If you could travel back in time to Help Hitler win the war

[pintere]

No one could cope with the Germans, because they had a motorized infantry. Under the guise of armor approached the enemy trenches and destroyed it. The British Army had no such machines

Hanomags can't win wars by themselves.

[Gooner1]

First sea lord reports 'it appears probable that a total if some hundred thousand men might reach these shores without being intercepted by naval forces....

Thanks. The First Sea Lord says 'might reach these shores' which is of course completely different to "nothing could prevent the Germans from landing a sizable force along the south coast".

The First Sea Lord was of course correct. Despite their best endeavours there was no guarantee the invasion fleet would be spotted. The British assumed the Germans might take advantage of fog. Or, more wildly, that the Germans possessed machines capable of making gigantic smoke screens.

A corollary of the Sea Lords statement is that if the invasion fleet was intercepted by naval forces they would not be reaching these shores

[pugsville]

No one could cope with the Germans, because they had a motorized infantry. Under the guise of armor approached the enemy trenches and destroyed it. The British Army had no such machines

only a very small amount of german forces had aroured half turks,s and only a small amuntof the german army was fully motorised, the german army relied on large amounts of horses the british army was fully motorised and had large numbers of universal or bren carriers. real half track would have been better for mobility but carriers were more all terrain vehicles.

[Paul Lakowski]

First sea lord reports 'it appears probable that a total if some hundred thousand men might reach these shores without being intercepted by naval forces....

Thanks. The First Sea Lord says 'might reach these shores' which is of course completely different to "nothing could prevent the Germans from landing a sizable force along the south coast".

The First Sea Lord was of course correct. Despite their best endeavours there was no guarantee the invasion fleet would be spotted. The British assumed the Germans might take advantage of fog. Or, more wildly, that the Germans possessed machines capable of making gigantic smoke screens.

A corollary of the Sea Lords statement is that if the invasion fleet was intercepted by naval forces they would not be reaching these shores

yes however the above force numbers were exactly the size of the forces that invaded Norway, an operation that no one thought possible or likely to succeed either, and yet it did.

It was classic for both sides to badly underestimate the other early in the war.

[line]

No one could cope with the Germans, because they had a motorized infantry. Under the guise of armor approached the enemy trenches and destroyed it. The British Army had no such machines

only a very small amount of german forces had aroured half turks,s and only a small amuntof the german army was fully motorised, the german army relied on large amounts of horses the british army was fully motorised and had large numbers of universal or bren carriers. real half track would have been better for mobility but carriers were more all terrain vehicles.

British in 1940 had no tank groups and in general the motorized divisions.

http://maxpark.com/user/4236105473/content/1335853
In the German Army all field military forces were divided into purely classical infantry troops are united in the "Army Infantry."
And in parallel with this there were shock troops of a breakthrough, encirclement and destruction of enemy personnel. This was the main German army who conquer the country, city, and the front ..
They were armored and motorized troops
   (Basic unit Tank Group (Army))
         It Tank Corps and they
                 Motorized Division)
They were rich armor, artillery, air defense means towing services and facilities troops. They were attached to Motorized Infantry Division that moved on armored personnel carriers and armored infantry. They were attached to a motorized reconnaissance troops usually SS troops. Tanks, self-propelled guns, howitzers, cannons, anti-tank guns, antiaircraft guns, wheel-tracked armored personnel carriers, trucks, and tractors of artillery, motorcycles and cars to ensure the operational headquarters ... and huge motorized echelon logistics.
             Two tank groups =
             conquered COUNTRY
     Wehrmacht Tank Group is the field
             strategic forces in Germany

[Adonnus]

The most obvious one is to treat the occupied peoples of the East more nicely, and form a large army out of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Baltic peoples etc and other ethnic minorities. As well as perhaps an army of Russians themselves for the "liberation" of their home country, with whatever idealistic future-state made up by propaganda to get them to go along with the idea. The manpower was certainly there both in POW camps and in the territories themselves. I would say this is the most sound option for the long term as it provides Germany with a source of manpower to match the Soviets. Using French soldiers and soldiers from the low countries in the east would also be useful, though they would likely have less incentive to fight (a less lenient occupation with more local autonomy combined with decent pay and food would have probably been enough. It's a job, after all.)

The formation of such an army was in fact suggested to Hitler numerous times but rejected due to... guess why!... racism. The practicality of suppressing racist urges until after the war was already won didn't occur to him as necessary.

The moral factors were there for the creation of an anti-Soviet army but of course the Nazis were short sighted racists so this didn't come to pass. If it had happened, likely the Germans would have had the resources to wage a war of attrition which without them they simply couldn't win.

The other possibility for a victory is taking that route so often talked about for going straight east from Smolensk to Moscow and ignoring Kiev. I doubt this would seriously change things in the long run though, even if Moscow was taken.

All this mind you is rendered irrelevant unless Germany can find itself a nuclear bomb by August '45 to force MAD on the Allies with. There were in the long term very few options for a German victory, truly.

