Stalingrad

[hms2011]

2.Pz and 5.Pz were deployed in the USSR in 1941, they only came later. 7.Flieger was also shipped to AGN. The two Pz. were used to boast combat strength before Typhoon.

I am aware of that.
However, the usefulness of the two panzers, operating at the end of a very long logistical line for a couple of weeks before the mud season, was limited.
Germanys best chance was to inflict as much casualties as possible near the border.
In that regard, the missing PzD (and other divisons) would be useful.

[hms2011]

15 and 21 PzD were needed in North Africa.

What big strategic goal did these panzer divisons fight for in North Africa?

[Erwinn]

15 and 21 PzD were needed in North Africa.

What big strategic goal did these panzer divisons fight for in North Africa?

North Africa was a half hearted operation and it's Rommel's own success. Germans fought an idealogical war and that war was in East. If they'd bother to look at the big picture, the main concern would be the Middle Eastern conquest during 1942.

[ljadw]

15 and 21 PzD were needed in North Africa.

What big strategic goal did these panzer divisons fight for in North Africa?

Preventing the loss of North Africa,which would result in the fall of Mussolini

[hms2011]

Preventing the loss of North Africa,which would result in the fall of Mussolini

Do you believe a potential fall of Mussolini would doom Germany no matter what happened in the east?

[Erwinn]

Preventing the loss of North Africa,which would result in the fall of Mussolini

Do you believe a potential fall of Mussolini would doom Germany no matter what happened in the east?

Early Italian capitulation could mean the invasion of Italy much sooner than 1943 and Allies may concentrate with their full strenght, bypassing France preparations. Early 1943 Italy-South France landings. I say this is really serious especially inadequate German forces in France at that time.

[ljadw]

In the English edition of Germany and WWII Tome V,PP 986-987,the following classification of the German Army on 22 june 1941 is given in decreasing order


1 20 PzD + 1 Light Division (PzD 21)

2 10 MoT D, 4 SS D, 1 Mountain D

3 1 Cav D + 3 Mountain Ds

4 26 ID (1st Wave)

5 16 ID (2nd Wave) + 14 (4th Wave)

6 14 ID (7th Wave) / 10 ID (8th Wave)


Total of 1-6 : 120

7 10 (11 Wave) + 10 (12 Wave)

8 5ID (5 wave) + 1 SS Police Division

9 15 ID (3Wave) + 4 (6 Wave)


Total of 7-9 : 45


10 9 ID (13 Wave) + 8 ID (14 Wave)

11 15 ID (15 Wave) + 9 Security Divisions


Total of 11-12 : 41
The divisions of the 13,14 ,15 Wave and the security divisions were useless for the east,they were only good as occupation forces and for the protection of the coasts .But,the Germans were that lacking of forces,that they were forced to use 2 ID of the 15 Wave for Barbarossa .

The claim that the Germans had a reserve of divisions for Barbarossa and did not use it,is not correct .

[ljadw]

Preventing the loss of North Africa,which would result in the fall of Mussolini

Do you believe a potential fall of Mussolini would doom Germany no matter what happened in the east?

Germany could not risk the loss of Italy,the results in the Balkans would be disastrous.

[ChrisDR68]

No : without hindsight,Blau was the only chance for the Germans to win the war in the East in 1942 (with hindight,it was already to late),even Halder supported Blau . The Moscow option was considered and was rejected,because the Ostheer was already to weak,and because it was unlikely that the SU would give up in Moscow was captured .

The Germans were not going to the Caucasus to capture the oilfields (Germany had oil enough),but to deny the oilfields to the Soviets,because they errorneously assumed that the SU would collaps without the oil of the Caucasus,although the expert of the Wirtschaftsministerium had warned that this was very questionable .

If that was their plan wouldn't it have made more sense to have aimed their advance on Astrakhan in order to cut the Caucasus off from the rest of the USSR?

