Stalingrad

[Aida1]

I thought it was Goering's deputy who made the promise as Goering was absent (can't remember why).

Yep, that was Jeschonnek:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Jesc ... viet_Union

It seems that the Luftwaffe high officers conferring with Goring on the evening of 23 November (head of air transport was not present, neither was a representative of Luftwaffe fuhrungsstab) were convinced air supply would only be an improvisation limited in time(Stalingrad M Kehrig p 219). They considered 350 ton a day was possible. Not well thought through as that tonnage required a number of aircraft that did not exist given that the number of serviceable aircraft on any given day was below 50 percent and there was also the weather factor and aircraft bei g shot down.

[ljadw]

Certainly = handwaving .
The only airfield that could handle large amounts of goods was Pitomnik ,but it was already unable to handle the supplies that were landed in the OTL . It could not handle more supplies .
Thus to transport more supplies was only a wast of means .
And : wounded and specialists are not supplies .

What you pretend about the airfields' capacity to handle supplies is incorrect as usual. The limiting factors always were numbers of serviceable aircraft, weather and aircraft being shot down, never insufficient capacity at the airfields.

Wrong

[ljadw]

I thought it was Goering's deputy who made the promise as Goering was absent (can't remember why).

Yep, that was Jeschonnek:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Jesc ... viet_Union

It seems that the Luftwaffe high officers conferring with Goring on the evening of 23 November (head of air transport was not present, neither was a representative of Luftwaffe fuhrungsstab) were convinced air supply would only be an improvisation limited in time(Stalingrad M Kehrig p 219). They considered 350 ton a day was possible. Not well thought through as that tonnage required a number of aircraft that did not exist given that the number of serviceable aircraft on any given day was below 50 percent and there was also the weather factor and aircraft bei g shot down.

Meaningless and irrelevant .
The number of supplies that the LW could transport to the Kessel was not deciding or had not the importance it was claimed by the Manstein lobby .Neither was the number of lost aircraft .
No one knew and still knows what 6th army needed as supplies and 6th army itself didn't know it .
Besides there is no proof that more supplies would result in a capitulation later than 31 January .

[Aida1]

I thought it was Goering's deputy who made the promise as Goering was absent (can't remember why).

Yep, that was Jeschonnek:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Jesc ... viet_Union

It seems that the Luftwaffe high officers conferring with Goring on the evening of 23 November (head of air transport was not present, neither was a representative of Luftwaffe fuhrungsstab) were convinced air supply would only be an improvisation limited in time(Stalingrad M Kehrig p 219). They considered 350 ton a day was possible. Not well thought through as that tonnage required a number of aircraft that did not exist given that the number of serviceable aircraft on any given day was below 50 percent and there was also the weather factor and aircraft bei g shot down.

Meaningless and irrelevant .
The number of supplies that the LW could transport to the Kessel was not deciding or had not the importance it was claimed by the Manstein lobby .Neither was the number of lost aircraft .
No one knew and still knows what 6th army needed as supplies and 6th army itself didn't know it .
Besides there is no proof that more supplies would result in a capitulation later than 31 January .

When you dig a hole you should crawl out of it instead of digging it deeper. You would be the only one that thinks the amount of fuel, ammo and food an army receives has no impact on its ability to conduct military operations. 6 army knew very well what it needed and made requests accordingly everyday. You could read Kehrigs book on Stalingrad as it has lots of details and statistics on that.

[ljadw]

I thought it was Goering's deputy who made the promise as Goering was absent (can't remember why).

Yep, that was Jeschonnek:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Jesc ... viet_Union

It seems that the Luftwaffe high officers conferring with Goring on the evening of 23 November (head of air transport was not present, neither was a representative of Luftwaffe fuhrungsstab) were convinced air supply would only be an improvisation limited in time(Stalingrad M Kehrig p 219). They considered 350 ton a day was possible. Not well thought through as that tonnage required a number of aircraft that did not exist given that the number of serviceable aircraft on any given day was below 50 percent and there was also the weather factor and aircraft bei g shot down.

Meaningless and irrelevant .
The number of supplies that the LW could transport to the Kessel was not deciding or had not the importance it was claimed by the Manstein lobby .Neither was the number of lost aircraft .
No one knew and still knows what 6th army needed as supplies and 6th army itself didn't know it .
Besides there is no proof that more supplies would result in a capitulation later than 31 January .

