when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#16

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Oct 2021, 23:35

PunctuationHorror wrote:IF they put up stiff resistance and IF they started guerilla tactics as planned and IF they were ruthless enough to accept heavy destructions and losses
I don't believe British people are fundamentally more courageous than French/Dutch/Belgians/Danish/Norwegians so at the individual level their resistance calculus would likely have been similar (there would have been marginal differences due to different political situations). At base the World Wars showed us that it's fairly easy to occupy/control a modern(ish) wealthy society because people want to earn and live; going underground just isn't that attractive.
PunctuationHorror wrote:What could the Germans do? Invade in Scotland, capture (a) port(s) and unload the panzers. Establish Hadrian's Wall 2.0 to bring in more strengths and then rush south.
This is a "German Moses" hypo re the Channel; why not the North Sea as well? (why not the Atlantic?)

Anyway the use of counterfactual analysis isn't to spool out a detailed ATL; rather it's to highlight a dynamic "hidden" by historical/geographical contingency. Here the dynamic is that a fraction of the German army was strong enough to defeat Britain's - even if reinforced by a few American divisions - well into the war.
Peter89 wrote:I'm not sure, the Soviet Union was still very strong, and by 1942 / 1943 they would complete their preparations for war as well.
I was looking at a hypothetical Channel Magic invasion in the midst of fighting on the Eastern Front, in 1942/43. Germany denudes the Ostheer significantly to enable, say, a 50-division Blitzkrieg over the Channel. Given that the depth of Soviet offensives was limited by their reliance on horsedrawn logistics even up to the end of the war, Ostheer can defend elastically all the way back to Poland and Romania while Britain is conquered.
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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#17

Post by PunctuationHorror » 20 Oct 2021, 01:38

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Oct 2021, 23:35
I was looking at a hypothetical Channel Magic invasion in the midst of fighting on the Eastern Front, in 1942/43. Germany denudes the Ostheer significantly to enable, say, a 50-division Blitzkrieg over the Channel. Given that the depth of Soviet offensives was limited by their reliance on horsedrawn logistics even up to the end of the war, Ostheer can defend elastically all the way back to Poland and Romania while Britain is conquered.
This is an interesting scenario. It would have required to thoroughly decimate the Royal Navy via air strikes on their naval bases and ports. For this they would have needed at least a bit of local air superiority. And then they would have needed an usable transport fleet. If they started with a building programme for transports and aircraft (fighters, naval bombers) in 1940 they could have had the required forces by the suggested time of '42/43. But where would they take the industrial capacity for it from?

I highly recommend Hearts of Iron 2 Darkest Hour, an oldish (2005?) PC game. It's a simplified all-round strategic war simulator and it gives a good idea of constraints like manpower (esp. for germany), resources, and capacities of industry and transport. It's a PC game, so it is not extremely accurate. But it has the basic things in place without beeing over-complex. It gives plenty opportunities to play out ideas and hypotheses. And if you tweak it a bit, funny things happen. Once I played Belgium and managed to hold the german offensive only to get steamrolled by soviet forces a few months later. However, the AI is stupid. So do not expect too much :lol:
When I play the reich, I usually launch the invasion of GB before or after taking on the Soviet Union. Not simultaneously. As a weak Royal Navy is crucial for the invasion, I prefer the invasion after a sucessful Barbarossa because afterwards there is more time to clean up the seas with aircraft.


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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#18

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Oct 2021, 06:55

PunctuationHorror wrote: If they started with a building programme for transports and aircraft (fighters, naval bombers) in 1940 they could have had the required forces by the suggested time of '42/43. But where would they take the industrial capacity for it from?

