#60
Post
by Cult Icon » 31 Jan 2015, 20:00
Just other thoughts about Sept. 1942, with the new thread and the benefit of hindsight. :
-Chuikov benefited much from Paulus' predictability. He even commanded down to platoon level.
-The pre-battle bombing of Stalingrad was a well known waste of aerial resources. It did not need to be so extensive.
-Paulus approached the city and created his battle plan as if he was still practicing maneuver warfare out in the open- the 'coup de main' option was off the cards but he still tried to take Stalingrad via 'coup de main' with 2 x Panzer korps even though it was a fortified region that saw 6 AOK coming for weeks. This was a mistake, and resulted in tense situations and an overall weakening of his mobile forces and armor.
-The obvious necessity of isolating 62nd/64th Army from the Volga was not sufficiently pursued; Paulus' pincer ran into a brick wall here, but quit and tried no-win options.
-There was little attempt to keep a strong ready reserve and allocate points of main effort. 6 AOK's strength was dissipated through inadequately strong attacks on a broad front. Concentration would have paid heftily if, for instance, he had supported 24. Pz's blitz into central stalingrad properly.
-Paulus seemed more focused on his orders and less focused on unit preservation, which should have been his priority once he got there; his combat elements were already down to 2/3rds, and his armor situation was even worse- closer to 1/2 the original. His next major reserve, 100 Jager, would came much later. That some of his divisions were losing 300 men a day should have alarmed him that he was doing something wrong.
-I think Paulus should have made an operational pause, rather than give attack orders for his korps piecemeal as soon as they arrived. He should have approached Stalingrad like a set-piece battle utilizing deception and accumulation of resources. He should have done more extensive planning like Manstein did for Kerch and Sevastapol. He had the powerful Fliegerkorps 8's main effort on his side, but this asset was not used in the optimal way. The subsequent operation should have involved all forces attacking with maximum deception & haste in order to have to highest probability of success. Its timetable would, by necessity, be total victory in several days of continuous strong attacks with clear objectives and sufficient force concentration on decisive points.
Last edited by
Cult Icon on 31 Jan 2015, 20:07, edited 1 time in total.