This answer is correct. The longer your supply line, the less arrives and the longer it takes to get there.Exlurker wrote:Easy answer?stg 44 wrote:How the hell did they supply the front then? They were worse off in all ways than the Germans in means of supply. Why do people keep talking about how bad the Germans were with logistics, when the Soviets were far worse off? I realize they were closer to their supply centers and that their troops had far less material support per person, such as the lack of a field kitchen for hot food.
Both the aggressor and the defender in this case were almost entirely reliant upon the railroad to meet their heavy logistic needs.
In a case such as this, the defender has the advantage of a much better functioning heavy logistics system...and close to hand. One that can continue to deliver massive tonnages (despite interdiction efforts) to railheads right behind the active front.
As the advance proceeds, the aggressor will quickly outrun this same facility for major supply and be forced to transship (i.e. offload and reload) it's supply at the railheads to either motorized or horsedrawn means, for delivery to the active front.
Supporting such an additional effort becomes (in and of itself) a major drain on the amount of supply tonnage that can actually be brought forward to the "pointy end". Without adequate allowance (within the initial heavy logistics planning) for delivery of the additional resources to the railheads to support and maintain this secondary distribution effort, attrition (due to lack of spares/maintenance) reduces the initial carrying capacity of the means of forward distribution at an exponential rate.
As the distance between the railheads and the fighting front increases, the ability to deliver the same tonnages forward requires a much larger "piece of the pie" which arrives each day at the railheads. Thus the fleet of transport vehicles (and the attendant "tertiary" resource requirements) would actually have to GROW in number (not shrink) to achieve the same results.
The historical records are littered with statements of "We require X number of trains per day to be able to resume offensive operations". What is overlooked is the fact that in many cases, "X" number of trains were arriving at the railheads in the rear. By the time you account for the additional cost to haul "X number of trains" of supply forward, you no longer have "X number of trains" arriving at the active front.
Wholly inadequate German logistical planning (at all levels) doomed Barbarossa.
On the other side of the fence, the Soviets just moved their railheads back along their existing LOC's and repaired the tracks when the Luftwaffe managed to put them out of service for brief periods.
That (in a nutshell) is your answer.
EDIT: This position is supported in Martin Van Crevald's work "Supplying War"; specifically the Chapter entitled "Russian Roulette". Well worth reading, if you share my interest in such matters.
Germany winning on the Eastern Front
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
Well! That's it! I'm done reading all the posts. My compliments to all who posted. The debaters were all very well informed. I expected to read several "The Germans could have won if..." debates. I have never spent a lot of time analyzing the Eastern Front because the scale is just too gigantic and Soviet OOB records too incomplete. So I more or less limited myself to the grand strategy of each Army Group and always assumed Hitler made his mistake at Stalingrad. But I recently changed my opinion on this and really couldn't find fault with the German strategy at all until Hitler adopted his "No surrender, die to the last man" mentality during Stalingrad. After that, everything he did was wrong (and for which reason he had to repeat the order again and again). Once I couldn't find fault with the German strategy then I had to consider the war was un-winnable. So I searched this forum for "Stalingrad" and this debate popped up, the very subject I was interested in. To find everyone pretty much in agreement that this was a war Hitler couldn't win was unexpected yet well thought out by all. It makes one wonder what was going through the German High Command's minds to try this?
This certainly is a great forum. I guess I'll head to the bookstore from here so I can support it.
This certainly is a great forum. I guess I'll head to the bookstore from here so I can support it.
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
Wargames wrote: After that, everything he did was wrong (and for which reason he had to repeat the order again and again). .
Why ?
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
Exlurker wrote:stg 44 wrote:
Wholly inadequate German logistical planning (at all levels) doomed Barbarossa.
This is an exaggerated and dangerous statement .
