German defeat in the East consequence of victories 1941-42?

[ljadw]

In june 1942 Germany was weaker than in june 1941 and the SU was stronger than in june 1941.

The success of Blau depended on 2 things ,the second of which being the most important

1)Immediately after the start of Blau the opposing Soviet forces had to be destroyed (700000 POW had to be taken) and their withdrawal to the Wolga and the Caucasus had to be prevented : this did not happen

2)The SU should not have enough reserves to replace these losses : this assumption was not correct

And, even without hindsight, there is NO proof at all that a success of Blau would have compelled the SU to stop the fighting : the German economic experts warned against the wishful assumption that the loss of the Caucasian oil would result in the collaps of the SU .

Already before Stalingrad Blau had failed, but,against one's better judgement,the Germans continued,because the alternative was worse .

[ML59]

I agree. Once the Germans reached Stalingrad, even if their strategy proved to be wrong and there were clear, evident signs of exhaustion of the troops and unresolved logistic problems, they had no easy way-out. The only hope was to be able to crush the soviet resistance and gain few months of respite to plan another spring campaign from favorable positions (in itself another questionable statement, given the state of transport network and the lack of oil that was already hitting hard German freedom of movements).

[stg 44]

In june 1942 Germany was weaker than in june 1941 and the SU was stronger than in june 1941.

The success of Blau depended on 2 things ,the second of which being the most important

1)Immediately after the start of Blau the opposing Soviet forces had to be destroyed (700000 POW had to be taken) and their withdrawal to the Wolga and the Caucasus had to be prevented : this did not happen

2)The SU should not have enough reserves to replace these losses : this assumption was not correct

And, even without hindsight, there is NO proof at all that a success of Blau would have compelled the SU to stop the fighting : the German economic experts warned against the wishful assumption that the loss of the Caucasian oil would result in the collaps of the SU .

Already before Stalingrad Blau had failed, but,against one's better judgement,the Germans continued,because the alternative was worse .

Stronger/weaker in what capacity? The Soviets had lost 40% of their pre-war economy and had 40-50 million people overrun. By most measures they were weaker than pre-war in 1942, while Germany overran huge resources and was in fact stronger due to controlling so much of the USSR. Especially relatively. Yes the Soviets had higher aircraft and AFV production than in 1941 and had more men mobilized, while relatively German combat strength had deteriorated compared to the start of the invasion, but by most measures the Germans were relatively stronger in 1942 to the Soviets than they were at the start of the invasion. Without LL the Soviets would have been significantly weaker, but it was the economic aid of the Allies that rescued the Soviets from even greater economic disruption that they would have otherwise experienced if fighting solely on their own resources.

Even with the German overall strategic position worsening due to US entry Blau even with the failure to destroy Soviet forces opposite them at the start of the offensive was remarkably successful at further degrading the Soviet economy and inflicting disproportionate losses on the Soviets. The problem with its execution was straying from the original plan by ignoring Stalingrad and then fixating on it and suffering unsustainable losses in street fighting to take the city. Had the Germans avoided that and withdrawn to defensible winter lines in October Blau would have been an outstanding overall success, even if it didn't obtain its objective of capturing Soviet oil. The damage to the Soviets would have been well worth the effort provided the Germans pulled back before Operation Uranus happened and Stalingrad wasn't allowed to become a bloodbath. Come 1943 the Germans would have been quite strong and able to defeat the Soviet winter offensives and hold the line in the East through most of the year, even as the situation in the west deteriorated. That would have left the Soviets much worse off.

[ljadw]

1)That the Soviets had lost 40 % of their pre-war economy does not mean that they were weaker than on 21 june 1941:it is not so that,if they had not lost these 40 %,they would have been 40 % stronger than in the OTL.

2)What the Germans could get (NET !) from the occupied territories in the East was almost meaningless compared to what they produced and to what they needed.

3)I disagree with your statement about the importance of LL

4)About Blau :there was no straying from the original plan :Blau was about the capture of the oil fields of the Caucasus and when this failed, it was over : Stalingrad was secundary .

5)There was no possibility to withdraw in october to defensible lines .