Then they could have used the Luftwaffe to bomb any oil tankers that risked trying to get the oil from Baku to the rest of unoccupied Russia on the Caspian Sea.

On a side note every account of Operation Blue I've read has stated that a lack of fuel halted German motorised units at regular intervals meaning they were unable to carry out their orders in a timely manner. If this was mainly due to logistical bottlenecks rather than a lack of oil on Germany's part then it makes even less sense to order Army Group A to advance deep into the interior of the Caucasus.

[doogal]

I did not imply they had a reserve of divisions: I suggested they over garrisoned in other theatres. Again it is my belief that once Hitler decided to attack the SU there was a window of opportunity but only if sufficient force could be applied: as events turned out we see the SU stretched but surviving;
Everything had to be staked on it to the detriment of allies and subsidiary theatres:

[Cult Icon]

Maintaining the patronage of the Axis Allies and their vital contribution to front line strength in the East?

What big strategic goal did these panzer divisons fight for in North Africa?

2. and 5. Pz were resting and refitting in Germany after being worn from the Balkans campaign. They completed their preparation, and came to play their role in Typhoon and were shipped mid-Sept. They were a disproportionate portion of the strength for Typhoon due to the worn-out nature of the other Pz. divisions.

I am aware of that.
However, the usefulness of the two panzers, operating at the end of a very long logistical line for a couple of weeks before the mud season, was limited.
Germanys best chance was to inflict as much casualties as possible near the border.
In that regard, the missing PzD (and other divisons) would be useful.

Regardless, an extra Mot. Korps would not win the war for the Axis.

[doogal]

Cult icon wrote :Maintaining the patronage of the Axis Allies and their vital contribution to front line strength in the East?

I take your point:

[hms2011]

Germany could not risk the loss of Italy,the results in the Balkans would be disastrous.

What the Germans couldn't risk was getting stopped short of Moscow, Leningrad and Rostov as happened historically. That ended in disaster.

While shortchanging North-Africa might result in the loss of Italy, it also might not.
It depends on a number of variables: first, the Brits must conquer Libya. Then Mussolini must fall as a result (he did survive the fall of NA historically). But what happens then?

The claim that the Germans had a reserve of divisions for Barbarossa and did not use it,is not correct .

As I mentioned in my previous post, they could have added a number of useful formations if they had realized how tough of a challenge the SU was, and reduced their commitments in secondary and tertiary theaters.

[hms2011]

Maintaining the patronage of the Axis Allies and their vital contribution to front line strength in the East?

While the Italian contribution to the early phase of Barbarossa was useful, I wouldnt deem it neither vital nor irreplaceble.

2. and 5. Pz were resting and refitting in Germany after being worn from the Balkans campaign.

Having to attack the Balkans in the spring of '41 was a big failure on the German side.
Or do you belive this attack, at that time, was the optimal way the Germans could have handled the situation from the summer of 1940 and onwards?

2. and 5. Pz ... They were a disproportionate portion of the strength for Typhoon due to the worn-out nature of the other Pz. divisions.

By the time of Typhoon, the German chances of victory had dwindled substantially.
Id est, they came too late. And fought too little (only a couple of weeks of decent weather). And used up precious supplies other formations could have benefitted from.

Regardless, an extra Mot. Korps would not win the war for the Axis.

Axis chances would be higher with more aircrafts, a handful of additional motorized divisions++.
But it obviously doesn't guarantee anything. It depends on how the Soviets and Germans would have responded to the changed situation.
Especially at the border.

[Cult Icon]

This is silly; The Axis allies were important to the German war effort economically, strategically, and in forces, and leaving Italy in the lurch would send a negative signal to other allies. A korps in exchange for their support was a German asset. The allied armies contributed 400,000 troops for Plan Blau alone, and they held less critical sectors in 1941 or helped provide manpower for encirclements.

It is not realistic that the Germany, with an extra mot. Korps and a reduced allied commitment will win the war when they were already at their culmination point in Nov. 1941. The Soviets were the stronger party.