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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
Well, at the beginning of the D-day invasions, Hitler received some Hungarian delegates and brought them with him to show them the tiny amount of land occupied by the Allies in Northern France as opposed to the huge chunk of France still in German hands.werd wrote:In 1944-45 Minsk-Warsaw-Berlin line was critical. Germans had data intelligence about Soviet plans and forces to cover the central direction. Hitler forbade to defend deep into this plot. In the summer withdrawal to Berezina allowed Germans to defend surely, putting to coming Russians big losses. In June 1944 Germans still were nearby Smolensk. Closer to Moscow, than to Berlin. Hitler's gross blunders cost to Germans of defeat in war.Alixanther wrote: However, Stalin was able to put enough pressure on all sectors (playing his manpower card gambit) in order to prevent the German forces from reinforcing a critical sector by army means alone.
Distance Vitebsk-Moscow 519 km; Berlin-Vitebsk 1389 km
If you think that simply ocuppying huge tracts of land is any guarantee for victory, you're mistaken.
Do you know why Hitler wanted to let the Russians come?
He practically realised as soon as '43 (if not earlier) that the war is actually lost. The only shenanigans he could make were of political nature, as he quite well did before - and not without an ounce of success.
It's of no secret nature that the "Mitteleuropa" concept of German politics demanded for a balanced position between Western and Eastern enemies. It's been there since Bismark, if not earlier.
Hitler, as Chancellor, saw (or was being told) that in order for Germany to survive, it needs a conflict between its enemies. Maybe my assumptions are a little far-fetched but I see that every ounce of war effort after Stalingrad as being directed not towards winning the war but cautiously moving the war parties towards a future half-a-century enmity which would prop Germany as yet again an uncontested European superpower, through peaceful means this time.
As soon as '42 Goering has made some plans for a "European Union" of some sort.
After D-day landings, Hitler and everyone else realized there's no use to get grip of Soviet Russia up to Moscow if the Allies come knocking at Germany's door - as it has already happened during WW1.
So I assume his "blunder" was actually a political decision to let the "winners" to come in equal parts in order to prevent either one of them to have the upper hand on the other.
Should he had managed to held the Russians until the Western Allies get into Ruhr, the WW1 scenario would unfold yet again - leaving Germany a weak republic, at the whim of even its minor neighbours. Which he definitely opted out.
It's far-fetched to assume he didn't want to inflict huge losses on the Soviets, yet he still wanted the Eastern front line to come closer to Germany.
This "controlled implosion" of the Reich borders led Hitler to believe he's able to dictate the outcome of the war (even from a loser perspective) on the grounds of "tertium gaudens". Which he pursued until he finally realized it has been out of his hand and any decision would have no further political importance.
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
Occupation of the European Russia guaranteed to Germany a victory. In Siberia let Stalin was at war with bears and can be with Japanese.Alixanther wrote:Well, at the beginning of the D-day invasions, Hitler received some Hungarian delegates and brought them with him to show them the tiny amount of land occupied by the Allies in Northern France as opposed to the huge chunk of France still in German hands.werd wrote:In 1944-45 Minsk-Warsaw-Berlin line was critical. Germans had data intelligence about Soviet plans and forces to cover the central direction. Hitler forbade to defend deep into this plot. In the summer withdrawal to Berezina allowed Germans to defend surely, putting to coming Russians big losses. In June 1944 Germans still were nearby Smolensk. Closer to Moscow, than to Berlin. Hitler's gross blunders cost to Germans of defeat in war.Alixanther wrote: However, Stalin was able to put enough pressure on all sectors (playing his manpower card gambit) in order to prevent the German forces from reinforcing a critical sector by army means alone.
Distance Vitebsk-Moscow 519 km; Berlin-Vitebsk 1389 km
If you think that simply ocuppying huge tracts of land is any guarantee for victory, you're mistaken.
In 1943 it was difficult to understand that Germany can't carry out offensives on eastern front. The chief of the General Staff of Italy in July 1943 asked Keitel what occurs on the Russian front?Do you know why Hitler wanted to let the Russians come?
He practically realised as soon as '43 (if not earlier) that the war is actually lost. The only shenanigans he could make were of political nature, as he quite well did before - and not without an ounce of success.