I highly recommend Hearts of Iron 2 Darkest Hour, an oldish (2005?) PC game.
Like I said upthread I don't think Sealion had a snowball's chance unless Germany beats the SU. Until then they don't have the actual industrial capacity to achieve air superiority nor to build a Channel fleet - primarily because their latent industrial capacity (manpower) is drained by the Eastern Front (or absent Barbarossa, the Eastern Defense Forces or whatever). That's a fact missed by most historians. As a smaller numerical factor but a larger historical factor, Germany was also slightly undermobilized early in the war. More discussion here and in some of my other threads. Sealion would become a credible threat in 1944-45, had the SU gone down. The Allies could counter that threat but only by tying down so many resources as to preclude defeating Japan and/or preventing the Axis overrunning virtually all of Eurasia.

...given that most historians miss the industrial manpower point, I wouldn't expect a video game to get it. I purchased HOI4 and have played it a few times, don't consider it very insightful for analysis.
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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#19

Post by Peter89 » 20 Oct 2021, 11:17

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Oct 2021, 23:35
Peter89 wrote:I'm not sure, the Soviet Union was still very strong, and by 1942 / 1943 they would complete their preparations for war as well.
I was looking at a hypothetical Channel Magic invasion in the midst of fighting on the Eastern Front, in 1942/43. Germany denudes the Ostheer significantly to enable, say, a 50-division Blitzkrieg over the Channel. Given that the depth of Soviet offensives was limited by their reliance on horsedrawn logistics even up to the end of the war, Ostheer can defend elastically all the way back to Poland and Romania while Britain is conquered.
Hmmm, the problem here I think is that the Germans overcommitted a bit. If they'd aim to cripple the Soviets in a sequence of attacks to establish a solid defense line and correct the blips and bends of the front, that might succeed if the Mediterranean commitment would be cut to a minimum (ie. the evacuation of Africa). Or alternatively, if they'd retreat to a more straight and more defensible line, they might free up enough resources to take the Suez base. Given how close both campaigns got to their objectives, it is entirely possible that one of these might succeed. It is also possible that a timely evacuation of North Africa might delay the defeat of the Luftwaffe. The problem was that the Germans could not do all of these simultaneously.

To equip and train the proper number of antishipping units was nowhere near as possible as the effective redeployment of ground forces. For example, the Torpedofliegerverbande on 5 August 1943 counted 120 aircraft available, 62 were serviceable, and of the 206 crews, only 37 were fit to fly them. The corresponding numbers on 23 July 1942 are 111, 84, 115 and 87. In the autumn of 1942 the Luftwaffe had 335 F5b and 145 F5W airborne torpedoes at its disposal. I'm just saying this because one cannot transfer Luftwaffe units from theater A to theater B without touching the production and training programs (not to mention other areas like maintenance).
The same goes for paratroopers and their transports, which were deployed carelessly along the Eastern front and the Med. At the very minimum, there should be a whole division deployed in the first wave (assuming that they got there in one piece). By 1942, these original units were bled white and reinforced with less experienced and capable troops.

Also, the naval prerequisites for a Magic Invasion against the British Isles, the Germans would need not-to-do the Channel Dash, for which there should be an executed Operation Felix. Not to mention the landing craft situation, which was about 100 MFPs at this point. I have no doubt that 50 battle-hardened German divisions could conquer the British Isles (I assume even half of that force could do that), but the question is rather, how do they get there...?

Imho there was no real chance for this, if there was an Eastern Front.
What you suggested earlier, that if the Axis pinned down or destroyed the British in the southern crescent (from Iran to Dakar, thus, linking up with the Italians and forcing the British to defend India and South Africa with substantial forces), is making sense though.
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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#20

Post by Gooner1 » 20 Oct 2021, 15:11

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Oct 2021, 23:35
I don't believe British people are fundamentally more courageous than French/Dutch/Belgians/Danish/Norwegians so at the individual level their resistance calculus would likely have been similar (there would have been marginal differences due to different political situations). At base the World Wars showed us that it's fairly easy to occupy/control a modern(ish) wealthy society because people want to earn and live; going underground just isn't that attractive.
Or the British people's resistance calculus could have been higher because a higher proportion of them were armed, uniformed and trained, because the country had become a prepared battlefield, because they knew what to expect, because they would not be taken by surprise unlike the Dutch/Belgians/Danish/Norwegians and Polish and maybe just because :milsmile:

Here the dynamic is that a fraction of the German army was strong enough to defeat Britain's - even if reinforced by a few American divisions - well into the war.
When did that happen? Sure the British army lost a few of the early encounters - almost traditional - I don't recall any defeats when reinforced by a few American divisions i.e. Tunisia till August (?) 1944 when the US had more divsions in contact.

