Stalingrad

[bf109 emil]

Von Paulus was perhaps had the best knowledge into what abilities it would take to defeat the USSR and IMHO his tactics seemed to have the best results and reliability when it came to German conquests over the Soviet Armies...

His planning of Barbarossa seemed to hold the jist of what was needed to defeat the SU and if it had been followed, defeat might have been possible as his planning called for a thrust to Moscow as opposed to what historically ended with Hitler changing plans and diverting attention from this plan into the Ukraine...

Later he carried out a strategic survey of Russia for the forthcoming operation Barbarossa. The main advice given by Paulus to Hitler was to make sure that after the invasion the Red Army was not to be allowed to retreat into the interior. For the campaign to be successful, he argued for battles of encirclement. He also suggested that the main thrust should be made north of the Pripyat Marshes, in order to capture Moscow at the earliest opportunity

Likewise he was successful in encircling the 6th and 9th army by May 23th at Balakleya and by the 30th these where defeated...

The Army was forced to halt during the first week in August in order for elements of 4th Panzer Army to catch up from the south. Paulus also contracted dysentery but continued to perform his duties efficiently.
The 19th of August saw the advance towards Stalingrad resume. Paulus had initiated an attack to envelop the two Russian Armies standing before the city, the 62nd and 64th. The forces of 4th Panzer Army became bogged down in heavy fighting around Abganerovo, south of the city and Paulus's advance was continually hampered by fuel shortages, allowing the bulk of the Russian Armies to escape into the city.

My question is regarding German logistics and supplies! If and had Paulus had sufficient available petrol, would or could he have completed the encirclement of the 62nd and 64th SU Armies and thus once again his method of encirclement proven to be sound and his taking of Stalingrad would have had been successful with the destruction of these 2 armies and little chance of Stalingrad being saved by hastily rushed up reserves and have fallen as Hitler so wished and desired?

[Paul_Atreides]

The 19th of August saw the advance towards Stalingrad resume. Paulus had initiated an attack to envelop the two Russian Armies standing before the city, the 62nd and 64th. The forces of 4th Panzer Army became bogged down in heavy fighting around Abganerovo, south of the city and Paulus's advance was continually hampered by fuel shortages, allowing the bulk of the Russian Armies to escape into the city.

??? If we look at Paulus' order from 19.08.42 then we can to read next lines:

2. 6th Army has a task to seize an isthmus between Volga and Don to the north of the railway Kalatch — Stalingrad and to be ready to repulse of attacks of the opponent from the east and the north.

For this purpose the Army crosses Don between Peskovatka and Trekhostrovskaya by the main forces on either side of from Vertyachiy. Providing itself from attacks from the north, it puts then blow by the main forces through a chain of hills between the Rossoshka river and sources of the B. Karennaya river in area directly to the north of Stalingrad up to Volga. Simultaneously the part of forces gets into the city from the northwest and seizes it.

This blow is accompanied on southern flank by advancement of a part of forces through the Rossoshka river in its average current which to the south-west of Stalingrad should connect to mobile formations of the next [4th] Army moving ahead from the south.

For security of flank of forces in area between the bottom current of the Rossoshka and Karpovka rivers and the Don river above the Kalatch from the northeast are put forward meanwhile only weak forces. With the approach of forces of the next Army from the south to Karpovka our forces are deduced from this area.

With shift of offensive to east coast of the Don river on its western coast below Malyi there are only small forces. Subsequently they strike blow through Don on either side of from Kalatch and participate in destruction of the forces of the opponent located there.

Translated by me from russian. Map.

So, words 'envelope' or 'encircle' are absent.

[bf109 emil]

??? If we look at Paulus' order from 19.08.42 then we can to read next lines:

the posting you list reads more of the result as opposed to Paulus's orders to his army and direction he gave to his troops while combating the 62 and 64th army

Translated by me from russian. Map.

So, words 'envelope' or 'encircle' are absent.

of course because they never happened to be completed upon the 62 and 64th unlike his tactics of "envelope" or "encircle" which he did order and perform thus destroying 6th and 9th army of the USSR at Balakleya just 4 months earlier...but lacking envelopment or completing these of the 62 and 64th did not mean Paulus never ordered this, only that his order or tactic never succeeded....hence from a lack of FUEL

[Paul_Atreides]

of course because they never happened

? This is order of Paulus to 6th Army.

hence from a lack of FUEL

When and what divisions didn't have enough fuel?

