Germany winning on the Eastern Front

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LWD
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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#121

Post by LWD » 03 Feb 2014, 16:40

ljadw wrote:The OP is not only exaggerated,nut also wrong :
1)The German logistic planning was not inadequate
The evidence is to the contrary.
2) The German logistic planning did not doom Barbarossa .

A succesful fighting advance to Moscow was impossible :this has nothing to do with bad logistics
Faulty assumptions on the resiliancy of the Red Army and the Soviet System were probably the most critical in dooming Barbarossa. However German logisitcal problems certainly contributed to their failure to take Moscow.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#122

Post by werd » 03 Feb 2014, 16:54

LWD wrote: Faulty assumptions on the resiliancy of the Red Army and the Soviet System were probably the most critical in dooming Barbarossa.
Barbarossa could be led in 1942, from positions more favorable to Wehrmacht. On June 22 1941 distances from borders Reich to Moscow 1000 km,in a year 120 km. But Hitler Moscow didn't interest any more.


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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#123

Post by Alixanther » 03 Feb 2014, 22:06

werd wrote:
LWD wrote: Faulty assumptions on the resiliancy of the Red Army and the Soviet System were probably the most critical in dooming Barbarossa.
Barbarossa could be led in 1942, from positions more favorable to Wehrmacht. On June 22 1941 distances from borders Reich to Moscow 1000 km,in a year 120 km. But Hitler Moscow didn't interest any more.
Of course. The time for Barbarossa had come and had passed.
Only Hitler could be such a naive to think that allying with the Japanese would make Stalin fear a war on two fronts and concede defeat.
He might have had a bit more success against Stalin if he allied with the U.S. :)
But again, he needed to put the Wehrmacht into a lucrative position otherwise they could withdraw their political support for the national-socialist regime...

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#124

Post by ljadw » 03 Feb 2014, 23:05

LWD wrote:
ljadw wrote:The OP is not only exaggerated,nut also wrong :
1)The German logistic planning was not inadequate
The evidence is to the contrary.
2) The German logistic planning did not doom Barbarossa .

A succesful fighting advance to Moscow was impossible :this has nothing to do with bad logistics
Faulty assumptions on the resiliancy of the Red Army and the Soviet System were probably the most critical in dooming Barbarossa. However German logisitcal problems certainly contributed to their failure to take Moscow.
The dooming of Barbarossa and the failure of taking Moscow are two different things .

As usual,the whole discussion is starting from the wrong POV that Germany lost the war in the East (because of failures from Hitler,etc) and it is ignoring that the SU won the war in the East .More than 70 years after the start of Barbarossa,people still are thinking that there was no opponent for the Germans,that it was a piece of a cake,which the Germans lost,because of their own stupidities .The German propaganda is still ruling .

Success or defeat in the East depended on something the Germans had no hold on = the ability of the SU (the Soviet leadership)to start on 22 june 1941 a total military and economic mobilisation. If the SU could do this,it was over for Germany . The Germans gambled that the Soviet leadership would collaps in the first weeks of the war,which would make the mobilization impossible . Their gamble was wrong .

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#125

Post by ljadw » 03 Feb 2014, 23:07

Again,the planning was not inadequate : the planning is determinated by the available resources,and THESE were inadequate

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#126

Post by LWD » 03 Feb 2014, 23:26

ljadw wrote:
LWD wrote:
ljadw wrote:The OP is not only exaggerated,nut also wrong :
1)The German logistic planning was not inadequate
The evidence is to the contrary.
2) The German logistic planning did not doom Barbarossa .

A succesful fighting advance to Moscow was impossible :this has nothing to do with bad logistics
Faulty assumptions on the resiliancy of the Red Army and the Soviet System were probably the most critical in dooming Barbarossa. However German logisitcal problems certainly contributed to their failure to take Moscow.
The dooming of Barbarossa and the failure of taking Moscow are two different things .
Possibly. If the Germans could have taken Moscow and held it then it's an open question of whether or not Barbarossa would have failed.
As usual,the whole discussion is starting from the wrong POV that Germany lost the war in the East (because of failures from Hitler,etc) and it is ignoring that the SU won the war in the East .
They are two sides of the same coin. You simply can't have one without the other.
More than 70 years after the start of Barbarossa,people still are thinking that there was no opponent for the Germans,that it was a piece of a cake,which the Germans lost,because of their own stupidities .The German propaganda is still ruling .
A nice accumulation of strawmen.
Success or defeat in the East depended on something the Germans had no hold on = the ability of the SU (the Soviet leadership)to start on 22 june 1941 a total military and economic mobilisation. If the SU could do this,it was over for Germany . The Germans gambled that the Soviet leadership would collaps in the first weeks of the war,which would make the mobilization impossible . Their gamble was wrong .
That's an opinion. It's far from clear that it is a correct one.
ljadw wrote:Again,the planning was not inadequate : the planning is determinated by the available resources,and THESE were inadequate
But the plan could have been revised and or some of the resources allocated in different ways that would have solved some or at least lessoned some of the problems.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#127

