German General Officer casualties in WW II.

[Lornito Uriarte Mahinay Jr.]

TANK

Generalmajor Albrecht Wüstenhagen, Commanding Officer of the 256.Infanterie-Division was killed by direct hit on his command vehicle by a Russian tank on 26 June 1944, while trying to breakout of the Bagration encirclement near Kochanawa.

PARTISAN

Generalmajor Siegfried Marseille, Kommandanteur Standortkommandantur Kursk (324), was killed by Russian partisans in Novoselski (Nowosselki) on 29 January 1944 north of Petrykaw (Petrikoff) in Belarus.

Generalmajor Georg Braun, Commanding Officer of the 68.Jager-Division, was killed together with his divisional staff officers when Soviet partisans blew up his command headquarters in the garrisoned city of Kharkov on 14 November 1941.

Generalleutnant Johann Mickl, Commanding Officer of the 392.Kroatien-Infaterie-Division, was severely wounded in the head during the difficult fighting in the Vratnik Pass in Karloberg near Senj on the 09 April 1945 when a group of Yugoslav Partisans ambushed his column. He died subsequently.

ARTILLERY

Generalleutnant Clemens Betzel, Commanding Officer of the 4.Panzer-Division, was killed by artillery shell near the railway station (Güterbahnhofs) in Danzig at 16.00 hours during the siege of the city by Russian troops on 27 March 1945.

General der Artillerie Wilhem Stemmermann, Commanding Officer of Gruppe Stemmermann, was killed by artillery fire during the break out from Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket on 18 February 1944 near Tscherkassy on the Eastern Front.

[tigre]

Hello B5N2KATE and thanks for joining us . I can not help you with regards to the author point of view, but it's something like you told in the first line of your post. The fatalities in high ranking officers drained the command ability and as example I'm thinking in the 21 Pz in the year of 1944 (with Feuchtinger an artillery man that was in command of the AR 227 in France 1940) and a lot of good panzers commanders killed or captured. Nevertheless what it's important here is the forum members opinion and a good debate isn`t it?. All the best. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Thanks again Baron Lornito Mahinay. Regards. Raúl M .

[B5N2KATE]

Agreed....it's a fine piece of research work...

But, nevertheless, I STILL would like to know what the author of this fine body of work made of it all....

It's an aspect of German operations that needs to be explained.....

I'm still looking for this, an I do wish the author himself had correlated his own data into something like a thesis. It may make commenting easier .....

I must be stupid after all...

[tigre]

Hello to all people ; following with the BATTLEFIELD LETHALITY.................................

SMALL ARMS.

Many of the general officer casualties from small arms came in the form of ambushes. Shortly after noon, 6 September 1942, GM Buck, 198th Infantry Division, was ambushed and killed while driving in his command car over a bridge near Klutschewaja. A reconnaissance element from the 723rd Soviet Rifle Regiment was hiding under a bridge along this route, recognized the division ccmnander's auto pennant on the vehicle, and destroyed the car with two anti-tank hand grenades. [63]

On the Western Front, soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division ambushed GL Falley, 91st Air Landing Division, on D-Day in Normandy. Falley's auto was hit by Browning Automatic Rifle fire as he returned from wargames. He was killed instantly. [ 64]

[63] Gerhard Graser, Zwischen Kattegat und Kaukasus, Weg und Kaempfe der 198. Infanterie-Division 1939-1945. Tuebingen, FRG: Traditions-Verband der ehemaligen 198. Infanterie-Division, 1961, pp. 184-185.
[64] Max Hastings, Overlord. p.84.

Source: GERMAN GENERAL OFFICER CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR II -- HARBINGER FOR U.S. ARMY GENERAL OFFICER CASUALTIES IN AIRLAND BATTLE. Major French L. MacLean. Infantry. School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 7 December 1988.

It's follows. Cheers. Raúl M .

[Lornito Uriarte Mahinay Jr.]

Tigre,

How the following generals were killed?

