Opening days of Barbarossa

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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AJFFM
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#31

Post by AJFFM » 18 Feb 2015, 18:48

At the height of Barbarossa, around Aug. 1st, the Germans had around 130 divisions in the front line and if I am not mistaken 30 divisions elsewhere in Europe and NA (not to mention the million or so men manning Anti-Aircraft batteries). Finding 17-20 divisions for this fourth AG which will be centered at V. Luki between AGN and AGC won't be hard especially if the tasks of this AG was purely defensive (cover the flanks of both AGs bordering it).

ljadw
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#32

Post by ljadw » 18 Feb 2015, 19:17

1 million men of the Flak does not mean a possible 20 divisions more .


AJFFM
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#33

Post by AJFFM » 18 Feb 2015, 19:41

And no one said all the 20 divisions should come exclusively from those 1 million men. One division per army (including from allies), amalgamation of Fallschirmjager regimental troops who are now jobless into the Heer, grouping the best performing SS and Security battalions and regiments into divisions (the latter is what happened from 42 onward) and finally taking the best battalions from occupation forces will end up with much more than 20 divisions.

When the Germans were hard pressed beginning from the middle of 42 all the above policies were implemented which saw the number of German troops shoot up despite mounting casualties but it was too little too late.

Alixanther
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#34

Post by Alixanther » 18 Feb 2015, 21:46

AJFFM wrote:At the height of Barbarossa, around Aug. 1st, the Germans had around 130 divisions in the front line and if I am not mistaken 30 divisions elsewhere in Europe and NA (not to mention the million or so men manning Anti-Aircraft batteries). Finding 17-20 divisions for this fourth AG which will be centered at V. Luki between AGN and AGC won't be hard especially if the tasks of this AG was purely defensive (cover the flanks of both AGs bordering it).
You can usually find people unsuitable to front duty manning those Flaks. That doesn't means all Flak personnel was unsuitable for front duty, but I doubt there were more than 50 %.

New formations also means new commanders. If the plan is to upgrade strength values of current formations, then they need various training in order to keep up with the seasoned troops, otherwise they're more of a burden than a relief.

Why would you need a new Army Group instead of simply reinforcing AGN? I don't see the point.

steverodgers801
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#35

Post by steverodgers801 » 19 Feb 2015, 03:19

AJ, you don't simply create an army group by putting a bunch of men together. You need officers to lead them, you need equipment of all kinds. Germany could not maintain their current structure, there was no means to build a whole new group.

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doogal
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#36

Post by doogal » 19 Feb 2015, 16:17

Not to mention that each formation from div, corps, army, army group has to be staffed by the full range of officer grades, you need competent non commissioned officers as well: You cant really just transplant an Army Group from another theatre due to it being in combat so that it cannot be removed.
Without doubt earlier in the War (with hindsight) Germany had the manpower to create a larger Wehrmacht(if you consider the figures for losses in the last two years and the efforts made to replace these) but as steve says how would you equip them.
And you should consider that pre 1933 there were a few thousand serving officers, only a percentage General Staff trained and this expanded to roughly 27000 by 1940 (that's with newer cohorts added and retired officers) there was still a shortfall of 3000 for the estimated size of the Heer.
The Luftwaffe also had to be staffed with Heer Officers, training took time and although from 1939 onwards training was effectively streamlined with combat taken into account, the existing staff levels were problematic:
And that's not even accounting for combat losses of all officer ranks from 1939 onwards:

AJFFM
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#37

Post by AJFFM » 19 Feb 2015, 19:03

First of all, the Germans already knew that after the pass the Marshes a gap would develop between 4th army and Guderian's Pz. Group as the latter moves south which is why 2nd Army was created in first place and moved into the gap. However as battle developed the entire AGC shifted south which pushed 2nd Army to the right of Guderian and by the time which in turn created the gap between AGC and AGN north of 9th Army.

While another AG would be a better solution even an independent Army under AGN control situated between 16th and 9th armies would have sufficed. Troop density per Km. of front north of 9th Army was sparse and when Northwestern Front attacked it easily took V. Luki after its first occupation. When the Kalinin front Attacked in December 41 it nearly enveloped AGC from the north and lead to the creation of the German salient in Rzhev and the pockets in V. Luki, Kholm and Demyansk.

The second issue is about officer corps and quality of troops, we are talking about the Wehrmacht nor the Red Army, there was no purge nor was mass firing of officers for failure. There were plenty of staff officers in occupation forces or relatively young retirees to make the necessary staffs for several armies not just one. For field command posts the average age of battalion commanders at the time of Barbarossa if I am not mistaken was 45, that is enough experience to lead divisions of which several officers were indeed of that age. Promotions after 3 huge successful campaigns were dually deserved. For troop quality, while they won't be top notch remember their objective is flank cover/defensive not attack. The terrain would have been a force multiplier for defenders and the quality of opposition itself was not that great to begin with.

Final point about equipment, the Nazis had the equipment of the entire French army at their disposal not to mention earlier and later conquests. The nature of the task for the troops in question would not have forced a major crisis in equipment.

