you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

[ljadw]

.


it came close , during the whole of 1941 the soviets lurched from one disaster to another
.

I would argue that it was the opposite :the Germans lurched from one disaster to another .

[Sid Guttridge]

Why would anyone bother if you are so determined on the point that you are not prepared under any circumstances to take on board contrary evidence?

Of course Germany could have won the war.

All it required was for Germany to make enough right decisions and its opponents to make enough wrong ones!

Cheers,

Sid.

[OpanaPointer]

Yeah, I was indicating that Germany was moving a poo-poo load of oil from Romania.

Wrong argument: the biggest German oil supplier was Germany itself, not Romania : between 1940/1945, Germany supplied almost 30 million tonnes of oil, Romania only 10 million .

Does that mean Germany wasn't getting a poo-poo load of oil from Romania?

[OpanaPointer]

Far more likely, the American people would turn first to counter the expansion of Japan in the Pacific.

The American public, in early November, 1941, reported that we would have to fight the Nazis (68%) and the Japanese (72%). We did that. Japan and Germany lost. This happened regardless of what anybody thinks should have happened.

[ljadw]

Yeah, I was indicating that Germany was moving a poo-poo load of oil from Romania.

Wrong argument: the biggest German oil supplier was Germany itself, not Romania : between 1940/1945, Germany supplied almost 30 million tonnes of oil, Romania only 10 million .

Does that mean Germany wasn't getting a poo-poo load of oil from Romania?

How much is poo-poo ?

[Richard Anderson]

Yeah, I was indicating that Germany was moving a poo-poo load of oil from Romania.

Wrong argument: the biggest German oil supplier was Germany itself, not Romania : between 1940/1945, Germany supplied almost 30 million tonnes of oil, Romania only 10 million .

Does that mean Germany wasn't getting a poo-poo load of oil from Romania?

How much is poo-poo ?

One-quarter of an item that was always never enough is a poo-poo load.

[Gorque]

I must say that I am not convinced that Bevin Alexander knows more than we : one exemple is the story of the importance of the Middle East Oil : Iran and Iraq did not produce much of the world oil,but only a small part of it and I don't see how this oil could benefit Germany as there were insoluble production,refinery and transport problems and as ( what will surprise a lot of people ) Germany was not short on oil .

The bolded above seems to contradict what Adam Tooze had written on the subject. Are you sure about this?

The disparity with respect to oil was most serious. Between 1940 and 1943 the mobility of Germany's army , navy and alr force, not to mention Its domestic economy , depended on annual imports of I .5 million tons of oil, mainly from Romania. In addition, German synthetic fuel factories, at huge expense, produced a flow of petrol that rose from 4 million tons in 1940 to a maximum of
6.5 million tons in 1943. Seizing the fuel stocks of France as booty In no way resolved this fundamental dependency. In fact, the victories of 1940 had the reverse effect. They added a number of heavy oil consumers to Germany's own fuel deficit. From its annual fuel flow of at most 8.9 million tons, Germany now had to supply not only its own needs, but those of the rest of Western Europe as
well. Before the war, the French economy had consumed at least 5.4 million tons per annum, at a per capita rate 60 per cent higher than Germany's. The effect of the German occupation was to throw France back Into an era before motorization. From the summer of 1940 France was reduced to a mere 8 per cent of its pre-war supply of petrol. In an economy adjusted to a high level of oil consumption the effects were dramatic. To give just one example, thousands of litres of milk went to waste m the French countryside every day , because no petrol was available to ensure regular collections. Of more Immediate concern to the military' planners in Berlin were the Italian armed forces, which depended entirely on fuel diverted from Germany and Romania. By February 1941 the
Italian navy was threatening to halt its operations in the Mediterranean altogether unless Germany supplied at least 250,000 tons of fuel. And the problems were by no means confined to the Reich's satellites. Germany itself coped only by dint of extreme economy. In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for the motor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chromc shortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotorizatlon' of the Wehrmacht. It is commonly remarked that the Luftwaffe suffered later in the war because of the inadequate training of its pilots, due in large part to the shortage of air fuel. But in 1941 the petrol shortage was already so severe that the Wehrmacht was licensing its soldiers to drive heavy trucks with less than 15 kilometres of on-road experience, a measure which was blamed for the appalling attrition of motor vehicles durrng the
Russian campaign. Shortages made themselves felt across the German economy. So tight were fuel rations that In November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at Its Brandenburg plant, Germany's largest truck factory, because it lacked the petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off the assembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to be arranged by the Wehmacht's econonuc office so as to ensure that there were no further Interruptions.

https://books.google.com/books?id=-h_Z_ ... il&f=false

[Richard Anderson]

Wrong argument: the biggest German oil supplier was Germany itself, not Romania : between 1940/1945, Germany supplied almost 30 million tonnes of oil, Romania only 10 million .