GM Alexander Mockel
GL Richrad Muller
GM Gustav Adolf von Nostiz-Wallwitz
GL Hans Oschmann

[tigre]

Hello to all people ; following with the BATTLEFIELD LETHALITY, some conclusions..........................

In reviewing these accounts of general officer fatalities several conclusions can be drawn. First, most of the deaths occurred from quick unexpected attacks. Air bombardments, artillery barrages, hidden minefields, snipers, and partisan attacks were quite different than the deadly but more methodical operations these men had experienced in World War I. Second, a great many deaths occurred in vehicles moving through the battle area. Such movement attracted air attacks and set up potential ambush situations. Although the commanders had to move by vehicle to control the battlefield better, it appears most did so without an adequate escort capable of discouraging some of the attacks. Much of this movement was done in hours of very good visibility which facilitated enemy air attacks. Some of their disdain for enemy capabilities may have resulted from Luftwaffe reports of friendly air superiority or the belief that a staff car was too small
a target to be effectively engaged. Finally, throughout the war German generals retained distinctive but dangerous markings of their grade. They continued to wear distinctive uniforms and flew vehicular pennants advertising their position. Both provided target information to snipers, ambushes, and partisans.

Given this high level of battlefield lethality, it would seem that general officer training would be tailored to reflect these dangers. Unfortunately it did not. Despite the establishment in January 1943 of a four to six week pre-command course for division and corps commanders, no protective measures were included in the lessons.

Source: GERMAN GENERAL OFFICER CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR II -- HARBINGER FOR U.S. ARMY GENERAL OFFICER CASUALTIES IN AIRLAND BATTLE. Major French L. MacLean. Infantry. School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 7 December 1988.

It's all folks. Hey Baron, I'll take a look on them. Cheers. Raúl M

[tigre]

Hello Baron Lornito Mahinay ; here you can find some clues about the Generals killed, wounded and captured......

Heer: http://www.geocities.com/orion47.geo/CR ... alties.htm

Luftwaffe: http://www.geocities.com/~orion47/CROIS ... alties.htm

SS Wiking: http://www.geocities.com/~orion47/SS-PO ... ngded.html

some words:

schwer verwundet: gravemente herido.
Fliegerangriff: ataque aéreo.
Partisanenüberfall: acción de los partisanos.
ermördet: asesinado.
Bombenangriff: bombardeo.
gefallen: caído.
tödlich verunglückt: herida fatal (por accidente normalmente).
Verwundung gestorben: muerto por heridas recibidas.
Raum: alrededores de.
Flugzeugabsturz: accidente aéreo.
Autounfall: accidente automovilístico.
Freitod: suicidio.
erschossen: fusilado.
hingerichtet: colgado.
entlassen: despedido.
verhaftet:arrestado.
verschleppt: secuestrado.
vermisst: perdido.
Krankheit: enfermedad.
abgestürzt: accidentado.
abgeschossen: derribado.

Hope may be useful . Cheers. Raúl M .

[Lornito Uriarte Mahinay Jr.]

Thanks Raul but I've already got a copy of it...I hope you and others here in this forum might give other sources...

[jjmcgr]

The 27th Infantry Division in the Pacific did not have a "terrible" combat record. Simply because an egotistical commander relieves a subordinate commander does not mean the subordinate unit was performing "terribly." The relief may have had other reasons, such as interservice rivalry or personality clash. A similar shallow analysis is often given of Gouverneur Warren at Five Forks in 1865. Warren's troops, with him at their head, won the battle, yet he was relieved anyway. An objective analysis of the 27th's performance shows it was about average of American units in the Pacific.

That said, I too do not understand the point of this exercise in discussing German general casualties (minus POWs) in World War II. Given the German military situation and the large number of general officer commands, and the number of disasters the German forces survived, it should be expected that senior officer casualties are the "cost of doing business." Such leadership is a virtue, not a weakness, in my opinion.

It is funny nowadays that some things formerly considered as virues are now viewed as mismanagement. One recent author has even decried the "too small" size of German headquarters as being a defect by overworking elite staff officers. In war wouldn't one expect all officers to be working as hard as they can in any event?

