Stalingrad

[mezsat2]

Hey Mezsat2,

I am not going to get into grand strategy in the Mediterranean or Middle East but I will correct a couple things. Hoth's 4th Panzer did ultimately stay with the 6th Army and you may rethink your conclusions on Caucasian oil after reading this article. https://en.topwar.ru/174335-pravda-o-za ... nefti.html

For whatever reason it is being ignored that the Don Basin is too small an area for all of Army Group South to operate in. The railroad Sixth Army relied on was insufficient for its needs let alone additional units, and even when Hoth captured the southern line it was under supplied. You can hop up and down and blame Hitler, or you can draw arrows going where you like on a map, but it won't change the fact that if the 17th Army doesn't go south it doesn't do anything at all.

Lastly, not to go on about the bridgeheads again but it would not have taken an additional Panzer Army (4th Panzer) to wipe them out, it just would have taken the 6th Army more time. Oil and time are pretty much the two commodities Germany never had enough of.

KP

Sorry, you're just wrong here, pal. Hitler ordered 4th PZ army in Aug. 42 to "help" Kleist take the Caucasus.
Everyone knows this, except you, apparently. Von Kleist reported that they just "got in his way" and drained
crucial supplies from him.

Ultimately, yes. 4th PZ army was diverted to Stalingrad in the fall/winter 1942- with great waste of fuel and equipment.

It is you that is wrong. 4th panzer army command with most of its forces was diverted to Heeresgruppe B at the end of july(Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg Band 6 DVA 1990 pp 931-932).

We can haggle back and forth about a few weeks of time. It makes no difference. 4th Panzer was inexplicably diverted to 1st PZ Armees' area of operations in Summer of 42, when they should have been devoted to 6th Army's thrust. In fact, had the 4th driven full speed into Stalingrad in Aug. 42, the city would have fallen virtually without a fight. 6th Army could worry about the Don and Don/Volga landbridge.

[AbollonPolweder]

...
Divisions did not fight in the pocket as divisions, but as battalions/Kampfgruppen .
Take 14.Pz :

Yes, the Lexikon der Wehrmacht confirms this opinion.
The method of counting the number of "Europeans" who found themselves surrounded near Stalingrad is not entirely correct. In particular, we are talking about the 14th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht. The easiest way is to look in the Lexicon. For example:

Anfang November 1942 wurde die Division aus der Front gezogen und als Eingreifreserve im großen Donbogen hinter der rumänischen Front versammelt. Die beiden Panzergrenadier-Regimenter hatten zusammen noch eine Stärke eines Bataillons, das Kradschützen-Bataillon hatte noch Kompaniestärke. Im Zuge des russischen Großangriffs zur Einschließung der deutschen Truppen in Stalingrad wurden die Reste der Division nach Osten gedrückt und im Kessel von Stalingrad eingeschlossen. Bei den Kämpfen im Kessel wurden die hier eingeschlossenen Teile der Division bis Januar 1943 vernichtet.
Nach Abschluss der Kämpfe um Stalingrad wurde im März 1943 in Westfrankreich im Raum Angers - Nantes - Chôlet - Montaigue neu aufgestellt. Hierzu wurden alle
nicht im Kessel von Stalingrad untergegangenen Teile der Division gesammelt und durch Ersatz aufgefüllt. Die Aufstellung dauerte bis in den Herbst 1943.
At the beginning of November 1942, the division was pulled out of the front and assembled as an strike reserve in the large Don arc behind the Romanian front. The two Panzergrenadier regiments together had a battalion strength, the Kradschützen battalion still had a company strength. In the course of the Russian large-scale attack to encircle the German troops in Stalingrad, the remnants of the division were pushed east and trapped in the Stalingrad Pocket. During the fighting in the pocket, the enclosed parts of the division were destroyed by January 1943.

After the end of the battles for Stalingrad, in March 1943 the Angers - Nantes - Chôlet - Montaigue area the division was re-established in western France. For this purpose, all parts of the division that had not perished in the Stalingrad pocket were collected and replenished with replacements.

From this text it can be seen that the 14th Panzer Division suffered heavy losses even before the encirclement and its “contribution” to the number of “Europeans” surrounded near Stalingrad is small, but until March 1943 it still was fighting as a combat unit.
P.S. We should ask Yuri why he thinks that the abbreviation Ma on the map is translated as "main forces"?

