Stalingrad

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Art
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Re: Stalingrad

#91

Post by Art » 22 Dec 2009, 16:45

ljadw wrote:I have some different figures for november 1942:Operational forces:6.6 ,Stavka reserve :0.2 ,inoperational forces:3.8 (source :Art:The SU at War,on this forum )
That is with the Navy personnel. Glantz's figures are based on the GKO decree of 7 October 1942 allocating rations to military units. Just three important points: allocaion of rations was made based on strength reports as of 20th date of the preceeding month (in this case 20 September); officers recieved rations only in frontline units, in rear districts and inactive fronts they were supposed to buy them for money, hence the number of rations allocated to rear elements was smaller than the actual strength; in GKO figures the Stavka's reserve is mostly included in "operating fronts".

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Re: Stalingrad

#92

Post by randwick » 22 Dec 2009, 23:26

.
I agree , that's why the total number for operative fronts is the test

I'll be curious to have the number for the Wehrmacht equivalent
Eastern front and north Africa would qualify as operating front ,occupation forces in the West wouldn't
neither would the troublesome Balkans
and as for the Soviet number would include the air force but not the Navy

I believe most of you are freezing I'm off to worship Santa , Xmass day on brontee beach !!

Cheers to all

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Qvist
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Re: Stalingrad

#93

Post by Qvist » 23 Dec 2009, 13:10

Sorry, but again, what is a comparison like that supposed to illuminate?

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Re: Stalingrad

#94

Post by randwick » 23 Dec 2009, 13:48

.

Every time I try to get out ....they just drag me back again

It would , in a rather approximate way , define the effective fighting forces of one combatant country
the active fronts number , include , as you point out , divisional , corps and armies support elements
as " fighting " this is proper
while the non active fronts are not fighting ,they are more like border guard , police or " R and R "
it leave open the question of the Navy , of course
but this hardly apply to Germany and the Soviet Union
for both country , the Navy was a small component which in the case of Germany was drained of men ferociously as the war went on

I'm trying rather desperately to further my point that Germany wasn't applying itself to the eastern front with anything like total commitment ,
a point quite easy to make when Stalingrad was the motor for Goebbels making a speech getting Germany on a " total war " footing , 18 months after the Soviets .
That was their BIG mistake , that was what they learned from Stalingrad ,
no half arsed war anymore this was a fight to the death and they were loosing



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ljadw
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Re: Stalingrad

#95

Post by ljadw » 23 Dec 2009, 16:41

If my memory does not let me down,Qvist has given the frontstrength for the Germans at the end of 1942 :2.6 million + the troops in Stalingrad and in Finland ;I guess a total of some 3 million .
An other comparison is the total of men engaged in the East (frontstrength ):
for 1941 :2.7 + Finland + OKH reserves + replacements :some 3.8 million ;CL 850000 ;NCL :390000 total losses :some 33 %
for 1943 :frontstrength at the end of the year :2.6 + total losses 1.8 =4.4 million =41 %
for 1942 :3 million + CL 1.1 + NCL ? (a guess 700000 ) =4.8
Thus you see that the Germans were applying to the Eastern front with total commitment .

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Qvist
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Re: Stalingrad

#96

Post by Qvist » 23 Dec 2009, 18:35

randwick wrote:.

