Stalingrad

[Qvist]

OK. If you think it's that simple, perhaps it's time we had some sources please? Because all FHO documentation I have read from this period suggests that the Germans assumed already from before Blau started that there would be Red Army offensives during the winter on a large scale, and also that the Stalingrad sector was among the likely target areas (which any fool could see by looking at a map, and the potential of which was obvious to any staff officer with a basic grasp of the density, condition and quality of the axis forces in Army Group B).

cheers

[randwick]

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There were offensives planned , and delivered on the Leningrad sector ,
the Sinavino height got another bloodbath during operation Iskra , that was obvious too
operation Mars was the big one ,fully foreseen ,the Soviets barely hiding their intentions
Army group center fought it to a standstill ,
there was the Novorossisk operation
a rather desperate landing to regain some of the black sea shore .
operation Saturn had the Italians as target , that wasn't in the Stalingrad area really

an offensive around Stalingrad was expected , what was a shock was the size of it
the Volga was carrying floating ice , the timing was perfect for a last effort to wipe out the last defenders
boxed in with no supply and no reinforcements , they were dead meat ,
it was hypnotic ,at last , the light at the end of the tunnel !!
any of the usual messy Soviet efforts would be dealt with in good time

the light was the proverbial oncoming train

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after all that was the 6th Army with half of the 4th panzer ,
if worst come to the worst some redeployment would have to be done .
during the first two days the German response was hardly rushed , no sense of urgency at all
the Romanian were not expected to hold , simply to make the location of the enemy effort plain

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[Qvist]

.....sources?

The fact, incidentally, is that every single German and axis army command on the Eastern Front, with the exception of 4th Army, faced a major Soviet offensive at one point or another during the course of the winter. Army Group North lost more than 130,000 men November through March. 18th Army saw very heavy fighting in February especially (against Iskra), while 16th Army experienced loss rates in March (against the renewed offensive in the Demyansk area) that hadn't been seen since the height of fighting in 1941. 9th Army and Gruppe Chevallerie (subsequently under 3rd Panzer Army) had Mars to contend with, which was a Stalingrad-sized offensive. 2nd Panzer army suffered heavily as it was drawn into the post-Stalingrad Soviet offensive that gutted 2nd Army and obliterated 2nd hungarian Army. Army Group Don faced constant heavy fighting for three months. and Army Group A had to contend with the Red Army counterpush in the Caucasus, though this brought little heavy fighting due to the fact that they were retreating voluntarily. Heck, even 4th Army had serious fighting on their hands in March. In other words, the Red Army winter offensive consisted of a large number of attacks along practically the whole length of the front.

[randwick]

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yes indeed and it would be the the story for the rest of the war
sudden burst of activity ,better and better timed in combination of punches with period of rest and refit in between

for the Stalingrad situation , the German drama was the lack of operational reserves ,
Manstein got a fresh panzer from France , bits of debris , scrapping of rear services
and the best wishes from the other armies group , who having their hands full , resisted ( successfully ) any major transfer
that was why feeble allied divisions had been strung on "inactive " flanks in the first place

I can only conjecture a lot of manpower was sitting in bloated rear services ,or a lot of men in manufacturing ?
the shortage of front troops doesn't really sound convincing at this stage , even accounting for the crisis in north Africa
could it be it was influenced by the demographic , was the birth rate of 1924 exceptionally low ?

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[ljadw]

I don't think that the class of 1924 was extremely low ;I have seen a figure for that of 1920 (those admitted by the Wehrmacht) of 500000,and of course not all of them had the East as destination .

[Qvist]

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yes indeed and it would be the the story for the rest of the war
sudden burst of activity ,better and better timed in combination of punches with period of rest and refit in between

for the Stalingrad situation , the German drama was the lack of operational reserves ,
Manstein got a fresh panzer from France , bits of debris , scrapping of rear services
and the best wishes from the other armies group , who having their hands full , resisted ( successfully ) any major transfer
that was why feeble allied divisions had been strung on "inactive " flanks in the first place

I can only conjecture a lot of manpower was sitting in bloated rear services ,or a lot of men in manufacturing ?
the shortage of front troops doesn't really sound convincing at this stage , even accounting for the crisis in north Africa
could it be it was influenced by the demographic , was the birth rate of 1924 exceptionally low ?

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SOURCES?

Or should we just assume that this is you giving free rein to conjecture and vague opinion?