I was looking at a hypothetical Channel Magic invasion in the midst of fighting on the Eastern Front, in 1942/43. Germany denudes the Ostheer significantly to enable, say, a 50-division Blitzkrieg over the Channel. Given that the depth of Soviet offensives was limited by their reliance on horsedrawn logistics even up to the end of the war, Ostheer can defend elastically all the way back to Poland and Romania while Britain is conquered.
Probably Army Group Centre collapses along with Army Group South. The Soviets advance several hundred kilometres east earlier and inflict several hundred thousand more casualties earlier. And the invasion of England still fails.

Realistically by mid-42, if not earlier, the English Channel wasn't protecting Britain from invasion anymore, it was protecting German occupied Europe from Allied invasion.

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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#21

Post by PunctuationHorror » 20 Oct 2021, 17:32

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Oct 2021, 06:55
PunctuationHorror wrote: If they started with a building programme for transports and aircraft (fighters, naval bombers) in 1940 they could have had the required forces by the suggested time of '42/43. But where would they take the industrial capacity for it from?

I highly recommend Hearts of Iron 2 Darkest Hour, an oldish (2005?) PC game.
Like I said upthread I don't think Sealion had a snowball's chance unless Germany beats the SU. Until then they don't have the actual industrial capacity to achieve air superiority nor to build a Channel fleet - primarily because their latent industrial capacity (manpower) is drained by the Eastern Front (or absent Barbarossa, the Eastern Defense Forces or whatever). That's a fact missed by most historians. As a smaller numerical factor but a larger historical factor, Germany was also slightly undermobilized early in the war. More discussion here and in some of my other threads. Sealion would become a credible threat in 1944-45, had the SU gone down. The Allies could counter that threat but only by tying down so many resources as to preclude defeating Japan and/or preventing the Axis overrunning virtually all of Eurasia.
This. I read this thread some times ago. Nice points.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Oct 2021, 06:55
...given that most historians miss the industrial manpower point, I wouldn't expect a video game to get it. I purchased HOI4 and have played it a few times, don't consider it very insightful for analysis.
Try HOI2 DH. If you search for it, you might even find a free download somewhere in the web. There is a big modding community and there are very detailed mods for this platform some "crazy people" came up with over the years: "1914", "New World Order", "The Grand Campaign", "1980" and even a modern day scenario called "Putin mod". The latter is weird, as european countries unite themselves in ~2015 to form two super states - a western and an eastern EU.

Indeed, industrial manpower, meaning you can explicitly allocate manpower to industry or military, is not directly implemented in HOI2 DH. However, it is built in indirectly as you can trade more military manpower for less production efficiency or vice versa depending on your mobilization level. This was added in Darkest Hour, previous versions of HOI2 don't have it to that extent. And there is "dissent", which affects your industrial capacity (IC), meaning people dont show up for work. IC again determines the transport capacity (it is simply IC multiplied with factors and affected by weather, seasons, logistic level, number of convoi ships), supply production, repair etc.

I never played HOI4, but I played HOI3 and went back to HOI2. In my opinion, HOI3 - after it was made playable by addons, the released version was unfinished buggy crap - has too much senseless micromanagement. HOI2 keeps things more reasonable. Yes, there are some improvements compared with HOI2, for instance you can manually draw supply lines and naval warfare is better, and it has a chain of command from theater, army groups, armies, corps down to divisions, whereas in HOI2, you have to imagine this chain of command and do it by yourself. Which I do like better. The mechanics of HOI2 are smart, pretty forward and you can easily edit the textfiles and set the multipliers, factors etc the game uses for its calculations if you feel it necessary to do so.