6)The aim of Blau was to eliminate the SU ,not to weaken it .


7) In june 1942 the Ostheer was weaker than in june 1941:this is proved by the manpower comparisons /The Red Army OTOH was stronger ,in everything .Soviet manpower in june 1941:5.5 million/in may 1942:1O.9 million;operational forces (Stavka reserves included) : 1941 : 3.3 million;1942 :5.9 million

[stg 44]

4)About Blau :there was no straying from the original plan :Blau was about the capture of the oil fields of the Caucasus and when this failed, it was over : Stalingrad was secundary .

That was the end result of Blau, but it was a phased plan and phase 3 was abandoned to rush phase 4, but then they did a modified phase 3 with 6th army. According to the plan Phase 3 was to rush to Stalingrad and take it, which was on the table as they moved down from Voronezh, but Hitler saw Soviet forces retreating and wanted to chase them, while von Bock wanted to stick to the plan and ended up getting sacked for one too many disagreements with Hitler. So Stalingrad became and afterthought, 4 Panzer army diverted south over the Don then rerouted back to Stalingrad later once it was determined they weren't necessary for the advance into the Caucasus and they joined up with 6th army that had belatedly moved on Stalignrad in August once defenses were much more prepared, rather than in July when 4th Panzer army could have rushed it and taken it undefended.

5)There was no possibility to withdraw in october to defensible lines .

There was if the decision to do so had been made, but Hitler didn't want to listen to reports of Soviets massing on the Romanians' flanks.

6)The aim of Blau was to eliminate the SU ,not to weaken it .

That was incidental to seizing the oil. It was assumed the Soviets were effectively already beaten and the move on the Caucasus would push them over the brink, but the main aim was to grab the oil to fuel the war effort in 1943 against the Wallies.

7) In june 1942 the Ostheer was weaker than in june 1941:this is proved by the manpower comparisons /The Red Army OTOH was stronger ,in everything .Soviet manpower in june 1941:5.5 million/in may 1942:1O.9 million;operational forces (Stavka reserves included) : 1941 : 3.3 million;1942 :5.9 million

Sure, but in terms of industrial capacity and overall manpower the Soviets were weaker, they just had mobilized for war. Germany meanwhile was relatively stronger having taken major resources and wiped out the pre-war army of the Soviets via a surprise invasion before the Soviets could mobilize. The problem was overall the Germans were weaker due to manpower losses and the addition of the US to the war. That factor more than Soviet mobilization meant Germany's doom.

[ljadw]

There were no reports of Soviets massing on the Rumanian flanks: til the end (= 6 november),FHO was talking of a Soviet attack against AGC,where the big fighting was and were the big German losses were .Hitler was the only who was thinking about something as Uranus .But there were no reserves available ,or better the available reserves were insufficient : only one PzD from the West .

The only possibility for the Germans to prevent a "catastrophe" was to withdraw at the line of 28 june 1942, which was excluded .

About the oil:Germany did not need the Caucasian oil and it was excluded that the oil could be transported to Germany .The Germans went to the Caucasus because they hoped that without the oil the SU would collaps,when this was questioned,Hitler said : I need the oil to continue the war,which was only an excuse,because,he didn't get the oil but continued the war .Germany would not be stronger with the oil .Germany could be stronger only if the SU was defeated .

I do not agree that the addition of the US was more important than the Soviet mobilisation :the Soviets would be in Berlin even if the US remained neutral and the US/UK would be in Berlin even if the Soviets were defeated .

[ljadw]

About Fall Blau : everyone is talking about Stalingrad, but Fall Blau failed very quickly ...in the Caucasus, before the Germans were at Stalingrad .After the Caucasian failure, it was decided that the Schwerpunkt would be moved to AGB= Stalingrad .

[Cult Icon]

Yes, Blau failed quickly, however, it still caused significant damage to the soviets (well under what they wanted, though). It was around 6.5 to 1 casualties (according to Glantz- from army records I recently looked at it appears to be more like ~3.5:1 IIRC) from July-Nov 1942, however the ratio reversed to 4 to 1 (in favor of the soviets in OP Ring). In the Caucasus, soviet counter-attack activity was weak until Nov 1942. It was moderate, high, and moderate at the North, Center, and at the Voronezth axis respectively.