It's of no secret nature that the "Mitteleuropa" concept of German politics demanded for a balanced position between Western and Eastern enemies. It's been there since Bismark, if not earlier.
Hitler, as Chancellor, saw (or was being told) that in order for Germany to survive, it needs a conflict between its enemies. Maybe my assumptions are a little far-fetched but I see that every ounce of war effort after Stalingrad as being directed not towards winning the war but cautiously moving the war parties towards a future half-a-century enmity which would prop Germany as yet again an uncontested European superpower, through peaceful means this time.
As soon as '42 Goering has made some plans for a "European Union" of some sort.
After D-day landings, Hitler and everyone else realized there's no use to get grip of Soviet Russia up to Moscow if the Allies come knocking at Germany's door - as it has already happened during WW1.
So I assume his "blunder" was actually a political decision to let the "winners" to come in equal parts in order to prevent either one of them to have the upper hand on the other.
Should he had managed to held the Russians until the Western Allies get into Ruhr, the WW1 scenario would unfold yet again - leaving Germany a weak republic, at the whim of even its minor neighbours. Which he definitely opted out.
It's far-fetched to assume he didn't want to inflict huge losses on the Soviets, yet he still wanted the Eastern front line to come closer to Germany.
This "controlled implosion" of the Reich borders led Hitler to believe he's able to dictate the outcome of the war (even from a loser perspective) on the grounds of "tertium gaudens". Which he pursued until he finally realized it has been out of his hand and any decision would have no further political importance.
- We exhaust the opponent.
- It not the action program, refusal of an initiative in operations.
Italians urged Germans to attack, take new millions pows. Hitler wanted to defend only. By summer 1944 number of divisions on eastern front in a year was reduced with 186 to 157. To the west reserves went.Hitler had an opportunity to weaken AG "Center" to a helpless state.
The policy and economy in the war have no value. Only fighting operations will be able to change the political and economic future.
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
ljadw wrote:Exlurker wrote:
stg 44:
Wholly inadequate German logistical planning (at all levels) doomed Barbarossa.
This is an exaggerated and dangerous statement .
Of course, if one regards Barbarossa as a giant error, there is no debate. However, if one accepts method to the Barbarossa madness, the various components do stand to inspection.
There are other glaring flaws, to be sure. Mismanagement of the military aspect of the anti-bolshevik alliance and the (quasi-ignored) ghastly performance of the medical arm come a close second and third. Still the logistical failures take the top spot on the totem pole of failures.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
its not exaggerated. The German army knew their logistics could not sustain a full scale offense beyond the Dneiper, so they just pretended that there would be no Soviet resistance after that fact. Think about it the German army was only about 20% motorized, yet they think they can get to Moscow in two months with most units marching at the same speed as Napoleons troops did. You can argue the German blindness in refusing to plan for Soviet resistance beyond the Dneiper is the worst flaw.
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
The OP is not only exaggerated,nut also wrong :
1)The German logistic planning was not inadequate
2) The German logistic planning did not doom Barbarossa .
A succesful fighting advance to Moscow was impossible :this has nothing to do with bad logistics
What was possible,was an advance to Moscow and farther by mobile light-armed divisions,without big fighting , AFTER the destruction of the Red Army and the collaps of the Soviet state :the equivalent of the Allied advance in Germany in april 1945.
The German logistic planning started from a realistic assessment of the situation :the campaign in the East would be won or lost in the battles between the border and the Dvina-Dnepr line ,where logistics were favouring the Germans and hindering the Soviets . That's why the Germans planned the decisive battle to happen in that region .
They failed,not because of logistics,but,because the SU did not collapse,and continued the fighting(which means:no fast advance to Moscow):this was the decisive factor,something the Germans were aware of .But,they guessed that the SU would collaps in the summer.