[randwick]

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Qvist , my respect for your passion and scholarship is huge ,

and You are absolutely right , "just assume that this is [ me ] giving free rein to conjecture and vague opinion? "

my interest in the Eastern front is purely impressionist but deep and of very long standing ,
while I bow most respectfully to accurate scholarship and delight in reading it
those opinions ans knowledge I possess are a stew of reading , life experience , discussing and a fair bit of guessing

Rightly can you feel this is unsatisfactory in the extreme , but it's my history


I was looking for information on the Soviet rail network around Stalingrad ,
got something , then , found out it had been on this forum for a while :roll:


.

[Qvist]

Okay, fair enough, but in that case it would be reasonable if you adjusted your impressions to accomodate new information that is sourced.

cheers

[Guaporense]

.I can only conjecture a lot of manpower was sitting in bloated rear services ,or a lot of men in manufacturing ?.

Well, second to to my copy Fighting power, 53.5% of the total mobilized strength of the German army was comprised of combat troops. This compares favorably with the American average of 38%. In July 1943, the Red Army had 11.94 million men, of with 6.63 million were theater forces. Of these forces, 74.7% were combat troops (this was the ratio of combat/service troops at the battle of Kursk (source: Glantz,The Battle of Kursk), I think that we can consider this the normal proportion of combat troops) for comparison the Germans had 84.5% of their theater forces comprised of combat troops, while the americans had 56.9%. So, the USSR had 0.747 x 6.63/11.94 = 41.5%.

So we have these proportions of combat troops for the respective armies:
Germany - 53.5%
USSR - 41.5%
USA - 38%

So Germany didn't waste manpower in rear services, instead, the country had the highest proportion of combat troops to mobilized strength.

Also, this is the ratio of military personnel to labor working in munitions industry for 1943, source: Harrison (1988):

Germany - 1.65
USSR - 0.742
USA - 0.863

Also, Germany had the highest proportion of military personnel to munitions workers, and the highest proportion of military personnel comprised of combat troops. So, Germany was, out of the major powers, the country in WW2 with had the largest number of frontline soldiers to population and to the overall number of workers mobilized.

They sent everybody they could to the front, but it just wasn't enough. Lack of manpower was the major problem in the German war effort since 1941.

[ljadw]

.I can only conjecture a lot of manpower was sitting in bloated rear services ,or a lot of men in manufacturing ?.

Well, second to to my copy Fighting power, 53.5% of the total mobilized strength of the German army was comprised of combat troops. This compares favorably with the American average of 38%. In July 1943, the Red Army had 11.94 million men, of with 6.63 million were theater forces. Of these forces, 74.7% were combat troops (this was the ratio of combat/service troops at the battle of Kursk (source: Glantz,The Battle of Kursk), I think that we can consider this the normal proportion of combat troops) for comparison the Germans had 84.5% of their theater forces comprised of combat troops, while the americans had 56.9%. So, the USSR had 0.747 x 6.63/11.94 = 41.5%.

So we have these proportions of combat troops for the respective armies:
Germany - 53.5%
USSR - 41.5%
USA - 38%

So Germany didn't waste manpower in rear services, instead, the country had the highest proportion of combat troops to mobilized strength.

Also, this is the ratio of military personnel to labor working in munitions industry for 1943, source: Harrison (1988):

Germany - 1.65
USSR - 0.742
USA - 0.863

Also, Germany had the highest proportion of military personnel to munitions workers, and the highest proportion of military personnel comprised of combat troops. So, Germany was, out of the major powers, the country in WW2 with had the largest number of frontline soldiers to population and to the overall number of workers mobilized.

They sent everybody they could to the front, but it just wasn't enough. Lack of manpower was the major problem in the German war effort since 1941.

I am afraid your comparison is flawed :you are giving for the SU 0.747 x6.63/11.94 ;you must do the same for Germany :X (I don't know the ratio combat/ supply troops in the east )x 3.13 /9 (?) ,because 9 is the strength of the Wehrmacht and 11.94 is the strength of the SU forces (army,navy and air force )

[Qvist]

.I can only conjecture a lot of manpower was sitting in bloated rear services ,or a lot of men in manufacturing ?.

Well, second to to my copy Fighting power, 53.5% of the total mobilized strength of the German army was comprised of combat troops. This compares favorably with the American average of 38%. In July 1943, the Red Army had 11.94 million men, of with 6.63 million were theater forces. Of these forces, 74.7% were combat troops (this was the ratio of combat/service troops at the battle of Kursk (source: Glantz,The Battle of Kursk), I think that we can consider this the normal proportion of combat troops) for comparison the Germans had 84.5% of their theater forces comprised of combat troops, while the americans had 56.9%. So, the USSR had 0.747 x 6.63/11.94 = 41.5%.

So we have these proportions of combat troops for the respective armies:
Germany - 53.5%
USSR - 41.5%
USA - 38%

So Germany didn't waste manpower in rear services, instead, the country had the highest proportion of combat troops to mobilized strength.

