Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 23 Nov 2021 09:54

HP wrote:
23 Nov 2021 09:12
If we drop down to the individual level, we can get stuff like "low IQ people are actually better boxers than high IQ people": https://brainsize.wordpress.com/2014/08 ... g-ability/
If we drop down to Bogosphere, we get reasoning like this [from the cited post]:
What are the odds that three of the world’s heavy weight boxing champions had allegedly such low IQ’s? That can’t be a coincidence.
Rarely does a post demonstrate ignorance of such widely divergent fields as boxing and statistics so succinctly. Gene Tunney, Lennox Lewis, and both Klitschko brothers are - just off the top of my head - examples of all-time great heavyweights who were/are highly intelligent. That's 4 intelligent heavyweight champs and only 3 dullards. Can't be coincidence.
HP wrote:If we accept that certain test results indicated better success as an officer than IQ, measurables classified as proxies by TheMarcksPlan were seen as more important in determining success as on officer than measurables (IQ) classified as direct by him in this case.
You're not tracking the direct/proxy distinction I'm making because you're incorrectly (though understandably) inferring that because something is directly measured, I'm saying it's causally related to combat effectiveness. That's categorically not true.

Height is the perfect example. We can certainly directly measure height but IMO height alone has so little relation to combat effectiveness that I wouldn't even bother considering it as a causal contributor to combat effectiveness. Ceteris paribus, height seems at least as much a disadvantage as it makes one a bigger target. Height is, however, overwhelmingly correlated with virtually all the other variables that are plausibly causal with combat effectiveness (battlefield intelligence, strength, endurance, psychological endowments such as confidence that come with higher socioeconomic status).

Now apply that reasoning to IQ. It's more often directly measured because many armies applied IQ or IQ-ish tests. Nonetheless, there is of course a distinction between battlefield-useful intelligence (combat-effectiveness causal) and the kind of intelligence one uses on an internet forum to tell good reasoning from bad (the latter being more closely related to IQ).

I haven't been as clear on the causal/not-causal distinction because, as I said above, I'm not that concerned with the details of the causal story yet (see analogy to lathe operators and measuring productivity versus explaining productivity).
HP wrote:To summarize: I think using demographic variables in "combat effectiveness" research would be too much effort for too little gain.
Anybody of this opinion is welcome to treat the thread as I treat "What's better? IS-2 or Tiger II, Part 2,376" and ignore it.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 23 Nov 2021 16:17

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
26 Dec 2020 23:18
Michael Kenny wrote:
26 Dec 2020 23:13
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
26 Dec 2020 23:02
it's probably also relevant that America had higher living and nutritional standards. We were taller and probably had higher IQ as a result (Britain only recently caught up in height).
I believe c 25% of US draftees were rejected for being illiterate. No McNamara's Morons in WW2!
Would like to read more on that. Source? I'd be surprised if 25% met the literal definition of illiterate - were probably more like semi-literate. But would be interesting to see the details.
Actually, in WW 2 about 1 in 3 US draftees was rejected for service. The top two reasons were mental incapacity or illness and physical or medical / health issues. That ratio holds pretty constant for Korea and Vietnam too. Larger cities on the coasts and the deep south had rates of rejection as high as 50%.

See: Hoehling: Home Front U.S.A. for example.

I have another source that breaks this down more called Handbook of Military Institutions I think but can't find it at the moment. Certainly 25% were not illiterate, but a good enough sized chunk was so poorly educated or stupid that it caused Lt. Gen. Hershey director of the draft to say "I cannot help but feel our educational system--from kindergarten on through the colleges and universities--has neglected one of its most important responsibilities, that of presenting a balance between the so-called physical, the mental, and the emotional."

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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Nov 2021 16:57

It is always amusing to see data and sources from earlier in a thread ignored.

"The double-whammy of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl resulted in pellagra, rickets, beriberi, and other diseases of malnutrition becoming rampant in the U.S. Jane Ziegelman and Andrew Coe explored this subject in some depth in A Square Meal, A Culinary History of the Great Depression. See also, A.R. Ruis, "'Children with Half-Starved Bodies' and the Assessment of Malnutrition in the United States, 1890–1950", in the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Fall 2013; Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 378-406.