As to HOI4: After watching videos on yt, I did not like what I saw and decided not to bother with it. Looks like they made an arcade shooter.

To give an idea how such a HOI2 game could unfold:
Lastly I played the November 1942 scenario which models roughly the OTL dispositions. If you are quick, very lucky (had to reload saved games until it "worked", because the AI is sometimes nasty) and send literally everything to eastern Ukraine you can save most of your troops from Caucausus and Stalingrad and prevent collapse. 1943 was mostly spent for retreat, reinforcements and stabilizing the eastern front, because soviet forces get too strong. Back to Ukraine, back to Estonia/Latvia. With germany, you can't really afford big losses or continuous attrition, but as SU keeps attacking, you can't do much about it. So time is against you. The manpower situation is just too dense. In Aug '43, after lucky stabilisations, I launched an offensive to Rostov - Astrakhan, to cut off Caucasus and managed to pocket and destroy ~60 of the >250 soviet divisions against me, but quickly abandoned the new gained territory as it was untenable. I sent considerable aid to Finland because they were under heavy pressure and prevailed only by luck.
In the west, I tried to save as much troops as possible from north africa and bring them to Sicily. Western Allies invaded Sardinia, Corsica, tried Sicily, but failed. In 44 Western Allies took Crete, greek islands and tried to invade mainland Greece, Sicily and Italy close Salerno and Neaples several times, but suffered heavy losses as my naval air sank many troopships in the mediterranean. In France they took Brest, but were repelled. In the meantime, they landed in Belgium and Netherlands, but were cut off and destroyed. Later they headed for Norway, what I missed, because I was busy on the eastern front. Took some time to clear it. For unknown reasons AI sent not more troops and it was not expoited further.
In early summer 1944 in the SU Karelia/Petrozavosk was conquered and Murmansk/Kola was cut off and finished. Then an armoured wedge from Latvia to Lake Ladoga was beaten in to meet with the troops in Karelia, and Leningrad was cut off (again). Both actions together yielded 50 soviet divisions. After this, there were several very lucky 20+ div encirclements and Moscow was encircled in a big pocket. This pocket existed for several months until it could be cleared. Afterwards, there were no more specatcular things. Urals were reached by spring of 1945, Novosibirsk by summer '45.
Sealion had to wait because I still needed to build aircraft, paratroopers, transport ships and some small naval units. Occupying all the areas of SU, upgrades and reinforcements consumed up all my IC and manpower. There were just no free capacities for Sealion armaments. Using as many troops from eastern european allies worked somehow to close the gaps. With the availible tank, mot. and mech troops I secured the Mediterranean. It took time to get trough Caucasus to Iran, Iraq, french Lebanon, Palestine to Suez, Egypt. Reconquering Lybia and Tunisia and formerly French Colonies went slowly, because the Allies several times tried to cut off my fast divisions by launching naval invasions in their back. To prevent this, I needed many infantriy divisions to secure ports and important points. I wanted to conquer Turkey as well, but I lacked troops for occupation. So Turkey came in the 50s. Finally Spain was persuaded to join my alliance in '47, so the western passage of the med was closed by air. It was followed by Battle of Morocco where US lost at least 50 divisions.
In the meantime, Allied strategic bombing campaign crippled my industry. However, it was more efficient to concentrate every availible interceptor/fighter aircraft for a massive counter attack on one allied bombing raid every now and then, than trying to fight all bombing raids continuously in a dispersed manner because the losses of constant interceptions would be too high and the kill/loss ratio too unfavorable. Signs of Allied air attrition became visible by '48.
In summer '49 Sealion was launched. The Allies had ~ 90+ divisions on the British islands, most in the south. Paratroopers captured ports in Scotland and northern England. As most allied fleets were sunk by then by aircraft, my transport fleets went unharmed but for losses by enemy aircraft. Approx. 40000 men did not survive the crossing. Air cover from Norway was crucial. However, my airgroups had heaviest losses, some were down below 10% strenght. I sent 22 tank and 26 mot/mech/cav and 21 inf divisions to conquer the island. North Ireland was taken by airborne assault shorty afterwards.
Last edited by PunctuationHorror on 20 Oct 2021, 23:49, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#22

