. A Supreme Commander's Directive doesn't need to concern itself with AFV repair centres. That's done several levels below.

I think that’s the difference between policy and strategy. Although I agree that I wouldn’t expect to see too much about AFV repair centres at the strategic level, I guess those setting out strategy would expect lower level subordinates to sort out those details to ensure the forces employed could be sustained.

Regards

Tom