Every time I try to get out ....they just drag me back again

It would , in a rather approximate way , define the effective fighting forces of one combatant country
the active fronts number , include , as you point out , divisional , corps and armies support elements
as " fighting " this is proper
while the non active fronts are not fighting ,they are more like border guard , police or " R and R "
it leave open the question of the Navy , of course
but this hardly apply to Germany and the Soviet Union
for both country , the Navy was a small component which in the case of Germany was drained of men ferociously as the war went on
Er, no, it would not in any meaningful way define the "effective fighting forces" of the combatants. It would just define the forces actively engaged in combat at a given point in time. What that is supposed to illuminate is still unclear to me.
The Soviet Navy was not a large force, but the Kriegsmarine certainly was - at its peak, some 800,000 strong. The Navy also consumed a major proportion of armaments production. Contrary to your assumption, its strength grew through most of the war - it was really only from mid-1944 that it began to be drained of men.
I'm trying rather desperately to further my point that Germany wasn't applying itself to the eastern front with anything like total commitment ,
a point quite easy to make when Stalingrad was the motor for Goebbels making a speech getting Germany on a " total war " footing , 18 months after the Soviets .
That was their BIG mistake , that was what they learned from Stalingrad ,
no half arsed war anymore this was a fight to the death and they were loosing .
Certainly Germany was not applying herself to the eastern front with anything like total commitment, not even in 1941. This however was hardly a mistake - there was no way they could have done so, it was the inescapable consequence of a multi-front war, not of a lack of interest. Goebbels Total war program was primarily a propaganda exercise. Germany was pursuing military mobilisation determinedly and more or less to the limit from 1933. There was nothing "half-arsed" about it, and it did not change for the better after Stalingrad. The peak period of German force mobilisation for the East was, in fact, the winter and spring of 1942. From early 1943, the EF suffered much more markedly than before from the impact of other fronts, leading for example to almost no reinforcements and blatantly insufficient replacements during the critical summer of 1943. The German effort suffered badly from unrealistic expectations both in 1941 and 1942, but these again did not spring from a failure to mobilise resources, but rather from the need to use resources elsewhere - above all on a massive buildup of aerial and naval strength in 1941. Sorry, but you are proceeding here on the basis of assumptions that are not valid.

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Re: Stalingrad

#97

Post by randwick » 23 Dec 2009, 23:36

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I accept your argument ,and concede , there is little else I can do really

the active front concept has some interest I feel , it certainly can be used in some way ,
such as giving a better grasp on casualties numbers , better than the overall strength
it has also the merit of including more of the rear support elements

as for going full on from the start , that's seems in contradiction with the labor organization after the total war speech , Goebbels was an Uber spin doctor , probably the modern father of them all but there were still important decision taken
in particular women working in factories ,severe restriction on consumers item
, going to round the clock for in war production etc etc
the number of tanks produced in 42 wasn't very impressive,
what this amount too was a better focus , as I said before ,
Pre Stalingrad the Nazis though they were winning
post Stalingrad a new grim outlook seized the regime


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Qvist
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Re: Stalingrad

#98

Post by Qvist » 24 Dec 2009, 00:11

in particular women working in factories
Germany already had a higher proportion of women in the economy at the outbreak of war than the United States had at the height of mobilisation. Their numbers did not increase appreciably after Stalingrad.
severe restriction on consumers item
Private consumption in Germany dropped like a rock during the first year of the war, in 1939-40. Far more strongly than it did after Stalingrad.
the number of tanks produced in 42 wasn't very impressive,
Which shows primarily that it was not a very highly prioritised item in 1942. The main focus was on ammunition and aircraft, for which there were good reasons.
Pre Stalingrad the Nazis though they were winning
post Stalingrad a new grim outlook seized the regime
Well, post-Stalingrad the Eastern Front was receiving a steadily decreasing proportion of German resources.

The basic point is that the "Stalingrad Total War divide" is fundamentally illusory. The twin strategic shocks of late 1942 - and here the impact of the allied landings in NW Africa were at least as important as Stalingrad - did lead to a number of additional measures to drum up more manpower for the army, but the main beneficiary of this was not the Eastern Front but Italy and the Balkans - which between them absorbed upwards of 30 divisions by September 1943. In armaments production, the surge in output from 1943 was fundamentally the result of vast investments in the preceding years.

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Re: Stalingrad

#99

Post by randwick » 24 Dec 2009, 12:42

.