Post by Peter89 » 20 Oct 2021, 22:02

Gooner1 wrote:
20 Oct 2021, 15:11
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Oct 2021, 23:35
I don't believe British people are fundamentally more courageous than French/Dutch/Belgians/Danish/Norwegians so at the individual level their resistance calculus would likely have been similar (there would have been marginal differences due to different political situations). At base the World Wars showed us that it's fairly easy to occupy/control a modern(ish) wealthy society because people want to earn and live; going underground just isn't that attractive.
Or the British people's resistance calculus could have been higher because a higher proportion of them were armed, uniformed and trained, because the country had become a prepared battlefield, because they knew what to expect, because they would not be taken by surprise unlike the Dutch/Belgians/Danish/Norwegians and Polish and maybe just because :milsmile:
TMP is right here; the unique courage of the British people can be described with one word: Channel.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#23

Post by Richard Anderson » 21 Oct 2021, 00:30

Peter89 wrote:
20 Oct 2021, 11:17
Hmmm, the problem here I think is that the Germans overcommitted a bit.
No, the problem here is that historical counterfactuals are not normally intended "to highlight a dynamic "hidden" by historical/geographical contingency." Rather they are typically intended to extrapolate a possible different series of events based on changes in historical events.

However, insofar as I can determine, "Magic" had little or no role to play in World War II? the initial premise simply assumes the force allocated for SEELÖWE gets ashore, rather than a magical transportation of 60 German divisions to England. There were nine German divisions planned for the first wave, followed by eight more in a second wave, then eight more in a third wave, each wave landing a week or more after the previous. So 25 divisions - 26 if you count 7. Fliegerdivision - rather than 60, which changes the dynamic significantly.

So the scenario more or less is that the Germans go ahead and damn the torpedoes and land nine division - ten counting 7. Flieger - on the British shores from Folkestone to Brighton. So when could they? Well, again absent Magic, in 1940 that was when their extemporized landing "fleet" was ready, so the second half of September. Could the first wave have then defeated the British defenses? Possibly, although by that time the bulk of the emergency anti-landing batteries were in place, the two divisions defending were more or less up to strength, their field defenses and obstacles were approaching completion, and British reserves were well placed to reinforce the front. It likely would have been a close run thing either way and if the Germans get a viable foothold the situation is dire for the British.

Moving to the next possible campaign season in May 1941, the British defenses are much stronger, while the German landing flotilla would be progressively more capable as Siebelfähre and MFP become more numerous. Assuming the German first wave is the same, the problem is the British beach defense is 50% stronger, the anti-boat batteries, field and fixed works, and obstacles are more or less complete, and the reserves are around twice as strong. In that scenario, despite the improvement in landing craft, German chances become much smaller. Plus, of course, any German attempt would mean the postponement or cancellation of BARBAROSSA.

After June 1941 and BARBAROSSA the chances of any German attempt are basically nil, given the forces earmarked were necessary to BARBAROSSA and the forces remaining in the West were incapable of offensive action.

What counterfactual is useful then? Certainly magic is not one.

An earlier availability of the landing flotillas? Sure, a landing in June 1940 would be almost certain of success. But this is where a true counterfactual comes into play...ask why was there no landing flotilla ready in June 1940 to move nine German divisions to the nearly undefended British shore? Explore what would have been necessary for that to happen.

Filling in the Channel so that the Germans could launch all 25 divisions at once against England. Sure, but we've already explored that possibility in an earlier thread.

