Germany winning on the Eastern Front

[Appleknocker27]

Pre-war strength does not mean experienced men ,unless you can prove that the men who were lost at Corregidor/Bataan had more experience that those who fought and won at Guadalcanal,Iwo Jima and Okinawa .

In a general sense it can mean many things, but in the specific context of this thread pre-war trained German Infantry and Romanian/Hungarian tankers (and their equipment) most definitely had more experience and were better trained than those that replaced them. Prove otherwise with specific information beyond your brand of logic that lacks any specificity germane to the topic.

Combat experience can only be learnt in combat = during war .

:roll:

Besides the success/failure of Blau did NOT depend on the availability of more ,not experienced, but non experienced Germans .

Really? So if the flanks of 6th Army was covered by German Infantry corps instead of allied that wouldn't have made a difference?

Between 1939 and 1941 the WM increased from 1 million to 7.2 million men,this means that of the 3 million men of the Ostheer only 14 % belonged to the pre-war army= some 400000.Thus your theory that everything depended on the pre-war strength is wrong .The 1 million préwar force had no combat experience.

In 1939 the Wehrmacht had 4,722,000 men and the Heer had 3,737,000. By 1941 that number had risen to 8,154,000 for the Wehrmacht and 5,000,000 for the Heer, which constitutes a 33% increase. Again, you post with no research, no analysis and offer what exactly?
The pre-war force had WWI/Freikorps veterans, Spanish Civil war veterans and long periods of personal development and collective training as cohesive units. It takes years to develop a competent Infantry Officer or NCO. Also, the majority of losses in 1941 were Infantry, which makes the 775,000 or so German losses in 1941 actually have a larger impact on 1942 than just the raw numbers suggest. If the majority of the 775k Soldiers lost are infantry, then frontline combat capability is degraded disproportionately to overall strength. That is specifically why Blau only involved Army Group South instead of all 3 Army Groups as Barbarossa had. German personnel strength was higher in 1942, but combat capability was degraded due to losses to specific combat arms and force generation was inadequate to keep up with the loss rate (quantitatively and qualitatively).

[Appleknocker27]

I can't understand that a professional soldier can write the following (or maybe the reason is the contempt for reservists and recruits ) :

"Loss of pré-war strength to be replaced by new replacement troops or is a negative qualitative exchange at best and at worst there is no replacement at all"


The truth is that Britain,the US and the SU won the war by calling up new replacement troops who where qualitatively as good as the pre-war units .

The SU lost in 1941 the majority of its pre-war forces ,replaced them by reservists and recruits and arrived at Berlin .

The pre-war British army was lost in 1914, was replaced by volunteers and recruits and,maybe Appleknocker has forgotten, but Britain won .

Strawman, clear and undeniable... We are discussing German Infantry and Romanian/Hungarian tankers (and equipment), not the Allies, so your strawman is denied and your point moot. The facts are clear that the losses of those two groups could not be made up and were not made up either quantitatively and qualitatively which had an adverse effect on future operations. You are trying to pull in examples outside the parameters of the conversation, thats a strawman

[ljadw]

NO : you said clearly that pre-war forces were better than recruits and reservists called up during the war,that they had more experience which means : war experience .
And you have NO proof that qualitatively the 800000 men lost in 1941 were better than those available in june 1942 for Blau .

[ljadw]

Pre-war strength does not mean experienced men ,unless you can prove that the men who were lost at Corregidor/Bataan had more experience that those who fought and won at Guadalcanal,Iwo Jima and Okinawa .

In a general sense it can mean many things, but in the specific context of this thread pre-war trained German Infantry and Romanian/Hungarian tankers (and their equipment) most definitely had more experience and were better trained than those that replaced them. Prove otherwise with specific information beyond your brand of logic that lacks any specificity germane to the topic.

Combat experience can only be learnt in combat = during war .

:roll:

Besides the success/failure of Blau did NOT depend on the availability of more ,not experienced, but non experienced Germans .

Really? So if the flanks of 6th Army was covered by German Infantry corps instead of allied that wouldn't have made a difference?

Between 1939 and 1941 the WM increased from 1 million to 7.2 million men,this means that of the 3 million men of the Ostheer only 14 % belonged to the pre-war army= some 400000.Thus your theory that everything depended on the pre-war strength is wrong .The 1 million préwar force had no combat experience.

In 1939 the Wehrmacht had 4,722,000 men and the Heer had 3,737,000. By 1941 that number had risen to 8,154,000 for the Wehrmacht and 5,000,000 for the Heer, which constitutes a 33% increase. Again, you post with no research, no analysis and offer what exactly?
The pre-war force had WWI/Freikorps veterans, Spanish Civil war veterans and long periods of personal development and collective training as cohesive units. It takes years to develop a competent Infantry Officer or NCO. Also, the majority of losses in 1941 were Infantry, which makes the 775,000 or so German losses in 1941 actually have a larger impact on 1942 than just the raw numbers suggest. If the majority of the 775k Soldiers lost are infantry, then frontline combat capability is degraded disproportionately to overall strength. That is specifically why Blau only involved Army Group South instead of all 3 Army Groups as Barbarossa had. German personnel strength was higher in 1942, but combat capability was degraded due to losses to specific combat arms and force generation was inadequate to keep up with the loss rate (quantitatively and qualitatively).