Thanks for those clarifications Quist ,
it require a complete change in my world view ( and quite a few , more illustrious others )

I don't mind really having to change everything and burn what I once believed but it does give a headache

I will go into retreat on the beach , meditate deeply using the amber fluid as a guide and ponder your words

Merry Christmas to all , may your god be with you


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Galt
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Re: Stalingrad

#100

Post by Galt » 25 Dec 2009, 02:16

In spite of the difficulty in arguing with Qvist's sources and logic, I find it hard to buy into the fact that German production was "at its limit" throughout pre-war and war years.

There are sources that do disagree that this was the case. A case in point would be statistics taken from the German-Soviet Military-Economic Comparision.

The following is an overview of German steel production allocations in Q4 1939:

Heer - 3.060.000 tons
Marine - 1.250.000 tons
Luftwaffe - 2.220.000 tons
Military construction - 2.060.000 tons
Total military - 8.590.000 tons

Civilian sector - 7.320.000 tons
Export - 1.730.000 tons
Total civilian - 9.050.000 tons

Total steel - 17.640.000 tons

Steel production was still over 40% geared for civilian purposes in Q4 of 1940.

As far as women in the workforce, it can be argued that at the beginning of the war, Germany was highly mobilized. In 1939, German industries utilized 2.62 million women. In July of 1944, German industries still only utilized 2.67 million women. This average was maintained from 1939 to 1944.

Interestingly, on 16 August 1941, General Keitel and the Wehrmachts-Waffenämter agreed that Germany reduce its military production efforts in the fall of 1941.

When looking at German armor production you see a similar trend. Guderian states in his book that after the French Campaign Hitler ordered tank production to be increased to 1000 per month due to lessons learned in that offensive. However, upon learning the cost would be 100,000 skilled workers from the civilian labor source, along with a 2B Reichmark expenditure, he decided to leave production levels constant. Slightly over 3,500 panzer chassis were built in 1941, including many light panzer II and Czech tanks. In 1944, almost 19,000 were built, including approximately 5,000 Panthers and Tigers, which were far heavier than anything build in world war II. While this type of production increase would be reasonable in the USA which was just beginning to mobilize, it is harder to say that country in full mobilization since the early/mid 30's would be capable of doing this, especially in light in the corresponding increases in aircraft, artiller, half-tracks, small arms, uboats and v-weapons that accompanied this...all in spite of the Allied bombing offensive.

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Qvist
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Re: Stalingrad

#101

Post by Qvist » 25 Dec 2009, 12:24

I find it hard to buy into the fact that German production was "at its limit" throughout pre-war and war years.
Well, that should not be taken quite literally of course, but re-armament throughout the pre-war years proceeded at an extremely high pace, consumed a percentage of GDP that were unprecedented in peacetime and essentially already at war levels, and to the absolute limits of the economy to support it - so much so that armament plans had to be scaled back in the late thirties simply because they were impossible to finance.
Steel production was still over 40% geared for civilian purposes in Q4 of 1940
Provided you assume that only the part of economy statistically subsumed under the armed forces were war-effort related, yes. But that was not the case.
Interestingly, on 16 August 1941, General Keitel and the Wehrmachts-Waffenämter agreed that Germany reduce its military production efforts in the fall of 1941.
This was due to increased demands for exports, a very great redistribution of work-force to fuel a surge in aircraft production and also infrastructure investments - not to a reduced urgency in the war effort.
When looking at German armor production you see a similar trend. Guderian states in his book that after the French Campaign Hitler ordered tank production to be increased to 1000 per month due to lessons learned in that offensive. However, upon learning the cost would be 100,000 skilled workers from the civilian labor source, along with a 2B Reichmark expenditure, he decided to leave production levels constant. Slightly over 3,500 panzer chassis were built in 1941, including many light panzer II and Czech tanks. In 1944, almost 19,000 were built, including approximately 5,000 Panthers and Tigers, which were far heavier than anything build in world war II. While this type of production increase would be reasonable in the USA which was just beginning to mobilize, it is harder to say that country in full mobilization since the early/mid 30's would be capable of doing this, especially in light in the corresponding increases in aircraft, artiller, half-tracks, small arms, uboats and v-weapons that accompanied this...all in spite of the Allied bombing offensive.
Sorry, but that whole line of reasning rests on invalid assumptions all the way. It presupposes, for instance, that Germany produced all the tanks they could both in 1941 and 1944. But tank production is a meaningless general indicator of war production. It was never a major production item, and what essentially limited it and determined the fluctuations in output was not the ability of German industry to produce tanks, but the degree of its priority within the war effort. Hence, the increased output went partly at the expense of other items.