What else?
(snip) Also, the naval prerequisites for a Magic Invasion against the British Isles, the Germans would need not-to-do the Channel Dash, for which there should be an executed Operation Felix. Not to mention the landing craft situation, which was about 100 MFPs at this point. I have no doubt that 50 battle-hardened German divisions could conquer the British Isles (I assume even half of that force could do that), but the question is rather, how do they get there...?
Actually quite a few more MFP and Siebel, but they were heavily committed to supporting operations in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Med, so again shifting them West strongly affects operations in the East and South.
Imho there was no real chance for this, if there was an Eastern Front.
What you suggested earlier, that if the Axis pinned down or destroyed the British in the southern crescent (from Iran to Dakar, thus, linking up with the Italians and forcing the British to defend India and South Africa with substantial forces), is making sense though.
Yeah, but how to do so within the actual constraints the Germans had, where it was necessary for them to concentrate forces to achieve success rather than disperse forces as in this scenario? For the Axis to be able to pin down or destroy the British in the "southern crescent" again would require a major curtailment of operations in the East.
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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#24

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 21 Oct 2021, 05:30

Peter89 wrote:Hmmm, the problem here I think is that the Germans overcommitted a bit.
The problem here is that there's no Channel Magic and RKKA destroyed the Ostheer. I'm not taking this ATL particularly seriously except to use it to isolate a point: Had Germany defeated the SU, she would arguably have possessed the resources to replace Channel Magic with local air superiority over the Channel (obviating the intervention of Allied bluewater naval units - USN isn't immolating itself to help Britain), to create a viable landing fleet, and to create a Channel Fleet centered on smaller and somewhat expendable assets like E-boats and MTB's. In other words only the Channel saved Britain (fairly obvious point) but that arguably wasn't an insuperable obstacle in feasible ATL's.

I'd move from "arguably" to "reasonably certain" in stating that, to prevent a post-SU Sealion, Wallies would have been required to tie down so many resources (air, sea, land) that they couldn't hold anywhere in Eurasia or North Africa and couldn't force Japan's surrender. That dynamic makes WW2's end game a race between restive, demoralized Allied populations and the A-bomb (though even the A-bomb isn't necessarily a war winner).
PunctuationHorror wrote:Try HOI2 DH.
I might; thanks for the rec. Problem is time; the four or so hours I spent on HOI4 are permanently lost (plus some cash) so I'm just hesitant to get involved. My resistance to gaming isn't snobbery - I'm well aware that I'll be consumed if I dip in my toe.

My biggest problem with these kinds of games is their inability to reproduce qualitative issues on the operational level. A fundamental dynamic of Barbarossa was that RKKA lacked the command and control to respond efficiently to German moves, which resulted in encirclements and the loss of valuable resources. Commanders of Fronts often didn't know where their units were or whether they still existed. To reproduce this "fog of war" on a map that lays everything out neatly is extremely difficult - I can't even grok a feasible solution.

Another complaint from HOI4 is that there's no apparent tactical combat effectiveness differential - Italian units are as good as American which are as good as Soviet. I can at least grok a solution to that design flaw. In the place of tactical combat effectiveness differentials, the game appears to vary unit effectiveness based on commanding generals. That's exactly the wrong way to view war and particularly WW2. It was a clash of systems, not of individuals. Plus it feeds a Wehrabooish narrative about generals like Rommel or Guderian who, IIRC, have particularly high values in the game but IMO were basically interchangeable with other products of their system.
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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#25

Post by Michael Kenny » 21 Oct 2021, 05:54

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
21 Oct 2021, 05:30
In other words only the Channel saved Britain............
'Water' does not protect you. Its the rusty things bobbing up and down on the water that are the deterent. It was no accident there was a large fleet available to deal with any possible attempts to cross that 'water'

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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#26

Post by Richard Anderson » 21 Oct 2021, 07:36

Michael Kenny wrote:
21 Oct 2021, 05:54
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
21 Oct 2021, 05:30
In other words only the Channel saved Britain............
'Water' does not protect you. Its the rusty things bobbing up and down on the water that are the deterent. It was no accident there was a large fleet available to deal with any possible attempts to cross that 'water'
Um, actually it was the decision to not make the attempt that ultimately saved the British...if you assume that a German attempt would have succeeded, which is a stretch. Or, in other words, it was common cowardice on the Germans side rather than some special courage on the British side that made the difference.