[[email protected]]

For the 1942 summer offensive Hitler originally prescribed an advance to the Volga at Stalingrad (Army Group B). Apart from the moral value of its capture (its name and the tank factory therein) it was to provide protection on the northern flank so as to provide cover for the offensive of Army Group A towards south-east: the Caucasus oilfields…
( Hitler earlier had even the idea of striking North from Stalingrad so as to get astride the rear of the Russian armies at Moscow! However the General Staff managed to persuade him of the impracticability of such a move )
The summer offensive of the German Army opened with brilliant success as the Russians were suffering from their huge losses of men and equipment in 1941 and their newly- raised armies had not yet appeared on the fronts. In the second half of July the Russians were hustled out of successive defensive positions by the rapid advance of the panzer armies and a state of confusion was prevalent favourable to further explotation by the German forces. The 4th panzer army, General Hoth, was the spearhead of the advance from Kursk to the Don and Voronezh. In fact it could have taken Stalingrad with a rush without a fight at the end of July however it was temporarily diverted south to help Kleist’s army to cross the Don. When it turned north again a fortnight later the Russians gathered just sufficient forces at Stalingrad to check it.
The 6th Army moved forward on 28 June. It was the largest German army with 11 infantry, 1 motorized, 2 panzer (14th Panzer Corps) divisions. 14th Panzer Corps reached the Volga on 23 August and General Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army released from the Caucasus offensive came up from the south and reached the Volga south of the city. The two armies met on 3 rd September…6th Army infantry divisions joined the panzer forces thereafter the Battle of Stalingrad started and the German forces were bogged down in street fighting with a catastrophic end…

[randwick]

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It is conventional and something I too believe but
could 4th panzer army have taken Stalingrad by itself in late July early August
the city is impossible to encircle without making a long hook with a major water crossing ,
it is stretched over kilometers of river banks cut by deep gullies
fighting in build up area is in favor of the defender ...always
and the tank assembly line were still churning machines
with a half competent Soviet commander , 4th Pz Army would have been stopped I reckon

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[Alk]

Qvist,

Sorry for a late response, I do not get on this site much, but I do not agree with a couple of your responses below.

[i]"Interestingly, on 16 August 1941, General Keitel and the Wehrmachts-Waffenämter agreed that Germany reduce its military production efforts in the fall of 1941."[/i]

This was due to increased demands for exports, a very great redistribution of work-force to fuel a surge in aircraft production and also infrastructure investments - not to a reduced urgency in the war effort.

[b]This runs counter to what I've been reading most of my life regarding a drop in military manufacturing in the later part of 1941. I'll quote the British Strategic Airwar Study, as support of my comment from Keitel, since i have it handy.... Regarding the Russian campaign...

"The first three months of the campaign acheived Hitler's most sanguine hopes, and in September, 1941, believing that the end of European hostilties was in sight, he ordered a sharp reduction in the production of armaments. This order, even though only partially carried out, resulted in considerable industrial dislocation, and also in significant reductions in armament stocks, in particular stocks of ammunition--the effects of which were never subsequently overcome."[/b]

"When looking at German armor production you see a similar trend. Guderian states in his book that after the French Campaign Hitler ordered tank production to be increased to 1000 per month due to lessons learned in that offensive. However, upon learning the cost would be 100,000 skilled workers from the civilian labor source, along with a 2B Reichmark expenditure, he decided to leave production levels constant. Slightly over 3,500 panzer chassis were built in 1941, including many light panzer II and Czech tanks. In 1944, almost 19,000 were built, including approximately 5,000 Panthers and Tigers, which were far heavier than anything built in early world war II (1941). While this type of production increase would be reasonable in the USA which was just beginning to mobilize, it is harder to say that country in full mobilization since the early/mid 30's would be capable of doing this, especially in light in the corresponding increases in aircraft, artillery, half-tracks, small arms, uboats and v-weapons that accompanied this...all in spite of the Allied bombing offensive."

Sorry, but that whole line of reasning rests on invalid assumptions all the way. It presupposes, for instance, that Germany produced all the tanks they could both in 1941 and 1944. But tank production is a meaningless general indicator of war production. It was never a major production item, and what essentially limited it and determined the fluctuations in output was not the ability of German industry to produce tanks, but the degree of its priority within the war effort. Hence, the increased output went partly at the expense of other items.