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Re: Stalingrad

#102

Post by Guaporense » 30 Dec 2009, 21:14

But, Qvist, in 1941, production of ammunition and aircraft was much lower than in 1944. About 30% of 1944 level.

And these two items comprised 70% of total value in munition production.

And note that in 1941, total munitions expenditure was about 11 billion RM, second to Overy, war and economy in the third reich. However, second to my copy of The Economics of WW2, total military outlays were 70 billion RM. So, even expenditures in munitions should not be considered a good indicator of military mobilization. So, were the 59 billion RM go? To military payment and supplies?

I think that the size of the armed forces in proportion to the population is a good indicator o military mobilization. Ger had over 7 million men in 1941, about 10% of pre war population. A larger proportion of the population than the US mobilized to the armed forces at any point in the war.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Re: Stalingrad

#103

Post by Guaporense » 30 Dec 2009, 21:29

Qvist wrote: :D

That is just so completely useless, in so many ways that I hardly know where to begin. How exactly do you define "combat troops"? How do you know that the definitions used for other countries are similar? Is it neccessarily a good thing to have as high a proportion of combat troops as possible?
I used the defition used by Van Creveld in Fighting power, were he differentiates between combat and service troops. Quoting him: "Inside a theater, therefore, combat troops represented 84.5% of total strength."
It is time you understood this: There is no simple, straightforward or meaningful way of answering large and complex questions with simple and undigested figures lifted off some book.
But that was not a large, complex question.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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Qvist
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Re: Stalingrad

#104

Post by Qvist » 30 Dec 2009, 22:17

I used the defition used by Van Creveld in Fighting power, were he differentiates between combat and service troops. Quoting him: "Inside a theater, therefore, combat troops represented 84.5% of total strength."
Okay, so, what is his definition of "combat" and "support" troops?
But that was not a large, complex question.
Are you joking? Do you think that dividing up armies into "combat" and "support" elements in a comparable way for different armies is even remotely straightforward? Did you understand anything of what I wrote?
I think that the size of the armed forces in proportion to the population is a good indicator o military mobilization. Ger had over 7 million men in 1941, about 10% of pre war population. A larger proportion of the population than the US mobilized to the armed forces at any point in the war.
Yes, the key word here being "indicator". Which means that it is a piece of information that, once put into a wider context, may provide some grounds for conclusion. As opposed to being confused for an automatic conclusion.

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Re: Stalingrad

#105

Post by Guaporense » 31 Dec 2009, 03:41

Qvist wrote:
But that was not a large, complex question.
Are you joking? Do you think that dividing up armies into "combat" and "support" elements in a comparable way for different armies is even remotely straightforward? Did you understand anything of what I wrote?
Van Creveld divided both US and German forces in these two groups. So I think that these numbers that I posted are comparable, since they come from the same source and the division is not made by myself. I sinned when I tried to make similar statistics with Soviet sources, without having the knowledge nescessary to compute this kind of data.
Yes, the key word here being "indicator". Which means that it is a piece of information that, once put into a wider context, may provide some grounds for conclusion. As opposed to being confused for an automatic conclusion.
Do you think that I sin when I put a barrage of statistics without a verbal interpretation of them to jump into certain conclusions?
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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