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doogal
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#38

Post by doogal » 19 Feb 2015, 20:12

ajfmm wrote: another AG would be a better solution even an independent Army under AGN control situated between 16th and 9th armies would have sufficed
If we are talking about a single Army then I have no problem with that, although why you wouldn't just enlarge 9th Army with an extra 2/3 inf corps and get your div strengths up rather than adding another army command I don't know.
ajffm wrote: while they won't be top notch remember their objective is flank cover/defensive not attack.
This sounds fine in practice but they would had to be of sufficient skill and strength to mount an active defense, including local counter attacks and possibly larger offensive operations.
ajfmm wrote: there was no purge nor was mass firing of officers for failure. There were plenty of staff officers in occupation forces or relatively young retirees to make the necessary staffs for several armies not just one. For field command posts the average age of battalion commanders at the time of Barbarossa if I am not mistaken was 45, that is enough experience to lead divisions of which several officers were indeed of that age. Promotions after 3 huge successful campaigns were dually deserved.
As I said from 1933-1939 they re-called early/late retirees, lowered entry standards to the new Wehrmacht War Academy, promoted nco`s and were still 3000 officers short at the start of the War. Many of these went to administrative roles, as such they assumed the peace time roles of the Army while the field army conducted operations. At the end of the war many in these roles had to fight owing to the lack of officers.
Im surprised at that age for Battalion commanders, it seems more like Regimental commanders age in 1940. ( but will defer if its right)
By the end of the War the ages for Colonels and Major Generals were closer to that age.

ajffm wrote: the Nazis had the equipment of the entire French army at their disposal not to mention earlier and later conquests
That would have meant keeping French production lines of main equipment, spares, and everything else running, with Labour, no attempt at conversion otherwise it would have been impossible: The diffusion in equipment was one of the greatest drawbacks of the expanded Wehrmacht when considering transport, motorisation etc.

AJFFM
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#39

Post by AJFFM » 19 Feb 2015, 20:27

Expanding the already large 9th army (initially 3 corps, later a fourth corps (XX corps) was added) which was already fighting on an overextended front would have been problematic due to logistic and battle control. The gap was relatively 150 km. long and assuming a division/20km of front (since the land in question was heavily wooded and cut by many rivers and lakes) an 8-10 division army would fill the gap but will still face trouble.

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doogal
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#40

Post by doogal » 20 Feb 2015, 12:09

I have seen the map u posted on the Stalingrad thread:

You without doubt have a point that 9th army was over extended and holding longer divisional fronts, and 11th army was to be used to "line straighten" in the area, but was re-deployed/split apart.
I don't disagree that at the beginning of Barbarossa there was enough slack for the addition of an extra army, but not another army group at that time based on the size of the Wehrmacht in 1941: We know now that there was sufficient manpower available over the course of the war, to have had more men in uniform earlier. As they didn't the extra formations would have to be made from reserve/occupation forces, which would then have to have replacements flowing to them: the larger the force the larger the existing problems: supply etc:
So an army at the most.

Erwinn
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#41

Post by Erwinn » 25 Feb 2015, 10:48

30 more divisions to fill the gap?

Surely you wouldn't think those divisions will stay there. They would eventually end up doing more of Hitler's fantasy work like going for a drive past-Rostov...(In 1941)

ljadw
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#42

Post by ljadw » 25 Feb 2015, 20:03

doogal wrote:We know now that there was sufficient manpower available over the course of the war, to have had more men in uniform earlier.
This is not correct,and,besides unimportant .

Alixanther
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#43

Post by Alixanther » 05 Mar 2015, 21:41

doogal wrote:We know now that there was sufficient manpower available over the course of the war, to have had more men in uniform earlier.
There are two types of people on this forum.

The first one is "Germany had the manpower available but they did not have the industrial power, so help us Tooze."
The second one is "Germany had all the weapons they need but they did not have the manpower."

Make up your mind.

ljadw
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#44

Post by ljadw » 05 Mar 2015, 22:28

This is meaningless blahblah :manpower available ? WHEN ? To do what ?

:industrial power available ? WHEN ? To do what ?

Alixanther
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Re: Opening days of Barbarossa

#45

Post by Alixanther » 06 Mar 2015, 08:39

ljadw wrote:This is meaningless blahblah :manpower available ? WHEN ? To do what ?

:industrial power available ? WHEN ? To do what ?

Actually, you're meaningless.

Manpower isn't something that dramatically varies along (short) time, unless you nuke some populations big time. Or, if you're discussing Middle Age bubonic plague, or something like that. So - your meaningless question ("when") is meaningless. German manpower is German manpower*. As simple as that.

Industrial power - on the other hand - is quite timescale relevant - although it should be taken with a grain of salt: no matter how many factories you create, you're still dependable on the scarcest raw material you (still) have.

* even if you take into account the expansion of the Reich, manpower also depends of the willingness of the Reich' citizens to fight. So, German expansion into Austria, Bohemia and Alsace-Lorraine could - or could not - be seen as "gaining manpower". There were instances where A-L recruits would surrender without fighting.

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