Post by steverodgers801 » 04 Feb 2014, 00:08

you fail to understand that the logistics failure was critical to the failure of taking Moscow. The Germans made a couple of colossal mistaken assumptions. The Soviet government would simply collapse, there were only a limited number of troops on the borders and the Soviets had no more reserves and were incapable of creating any more in time, once the initial troops were eliminated the Germans could simply march to their objectives before the mud season started and the inability of the Germans to sustain a full scale offense beyond the Smolensk line would not matter since there would be no resistance.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#128

Post by BDV » 04 Feb 2014, 00:37

ljadw wrote:Again,the planning was not inadequate : the planning is determinated by the available resources,and THESE were inadequate
As per original Barbarossa directive and actual Axis military actions of 1941, Axis forces had plenty of resources available that were not brought to bear, either in an efficient manner, or not at all. It may well be that these resources would still prove inadequate to tackling the task at hand, but that is the realm of specualtion.

Also the field actions demonstrate that, however much ballyhooed on paper, destroying the RKKA in the field was just not a discernible goal of the german military. Rather, time and time again, german military actions degenerate into a "capture the flag" type of endeavour: AGN actions in July, Guderian reluctance to move to Kiev, northern flank of Taifun debacle, vKleist's and VLeeb's jaunts to Rostov and Tikhvin respectively, AGC's naked armor thrusts post-Vyazma-Bryansk, so on and so forth.

So the resource historically employed were inadequate to bring the historical plan to completion. Does not mean that that was the only possible plan to the german military planners of the time (unless you think that vRunstedt fabriacted his statements on the matter). Or that there were no additional resources available to Germany/Axis.

Just that these additional resources were:
1. Used elsewhere - KM against RN and civilian shipping, LW bombing arm against GB civilians and shipping, OKH troops and trophy weaponry (in particular heavy artillery) used to secure the occupied teritorries' coastlines, ("he who defends everything")
2. Poorly used (military-industrial capacity of occupied teritorries,
3. or not used at all - french military training facilities and personnel, trophy weaponry in depots
4. and Maritsa-Merkured.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#129

Post by ljadw » 04 Feb 2014, 08:10

steverodgers801 wrote:you fail to understand that the logistics failure was critical to the failure of taking Moscow. The Germans made a couple of colossal mistaken assumptions. The Soviet government would simply collapse, there were only a limited number of troops on the borders and the Soviets had no more reserves and were incapable of creating any more in time, once the initial troops were eliminated the Germans could simply march to their objectives before the mud season started and the inability of the Germans to sustain a full scale offense beyond the Smolensk line would not matter since there would be no resistance.
The point is that these mistaken assumptions were not the cause of the failure of Barbarossa :Barbarossa could only succeed if these assumptions were right . Barbarossa did not fail because the German assumptions were mistaken,it failed because the Soviets were stronger than assumed :if the Germans knew the truth,Barbarossa stil would fail .
Last edited by ljadw on 04 Feb 2014, 08:27, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#130

Post by ljadw » 04 Feb 2014, 08:13

They are two sides of the same coin. You simply can't have one without the other.

But the plan could have been revised and or some of the resources allocated in different ways that would have solved some or at least lessoned some of the problems.[/quote]


The coin had only one side .

That some problems could have been solved would still result in a German failure .

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#131

Post by ljadw » 04 Feb 2014, 08:22

However German logisitcal problems certainly contributed to their failure to take Moscow.[/quote]

1)Logistical problems are not the same as logistical failures :failures implies a) a culprit/scape-goat b)that the Germans could have avoided these failures and have taken Moscow


2)The aim of Typhoon was not to take Moscow,it was to eliminate the "last" Soviet reserves (the Germans assumed that there would be a few of them) and this would result in the fall of Moscow .


3)Logistical problems would only play a role if the summer battles were not decisive .