Also, this is the ratio of military personnel to labor working in munitions industry for 1943, source: Harrison (1988):

Germany - 1.65
USSR - 0.742
USA - 0.863

Also, Germany had the highest proportion of military personnel to munitions workers, and the highest proportion of military personnel comprised of combat troops. So, Germany was, out of the major powers, the country in WW2 with had the largest number of frontline soldiers to population and to the overall number of workers mobilized.

They sent everybody they could to the front, but it just wasn't enough. Lack of manpower was the major problem in the German war effort since 1941.

That is just so completely useless, in so many ways that I hardly know where to begin. How exactly do you define "combat troops"? How do you know that the definitions used for other countries are similar? Is it neccessarily a good thing to have as high a proportion of combat troops as possible?

53.5% of the total mobilized strength of the German army was comprised of combat troops.

By what definition?

comparison the Germans had 84.5% of their theater forces comprised of combat troops

No, they did not. At least not by any reasonable definition of "combat troops". Or by any definition in use by the Germans themselves. An OKH Gliederung of the Ostheer (IWM MI14/253-2 „Gliederung des Ostheeres ohne SS und LW-Feldverb.“, OrgAbt 5170/43) states an overall Iststärke in the East of 2,564,000 without SS and LW-FD for 1 October 1943, of whom 1,578,000 were in divisions and brigades, 400,000 in minor independent combat units, 96,000 in Security troops and 490,000 in supply and support elements of Corps, Armies and Army Groups. All in all, 47% of the Ostheer belonged to combat units at that time (and this was by the most expansive definition of combat strength in use in the German army - the larger Gefechtsstärke which normally covered roughly 2/3 of all personell in a division when it was at full strength)), while 53% were non-combat and security elements. That is just the field army, and does not include the Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, auxiliary organisations like SS, Police, Wehrmachtsgefolge, RAD, OT etc. Nor the numerous men in the rear commands in the East, such as WB Ukraine, WB Ostland etc. Nor Hiwis and Osttruppen, all of which would have dragged the non-combatant proportion still further up.

The only way I can imagine that someone have calculated this and come up with roughly 83% is by adding together the strength of the divisions, minor combat units and security troops and calling this "combat strength". This is, of course, meaningless - both Divisions and minor combat units contained a large proportion of supply & support units. Proportionately more, in fact, than British or American divisions and proportionately vastly more than a Soviet Rifle division. Quite simply, the Germans concentrated much more of their supply&support resources within their divisions than other armies did. Which doesn't make them combat troops. A supply column is a supply column, whether it belongs to a division, to a GHQ motor pool or to the commanding army. Security troops were not considered to belong to combat troops at all by the Germans.

It is time you understood this: There is no simple, straightforward or meaningful way of answering large and complex questions with simple and undigested figures lifted off some book.

[randwick]

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there also is the problem of theaters
400.000 Germans in Norway ,that seems a lot
the German units in the west were quite cozy ,
for sure some units were rotated for refit ,not many were fully mobile ,
some garrisons were needed to keep the locals wise and the British hesitant

but troops were withdrawn constantly without ill effects ,
a more economical occupation earlier should have produced a dozen divisions at least

the Soviets also had various fronts , Mandchuria and to a lesser extend Turkey and Iran were never left unmanned
Iran even had an intervention , troops were needed to keep central Asia and of course the Gulags

Glantz mention in "colossus reborn " a field force in early October 42 , in millions

operating fronts .... ..... 5.9
non operating front .......1.1
military district ............2.2
the fleet ...................0.46
NKVD.........................0.5
commissariats..............0.62

total ..........................10.78 millions

or about 60% doing some fighting of which maybe ( ? ) less than half would have been in infantry companies
I'll try to parse the numbers further but in my usual Euristic way , I would say a third of a force manpower
being close enough to be hit by enemy artillery seems reasonable .

.

[ljadw]

I have some different figures for november 1942:Operational forces:6.6 ,Stavka reserve :0.2 ,inoperational forces:3.8 (source :Art:The SU at War,on this forum )

[randwick]

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Glantz give about half a million in front hospitals ,
but knowing the standard of fitness of the Soviet Army , those guys must have been seriously knocked out of it
I'm not quite sure of the return to fighting number but I've read often enough of the soldiers trying to avoid the rear hospital as they would usually not be re- assigned to their old units ,
comradeship and unit cohesion was one thing but the new guys in an outfit would
be used first as canon folder by the old hands

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[Qvist]

What has any of this got to do with the proportion of combat forces? A Tank Division on the Siberian border (inoperative fronts) wasn't combat troops, but a roadbuilding unit belonging to Southwest Front (operational Fronts) was?

cheers