The Germans were as the student before the decisive question of the decisive exam :they guessed that the question would be easy
The Germans were as the Democrats in the presidential elections,knowing that they must capture New York to win :they started from the POV that New York would fall,not that they would loose New York .(or the Republicans knowing that they must win in Virginia).
1)The German logistic planning was not inadequate
2) The German logistic planning did not doom Barbarossa .
A succesful fighting advance to Moscow was impossible :this has nothing to do with bad logistics
What was possible,was an advance to Moscow and farther by mobile light-armed divisions,without big fighting , AFTER the destruction of the Red Army and the collaps of the Soviet state :the equivalent of the Allied advance in Germany in april 1945.
The German logistic planning started from a realistic assessment of the situation :the campaign in the East would be won or lost in the battles between the border and the Dvina-Dnepr line ,where logistics were favouring the Germans and hindering the Soviets . That's why the Germans planned the decisive battle to happen in that region .
They failed,not because of logistics,but,because the SU did not collapse,and continued the fighting(which means:no fast advance to Moscow):this was the decisive factor,something the Germans were aware of .But,they guessed that the SU would collaps in the summer.
The Germans were as the student before the decisive question of the decisive exam :they guessed that the question would be easy
The Germans were as the Democrats in the presidential elections,knowing that they must capture New York to win :they started from the POV that New York would fall,not that they would loose New York .(or the Republicans knowing that they must win in Virginia).
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
steverodgers801 wrote:its not exaggerated. The German army knew their logistics could not sustain a full scale offense beyond the Dneiper, so they just pretended that there would be no Soviet resistance after that fact. .
What do you expect ? That they would say "there will still Soviet resistance beyond the Dnepr",knowing that THIS would doom Barbarossa ?
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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
The dissolution of the Soviet State is a political outcome. Hitler and the OKW expected the fall because they thought they've witnessed a fundamental flaw of the Soviet regime.
They thought that the slave mentality imposed to the citizens of the Soviet space is only 2 seconds away from rebellion, if and when an external force is going in. They, however, did nothing (or very little) to shake the Soviet dogma from people's hearts. Au contraire, if anything, Stalin was able to impose his whim without any restraint after the German attack, practically "proving" everyone else that his paranoid planning was right from the start.
They thought that the slave mentality imposed to the citizens of the Soviet space is only 2 seconds away from rebellion, if and when an external force is going in. They, however, did nothing (or very little) to shake the Soviet dogma from people's hearts. Au contraire, if anything, Stalin was able to impose his whim without any restraint after the German attack, practically "proving" everyone else that his paranoid planning was right from the start.
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
In the German army of eastern front on June 22, 1941 there were 3,55 mln people, from them 0,6 million drivers on 600 thousand of vehicles.17 % of army drivers. Motorization of army was very high. In 1941 it was difficult to win. Underestimated ability of the opponent to throw new and new million soldiers on the front. But that such war in 1941, one pocket, the second, the third, the fifth... Total superiority of Wehrmacht at tactical level. Germans occupied Belorussia, Ukraine. October 8 mudslide started and Stalin got a few time to complete destruction. In 1942 war already only with the Russian Federation. Hitler didn't want to win. Germans could take easily Moscow in the summer 1942 and win war.steverodgers801 wrote: Think about it the German army was only about 20% motorized, yet they think they can get to Moscow in two months with most units marching at the same speed as Napoleons troops did.
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Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
No they couldn't take Moscow in summer. German logistics called for a halt at Smolensk for about three weeks to allow the rail lines to catch up. It would be fall before they could even start for Moscow. Assuming one month for a pocket in before Moscow it will be mud season before they can even think about Moscow.
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
Distance between Smolensk and Moscow 400 km. On October 2 offensive began, Germans promoted on 170 km, October 7 having closed a pocket in Vyazma.13 the surrounded were given. 2 more weeks on dry soil and Germans would take Moscow.steverodgers801 wrote:No they couldn't take Moscow in summer. German logistics called for a halt at Smolensk for about three weeks to allow the rail lines to catch up. It would be fall before they could even start for Moscow. Assuming one month for a pocket in before Moscow it will be mud season before they can even think about Moscow.