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#132

Post by werd » 04 Feb 2014, 10:51

On October 2 offensive began, 7 in an environment there were 67 of 95 divisions of 3 Soviet fronts. Germans needed about 10 days for replacement of the tank and motorized divisions infantry and is bright released motorized connections to Moscow. After falling of Moscow to Volga practically didn't remain the Soviet parts. Germans freely could reach Volga.Guderian wrote that offensive to Moscow could begin on August 20. On September 10 Germans would take Moscow. By September 20 the German motorized forces would come to Volga.
Hitler broke the plan "Barbarossa". On July 19 in the directive 33 ordered to withdraw from army group "Centre" 2 tank groups for operations near Leningrad and in Ukraine.
In 1941 the Wehrmacht was army only. The Red Army was anything.

http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D1%EC%EE% ... %E5_(1941)

By the end of July of 1941 armies of AG Centre occupied Yartsevo, Smolensk and Yelnya. Since July 10 in fights for Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk and Mogilyov about 300 thousand people were taken prisoner, over 3 thousand tanks and approximately as much tools are taken.
Approach of AG North and South took place not so quickly. Therefore on July 19 Hitler published the directive No. 33 in which it was recommended to transfer tank connections of AG "Center" to the order AG "North" (tank group Gotha) and AG "South" (Guderian's tank group). Approach to Moscow was recommended to be continued forces of infantry connections. According to the German military leaders, this decision led to a delay of approach to Moscow and, finally, to a plan failure "Barbarossa". The commander of the 3rd tank group Hermann Hoth wrote later [20]:
It was full renunciation of the initial plan — the powerful forces concentrated in the center, to break through through Smolensk to Moscow. "Powerful forces" the center, consisting of two tank groups and three field armies, were reduced to one field army. Both tank groups — the main striking power — were thrown one to the right, another on the left. It is obvious that the similar circumstance contradicted the principle — to come where the opponent is most of all weakened, that is , between Smolensk and Velikie Luki in the direction to Rzhev.

http://mosoborona.ru/?page_id=318

During the operation "Typhoon" Germans managed to bring down the Soviet front of defense on the Western strategic direction, to surround and crush the main forces of three fronts. They suffered a huge loss in staff, arms and military equipment. In the largest copper near Vyazma field managements of the 19th and 20th armies of the Western front, the 24th and 32nd armies of Reserve, 37 divisions got to an environment (including one division near Kaluga), 9 armored brigades and 31 art regiments of RGK (see the scheme 23). The armies surrounded there were a part of ten armies — five Western fronts (the 16, 19, 20, 30 and task force of the general Boldin) and five Reserve (24, 31, 32, 43 and 49). In an environment near Bryansk there were field managements of three armies (3, 13 and 50), 22 divisions, 2 armored brigades and 15 art regiments of RGK. Besides, in certain areas 5 more divisions and 4 art regiments of RGK were surrounded.

And all in an environment near Vyazma and Bryansk there were 7 of 15 field managements of armies, 64 divisions from 95 (67% of available by the fight beginning), 11 armored brigades from 13 (85%), 50 art regiments of RGK from 62 (80%). Considering that from an environment the remains of 32 divisions (including and three divisions from five, surrounded out of the general coppers) could escape and 13 art regiments of RGK, all were 32 divisions, 11 armored brigades and 37 art regiments of RGK are lost. It is necessary to recognize that our armies at the initial stage of defensive operation suffered a crushing defeat, equivalent to accident.

On October 18 in the message of OKV it was declared defeat of group of the marshal of Tymoshenko "as a part of 8 armies, 67 shooting, 6 cavalry and 7 tank divisions and 6 armored brigades. During fights it was taken prisoner of 648 196 people, 1197 tanks, 5229 tools of various type, and also a huge number of military property" are taken and destroyed. Later Germans called also such figures taken near Vyazma and Bryansk captured — 657 948 servicemen. According to the specified data, 673 098 people were taken prisoner, trophies made: 1277 tanks, 4378 artillery pieces, 1009 antiaircraft and anti-tank guns, 87 planes and huge number of other military equipment.

Defeat of our armies in the first half of October far surpassed June defeat of the main forces of the Western front in the scales and consequences in Belorussian and death of the Southwest front in September, 1941. For the third time since the beginning of war strategic defense of the Soviet armies was broken through. As a result of defeat armies of the Western and Reserve fronts had to recede on 250-300 km, and armies of the Bryansk front were rejected on 360-390 km. In an environment there was the largest (for all next years wars) group of armies. The front line appeared in only 100-110 km from the capital.