You would be the only one that thinks the amount of fuel, ammo and food an army receives has no impact on its ability to conduct military operations.

Where did I say this ?

[ljadw]

I thought it was Goering's deputy who made the promise as Goering was absent (can't remember why).

Yep, that was Jeschonnek:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Jesc ... viet_Union

It seems that the Luftwaffe high officers conferring with Goring on the evening of 23 November (head of air transport was not present, neither was a representative of Luftwaffe fuhrungsstab) were convinced air supply would only be an improvisation limited in time(Stalingrad M Kehrig p 219). They considered 350 ton a day was possible. Not well thought through as that tonnage required a number of aircraft that did not exist given that the number of serviceable aircraft on any given day was below 50 percent and there was also the weather factor and aircraft bei g shot down.

Meaningless and irrelevant .
The number of supplies that the LW could transport to the Kessel was not deciding or had not the importance it was claimed by the Manstein lobby .Neither was the number of lost aircraft .
No one knew and still knows what 6th army needed as supplies and 6th army itself didn't know it .
Besides there is no proof that more supplies would result in a capitulation later than 31 January .

6 army knew very well what it needed and made requests accordingly everyday.

Wrong. Not for the first time .
It were the Soviets who determined what 6th army needed :if there was not much fighting, less ammunition was needed .
No one knows the exact number of Germans that were encircled,the number of casualties ( created by the enemy, not the Martians ! )had an impact on the supply needs : deaths do not need supplies .
No one knows the amount of supplies 66th army received before Uranus .
No one knows the amount of available stocks at the start of Uranus .
All we know is that with the available stocks and the incoming supplies ( not BECAUSE of them ) 6 th army fought during 10 weeks ,but no one knows the importance of the stocks compared to the incoming supplies .
And about these supplies : supplies that remained in Pitemkin were useless (as it was in Antwerp, Tunis,...) and it is perfectly possible that less aircraft could transport more supplies :
Example : on Day X there were 100 transport aircraft and 100 tons of supplies .On Day X + 1 80 aircraft and 150 tons of supplies .

[Aida1]

Yep, that was Jeschonnek:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Jesc ... viet_Union

It seems that the Luftwaffe high officers conferring with Goring on the evening of 23 November (head of air transport was not present, neither was a representative of Luftwaffe fuhrungsstab) were convinced air supply would only be an improvisation limited in time(Stalingrad M Kehrig p 219). They considered 350 ton a day was possible. Not well thought through as that tonnage required a number of aircraft that did not exist given that the number of serviceable aircraft on any given day was below 50 percent and there was also the weather factor and aircraft bei g shot down.

Meaningless and irrelevant .
The number of supplies that the LW could transport to the Kessel was not deciding or had not the importance it was claimed by the Manstein lobby .Neither was the number of lost aircraft .
No one knew and still knows what 6th army needed as supplies and 6th army itself didn't know it .
Besides there is no proof that more supplies would result in a capitulation later than 31 January .

6 army knew very well what it needed and made requests accordingly everyday.

Wrong. Not for the first time .
It were the Soviets who determined what 6th army needed :if there was not much fighting, less ammunition was needed .
No one knows the exact number of Germans that were encircled,the number of casualties ( created by the enemy, not the Martians ! )had an impact on the supply needs : deaths do not need supplies .
No one knows the amount of supplies 66th army received before Uranus .
No one knows the amount of available stocks at the start of Uranus .
All we know is that with the available stocks and the incoming supplies ( not BECAUSE of them ) 6 th army fought during 10 weeks ,but no one knows the importance of the stocks compared to the incoming supplies .
And about these supplies : supplies that remained in Pitemkin were useless (as it was in Antwerp, Tunis,...) and it is perfectly possible that less aircraft could transport more supplies :
Example : on Day X there were 100 transport aircraft and 100 tons of supplies .On Day X + 1 80 aircraft and 150 tons of supplies .

Betrays your complete lack of knowledge on how the supply of 6 army was organized. If you read a detailed study on Stalin grad, you would know better than this jumble of words.
As if the daily requests by 6 army were not based on what the army needed.

[Aida1]

Yep, that was Jeschonnek:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Jesc ... viet_Union

It seems that the Luftwaffe high officers conferring with Goring on the evening of 23 November (head of air transport was not present, neither was a representative of Luftwaffe fuhrungsstab) were convinced air supply would only be an improvisation limited in time(Stalingrad M Kehrig p 219). They considered 350 ton a day was possible. Not well thought through as that tonnage required a number of aircraft that did not exist given that the number of serviceable aircraft on any given day was below 50 percent and there was also the weather factor and aircraft bei g shot down.