In August the Soviet defense was weaker. If operation began on August 25, till September 15 Germans would captivate the next million captured and took Moscow. Hitler considered wheat of Ukraine more important. He told Moscow only a symbol, we won't starve as in World War I.
http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/ ... emacy-east
On July 30, the Army Supreme Command ordered a temporary halt to the invasion to recover, regroup, and resupply.
The division of the advancing German forces into three Army Groups—North, Center, and South—was partly dictated by the vastness of the terrain to be traversed, and partly by the need to skirt the huge and virtually impenetrable obstacle of the Pripet marshes. But that stratagem, together with the heavy losses it had sustained, and the continual arrival at the front of new Soviet reserves, made it look increasingly less likely that the enemy could be eliminated by the single knockout blow favored by German military theory, going back ultimately to the early nineteenth-century treatise On War by the intellectual Prussian army officer Carl von Clausewitz.
While the advance stalled, Hitler and his generals debated what to do next. It had become obvious that the dissipation of German military strength was hampering the drive for victory. The weight of the campaign had to be concentrated into one of the three main Army Groups. The generals favored strengthening the Army Group Center for a rapid advance on Moscow, where they believed the main enemy force to be located. There it could be destroyed, they thought, bringing a Clausewitzian total victory. But Hitler refused. Instead, he strengthened Army Group South, taking away men and resources from Army Group Center in order to make it ready for the assault on Kiev.
Still expecting the edifice of Soviet command to collapse, Hitler did not think that the assault on Stalin’s capital city should be the highest military priority. So he stuck to his original plan to concentrate on acquiring the food supplies and industrial resources of the Ukraine. After that, Army Group South would push on towards the Caucasus, with its oilfields, so badly needed by the petrol-starved German tanks, assault guns, and transport vehicles, while Army Group Center would resume the march on Moscow. Overawed by Hitler, whom they held to be the architect of the previous year’s rapid conquest of western Europe, in a situation where many of them had entertained serious doubts about the wisdom of attacking through the Ardennes, the generals felt unable to gainsay their leader.
On August 21, 1941, the decision was finally taken, and soon the German forces began to encircle the city, with General Heinz Guderian’s panzers from Army Group Center approaching from the northeast, and Field-Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt moving tanks across the river Dneiper to the south; three weeks later the various German forces joined up. The city was surrounded, with four Soviet armies encircled.
Re: Germany winning on the Eastern Front
The claim that you have "designed and made dozens of war games" doesn't really carry much weight. A high moral unit by defintion isn't "hopeless" nor have units that had the opertunity to retreat always done so.Wargames wrote:I've designed and made dozens of war games and moral is not a factor (not even for the Italians in North Africa). Surrender is the result of a hopeless, inescapable situation. When presented with the opportunity to run (escape) or surrender, the soldier always chooses to run. Surrender represents accepting the unknown. Running represents escaping back to the known.LWD wrote:There may be many reasons to fight on or to surrender but moral is an important one.
Your conclusion that moral is not a factor is not supported by the facts or logic of the case.Wargames wrote: ...The comment that using motorized units to surround units (cut off their rear) which then surrendered is correct. Notice moral is not an issue for surrender. Having someone in your rear and cutting off your escape is.
It's in most of the threads that discuss the beginnings of Barbarossa or a German chance to win. The essence is that the ground and river conditons were not suitable on the original date.Wargames wrote:I'm late to this debate. Can someone direct me to where this was argued?Konig_pilsner wrote:The assumption that Barbarossa could have been launched as planned earlier has been dispelled years ago,
Whether less arrives or not depends on what the limitations of the supply line are. If there are "choke points" for instance and the pipe lines on either side are adequate or better then length may not be as critical. A brake in transportation mode can also be of more import than a few extra miles.Wargames wrote: ... This answer is correct. The longer your supply line, the less arrives and the longer it takes to get there.