[Konig_pilsner]

Mezsat2 wrote.

We can haggle back and forth about a few weeks of time. It makes no difference.

The only one haggling is you. You were incorrect and there is no shame in admitting it, actually it would be a sign of maturity.

In fact, had the 4th driven full speed into Stalingrad in Aug. 42, the city would have fallen virtually without a fight. 6th Army could worry about the Don and Don/Volga landbridge.

Yeah... sure. Leeb could have driven right into Leningrad! Bock could have driven right into Moscow! And now, Paulus could have driven right into Stalingrad!

It has been explained to you why this did not happen historically, and why it couldn't happen in your fantasy. If you are really interested in understanding the subject manner of which you are so inclined to have such strong opinions, I suggest start by reading Beevor's Stalingrad. That is what I did.

KP

[Yuri]

Today, November 19, 2022 marks the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the greatest military operation in modern military history, Operation Uranus, which marked the beginning of the expulsion of European invaders from the territory of the Soviet Union.
To commemorate the greatest contribution of artillery to the success of Operation Uranus, 78 years ago in 1944, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, Comrade Stalin, issued an order to establish the "Artillery Day" holiday on November 19.
Congratulations to all gunners (and myself too) on the Artillery Day Holiday!

[Aida1]

Today, November 19, 2022 marks the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the greatest military operation in modern military history, Operation Uranus, which marked the beginning of the expulsion of European invaders from the territory of the Soviet Union.
To commemorate the greatest contribution of artillery to the success of Operation Uranus, 78 years ago in 1944, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, Comrade Stalin, issued an order to establish the "Artillery Day" holiday on November 19.
Congratulations to all gunners (and myself too) on the Artillery Day Holiday!

Hardly the greatest military operation in modern miltary history.

[Yuri]

Today, November 19, 2022 marks the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the greatest military operation in modern military history, Operation Uranus, which marked the beginning of the expulsion of European invaders from the territory of the Soviet Union.
To commemorate the greatest contribution of artillery to the success of Operation Uranus, 78 years ago in 1944, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, Comrade Stalin, issued an order to establish the "Artillery Day" holiday on November 19.
Congratulations to all gunners (and myself too) on the Artillery Day Holiday!

Hardly the greatest military operation in modern miltary history.

Of course, for Europeans, this is the greatest military disaster.

[Aida1]

Mezsat2 wrote.

We can haggle back and forth about a few weeks of time. It makes no difference.

The only one haggling is you. You were incorrect and there is no shame in admitting it, actually it would be a sign of maturity.

In fact, had the 4th driven full speed into Stalingrad in Aug. 42, the city would have fallen virtually without a fight. 6th Army could worry about the Don and Don/Volga landbridge.

Yeah... sure. Leeb could have driven right into Leningrad! Bock could have driven right into Moscow! And now, Paulus could have driven right into Stalingrad!

It has been explained to you why this did not happen historically, and why it couldn't happen in your fantasy. If you are really interested in understanding the subject manner of which you are so inclined to have such strong opinions, I suggest start by reading Beevor's Stalingrad. That is what I did.

KP

You are not a great speecialist either on Stalingrad given the statements you made.

[mezsat2]

My dates are certainly off. I believe it was early July when 4th Pz Army was diverted to the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the disastrous consequences of this move are clearly evident.

Today it is well-known that Stalingrad was virtually undefended throughout June and July. Could 4th PZ have stormed the city in a rush and taken it at that time? It was possible, IMHO. 6th Army could slug it out with the Red Army units scattered up and down the Don. Seizure of the bridge at Kalach was an obvious necessity.

Again, German intelligence left a lot to be desired in those days. I don't think they really had a good idea of what the Russians had at Stalingrad in Summer 1942. Good intelligence is about 40% as important as the power of forces in the field.

[Globalization41]

[(Yuri posted) Today, November 19, 2022 marks the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the greatest military operation in modern military history, Operation Uranus...] ... Don't you think the Red Army summer offensive of '44 was bigger than the Stalingrad campaign Yuri? ... ... Stalin might have a bad reputation with some people, but the Soviets should have kept Stalingrad's city name in honor of the infantrymen who fought in the battle.