The effects are also mentioned extensively by those in the U.S. Army, such as George Marshall, who directly experienced the results of malnutrition while administering the CCC and then later when attempting to build the Army. By the end of the war, 30 percent of draftees were rejected for medical reasons...for November 1940-September 1941, the period of the first draft, it was 52.8 percent. Problems with feet, teeth, eyes, and musculo-skeletal defects led the list. It got better, flat feet fell off the charts as a problem after November 1941, mostly because the standards were reduced, but dental and visual problems remained top of the list. Interestingly, visual problems were more than twice as prevalent in the World War II draft as it was in the Great War draft, auditory issues were three times more prevalent, but sadly a comparison on tooth defects was not made. See, G.St.J. Perrott, "Selective Service Rejection Statistics and Some of Their Implications", in the American Journal of Public Health, April 1946, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 336-342." viewtopic.php?p=2311512#p2311512

"Before the war, 3.8% of all draftees (a different source says 3.6%, but over a different period) were rejected due to "educational deficiency". They thus raised the standard on 1 May 1941 and the cut-off point became, for better or worse, completion of "four years in an American grammar school", at least until 1 April 1942. However, IIRC it was 1943-1944 that the last 40,000 functional illiterates were separated in the Army. Eventually, 14% of all draftees were rejected due to mental or educational deficiency. The note to the entry reads "Includes (1) registrants with more than one disqualifying defect who were rejected for educational deficiency before 1 June 1943; (2) registrants rejected for failure to meet minimum intelligence standards, beginning on 1 June 1943; and (3) morons, imbeciles, and idiots rejected November 1940-July 1945." viewtopic.php?p=2311862#p2311862

Marcus S. Goldstein, “Physical Status of Men Examined through Selective Service in World War II.” Public Health Reports (1896-1970), vol. 66, no. 19, Association of Schools of Public Health, 1951, pp. 587–609 and Colonel Egbert S. Anderson, MC, USA (ed.), Physical Standards in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, US Army, 1967) are also valuable.
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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by histan » 24 Nov 2021 03:20

Hi TMP

When you started this thread you had a range of possible definitions and metrics to chose from in defining "combat effectiveness". I am interested in why you chose the TDI definition over the others that are available in the literature and used by other researchers. The reason for posing this question is that one output from this thread is that the TDI definition is unsuitable for the kind of study proposed, not least because it is very difficult to measure / calculate. Some other definitions seem to be more suitable.

In particular, I am interested as to why you did not chose "casualty effectiveness" as the measure. This is a well established measure and was used by analysts long before HERO/TDI was formed. It continues to be used by today's historical analysts and is discussed by those who chose to use "combat effectiveness" (defined in terms of mission outcomes) instead of "casualty effectiveness". There is no need to link "casualty effectiveness" with the TDI concept of "combat effectiveness", it is a measure in its own right. Indeed, linking it to the TDI measure is a source of confusion. You state that they are different but seem to link the two almost as if they are inseparable.

Casualty Effectiveness is is defined as a ratio of x and y: ie x/y
If x is defined the number of Red casualties and y relates to Blue forces, what is the definition of y that you would propose to use when calculating casualty effectiveness?

You write:
"Height is, however, overwhelmingly correlated". Where does "overwhelmingly" fit into the degree of correlation? Is it above a strong correlation?
The reason for asking is that I am aware of work undertaken into the correlation of height with IQ. If I remember correctly, the correlation between the two ranges mostly between 0.1 and 0.3, with an average around 0.2. My limited knowledge of statistics suggests that a rule of thumb is less than 0.25 might be regarded as no correlation, between 0.25 and 0.5 a weak correlation, between 0.5 and 0,75 a medium correlation, and greater than 0.75 a strong correlation. I am aware, that is in most things context is vitally important and that these rules of thumb can be significantly modified.
As far as I can see, a very weak / weak correlation has been established between height and IQ. I am, as usual, open to persuasion that in this context the rules of thumb should be relaxed.