Meaningless and irrelevant .
The number of supplies that the LW could transport to the Kessel was not deciding or had not the importance it was claimed by the Manstein lobby .Neither was the number of lost aircraft .
No one knew and still knows what 6th army needed as supplies and 6th army itself didn't know it .
Besides there is no proof that more supplies would result in a capitulation later than 31 January .

You would be the only one that thinks the amount of fuel, ammo and food an army receives has no impact on its ability to conduct military operations.

Where did I say this ?

You did in the above as you claimed the amounts supplied were not important. And claiming that 6 army had no idea what supplies it needed is completely ridiculous. Betrays your lack of knowledge on the subject.

[ljadw]

It seems that the Luftwaffe high officers conferring with Goring on the evening of 23 November (head of air transport was not present, neither was a representative of Luftwaffe fuhrungsstab) were convinced air supply would only be an improvisation limited in time(Stalingrad M Kehrig p 219). They considered 350 ton a day was possible. Not well thought through as that tonnage required a number of aircraft that did not exist given that the number of serviceable aircraft on any given day was below 50 percent and there was also the weather factor and aircraft bei g shot down.

Meaningless and irrelevant .
The number of supplies that the LW could transport to the Kessel was not deciding or had not the importance it was claimed by the Manstein lobby .Neither was the number of lost aircraft .
No one knew and still knows what 6th army needed as supplies and 6th army itself didn't know it .
Besides there is no proof that more supplies would result in a capitulation later than 31 January .

6 army knew very well what it needed and made requests accordingly everyday.

Wrong. Not for the first time .
It were the Soviets who determined what 6th army needed :if there was not much fighting, less ammunition was needed .
No one knows the exact number of Germans that were encircled,the number of casualties ( created by the enemy, not the Martians ! )had an impact on the supply needs : deaths do not need supplies .
No one knows the amount of supplies 66th army received before Uranus .
No one knows the amount of available stocks at the start of Uranus .
All we know is that with the available stocks and the incoming supplies ( not BECAUSE of them ) 6 th army fought during 10 weeks ,but no one knows the importance of the stocks compared to the incoming supplies .
And about these supplies : supplies that remained in Pitemkin were useless (as it was in Antwerp, Tunis,...) and it is perfectly possible that less aircraft could transport more supplies :
Example : on Day X there were 100 transport aircraft and 100 tons of supplies .On Day X + 1 80 aircraft and 150 tons of supplies .

Betrays your complete lack of knowledge on how the supply of 6 army was organized. If you read a detailed study on Stalin grad, you would know better than this jumble of words.
As if the daily requests by 6 army were not based on what the army needed.

Needs of front troops are always exaggerated ,

[ljadw]

It seems that the Luftwaffe high officers conferring with Goring on the evening of 23 November (head of air transport was not present, neither was a representative of Luftwaffe fuhrungsstab) were convinced air supply would only be an improvisation limited in time(Stalingrad M Kehrig p 219). They considered 350 ton a day was possible. Not well thought through as that tonnage required a number of aircraft that did not exist given that the number of serviceable aircraft on any given day was below 50 percent and there was also the weather factor and aircraft bei g shot down.

Meaningless and irrelevant .
The number of supplies that the LW could transport to the Kessel was not deciding or had not the importance it was claimed by the Manstein lobby .Neither was the number of lost aircraft .
No one knew and still knows what 6th army needed as supplies and 6th army itself didn't know it .
Besides there is no proof that more supplies would result in a capitulation later than 31 January .

You would be the only one that thinks the amount of fuel, ammo and food an army receives has no impact on its ability to conduct military operations.

Where did I say this ?

You did in the above as you claimed the amounts supplied were not important. And claiming that 6 army had no idea what supplies it needed is completely ridiculous. Betrays your lack of knowledge on the subject.

FYI : having no impact or not important are two different things .

[Aida1]

Meaningless and irrelevant .
The number of supplies that the LW could transport to the Kessel was not deciding or had not the importance it was claimed by the Manstein lobby .Neither was the number of lost aircraft .
No one knew and still knows what 6th army needed as supplies and 6th army itself didn't know it .
Besides there is no proof that more supplies would result in a capitulation later than 31 January .

6 army knew very well what it needed and made requests accordingly everyday.