[line]

All this mind you is rendered irrelevant unless Germany can find itself a nuclear bomb by August '45 to force MAD on the Allies with. There were in the long term very few options for a German victory, truly.

Your knowledge of history is very low. To get started, read diaries Halder and von Bock. Bock wanted to take Moscow in July, Hitler did not allow him. Sabotage was Hitler that he ordered to create a ring surrounding a narrow, very dense and active ... Rather than move forward a lot of unnecessary combat surrounded.


http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/06.html
25/6/41
In the morning came Schmundt (army chief adjutant of Hitler) and told us that the Fuhrer asked how big is the environment zone near Minsk, and is concerned as to whether we will be able to over-stretched army forced to surrender was surrounded by a large force of Russian. In this regard, the Führer is wondering whether we should not avoid the failure to close our tank mites under Novogrudok. [51] Schmundt going to convey my views on the matter to General Jodl of the High Command.
I called the chief of staff of the 3rd Panzer Group (background Hyunersdorf) and informed him that the progress towards the Dvina is now a matter of secondary importance, the main thing now - to complete the current operation, completely surround the Russian army between Bialystok and Minsk, and destroy them. Lightning breakthrough 3rd Panzer Group in Minsk district will be a prelude to it. In this connection, implementation covering the eastern flank of the group about Borisova and in the upper reaches of the Dvina is of particular importance. Hyunersdorf immediately agreed with me, but I noticed that the roads in the area to be extremely bad!
In a few words, said Strauss (9 Army) about the situation, told him his thoughts about how it is necessary to lead the battle, and informed him about the possibility of turning his army to the planned Russian "pocket" - in case of a cover eastern flank.
Notify the Chief of Staff of the 4th Army (Blumentritt) that the left wing of his army must also move quickly to remove pressure from the right wing of the 9th Army.
Around 15.00 came the news of what the Army High Command plans to establish even closer encirclement in the designated area! Halder sees the movement's southern flank it "ticks" in the direction of Zelva and Volkovysk, and focusing on this front, the main force of the 9th Army, which should complete the encirclement. I am furious, because in doing so we, having achieved a major tactical success, lose the ability to achieve a far more significant victory!
Meanwhile, new orders came on the further use of [52] tank groups that urgently demands their move towards Minsk, where they will be able to close ranks and replenish fuel reserves to be able to develop the offensive in an easterly direction.

[line]

On July 12-13, 1941 Germans could take Kiev. Hitler has forbidden.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/1941_07.html
July 9, 1941
During the evening report the commander-in-chief had had a brisk discussion of a question of the direction of approach of the 1st tank group. I argued the following point of view. We shouldn't leave Kiev on the left flank at all. Disorder signs on the party of the opponent are so big that the fast, sudden strike against Kiev where the opponent builds several pontoon bridges (it indicates preparation of withdrawal in this direction), creates exclusively favorable prospects for decisive success. If this attempt of sudden capture of Kiev is unsuccessful, then it isn't necessary to be got involved in long fights for Kiev and it is vain to endow mobile connections. In this case it will be possible to direct with success those connections which follow the 13th tank division in the direction of Zhytomyr, to Bila Tserkva and to use them for interception of the highway and railroads conducting to the lower Dnieper Current.

The commander-in-chief has stated this point of view in conversation with the Fuhrer who though hasn't objected, however, apparently, isn't convinced of correctness of it yet. The Fuhrer has emphasized that he doesn't expect any success from blow to Kiev.

[Adonnus]

All this mind you is rendered irrelevant unless Germany can find itself a nuclear bomb by August '45 to force MAD on the Allies with. There were in the long term very few options for a German victory, truly.

Your knowledge of history is very low. To get started, read diaries Halder and von Bock. Bock wanted to take Moscow in July, Hitler did not allow him. Sabotage was Hitler that he ordered to create a ring surrounding a narrow, very dense and active ... Rather than move forward a lot of unnecessary combat surrounded.

Aaaand nothing you've said either directly addresses or contradicts much that I've said as well as being virtually unintelligible by itself. I've read this about 10 times over and it makes sense less each time I read it.

[line]

Environment is narrow. Very dense and Germans attacked on copper perimeter, instead of expectation of capitulation of the opponent. The blank space has held down many divisions, could move ahead.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/1941_07.html
July 2, 1941
In the middle of the day the Fuhrer has summoned the commander-in-chief, the Fuhrer has expressed the concern about a bag around Novogrudok. He considers necessary even more to squeeze an environment ring, and also to make this ring more dense and to concentrate reserves behind the line of an environment. The question of transition to approach of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups about what we have already given the order, can undergo discussion still. Thus, the Fuhrer has an uneasy mood again.
The commander-in-chief has offered me several options of narrowing and a section on part of a bag around Novogrudok. For this purpose he wants to use the 18th motorized and the 10th tank the divisions which are a part of shock group 2nd and 3rd of tank groups which further approach has to begin 3.7. I object to it. Discussion of this question with Greyfenberg.
Phone conversation about a background Sideways:
Answering my questions raised to his chief of headquarters he has declared the following. Breakthrough of the opponent surrounded in the woods at Novogrudok on the northeast extremely is improbable. Tonight to the back of the 14th motorized division the 900th crew will be thrown from Vilnius. Matters of the 14th motorized division were improved also as a result of advance of the 161st infantry division operating more to the right of the 14th. To the northeast of this site all edge of the wood in which there is a surrounded opponent is mined by tank group Goth. the 35th and 5th infantry divisions from structure of the 5th army case have approached an edge of this wood.