Regards

John

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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 24 Nov 2021 08:28

histan wrote:As far as I can see, a very weak / weak correlation has been established between height and IQ.
True as regards contemporary populations in developed countries. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Height_and_intelligence. But for populations born early last century, living standards had significant impacts on height. Again I'm using height as a proxy for pre-adult living standards:
Poor nutrition and illness in childhood limit human growth. As a consequence, the average height of a population is strongly correlated with living standards in a population. This makes the study of human height relevant for historians who want to understand the history of living conditions.
https://ourworldindata.org/human-height ... man-height

...thus the taller 1920-born man gets "proxy credit" not just for the intrinsic height-IQ relationship but for the panoply of life-enhancing benefits stemming from having good taste in parents.

On the Oxford site you can toggle the map to see the significant height differences between different populations. For WW2 soldier ages the US was tallest, Commonwealth Dominions next, then Western Europe, followed by Eastern Europe (generally speaking). This roughly tracks national wealth levels, though ideally we'd want to see wealth levels and Gini coefficients: average wealth doesn't matter so much if the 8th Lord Peasantpounder is super wealthy and the proletariat very poor - I suspect this is why early-century Britain lagged in height relative to poorer (on average) Germany.
I am interested as to why you did not chose "casualty effectiveness" as the measure.
I was perhaps too loosey-goosey on "combat effectiveness" vs. "casualty effectiveness" at the start of this thread, which was TBH something I posted while bored and snowed-in while visiting Grandpa (back with him now for Thanksgiving as I type this but staying at a hotel nearby). Lately I've been clear that either is a candidate for testing a causal relationship:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Nov 2021 12:42

Consider this thread bifurcated into two questions then:

1. What's the effect of demographic measurables on combat effectivess?

2. What's the effect of demographic measurables on casualty effectiveness?
If I could force my own jargon on everyone, I'd want to say "combat effectiveness" is the umbrella term with "mission effectiveness" and "casualty effectiveness" being subsets of "combat effectiveness."

But you're right that data on casualty effectiveness would be much easier to get - and that data would be less susceptible to subjective judgments and bias.

OTOH I could see a "gross model" based on combat/mission effectiveness at very high levels, testing very gross outcomes. This is basically my posited comparison of British and Dominion divisions in WW1.
histan wrote:Casualty Effectiveness is is defined as a ratio of x and y: ie x/y
If x is defined the number of Red casualties and y relates to Blue forces, what is the definition of y that you would propose to use when calculating casualty effectiveness?
I think we need four variables - one for losses and one for forces for each side?

There seems to be an unresolved issue about whether and to what extent aimed-fire and/or area-fire models of casualty effectiveness are best. Even within TDI's reports, they sometimes give casualty effectiveness values adjusted for force ratios and sometimes not.

I don't think I need to resolve this debate, however, because in a "ratio of ratios" such differences would drop out.
histan wrote:here is no need to link "casualty effectiveness" with the TDI concept of "combat effectiveness", it is a measure in its own right. Indeed, linking it to the TDI measure is a source of confusion. You state that they are different but seem to link the two almost as if they are inseparable.
Not according to TDI:
While there was a not a direct linear relationship in the model between combat effectiveness and casualty effectiveness, a higher combat effectiveness value clearly improved casualty effectiveness. Casualty effectiveness was usually higher than the combat effectiveness value.

There is a sense that one can determine “combat effectiveness” as the square root of casualty effectiveness. In this construct, a casualty effectiveness of four would mean a combat effectiveness value of two. In effect, being twice as good as your opponent results in a favorable casualty exchange being four times better. This has not been systematically tested.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 24 Nov 2021 18:21

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
22 Nov 2021 15:19
The thread started by inquiring whether anyone has researched these questions, including by accumulating this kind of data. Then it predictably diverged into byways with people variously objecting to asking the question at all, to asking the question with the wrong jargon, to arguing that the existence of noise nullifies the existence of the signal, etc.
Problem on topic was be same problem what everyone can to read on many tmp topics .

Tmp want for to get real history datas for to make imagination story . That was not be problem . It can to be ok .

Problem was be tmp not want datas for to understand history but want for to collect cherrys on datas on imagination story what not can be compatible on history datas .