Wrong. Not for the first time .
It were the Soviets who determined what 6th army needed :if there was not much fighting, less ammunition was needed .
No one knows the exact number of Germans that were encircled,the number of casualties ( created by the enemy, not the Martians ! )had an impact on the supply needs : deaths do not need supplies .
No one knows the amount of supplies 66th army received before Uranus .
No one knows the amount of available stocks at the start of Uranus .
All we know is that with the available stocks and the incoming supplies ( not BECAUSE of them ) 6 th army fought during 10 weeks ,but no one knows the importance of the stocks compared to the incoming supplies .
And about these supplies : supplies that remained in Pitemkin were useless (as it was in Antwerp, Tunis,...) and it is perfectly possible that less aircraft could transport more supplies :
Example : on Day X there were 100 transport aircraft and 100 tons of supplies .On Day X + 1 80 aircraft and 150 tons of supplies .

Betrays your complete lack of knowledge on how the supply of 6 army was organized. If you read a detailed study on Stalin grad, you would know better than this jumble of words.
As if the daily requests by 6 army were not based on what the army needed.

Needs of front troops are always exaggerated ,

In the case of 6 army certainly not as it could not request more than the bare minimum and mostly did not get even that.

[Aida1]

Meaningless and irrelevant .
The number of supplies that the LW could transport to the Kessel was not deciding or had not the importance it was claimed by the Manstein lobby .Neither was the number of lost aircraft .
No one knew and still knows what 6th army needed as supplies and 6th army itself didn't know it .
Besides there is no proof that more supplies would result in a capitulation later than 31 January .

You would be the only one that thinks the amount of fuel, ammo and food an army receives has no impact on its ability to conduct military operations.

Where did I say this ?

You did in the above as you claimed the amounts supplied were not important. And claiming that 6 army had no idea what supplies it needed is completely ridiculous. Betrays your lack of knowledge on the subject.

FYI : having no impact or not important are two different things .

Semantics as it is very important for an army to have all the ammo and fuel it needs. Has a major effect on operations if you have far less than you would need.

[mezsat2]

Walking into Stalingrad was an insane act by Hitler.

Equally insane was Stalin/Zhukov's choice to encircle the already
destroyed and worthless 6th Army in the city in Nov. 1942. They could
have easily driven all their tanks across the frozen Don to Rostov and
cut off, essentially, the entire German army.

It was insane, again, as a tactician, not a strategist. Stalin
actually wanted to prolong the war as long as possible so he
could eventually take over Eastern Europe. His actions were
strategic, not tactical.

[ljadw]

Walking into Stalingrad was an insane act by Hitler.

Equally insane was Stalin/Zhukov's choice to encircle the already
destroyed and worthless 6th Army in the city in Nov. 1942. They could
have easily driven all their tanks across the frozen Don to Rostov and
cut off, essentially, the entire German army.

It was insane, again, as a tactician, not a strategist. Stalin
actually wanted to prolong the war as long as possible so he
could eventually take over Eastern Europe. His actions were
strategic, not tactical.

The fall of Rostow would (better :could maybe ) have cit off AGA of Kleist , but not AGN which was fighting at the suburbs of Leningrad, not AG Center which stopped big Soviet attacks and even not AGS which was located north of Rostow .
What Hitler and Stalin did was not insane .
Stalin did not want to prolong the war as long as possible, because the longer the war, the greater the risk that the West and not the USSR would conquer Eastern Europe .

[Aida1]

Walking into Stalingrad was an insane act by Hitler.

Equally insane was Stalin/Zhukov's choice to encircle the already
destroyed and worthless 6th Army in the city in Nov. 1942. They could
have easily driven all their tanks across the frozen Don to Rostov and
cut off, essentially, the entire German army.

It was insane, again, as a tactician, not a strategist. Stalin
actually wanted to prolong the war as long as possible so he
could eventually take over Eastern Europe. His actions were
strategic, not tactical.

The fall of Rostow would (better :could maybe ) have cit off AGA of Kleist , but not AGN which was fighting at the suburbs of Leningrad, not AG Center which stopped big Soviet attacks and even not AGS which was located north of Rostow .
What Hitler and Stalin did was not insane .
Stalin did not want to prolong the war as long as possible, because the longer the war, the greater the risk that the West and not the USSR would conquer Eastern Europe .

He was not literally meaning the whole german army, i am certain. Certainly, the offensive could from the beginning have been even more ambitious.