The Axis of course had no business in the USSR; they were always defeated once their forces ran out and the soviets brought in the next new wave.

In june 1942 Germany was weaker than in june 1941 and the SU was stronger than in june 1941.

The success of Blau depended on 2 things ,the second of which being the most important

1)Immediately after the start of Blau the opposing Soviet forces had to be destroyed (700000 POW had to be taken) and their withdrawal to the Wolga and the Caucasus had to be prevented : this did not happen

2)The SU should not have enough reserves to replace these losses : this assumption was not correct
.

[Alixanther]

The war in the East was lost at Voronezh: there was the only opportunity to destroy a significant portion of coordinated Soviet war effort. If they had swung North instead of South, they could have made the classical "hammer and anvil" manoeuver to envelop and destroy the Soviet front opposing AGC.
There were no more threats in the South, so the swing was completely reasonable and feasible. Once the center of Soviet forces crumbles, there's little hope they could maintain a whole line and they would probably crunch towards Moscow - as in before winter '41. Moscow '42 would probably be as hard as Moscow '41, the difference is that a whole lot of Soviet manpower is already destroyed and morale is withering (otherwise there would be no need for order 227, right?)
Stalingrad counter operation was more important than Kursk for the Soviets because it effectively removed the sense of an impending doom they had for nearly 1 year and a half. Not so much for the Germans - there's no big deal if Stalingrad stays in Soviet hands in '42.
Having more tanks and AFVs does not grant SU in '42 a greater ability to deal offensive blows than in '41, granted the Germans do not make colossal blunders and miss their biggest opportunity to end the war in the East.

It's absurd to retort to manpower numbers when dealing with attrition wars. There's no case when a state fought until full manpower depletion. None. Never.
An attrition war is effectively a war of undermining enemy morale, because there's no decisive victory in sight. Therefore, it's logical for both Soviets and Germans to count on enemy morale crunching effects. Which, by the way, happened to both parties, on several instances.

There was no "schwerpunkt" at Stalingrad or anywhere on the Volga. That's the worst place to search for such a point. In order to avoid a catastrophe, any army must have competent generals instead of pretentious morons.

[doogal]

The war in the East was lost at Voronezh: there was the only opportunity to destroy a significant portion of coordinated Soviet war effort. If they had swung North instead of South, they could have made the classical "hammer and anvil" manoeuver to envelop and destroy the Soviet front opposing AGC.

Is this not the axis which Stalin believed they would have to defend in the summer of 42??
And was AGC really strong enough for such an operation??
With its diminished infantry and lack of mobile formations AGC would have been hard to pushed to act in a co-ordinated offensive.....

[Cult Icon]

There is the destruction/depletion of formations. It takes time to build or rebuild formations. The Soviets were simply much faster than the Axis in doing this. They can offer another wave while the Axis can only offer token reinforcements. The wave offered in Nov 1942 was significantly improved than those that fought before.

The german offensive schick relied on strategic offensive or bust. There was no other way around it for them.

[KDF33]

I don't think the extent of the damage the opening phase of Blau inflicted upon the Soviets is fully understood.

In July, Army Group South (and then B and A) recorded taking 400,095 prisoners, which compares quite well with the results of the previous year, given that we're talking here of a single army group. Compare with, say, July 1941, during which 701,246 prisoners were recorded captured, for the three army groups.

This success was achieved for a cost of 57,381 combat casualties, which already gives a ratio of close to 7-to-1 without even including Soviet KIA/WIA.

The extent of the damage is reflected in RKKA manpower, which fell by 776,313 men between July 1 and August 1.

Contrary to the popular image of an immediate failure, Blau actually shattered the Soviet forces facing HGS. The reason why the Soviets reconstituted their front is because Stavka reserve, by July 1, had 750,000 men on hand in 62 Infantry Divisions, 3 Cavalry Divisions and 5 Tank Corps, among assorted units. These forces were tapped during July; by 1 August there were just 23 Infantry Divisions and 2 Tank Corps left in reserve.