Example. For to get answer what tmp want on tmp imagination story tmp was write again again again
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Nov 2021 03:22
1. I don't think there's any doubt that fitter, healthier, smarter soldiers will - ceteris paribus - produce a military having greater combat effectiveness. Do you? I'm under the impression that no serious person disagrees, although perhaps some have in this thread.

ceteris paribus

ceteris paribus
And
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Nov 2021 03:22
90% of the argument in this thread reflects an unwillingness to accept the ceteris paribus.
But ceteris paribus was be at mostest centar of problem on topic .

On tmp imagination story tmp must have ceteris paribus for to have result he want .

But on real history datas nothing was can to be ceteris paribus.

When tmp want data what was be ceteris paribus tmp must to make research and analysis on self because nobody else was make research and analysis on tmp definitions and tmp ceteris paribus . That mean no data from other persons was be good on tmp imagination story .

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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 25 Nov 2021 20:29

I don't know if this book will help:
Ham and Jam Cover.JPG
The leadership provided by Gale in the creation, development and Normandy operations of 6th Airborne Division was critical. The capability of the Division was developed through a tough regime of realistic and relevant training which also forged a robust identity. Aggressive and inventive leadership was selected and employed throughout the order of battle, while intelligent but simple operational planning was used as the base of briefing which was then cascaded throughout. The impact of surprise in the landing operation and a pragmatic approach toward co-opting the firepower of surrounding forces then maximised 6th Airborne’s combat effectiveness. It was Gale and his leadership culture which underpinned the development of the capability of the airborne soldier and the cohesion of the fighting force as a whole.
Hopefully not yet another random definition of combat effectiveness. :wink:

Regards

Tom
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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by Richard Anderson » 25 Nov 2021 22:49

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
25 Nov 2021 20:29
I don't know if this book will help:

Ham and Jam Cover.JPG
The leadership provided by Gale in the creation, development and Normandy operations of 6th Airborne Division was critical. The capability of the Division was developed through a tough regime of realistic and relevant training which also forged a robust identity. Aggressive and inventive leadership was selected and employed throughout the order of battle, while intelligent but simple operational planning was used as the base of briefing which was then cascaded throughout. The impact of surprise in the landing operation and a pragmatic approach toward co-opting the firepower of surrounding forces then maximised 6th Airborne’s combat effectiveness. It was Gale and his leadership culture which underpinned the development of the capability of the airborne soldier and the cohesion of the fighting force as a whole.
Hopefully not yet another random definition of combat effectiveness. :wink:

Regards

Tom
Well, it is also a good definition of how military organizations throughout history have fostered combat effectiveness. So let's parse it out...

[Strong] leadership [from the top];
[Creating] a tough regime of realistic and relevant training;
[Fostering] robust [unit] identity [and esprit de corps];
[Encouraging] aggressive and inventive [junior] leadership;
Simple operational planning.
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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 25 Nov 2021 23:05

Richard Anderson wrote:
25 Nov 2021 22:49
Well, it is also a good definition of how military organizations throughout history have fostered combat effectiveness. So let's parse it out...

[Strong] leadership [from the top];
[Creating] a tough regime of realistic and relevant training;
[Fostering] robust [unit] identity [and esprit de corps];
[Encouraging] aggressive and inventive [junior] leadership;
Simple operational planning.
I agree entirely, but would also add, amongst other things:

Generate longer ranged, more lethal firepower, preferably lots and lots of it. :D

Regards

Tom

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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 26 Nov 2021 00:47

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
25 Nov 2021 20:29
I don't know if this book will help:

Ham and Jam Cover.JPG
The leadership provided by Gale in the creation, development and Normandy operations of 6th Airborne Division was critical. The capability of the Division was developed through a tough regime of realistic and relevant training which also forged a robust identity. Aggressive and inventive leadership was selected and employed throughout the order of battle, while intelligent but simple operational planning was used as the base of briefing which was then cascaded throughout. The impact of surprise in the landing operation and a pragmatic approach toward co-opting the firepower of surrounding forces then maximised 6th Airborne’s combat effectiveness. It was Gale and his leadership culture which underpinned the development of the capability of the airborne soldier and the cohesion of the fighting force as a whole.
Hopefully not yet another random definition of combat effectiveness. :wink:

Regards

Tom
Richard Anderson wrote:
25 Nov 2021 22:49
Well, it is also a good definition of how military organizations throughout history have fostered combat effectiveness. So let's parse it out...