[b]I do not see the invalid assumptions you are referring to. I tried to clearly point out in my response above that tank production was not at the expense of other items. I did not make it to be a meaningless indicator. I clearly mentioned "corresponding increases" aircraft, artrillery, half-tracks, small arms, uboats and v-weapons.

a few examples of this would be:

Production of 75mm+ Guns of All Types Year Germany

1942 13,113
1944 62,940

German Ammunition Production, 20mm and Larger

1941 108,557,000 rounds
1944 323,401,000 rounds

German Aircraft production

1941 12,401
1944 40,593

German Panzer production

1941 3,623
1944 18,956

German Half-Track production Sd Kfz 250/251

1941 813
1944 9,436[/b]

I can get into individual small arms increases as well, but hopefully this will suffice to show that production was dramatically increased more-or-less across the board between 1941-44. It stetches my imagination to see these increases as a logical evolution of the maturity of German war industries over the passage of time. The increases are too large. At least to myself, it seems that the urgency of the military situation brought a greater mobilization of german resources in 1944 than was the case in 1941. The argument by many is that after two years of being in the world war II, Germany should have been more fully mobized by 1941, and definitely could have been.

cheers

[[email protected]]

Although German wartime technology produced wonder weapons such as V-rockets, jet and rocket planes, hydrogen peroxide propelled subs, tiger tanks etc…initially the war industry itself was inefficient, wasteful and badly organized up to mid 1943. There was a lot of infighting between rival organizations such as the Army, Navy, Luftwaffe and the SS for the raw materials and production capacity. Each had its own priority. Hitler was the final arbiter for the allocation of resources. At the end of the war although there was an acute shortage of steel for tank and naval production, 15 millions tons of steel was discovered by the Allies horded by factories for their own needs! In the factories far fewer women worked compared with England and Sunday was largely a day of rest, perhaps humane but not condusive to production!
Things improved when Dr.Todt was placed in charge of war production and after his death Albert Speer.
A good demonstration of inefficient production organizaton was in and around Hamburg: British bombing in the summer of 1943 devastated the region, however soon after a thorough reorganization of industrial plant was effected and the war production increased significantly.
Similarly in Germany aircraft production reached its peak as late as August 1944! Only then plant organizations and resource allocations were optimized but it was already too late…

(In any case these efforts were not wasted: they payed the way for post war German prosperity and made Germany the biggest exporter in the world)

[ljadw]

the theory of "the far fewer women"(invented by Speer) has been refuted by Tooze

[bf109 emil]

Slightly over 3,500 panzer chassis were built in 1941, including many light panzer II and Czech tanks.In 1944, almost 19,000 were built, including approximately 5,000 Panthers and Tigers, which were far heavier than anything built in early world war II

considering Panther total production for 3 yrs was 6000
-Tiger tank total for both Tiger I and II was a paultry 1814 total for 4 yrs. Germany must have still been producing junk tanks

[Meyer]

Tiger production ran for three years. And for the Panther, two years and three months.

[randwick]

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There is no argument that 44 was the peak war production , and considering the dificulies in ressurces raw materilas , transports and skilled manpower , one coulds assume that 41...42 war production was slack in the extreme
It is a war and butter policy
the Goebbels speech send the message loud and clear , no more butter


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[Qvist]

There is no argument that 44 was the peak war production , and considering the dificulies in ressurces raw materilas , transports and skilled manpower , one coulds assume that 41...42 war production was slack in the extreme
It is a war and butter policy
the Goebbels speech send the message loud and clear , no more butter

No, it wasn't. It was a West and East policy, combined with a massive investment in productive capacities that did not produce any tanks or aircraft in 1942, but which did produce the plants that were delivering those increased numbers of planes and tanks in 1944. See multitudes of existing threads, f.e. in the Economy section.

cheers

[Qvist]

This runs counter to what I've been reading most of my life regarding a drop in military manufacturing in the later part of 1941. I'll quote the British Strategic Airwar Study, as support of my comment from Keitel, since i have it handy.... Regarding the Russian campaign...