Wrong : the German pre-war WM never had 4.7 million men ,but some 1 million.

And in june 1941, the strength of the WM was :7.234 million

Feldheer : 3.8 million

Ersatzheer 1.2 million

LW : 1.68 million

KM :404000

WSS : 150000

[ljadw]

Besides the success/failure of Blau did NOT depend on the availability of more ,not experienced, but non experienced Germans .

Really? So if the flanks of 6th Army was covered by German Infantry corps instead of allied that wouldn't have made a difference?

Proof that more men = more men for the east,that more men for the east would be more men for 6th Army and not for the Caucasus which was the aim of Blau .Proof that more men for 6th Army would mean more infantry corps,proof that more infantry corps could be supplied,proof that more infantry corps would be at the flancs and not in Stalingrad .

[ljadw]

About combat experience : combat experience is experience of combat and combat happen only during war, thus combat experience can only be learnt during a war .

The Swedish army has not been involved in a war since almost 200 years and has thus no combat experience .

[ljadw]

775000 losses in 1941 does not mean that these men were absent in 1942 :a big part of the wounded returned to the east .

It is also not so that all losses belonged to the original 3 million of june 1941.

And : it is not so that only KIA,WIA and MIA left the east:a lot of non wounded also left the east .Maybe more than wounded .Not only individual soldiers but also whole units : the LSS left the east in the sumer of 1942,with all its valid men .

And, this is basic,it is NOT so that if the Ostheer had 200000 less casualties in 1941, it would have 200000 more men in 1942.Thus there is no influence of the 1941 casualties on the outcome of Blau.

The question is not if the Ostheer was weaken than in 1941,but if the losses of 1941 influenced the outcome of Blau = if without these losses (how much ? ) Blau could succeed .

The answer is

1) NO

2 ) this IF is a classic search for an excuse for a German failure .In the pat the reason for the failure of Blau was the intervention of Hitler, now it is the 1941 casualties .

Both explanations are ludicrous .

[Boby]

Well, splitting the offensive, imho, was a great mistake, but I agree Blau would have failed anyway, but, AGS found himself much better to face Uranus?

[ljadw]

Why ? Less German casualties in 1941 imply less Soviet casualties in 1941, and the result would be the same .

To create a ATL with less German casualties and the same Soviet casualties is on the same level as creating an ATL where Germany would have nuclear weapons anf te means to transport them to the other side of the world .

And even if there were 100000 less casualties in 1941,that does not mean that there would be 100000 more Germans would be available to protect the flanc of AGB.

To those who reply that it would be better not to fight in the Caucasus and to send everyone to the Wolga, the answer (without hindsight ) is that to reach the Wolga would not be decisive,only the capture of the oil fields could be decisive (and with hindsight we know that it would not be so ) .Thus,the decision to make the Caucasus the most important aim was justified .

No splitting would not help the Germans :more forces for the Caucasus would not make it easier to capture the oilfield,and to give up the Caucasus would mean to give up the Wolga, because Stalingrad without the Wolga was meaningless .

[Boby]

No, I mean 1942. Of course no one know in July 1942 that Uranus would happen in November, but without splitting the offensive AGS can confront it much better. Do you agree? And not forget this FHO data.

30.6.1942 Sollstärke Front+Armee+Heerereserves = 5.064.000 (487 units)
31.7.1942 " = 6.104.000 (625 units)

In FRONT
30.6.1942 3.692.000 (315 units) Opposing HGS (A+B) = 1.056.500 (99 units)
31.7.1942 4.241.000 (386 units) " 1.460.000 (154 units)

In ARMEERESERVE
30.6.1942 902.000 (106 units) Opposing HGS (A+B) = 238.000 (31 units)
31.7.1942 1.565.000 (190) " 986.500 (119 units)

[ljadw]

No, I mean 1942. Of course no one know in July 1942 that Uranus would happen in November, but without splitting the offensive AGS can confront it much better. Do you agree? )

Why would it make possible to confront the Soviets better ?

What would AGS do with the additional divisions who in the OTL were in the Caucasus : would they use these divisions to protect the flancs, to conquer Stalingrad or to go to Astrachan ?
And could AGS supply these additional divisions ?

[Boby]

Well, IF they supplied it in the OTL, why not in the shorter ATL? Flanks, city, or both. More units per km of front.

[steverodgers801]

because the farther south the Germans went the longer the flank was. The original plan was to secure the Volga first and then move south, but Hitler wanted to go south at the same time.

[Appleknocker27]

Wrong : the German pre-war WM never had 4.7 million men ,but some 1 million.

And in june 1941, the strength of the WM was :7.234 million

Feldheer : 3.8 million

Ersatzheer 1.2 million

LW : 1.68 million

KM :404000

WSS : 150000

It isn't wrong since you clearly stated 1939, the "pre-war" army existed until 31 August, no? Check the numbers, which don't match your statements:
http://www.feldgrau.com/stats.html

[ljadw]

nonsense: a pre-war army is a peace army,which is not mobilised,the mobilisation transformed the WM in a war army .

Besides,the more than questionable Feldgrau figures are for 1939, not for the pre-war period .

They are questionable because there are NO such things as strength figures for 1941 or other years .