Isn't it amazing what we can deduce from a historical counterfactual?
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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#27

Post by Peter89 » 21 Oct 2021, 09:09

Richard Anderson wrote:
21 Oct 2021, 00:30
Peter89 wrote:
20 Oct 2021, 11:17
Hmmm, the problem here I think is that the Germans overcommitted a bit.
No, the problem here is that historical counterfactuals are not normally intended "to highlight a dynamic "hidden" by historical/geographical contingency." Rather they are typically intended to extrapolate a possible different series of events based on changes in historical events.

However, insofar as I can determine, "Magic" had little or no role to play in World War II?
I thought the "Magic Invasion" is a metaphor, and can be translated to
Richard Anderson wrote:
21 Oct 2021, 00:30
a "magical" transportation of 60 German divisions to England
.

Richard Anderson wrote:
21 Oct 2021, 00:30
Imho there was no real chance for this, if there was an Eastern Front.
What you suggested earlier, that if the Axis pinned down or destroyed the British in the southern crescent (from Iran to Dakar, thus, linking up with the Italians and forcing the British to defend India and South Africa with substantial forces), is making sense though.
Yeah, but how to do so within the actual constraints the Germans had, where it was necessary for them to concentrate forces to achieve success rather than disperse forces as in this scenario? For the Axis to be able to pin down or destroy the British in the "southern crescent" again would require a major curtailment of operations in the East.
I think it was an either-or decision; if the Germans send the Soviets to the Allies, then there could be no realistic way to achieve success in either the SU or in the "southern crescent". A major curtailment wouldn't cut it. The only possible way to achieve anything substantially different was to commit resources to one of these choices - although I am not sure of the former scenario. The Germans tried to do everything at once - and failed.
I think it is worth to explore the drives behind this decision making process, because it can reveal a lot for today's geopolitics and for the nature of multi-front wars.
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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#28

Post by Peter89 » 21 Oct 2021, 09:47

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
21 Oct 2021, 05:30
Had Germany defeated the SU, she would arguably have possessed the resources to replace Channel Magic with local air superiority over the Channel
I'm not sure about that. The Germans lost a disproportionately low number of fighters on the Eastern front: 2,300 single engine fighters, 7 night fighters and 632 twin engine fighters (from Barbarossa until 01.01.1944). Of course, a successful / earlier completition of the campaign could consume more.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
21 Oct 2021, 05:30
(obviating the intervention of Allied bluewater naval units
The problem what I tried to describe above is complicated. The Germans had serious problems with anti-shipping operations. For example, they had less operational aerial torpedoes than the contemporary Japanese air fleet had in one strike. Most of their experience was against slow, under-AA-gunned and not really maneuvering merchant ships. Given the almost complete lack of night anti-shipping capabilities and research, the British could move their destroyers into the Channel during a night. etc.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
21 Oct 2021, 05:30
to create a viable landing fleet, and to create a Channel Fleet centered on smaller and somewhat expendable assets like E-boats and MTB's.
Experience shows us that a successful landing against organized opposition is not a cakewalk. Air superiority and naval presence is one thing, but there must be a lot of other stuff that are needed, including experience and joint planning. It is hard to imagine a successful landing in Britain if there was no such operation before... and there wasn't one. The same goes for the Allies, as argued by Douglas Porch: if the Allies strike Normandy prematurely, that could not end well for them, thus, a peripherial strategy was needed. I believe the correctness of his arguments and I think the same is true for Germany & co. Operations like that would consume time and resources in exchange for experience. Also there was a battle of doctrines, which were not bad for the Axis in 1942-1943, but still problematic, because it was built upon aging aircrafts (Ju 52 and Ju 87) and assumptions that are not necessarily true in the case of Britain.
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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#29

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 21 Oct 2021, 11:25

Peter89 wrote:I'm not sure about that. The Germans lost a disproportionately low number of fighters on the Eastern front
You're making Philips O'Brien's mistake of equating the cost of the Eastern Front with material lost, ignoring the opportunity cost of labor deployed/killed/disabled against SU.
Peter89 wrote:The Germans had serious problems with anti-shipping operations
Nothing that 2-3 years of training wouldn't fix. There's nothing about being German that makes one more or less good than Americans or Japanese at hitting ships.