It runs counter to what I've been reading all my life too. The reason for which is that a satisfactory analysis of this has been missing for mots of that period, and Tooze conclusively dismantles this interpretation. What happened in the second half of 1941 was that Germany, treating the outcome of Barbarossa as a foregone conclusion, oriented armaments away from immediate needs and towards future needs, which implied on the one hand a major reallocation of effort from some sectors to others, and a massive investment boom. As a result, immediate output of items like ammunition (of which they had accumulated a rather vast surplus) and infantry weapons were consciously reduced - not to enable less armaments, but to enable other armaments. The effects of redistribution took 6-12 months to result in significantly increased output, and infrastructure investments took years to bear fruit. In other words, interpreting this as a scaling back of the armaments effort requires a blind reading of statistics that are too narrowly selected. What occurred was the precise opposite: A significant up-scaling of the armamanets effort, and one that was the principal reason for the high output figures of 1943-44, when the infrastructure investments began to pay off in earnest.

When looking at German armor production you see a similar trend. Guderian states in his book that after the French Campaign Hitler ordered tank production to be increased to 1000 per month due to lessons learned in that offensive. However, upon learning the cost would be 100,000 skilled workers from the civilian labor source, along with a 2B Reichmark expenditure, he decided to leave production levels constant. Slightly over 3,500 panzer chassis were built in 1941, including many light panzer II and Czech tanks. In 1944, almost 19,000 were built, including approximately 5,000 Panthers and Tigers, which were far heavier than anything built in early world war II (1941). While this type of production increase would be reasonable in the USA which was just beginning to mobilize, it is harder to say that country in full mobilization since the early/mid 30's would be capable of doing this, especially in light in the corresponding increases in aircraft, artillery, half-tracks, small arms, uboats and v-weapons that accompanied this...all in spite of the Allied bombing offensive."

See above. Among the more important programmes launched in mid-1941 was the Tank programme, into which the army sank several hundred million Reichmarks in investment in new plant (f.e., the Nibelungenwerke at St.Valentin) and conversion of existing ones. Why? Because they concluded they needed a far larger tank fleet than what they presently had, even after a successful Barbarossa. It was largely this programme which resulted in later years in increased output of tanks, and it could not be carried out with a wave of the wand. A further reason that affected overall output in the short term was the severe scaling back of obsolete light types. Production of medium tanks (Pz III and IV) in fact increased by 60% between June 1941 and January 1942.

I do not see the invalid assumptions you are referring to. I tried to clearly point out in my response above that tank production was not at the expense of other items. I did not make it to be a meaningless indicator..

Of course tank production went at the expense of other items. The production of anything goes at the expense of other items. The labor, plant and raw materials it consumes could and would have been used on other things if it had not been used on tanks. And any individual item is a meaningless indicator of overall armaments production for the very simple reason that it reflects its relative priority within the armaments effort as much as it reflects anything else. Surely this is fairly self-evident?

I clearly mentioned "corresponding increases" aircraft, artrillery, half-tracks, small arms, uboats and v-weapons

In which you are wrong - increases elsewhere were not corresponding. From 1941 to 1944 (according to the Speer ministry's armaments index), tank production increased by a factor of 6.6. The overall index increased by a factor of 2.9. Hence, the relative weight of tanks within the German armaments effort had more than doubled - which primarily was a direct result exactly of decisions made in mid-1941.

Other areas: Weapons 3.2, Vehicles minus 0.1 (relative to 1942, no 41 figures), Aircraft 2.9, Ships and subs 1.4, Ammunition 3.0, Powder 2.2, Explosives 2.2.

For ammunition, you have to take into account that 1941 represents a somewhat artificial low, as it had been extremely heavily prioritised in 1939-40, and vast reserve stocks laid up that amply sufficed for the immediate future. Given that all German armaments planning presupposed a quick and successful Barbariossa, it would have been meaningless to continue ammunition production at the previous high levels. Of course, once it became apparent that Barbarossa failed, this proved to be a rather costly miscalculation that had to be reversed. But that does not mean that the drop in ammo output in late 1941 betokens a scaled-back armaments effort.

cheers

[ljadw]

vehicles production:from:'the german war economy' 'the motorisation myth 'P 125
Trucks:
1940 :63296
1941:62400
1942:81279
1943:1O9O85
Half-tracks and special vehicles:
1940:6435
1941:8821
1942:1O733
1943:17535
Distribution of the trucks
Armed forces:
1940:38420
1941:37003
1942:59463
1943:92580
Civilian sector:
1940:15571
1941:15725
1942:16577
1943:12992
The remainder were destinated for the export .