The reasons for the German invasion of the USSR according to Hitler

[PODS96]

I recently came across a rather interesting document.

It is a speech where Hitler explains his reasons for invading the Soviet Union.

The document called "The Führer to the German People: 22 June 1941" basically explains that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive invasion in the face of Soviet rearmament and expansion.

To what extent is this accepted in historiography? I am aware that Suvorov's theory that the USSR invasion of Germany was imminent has been discredited, but this is something different.

Thoughts?

Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/The_F% ... _June_1941

[wm]

Any document titled "to the people" is propaganda by definition.

[PODS96]

Any document titled "to the people" is propaganda by definition.

However, his arguments are logical.

There was a westward expansion of the USSR and a massive buildup of weapons.

The belief that the Nazis were not concerned about this is absurd.

[OpanaPointer]

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/ ... ar_II.html

Scroll down to June 22.

[PODS96]

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/ ... ar_II.html

Scroll down to June 22.

Yes, it is exactly the same as what I posted.

Generally, the rebuttals that I have read against the theory of preventive war is that the deployment of troops in 1941 did not have an offensive character, however, the expansion of the USSR to the west and the fear of the Nazi leadership to suffer the same as Finland seems evident.

[OpanaPointer]

I'm not in a position to check the files I posted back then. Sorry for any confusion.

[wm]

Kershaw, Ian. Fateful Choices.jpg

Ian Kershaw, "Fateful Choices."

[DavidFrankenberg]

I recently came across a rather interesting document.

It is a speech where Hitler explains his reasons for invading the Soviet Union.

The document called "The Führer to the German People: 22 June 1941" basically explains that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive invasion in the face of Soviet rearmament and expansion.

To what extent is this accepted in historiography? I am aware that Suvorov's theory that the USSR invasion of Germany was imminent has been discredited, but this is something different.

Thoughts?

Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/The_F% ... _June_1941

Hitler's idea was to force England to make peace before the USA comes in the war (he thought in 1942).
By taking USSR's land and resources (oil and others), he would get enough forces to discourage any US intervention. Then, England alone should make peace.

[ChrisDR68]

The document called "The Führer to the German People: 22 June 1941" basically explains that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive invasion in the face of Soviet rearmament and expansion.Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/The_F% ... _June_1941

Pretty much exactly the same spurious reason the German Junker Class wanted a war with Imperial Russia in 1914. Very little of Hitler's thinking was original or novel. The Teutonic fear of the Slavic hordes to the east (at least within the German ruling class) was a long standing one.

[Peter89]

The document called "The Führer to the German People: 22 June 1941" basically explains that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive invasion in the face of Soviet rearmament and expansion.Source: https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/The_F% ... _June_1941

Pretty much exactly the same spurious reason the German Junker Class wanted a war with Imperial Russia in 1914. Very little of Hitler's thinking was original or novel. The Teutonic fear of the Slavic hordes to the east (at least within the German ruling class) was a long standing one.

I seriously doubt that it was a serious or popular theory.

East Germany began to lose its German population even before the Versailles treaty (Ostflucht). Thus the realistic approach would have been to reclaim the lands under German control for the German farmers.

[gebhk]

I would suggest it was more than the 'Junker Classes' 'fearing' a slavic onslought. More likely an excuse, albeit I would agree that little in Hitler's ideas was original. To whit, the concept of lebensraum which was around long before he was even born, the term itself perhaps coined by Peschel in 1860 and popularised in its modern meaning by Ratzel in 1901. This was developed against a background of German belief in the myth that it was German emigrees and later colonists in the middle ages onwards that had brought civilisation to 'the East' while the Slavs sat around twiddling their thumbs - so by implication the Slavs didn't deserve the land and its riches - the Germans did.

This view was reinforced, according to the Lithuanian historian Vėjas Gabrielius Liulevičius, during WW1. "German troops developed a revulsion towards the 'East' and came to think of it as a timeless region beset by chaos, disease and barbarism", instead of what it really was, a region suffering from the ravages of warfare. He suggests that the encounter with the East formed an idea of "spaces and races", which needed to be "cleared and cleansed". All this was, of course, but local application of an idea that was gaining ground in the second half of 1800's internationally, that the 'lower races' could not be elevated by religion and civilisation, as was previously considered and should, therefore, be wiped out one way or another to make way for the 'higher races' and that this was just the natural order of things - indeed an ethical imperative (such as the concept of 'manifest destiny' used by some to justify US territorial aggression and abuse of the native populations - a concept that AH was much interested in, stating more than once that the native populations of East Europe should be treated like 'Redskins').

Peter89 is absolutely right, however, that Germany had far more immediate agricultural problems, in that due to the the combined effects of the 'ostflucht' and low birthrate, it was unable to fully exploit the agricultural land it already had, without compounding the problem by occupying even more land. The real issue was how to make farming at least as attractive an occupation as working in industry. However, no one has ever accused AH of being a rational or practical thinker.