Besides, LW had significant anti-shipping success around Crete, against Malta Convoys (inc fast warships), Arctic Convoys, and in the Black Sea. I wouldn't argue they were all Dick Best but certainly not incompetent. Even assuming no German improvement, taking Crete and multiplying LW strength by 20-30 or so gives a good approximation. That's a massacre, probably the biggest naval losses in history.

I suspect - just a theory so far - that much of LW's anti-shipping problems related to using 2E bombers as torpedo planes. They were slow, not maneuverable, presented large Flak targets. Think of the B-26's striking Nagumo from Midway. By 1944 Fw-190 or Me-262 would give fast, evasive platforms for torpedo attacks in the Channel.
Peter89 wrote:experience and joint planning
I neglected to mention your upthread omission of successful German amphibious ops. Kerch, Baltic Islands, Dodecanese... KM also had many serviceable plans for landing craft that weren't developed for obvious reasons. IIRC they even planned their own Mulberries for Sealion (kind of an obvious measure IMO). In a post-SU ATL there's further opportunities for learning prior to Sealion 44/45 (Cyprus, advances along Red Sea and Med coasts, perhaps Sweden).

Amphibious assaults are combat ops requiring high levels of aggression, courage, and devolved initiative. German Army excelled in these traits; I see no reason they'd not have made decent amphibians.

One can also see German defenders dumbfounded by the Allies' mistakes at Dieppe. I.e. they already had insights into amphibious ops not available to the Empire in 1942. Preparing to defend against something goes a long way to developing a theory of how to do something.

The biggest missing piece would be naval gunfire support. There are possible solutions, such as building monitors/gun-barges useful only for assaults. Germany would also have built more DD's (inc what they called MTB's); these provided the most valuable NGS on D-Day.
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Re: when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

#30

Post by Yuri » 21 Oct 2021, 12:43

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Oct 2021, 23:35
PunctuationHorror wrote:IF they put up stiff resistance and IF they started guerilla tactics as planned and IF they were ruthless enough to accept heavy destructions and losses
I don't believe British people are fundamentally more courageous than French/Dutch/Belgians/Danish/Norwegians so at the individual level their resistance calculus would likely have been similar (there would have been marginal differences due to different political situations). At base the World Wars showed us that it's fairly easy to occupy/control a modern(ish) wealthy society because people want to earn and live; going underground just isn't that attractive.
It doesn't matter what you believe. It is only important that the German military leaders who were supposed to invade the British Isles knew and believed in.

Unfortunately, recent events do not allow me to focus on completing the research on the topic "the fighting spirit of the troops of the era of the people's armies". Therefore, I will only say briefly about the place that the German military leaders assigned to their British opponent among their many other enemies.


In the opinion of all, I repeat, all German officers and generals who spoke about the fighting spirit of their opponents, in a defensive battle, a British soldier, a native of the British Isles, has no equal in steadfastness and perseverance. They are superior in this to both Germans and Russians. Approximately the same qualities, according to the German military leaders, were possessed by soldiers who came from Canada. People from South Africa, Australia and New Zealand were considered less resistant. Further, no amount of torture will force a British officer to tell more than his name and the number of the unit to which he belonged. Therefore, the Germans did not torture British officers, it was pointless - the officer would die, but he would not say anything.

Further, some German officers and generals believed that Hitler refused to land on the British Isles, including for this reason. He - Hitler - fought against the British in the First World War and knew about the fighting qualities of the British not from hearsay.

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