[Delta Tank]

jjmcgr,

jjmcgr wrote; It is funny nowadays that some things formerly considered as virues are now viewed as mismanagement. One recent author has even decried the "too small" size of German headquarters as being a defect by overworking elite staff officers. In war wouldn't one expect all officers to be working as hard as they can in any event?

Yes, but everyone has to sleep, eat, and relax. Do you think as clearly after being awake for 75 hours as you do after a good night of sleep? In 6 years of war, should a staff officer deserve any leave? I was told by a SAMS graduate back in 1986 or so, that when they studied different staff structures, everyone was amazed at how small Germans staffs were and I think still are. The opinion was that their staffs were so small that after a prolong period they had difficulty functioning, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for ????
(currently I forget exactly what SAMS stands for, but it is the 2d year of the US Army Command and General Staff School, where about 40 officers are selected to stay for more instruction.)

Mike

[jjmcgr]

SAMS stands for School of Advanced Military Studies. I work out of the building next to where SAMS is.
It is not suprising that American studies would view German staffs as too small as, since WW2 US Army staffs have all been overstaffed by design (not always!--In WW1 a US Army brigade staff was three people!). In WW2 US Army battalions had complete staffs, something similar German units lacked. In most cases, these staff officers soon became replacement company or battalion commanders (see The Clay Pigeons of St. Lo, for example) and, therefore, in continuous operations after a couple of days US Army battalion staffs resembled those of the Germans anyway.

From my personal experience in the US Army over many years, sleep plans, at least for officers, were on paper only. On exercises at places like the JRTC (light infantry training center), commanders and key staff officers, realizing the exercise lasted only a finite number of days, stayed up most of the time, not willing to delegate decisionmaking in the zero defect environment of the time. Things are probably different in the low intensity environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, but I bet few got sleep during the 2003 Baghdad campaign except during the big operational lull.

WW2 was not usually fought 24 hours by ground troops. The technology of the day made night operations difficult. Most of the time night operations consisted of patrolling, OPs or recon ops. Accordingly, GSOs in German staffs could get some rest. The Germans also had a system of rotation for such officers where they'd get a couple of months off after so many months at the front.

[Delta Tank]

jjmcgr,

jjmcgr wrote, From my personal experience in the US Army over many years, sleep plans, at least for officers, were on paper only. On exercises at places like the JRTC (light infantry training center), commanders and key staff officers, realizing the exercise lasted only a finite number of days, stayed up most of the time, not willing to delegate decisionmaking in the zero defect environment of the time. Things are probably different in the low intensity environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, but I bet few got sleep during the 2003 Baghdad campaign except during the big operational lull.

I did one rotation at NTC and the reason why the Army made it over two weeks long was because you can not stay awake for that period of time. At division and corps level they had a computer simulation called BCTP (??) and it ran 24 hours a day for something like 5 days and during the AARs during the exercise, the scenario continued, forcing the "2d Team" to make decisions without consultation with the "1st Team".
My sleep plan was to sleep during the lulls, and our training cycle pushed us to sleep when we could. I still stood radio watch and all that stuff, but I got my choice of time and my tank crew was just happy that the Co was taking a turn. The best sleep I ever had was one night, at Fort Carson, laying on the turret floor, and my gunner, a corporal, put the tank into the order of march and and did everything that had to be done while I slept. Great sleep, still remember waking up and taking watch under a full moon and watching the coyotes hunting through the company assembly area.

Mike

[Zebedee]

Very interesting reading. Many thanks for posting tigre

The conclusion struck me as bizarre though:

Given this high level of battlefield lethality, it would seem that general officer training would be tailored to reflect these dangers. Unfortunately it did not. Despite the establishment in January 1943 of a four to six week pre-command course for division and corps commanders, no protective measures were included in the lessons.

Surely leading from the front was one of the 'virtues' instilled by officer training in the Heer? As a consequence, surely battlefield casualties in general officers must be viewed in this light?

[Gunter_Viezenz]

Thank you very much Tigre these posts have been very informative.