In 1939 Germany imported 5.1 million ton, of which 1.6 million from Romania; in 1940 it imported only 2.2 million ton of which 1.3 million from Romania .The import from Romania was going down by 20 %, the import from the other sources (mainly US and Latin America ) decreased by 75 %, and ....Germany did not collaps . Germany used oil tankers because the railways could not transport the oil . That has nothing to do with the importance of the Romanian oil .

Besides, I like to know what the direction was of these tankers : were they using the Danube to go to Germany or were they going to Italy ,using the Mediterranean ?

Um, no. In 1938, Germany imported 5,418 million metric tons of crude, 11.535 million tons of gasoline, 172,000 tons of kerosene, 10.639 million tons of gas and diesel oil, 2.702 million tons of fuel oil, and 2,716 million tons of lubricants. The largest suppliers were the United States and the Netherlands East Indies, along with Venezuela. Romania supplied a fraction of the crude, 158,000 tons, but a large fraction of the gasoline, 2.746 million tons. In the same year, civilian consumption of liquid fuels and lubricants was only 7 million metric tons.

In 1943, domestic production of finished fuels was 7.572 million metric tons...and imports of crude were 7.292 million tons, including 4.867 million from Rumania, while Germany produced 2.087 million tons of crude and 6.794 million tons of synthetic.

[steverodgers801]

the Germans did get about 900,000 tons of oil from the Soviets which was critical after the start of the blockade

[Boby]

Wrong argument: the biggest German oil supplier was Germany itself, not Romania : between 1940/1945, Germany supplied almost 30 million tonnes of oil, Romania only 10 million .

In 1939 Germany imported 5.1 million ton, of which 1.6 million from Romania; in 1940 it imported only 2.2 million ton of which 1.3 million from Romania .The import from Romania was going down by 20 %, the import from the other sources (mainly US and Latin America ) decreased by 75 %, and ....Germany did not collaps . Germany used oil tankers because the railways could not transport the oil . That has nothing to do with the importance of the Romanian oil .

Besides, I like to know what the direction was of these tankers : were they using the Danube to go to Germany or were they going to Italy ,using the Mediterranean ?

Um, no. In 1938, Germany imported 5,418 million metric tons of crude, 11.535 million tons of gasoline, 172,000 tons of kerosene, 10.639 million tons of gas and diesel oil, 2.702 million tons of fuel oil, and 2,716 million tons of lubricants. The largest suppliers were the United States and the Netherlands East Indies, along with Venezuela. Romania supplied a fraction of the crude, 158,000 tons, but a large fraction of the gasoline, 2.746 million tons. In the same year, civilian consumption of liquid fuels and lubricants was only 7 million metric tons.

In 1943, domestic production of finished fuels was 7.572 million metric tons...and imports of crude were 7.292 million tons, including 4.867 million from Rumania, while Germany produced 2.087 million tons of crude and 6.794 million tons of synthetic.

What is the source? Very interesting, thanks.

[ljadw]

My figures are from Dietrich Eichholtz (Geschichte der Deutsche Kriegswirtschaft) who is giving for 1943 a production of synthetic oil of 5.7 million ,domestic crude of 1,88 million imports of 2.76 million and from the occupied countries 0.57 million .

During the war, the domestic production (crude and synthetic )was always higher than the imports ,that's why I am saying that the biggest oil supplier for Germany was Germany itself .

[ljadw]

the Germans did get about 900,000 tons of oil from the Soviets which was critical after the start of the blockade

That is not correct : in 1940/1941 Germany received 1 million ton of oil from the SU,but in this period it produced (crude/synthetic) 10 million ton and imported 5 million ton of which 3.4 million ton from Romania . The Soviet imports were only 20 % of the total imports and only 6.6 % of the grand total .

Besides, the Soviet imports started only in 1940,not in september 1939.

[ljadw]

I must say that I am not convinced that Bevin Alexander knows more than we : one exemple is the story of the importance of the Middle East Oil : Iran and Iraq did not produce much of the world oil,but only a small part of it and I don't see how this oil could benefit Germany as there were insoluble production,refinery and transport problems and as ( what will surprise a lot of people ) Germany was not short on oil .

The bolded above seems to contradict what Adam Tooze had written on the subject. Are you sure about this?