At this time the new factor — climatic which soon affected rates of approach of Germans started working. Calculations of Hitlerite command to win fight for Moscow before an autumn mudslide didn't justify. Still on October 7 near Vyazma the first snow dropped out, rains which turned roads, especially soil, into the dirt rivers in which the mixed equipment collected by Hitlerites as trophies in the occupied countries of Europe slipped began. But at full capacity consequences of mudslide were shown later — in the second half of October. From the beginning of heavy fighting on the Mozhaisk line of defense the expense of ammunition and fuel immeasurably increased, and opportunities for their delivery to coming parts sharply decreased. In the magazine of operations of group of center armies still on October 10 noted that movement of tank parts because of a bad condition of roads and bad weather is impossible now and that for the same reasons there are difficulties in providing tanks with fuel. The main way for AG Center was the highway Vyazma — Moscow; which as a result of operations any more didn't correspond long ago to the name. Owing to different damages from bombardments and explosions of the mines slowed-down action it constantly and for a long time failed. According to the German data, as a result of explosion of such mine in a roadbed there was a funnel of 10 m in depth and with a diameter of 30 m. Detonators were established with such accuracy that daily occurred on some explosions and therefore it was necessary to build every day anew detours.

For supply by fuel and ammunition of the tank and motorized divisions during this period Germans even more often were compelled to use aircraft. According to available data Germans used aircraft for giving to armies of fuel and ammunition, except regular transport planes, applied gliders like Messershmitt-321 (Me.321 "Giant"). The cargo compartment of a glider by the sizes almost didn't concede to the railway car, and its floor could sustain 20 tons of loading twice more empty weight of the glider.

"The crossing through Dnepr functions only in one track, entrances completely failed, as well as detours. At Dnepr 10 thousand cars in five rows accumulated, the discipline completely is absent. Thus, business approached to that bad weather became even more dangerous opponent, than Red Army".


Due to the amplified mudslide action of connections of the opponent became even more attached to rather good roads which and needed to be blocked first of all. And our command, organizing defense, considered passability of roads and the district adjoining to them. Performance of a task of delay of rates of approach of enemy armies and failure of their supply were promoted by that connections and the parts which have been cut off from the armies, continued to work in the back of the opponent, detaining approach of its reserves.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av5/03.html

On October 7, 1941 the 800-kilometer front failed. The armies getting in the way of AG Center, got to an environment. Systematic withdrawal on Vyazma, and then Mozhaisk the line of defense didn't turn out. The Vyazma boundary together with the armies which were on it appeared in extensive "copper". Only remained on a way to Moscow the system of defensive works — the Mozhaisk line of defense — simply couldn't be borrowed. At the disposal of the Soviet command there were only about one and a half weeks which were required to Germans on change built on perimeter of a ring of an environment of the tank and motorized divisions on infantry and a throw of the released motorized corps to Moscow.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#133

Post by werd » 04 Feb 2014, 12:16

Fuhrer Directive 33,34

http://books.google.by/books?id=DO6j77x ... er&f=false

The Führer Directives were instructions and strategic plans issued by Adolf Hitler himself.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%BChrer_Directives

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#134

Post by LWD » 04 Feb 2014, 14:48

ljadw wrote:
They are two sides of the same coin. You simply can't have one without the other.
But the plan could have been revised and or some of the resources allocated in different ways that would have solved some or at least lessoned some of the problems.
The coin had only one side .
Decending even further into the absurd.
That some problems could have been solved would still result in a German failure .
Or not. You are probably correct here but it is by no means certain. You really should learn to distinquish between your opinions and facts.
ljadw wrote:
However German logisitcal problems certainly contributed to their failure to take Moscow.
1)Logistical problems are not the same as logistical failures :failures implies a) a culprit/scape-goat b)that the Germans could have avoided these failures and have taken Moscow
NO. Now you are trying to redefine English to fit your notions of how things could be.

I don't think I need to write anymore. I'm not going to convince you and by your own words you have pretty much shown everyone else that your position is deficient in fact, logic, and reason.

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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front

#135

Post by BDV » 04 Feb 2014, 14:58

@werd

What either Guderian and Manstein, and the other panzer hotheads claim about lost "opportunities" in 1941 is Baron Münchausen teritorry. These actions were militarily impossible as proven by events on the field: Soltsy encirclement by Soviet units, Staraya Russa counterattack by the Soviet units, Yielnia counterattack by the Soviet units, Kalinin counterattack by the Soviet units, which all happened in 1941 during time periods (July, August, October) when "defenderless" Soviet Union/ Leningrad/ Moscow/ were allegedly ripe for picking.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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