However the ostflucht/low birthrate issue gave more than the just the 'Junker classses' cold sweats about the 'Slavic Hordes' at night. The fear that the vacuum being created in eastern Germany would suck in settlers from across the border (in the first instance, from Poland which had agricultural OVERpopulation compounded year on year by a spectacular birthrate) was a concern of most conservatively-minded folk, never mind the racial purity nuts and from the earliest days of the Weimar Republic.

In short, there seems little reason to think that invading the Soviet Union was some spur-of-the-moment sudden brainwave of Hitler's, as seems recently to have been suggested. This was something Germany had been building up to for nearly 100 years and part of Hitler's wider strategy from at least 1934 according to Klaus Hildebrand when: "he [Adolf Hitler] set about pursuing anti-Soviet policies and building up the army in order to, according to Hitler, "after short, decisive blows to the West" create "Lebensraum in the east"

[ChrisDR68]

I would suggest it was more than the 'Junker Classes' 'fearing' a slavic onslought. More likely an excuse, albeit I would agree that little in Hitler's ideas was original. To whit, the concept of lebensraum which was around long before he was even born, the term itself perhaps coined by Peschel in 1860 and popularised in its modern meaning by Ratzel in 1901. This was developed against a background of German belief in the myth that it was German emigrees and later colonists in the middle ages onwards that had brought civilisation to 'the East' while the Slavs sat around twiddling their thumbs - so by implication the Slavs didn't deserve the land and its riches - the Germans did.

Not just lebensraum but the idea of uniting all the German speaking people's of central Europe into a Greater Germany, the Swasika symbol which predated Hitler by hundreds of years, anti-semitism which was just as ancient and as you state the idea that the Germans were racially and culturally superior to their eastern neighbours. His novelty was uniting all of these things into one ideological package.

This view was reinforced, according to the Lithuanian historian Vėjas Gabrielius Liulevičius, during WW1. "German troops developed a revulsion towards the 'East' and came to think of it as a timeless region beset by chaos, disease and barbarism", instead of what it really was, a region suffering from the ravages of warfare. He suggests that the encounter with the East formed an idea of "spaces and races", which needed to be "cleared and cleansed". All this was, of course, but local application of an idea that was gaining ground in the second half of 1800's internationally, that the 'lower racers' could not be elevated by religion and civilisation, as was previously considered and should, therefore, be wiped out one way or another to make way for the 'higher racers' and that this was just the natural order of things - indeed an ethical imperative (such as the concept of 'manifest destiny' used by some to justify US territorial aggression and abuse of the native populations - a concept that AH was much interested in, stating more than once that the native populations of East Europe should be treated like 'Redskins').

Peter89 is absolutely right, however, that Germany had far more immediate agricultural problems, in that due to the the combined effects of the 'ostflucht' and low birthrate, it was unable to fully exploit the agricultural land it already had, without compounding the problem by occupying even more land. The real issue was how to make farming at least as attractive an occupation as working in industry. However, no one has ever accused AH of being a rational or practical thinker.

Just finished watching The Evolution of Vernichtungskrieg: The German Army and the Occupation of the Soviet Union You Tube video on the WW2TV channel of how the Germans operated behind their lines between 1941-44 in the east and the changes their policies went through in 1941 and 1942 and then again in 1943-44. Very informative and shows how seriously they took agricultural and economic exploitation of their conquered territory once they realised the Soviet Union wasn't going to fall in one campaign.

However the ostflucht/low birthrate issue gave more than the just the 'Junker classses' cold sweats about the 'Slavic Hordes' at night. The fear that the vacuum being created in eastern Germany would suck in settlers from across the border (in the first instance, from Poland which had agricultural OVERpopulation compounded year on year by a spectacular birthrate) was a concern of most conservatively-minded folk, never mind the racial purity nuts and from the earliest days of the Weimar Republic.

Deeply ironic considering how many slave labourers the Germans took from Soviet Russia and put them to work in the Reich's factories and farms.

In short, there seems little reason to think that invading the Soviet Union was some spur-of-the-moment sudden brainwave of Hitler's, as seems recently to have been suggested. This was something Germany had been building up to for nearly 100 years and part of Hitler's wider strategy from at least 1934 according to Klaus Hildebrand when: "he [Adolf Hitler] set about pursuing anti-Soviet policies and building up the army in order to, according to Hitler, "after short, decisive blows to the West" create "Lebensraum in the east"

I agree especially when remembering that Germany had actually beaten Imperial Russia in 1917 and had achieved it's eastern empire there until the armistice in 1918 and subsequent treaties rendered it null and void. This victory is likely to have factored into Hitler's thinking between the wars.

[wm]

Although it was Bolshevik Russia that surrendered to Germany. Imperial Russia was determined to fight to the end.