Ring an environment around Vjazma narrow, by order of Hitler many forces have created a dense environment. It is clear? When Russians came in 1944-1945 emphasis was placed on expansion of an external ring of an environment. Hitler on the contrary has more than forces on an internal ring. To squeeze him is more dense. It is sabotage.

http://www.xliby.ru/voennaja_istorija/p ... voi/p3.php
Operation plan. [44] The operational plan on approach in the direction of Moscow which Bock at the end of August "has already buried" was based on preparation of large operation on an environment of the opponent who is in the area to the east of Smolensk. By concentration of large groups on flanks where it has been decided to strike the main blows with forces of mobile connections, it was supposed to break through defense of the opponent and, having closed both rings near Vyazma, to surround him. From the very beginning concerning a plan of operation there were contradictions between Bock and OKH. If Bock wanted to carry out deeper coverage from flanks, then OKH demanded to close pincers near Vyazma, that is directly around fighting positions of the opponent. Already during negotiations on September 2, as well as in the further demands made to OKH, Bock asked to aim tank troops at Gzhatsk.

Still on September 17 he wrote Halder:

"When I think of too narrow strip of approach which it is ordered to me to carry out, no thoughts arise. But it seems to me that the question should be raised so: who has to dictate the rules — I or the opponent? If tanks to put time of end of an environment into dependence on that, will linger or not infantry on the advanced positions, then the opponent will dictate! Whether tanks if they successfully move ahead owe, to come back if the infantry stops somewhere, or they have to move ahead further and by that to finish by own efforts an environment? Or it would be better to use the speed and striking power of tanks, to aim them in depth (Vyazma — Gzhatsk) to cut ways of supply of the opponent, to crush his reserves and control facilities and only then to turn to the west and to close a ring of an environment which we plan?"

Eventually everything has occurred as it was recommended in the directive OKV No. 35 though it was promised to Bock that "all doors will be left open".

[ChrisDR68]

LW conducted a secret war-game in 1937 where by they postulated a RAF LW air-war and came to the conclusion that without the Ural Bomber they could not win an air-war over Southern England.

Churchill conceded that nothing could prevent the Germans from landing a sizable force along the south coast, however the RN/RAF could guarantee the supply lines would be interdicted and certainly choked off for long periods. What they may not have anticipated was how well the Germans could defend in place and hold on to territory already captured.

The interesting question is if Operation Sealion had been successful in 1941 leaving almost the whole of western and central Europe in Nazi hands would the Germans have been strong enough to invade and conquer European Russia in 1942?

With the UK knocked out of the war there would have been no diversion of military assets to northern Africa and the mediterranean theatre generally, the atlantic (no u-boats or surface fleet needed) and defending European airspace from the RAF. It would have enabled a complete focus for the weremacht on one active theatre of operations.

All that being the case I think an Operation Barbarossa launched in May 1942 would have had a fair chance of success.

[Paul Lakowski]

sounds about right however Stalin hoped he could wait on the sidelines until 1942 watching the allies & axis beat each other into rubble and then he would sweep in and conquer Europe.

In other words by 1942 he would be ready.

[Guaporense]

If I could I wouldn't, because I don't want Hitler to win the war!

I wouldn't kill him because they would kill me later, well, with a well hidden bomb, maybe.

I guess I would advise Hitler to attack France in 1938, so Germany is probably defeated in a quick war.

[Guaporense]

sounds about right however Stalin hoped he could wait on the sidelines until 1942 watching the allies & axis beat each other into rubble and then he would sweep in and conquer Europe.

In other words by 1942 he would be ready.

If France fell as it did historically they would have a hard time anyway because they would be facing Germany like historically, and differently from the historical situation, they would be the aggressors which give Germany the moral high ground. This is important because Red Army soldiers wouldn't fight as hard and they wouldn't be able to mobilize 35 million men to fight a war of aggression rather than a war for survival (when the USSR's existence was under threat, they mobilized every warm body they could find, in a war of aggression outside of their own borders their incentives to mobilize will be much smaller). Germany would have a better shot of surviving that way actually.

Building up massive fortifications around the USSR's border would be a smart move for Germany from mid 1940 onward.

[mustang19]

I really can't fault many things that Hitler did. The Wunderwaffe, for example, mostly made sense because Germany had nothing left but rocket fuel toward the end of the war. The Eastern Front would go badly no matter what and I don't see much room for strategy there.

The one tragedy that could have been avoided is if Goebbel didn't have kids. He had to kill them to avoid capture by the Soviets.