Globalization41.

[Aida1]

My dates are certainly off. I believe it was early July when 4th Pz Army was diverted to the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the disastrous consequences of this move are clearly evident.

Today it is well-known that Stalingrad was virtually undefended throughout June and July. Could 4th PZ have stormed the city in a rush and taken it at that time? It was possible, IMHO. 6th Army could slug it out with the Red Army units scattered up and down the Don. Seizure of the bridge at Kalach was an obvious necessity.

Again, German intelligence left a lot to be desired in those days. I don't think they really had a good idea of what the Russians had at Stalingrad in Summer 1942. Good intelligence is about 40% as important as the power of forces in the field.

It happened on july 13 (Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg Band 6 p 884) but 4 Pz army was not really diverted to the Caucasus at that time. The diversion to Heeresgruppe A was because of the attempt to surround red army forces to the east of Rostov which eventually failed. Bock had wanted to push east because he did not believe the surrounding of the red army forces would succeed. Anyway, at that time Hitler was not yet really interested in taking Stalingrad(DRWZ Band 6 p 889) so the whole idea of rushing for Stalingrad then is hindsight and there is also the lack of fuel . German intelligence was certainly aware that the red army was going to try to hold Stalingrad without knowing the detail of the defensive preparations (DRZW Band 6 p 888).
The real problem was going for 2 objectives at the same time with forces that were too weak.

[mezsat2]

My dates are certainly off. I believe it was early July when 4th Pz Army was diverted to the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the disastrous consequences of this move are clearly evident.

Today it is well-known that Stalingrad was virtually undefended throughout June and July. Could 4th PZ have stormed the city in a rush and taken it at that time? It was possible, IMHO. 6th Army could slug it out with the Red Army units scattered up and down the Don. Seizure of the bridge at Kalach was an obvious necessity.

Again, German intelligence left a lot to be desired in those days. I don't think they really had a good idea of what the Russians had at Stalingrad in Summer 1942. Good intelligence is about 40% as important as the power of forces in the field.

It happened on july 13 (Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg Band 6 p 884) but 4 Pz army was not really diverted to the Caucasus at that time. The diversion to Heeresgruppe A was because of the attempt to surround red army forces to the east of Rostov which eventually failed. Bock had wanted to push east because he did not believe the surrounding of the red army forces would succeed. Anyway, at that time Hitler was not yet really interested in taking Stalingrad(DRWZ Band 6 p 889) so the whole idea of rushing for Stalingrad then is hindsight and there is also the lack of fuel . German intelligence was certainly aware that the red army was going to try to hold Stalingrad without knowing the detail of the defensive preparations (DRZW Band 6 p 888).
The real problem was going for 2 objectives at the same time with forces that were too weak.

You are essentially correct. The proper strategic action would have been to drive all forces straight down the Don, secure the landbridge to the Volga, throw up defenses, and occupy Stalingrad completely by early August and eliminate all Red Army bridgeheads over the Don.

All of 1st Panzerarmee could have stood down in and around Rostov until sufficient fuel and ammo were stockpiled. Luftwaffe would concentrate completely on the Soviet guns on the left bank of the Volga and the ferry landings. Spring 43 may have provided the opportunity to drive on the Caucasus.

[ljadw]

My dates are certainly off. I believe it was early July when 4th Pz Army was diverted to the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the disastrous consequences of this move are clearly evident.

Today it is well-known that Stalingrad was virtually undefended throughout June and July. Could 4th PZ have stormed the city in a rush and taken it at that time? It was possible, IMHO. 6th Army could slug it out with the Red Army units scattered up and down the Don. Seizure of the bridge at Kalach was an obvious necessity.

Again, German intelligence left a lot to be desired in those days. I don't think they really had a good idea of what the Russians had at Stalingrad in Summer 1942. Good intelligence is about 40% as important as the power of forces in the field.