The Germans proved incapable to repeat the scale of their July success in August and afterwards, given the lengthening of the front and the consequent dilution of offensive power to guard the flanks; supply problems due to overextension; and the lack of a clearly-defined Schwerpunkt for the offensive.

As for the Soviets, even though they recovered balance in the ensuing months, it took them until March 1943 to regrow the RKKA to the manpower it boasted at the beginning of Blau. Simply put, the Red Army of the summer of 1942 could no longer absorb damage on a scale approaching that of 1941, which I believe suggests that a German strategy focused on attriting the Red Army, rather than capturing far-flung territorial objectives, would have substantially changed the outcome of the campaign in 1942, even the overall Soviet-German war.

Regards,

KDF

[Alixanther]

Thank you, KDF!
As you all can see, after such a fastidious opening, if Blau would have swung up instead of down and onwards, ever diluting the force of attack, they would have probably accomplish the famous and well sought ancient maneouver of "hammer and anvil", beginning at Cannae. Maybe if would have been hard to destroy the entire RKKA fronts opposing AGC but at least a large part would have certainly been destroyed in process.
Someone asked before if this was possible due to the weakness of AGC. Well, the AGC does not need any more strenght as it had, since it was "the anvil". The "hammer" was AGS, which would complete the encirclement and provide full inter-Army Group cooperation.

I dare to say that once the schwerpunkt of Voronezh penetrated, the entire AGS would pour unstoppable to their goal.

[ljadw]

I don't think the extent of the damage the opening phase of Blau inflicted upon the Soviets is fully understood.

In July, Army Group South (and then B and A) recorded taking 400,095 prisoners, which compares quite well with the results of the previous year, given that we're talking here of a single army group. Compare with, say, July 1941, during which 701,246 prisoners were recorded captured, for the three army groups.

This success was achieved for a cost of 57,381 combat casualties, which already gives a ratio of close to 7-to-1 without even including Soviet KIA/WIA.

The extent of the damage is reflected in RKKA manpower, which fell by 776,313 men between July 1 and August 1.

Contrary to the popular image of an immediate failure, Blau actually shattered the Soviet forces facing HGS. The reason why the Soviets reconstituted their front is because Stavka reserve, by July 1, had 750,000 men on hand in 62 Infantry Divisions, 3 Cavalry Divisions and 5 Tank Corps, among assorted units. These forces were tapped during July; by 1 August there were just 23 Infantry Divisions and 2 Tank Corps left in reserve.

The Germans proved incapable to repeat the scale of their July success in August and afterwards, given the lengthening of the front and the consequent dilution of offensive power to guard the flanks; supply problems due to overextension; and the lack of a clearly-defined Schwerpunkt for the offensive.

As for the Soviets, even though they recovered balance in the ensuing months, it took them until March 1943 to regrow the RKKA to the manpower it boasted at the beginning of Blau. Simply put, the Red Army of the summer of 1942 could no longer absorb damage on a scale approaching that of 1941, which I believe suggests that a German strategy focused on attriting the Red Army, rather than capturing far-flung territorial objectives, would have substantially changed the outcome of the campaign in 1942, even the overall Soviet-German war.

Regards,

KDF

As the aim of Blau was NOT to inflict damage to the SU,but to force her on her knees, all this is irrelevant .

From "Hitler's War " P 156 by Magenheimer (who is critical of Hitler) : P 156 :
"By the beginning of september the German Command had practically nothing left with which to bring about the intended turn of the war in 1942.
With hindsight, it is clear that at the beginning of september 1942,the Germans had lost the strategical and tactical initiative on the eastern front.....

P 157
The outright capture of Stalingrad would have brought the attack to a tactical conclusion in this sector,but this would not have resulted in a turn of war in Germany's favour ."

The aim of Blau was to have a turn of war in Germany's favour : at the beginning of september it was obvious that the Germans had failed .

Picking about loss ratios will not transform Blau from failure to victory .

[Cult Icon]

The whole summer 1942 offensive showed that the German offensive capability had declined greatly. 4.PzA and 6.A had supply difficulties throughout the battle of Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, the situation was even worse.