[Strong] leadership [from the top];
[Creating] a tough regime of realistic and relevant training;
[Fostering] robust [unit] identity [and esprit de corps];
[Encouraging] aggressive and inventive [junior] leadership;
Simple operational planning.
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
25 Nov 2021 23:05
I agree entirely, but would also add, amongst other things:

Generate longer ranged, more lethal firepower, preferably lots and lots of it. :D

Regards

Tom
Yes yes very interesting but nothing for to help tmp .

He was demand ceteris paribus ceteris paribus ceteris paribus .

That mean tmp was not be interest on no datas what explain operational effectivness was change on change other factors .

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Nov 2021 03:22
90% of the argument in this thread reflects an unwillingness to accept the ceteris paribus.
Maybe now it can to be 93% . 8-)

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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 26 Nov 2021 00:56

On 1939.year and 1940.year Germany army was win many battles . Germany army was be mostest combat effective and casualty effective .

On 1944.year and 1945.year Germany arny was not win many battles . Germany army was be mostest combat not effective and casualty not effective .

ceteris paribus

On analysis ceteris paribus tmp theory was mean Germany mens was get smaller smaller and smaller 1939.year until 1945.year or Soviet mens Britain mens Canada mens Amerika mens was get biger biger and biger 1939.year until 1945.year.

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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Nov 2021 04:22

It's rather like military macroeconomics. Doesn't make any sense from the "firm" /organizational perspective but from the national level it is magic voodoo (interest rates, tax rates, employment, etc.) moving this and that.

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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 26 Nov 2021 06:25

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Nov 2021 04:22
It's rather like military macroeconomics. Doesn't make any sense from the "firm" /organizational perspective but from the national level it is magic voodoo (interest rates, tax rates, employment, etc.) moving this and that.
Can you put some meat on the bones of that analogy? Macroeconomics does not, by definition, apply to firms nor micro to economies (a common instance of this confusion is the "household budget" model of national accounts).

Let's take casualty effectiveness specifically. In what way would aggregating casualty effectiveness scores from small unit engagements (say we have all of them) be other than an aggregation of scores?

For you analogy to work, the aggregation step would have to be a completely separate field along the lines of micro vs. macro economics.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Nov 2021 14:40

For practical purposes (from the perspective of commanders) these national level results have little relevance to their work which requires a complex set of factors that "kitchen sink" statistical analysis would not cover. However the conclusions of this is fine if you operate at the national level, say you are a policymaker, the Fed chairman or operate at the highest levels of the armed forces etc.

It reminds me of Peter Lynch's saying from stock trading: “If you spend more than 13 minutes analyzing economic and market forecasts, you've wasted 10 minutes” . He was generous about 10...try 12.

The first two divisions of the SS did select their volunteers and draftees based on tall height up to 1943, which was the last time they were committed as fully trained formations. They displayed superior performance in this timeframe, but the impact of the quality of their soldiers, commanders, size of their organization, nazi beliefs, etc. is debatable. This tall height was combined with an officer corps of lower educational status (SS officer candidates did not require a secondary school diploma unlike the Army) but had gone through an educational program that was more political/athletic in character (OCS at Bad Tolz and other places).

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Re: Quantitative research on demographic measurables and combat effectiveness?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 27 Nov 2021 12:17

Cult Icon wrote:For practical purposes (from the perspective of commanders) these national level results have little relevance to their work which requires a complex set of factors that "kitchen sink" statistical analysis would not cover. However the conclusions of this is fine if you operate at the national level, say you are a policymaker, the Fed chairman or operate at the highest levels of the armed forces etc.
...also fine if you're some guy curious about army performance, with no practical purpose.
Cult Icon wrote:This tall height was combined with an officer corps of lower educational status (SS officer candidates did not require a secondary school diploma unlike the Army) but had gone through an educational program that was more political/athletic in character (OCS at Bad Tolz and other places).
As height is only a proxy and intrinsically worthless to combat effectiveness (I'd guess), SS officers would be (I'd guess) of lower quality (ceteris paribus).
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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