It happened on july 13 (Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg Band 6 p 884) but 4 Pz army was not really diverted to the Caucasus at that time. The diversion to Heeresgruppe A was because of the attempt to surround red army forces to the east of Rostov which eventually failed. Bock had wanted to push east because he did not believe the surrounding of the red army forces would succeed. Anyway, at that time Hitler was not yet really interested in taking Stalingrad(DRWZ Band 6 p 889) so the whole idea of rushing for Stalingrad then is hindsight and there is also the lack of fuel . German intelligence was certainly aware that the red army was going to try to hold Stalingrad without knowing the detail of the defensive preparations (DRZW Band 6 p 888).
The real problem was going for 2 objectives at the same time with forces that were too weak.

You are essentially correct. The proper strategic action would have been to drive all forces straight down the Don, secure the landbridge to the Volga, throw up defenses, and occupy Stalingrad completely by early August and eliminate all Red Army bridgeheads over the Don.

All of 1st Panzerarmee could have stood down in and around Rostov until sufficient fuel and ammo were stockpiled. Luftwaffe would concentrate completely on the Soviet guns on the left bank of the Volga and the ferry landings. Spring 43 may have provided the opportunity to drive on the Caucasus.

Spring 1943 would be too late,much too late : time was Germany's biggest enemy and time was running against Germany :Germany could not win,even not survive a long war .
Besides :Stalingrad was only a subordinate target :the real target was the oil of the Caucasus (and it was very doubtful that the Germans could occupy Baku and Maikop and if this was done,that the USSR would collaps .) To occupy the oilfields,the Germans needed to go to Astrachan and this could be done only if BEFORE the Soviets were totally defeated and the fall of Stalingrad would not cause the collaps of the USSR .

[Aida1]

My dates are certainly off. I believe it was early July when 4th Pz Army was diverted to the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the disastrous consequences of this move are clearly evident.

Today it is well-known that Stalingrad was virtually undefended throughout June and July. Could 4th PZ have stormed the city in a rush and taken it at that time? It was possible, IMHO. 6th Army could slug it out with the Red Army units scattered up and down the Don. Seizure of the bridge at Kalach was an obvious necessity.

Again, German intelligence left a lot to be desired in those days. I don't think they really had a good idea of what the Russians had at Stalingrad in Summer 1942. Good intelligence is about 40% as important as the power of forces in the field.

It happened on july 13 (Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg Band 6 p 884) but 4 Pz army was not really diverted to the Caucasus at that time. The diversion to Heeresgruppe A was because of the attempt to surround red army forces to the east of Rostov which eventually failed. Bock had wanted to push east because he did not believe the surrounding of the red army forces would succeed. Anyway, at that time Hitler was not yet really interested in taking Stalingrad(DRWZ Band 6 p 889) so the whole idea of rushing for Stalingrad then is hindsight and there is also the lack of fuel . German intelligence was certainly aware that the red army was going to try to hold Stalingrad without knowing the detail of the defensive preparations (DRZW Band 6 p 888).
The real problem was going for 2 objectives at the same time with forces that were too weak.

You are essentially correct. The proper strategic action would have been to drive all forces straight down the Don, secure the landbridge to the Volga, throw up defenses, and occupy Stalingrad completely by early August and eliminate all Red Army bridgeheads over the Don.

All of 1st Panzerarmee could have stood down in and around Rostov until sufficient fuel and ammo were stockpiled. Luftwaffe would concentrate completely on the Soviet guns on the left bank of the Volga and the ferry landings. Spring 43 may have provided the opportunity to drive on the Caucasus.

Spring 1943 would be too late,much too late : time was Germany's biggest enemy and time was running against Germany :Germany could not win,even not survive a long war .
Besides :Stalingrad was only a subordinate target :the real target was the oil of the Caucasus (and it was very doubtful that the Germans could occupy Baku and Maikop and if this was done,that the USSR would collaps .) To occupy the oilfields,the Germans needed to go to Astrachan and this could be done only if BEFORE the Soviets were totally defeated and the fall of Stalingrad would not cause the collaps of the USSR .

As always denying everything.

[ljadw]

The reply I expected .

[mezsat2]

All this said, Stalingrad could have fallen to Wehrmacht forces with tolerable losses in August 1942 were it suddenly attacked in force.

The overall strategic question is whether or not Germany could defend the Don from Voronezh to the bend in winter, and also fortify
the Don/Volga land bridge in sufficient strength. Stalin may have blown right through these defenses in Jan. Feb. 1943 straight to
Rostov and cut off most of the German army.

These hypothetical questions will never have a rational answer.