The disparity with respect to oil was most serious. Between 1940 and 1943 the mobility of Germany's army , navy and alr force, not to mention Its domestic economy , depended on annual imports of I .5 million tons of oil, mainly from Romania. In addition, German synthetic fuel factories, at huge expense, produced a flow of petrol that rose from 4 million tons in 1940 to a maximum of
6.5 million tons in 1943. Seizing the fuel stocks of France as booty In no way resolved this fundamental dependency. In fact, the victories of 1940 had the reverse effect. They added a number of heavy oil consumers to Germany's own fuel deficit. From its annual fuel flow of at most 8.9 million tons, Germany now had to supply not only its own needs, but those of the rest of Western Europe as
well. Before the war, the French economy had consumed at least 5.4 million tons per annum, at a per capita rate 60 per cent higher than Germany's. The effect of the German occupation was to throw France back Into an era before motorization. From the summer of 1940 France was reduced to a mere 8 per cent of its pre-war supply of petrol. In an economy adjusted to a high level of oil consumption the effects were dramatic. To give just one example, thousands of litres of milk went to waste m the French countryside every day , because no petrol was available to ensure regular collections. Of more Immediate concern to the military' planners in Berlin were the Italian armed forces, which depended entirely on fuel diverted from Germany and Romania. By February 1941 the
Italian navy was threatening to halt its operations in the Mediterranean altogether unless Germany supplied at least 250,000 tons of fuel. And the problems were by no means confined to the Reich's satellites. Germany itself coped only by dint of extreme economy. In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for the motor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chromc shortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotorizatlon' of the Wehrmacht. It is commonly remarked that the Luftwaffe suffered later in the war because of the inadequate training of its pilots, due in large part to the shortage of air fuel. But in 1941 the petrol shortage was already so severe that the Wehrmacht was licensing its soldiers to drive heavy trucks with less than 15 kilometres of on-road experience, a measure which was blamed for the appalling attrition of motor vehicles durrng the
Russian campaign. Shortages made themselves felt across the German economy. So tight were fuel rations that In November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at Its Brandenburg plant, Germany's largest truck factory, because it lacked the petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off the assembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to be arranged by the Wehmacht's econonuc office so as to ensure that there were no further Interruptions.

https://books.google.com/books?id=-h_Z_ ... il&f=false

I must disagree with Tooze when he claims that the mobility of the WM depended on the import of 1.5 million ton of oil a year : he forgets the crucial role of the railways,and his figures are not correct : Germany did not import 1.5 million ton a year, but more ,much more :1940 : 2.2 million, 1941 :2.8 million, 1942 :2.3 million and in 1943 :2.8 million .

Other point : he mentions shortages in the economy in 1941, but he forgets to say that there was no collaps of the economy and that in 1942 the economy produced more war materials than in 1941,although the fuel deliveries were only going up with some 4 % .As a lot of other people, he gives oil an importance it did not have in Germany (it didn't have also this importance in the SU .

THe total of oil deliveries to Germany (booty not included) was in

1939: 8.2 million

1940:6.8 million

1941 : 8.3 million

1942 : 8.6 million

1943 : 10.3 million

1944 :6.4 million

Thus there is no correlation between military successes and the available amount of oil .

I am also not convinced by the theory that the low quality of the LW replacements was caused by the decreasing amount of oil that was available for the training units : even with more oil,the quality of the replacements would remain low, because the problem was not the shortage of oil, but the fact that the duration of the training was shortened,because the front units needed more replacements and much quicker : if the training was shortened by a week, that means X less flight hours for the newcomers .And less flight hours means a lower quality .

[ljadw]

German oil imports in 1933 : 2.756 million ton

Romania :187000

SU : 428000

Iran : 158000

US : 464000

Mexico :285000

Peu : 140000

other (unknown ) American countries :957000

other countries :136000


1934 :

Romania : 255000

SU : 395000

Iran : 234000

US : 441000

Mexico : 271000

Venezuela : 27000

Peru : 78000

Other American countries : 1,26 million

Other countries : 176000

Total : 3237000

I will give the other years later

[Richard Anderson]

What is the source? Very interesting, thanks.

WWII Records of the United States Air Force, reels A5464 and B-1870, various intelligence reports on the Axis oil industry. They are of course estimates except for the detailed situation for 1938. However, the problem with ljadw and many of the sources he is pulling from, is the distinction between what is crude and other types of oils, what are finished petroleum products, what are the synthetic products, and so forth too often get blurred, confusing the subject.

It remains, whether or not Romanian (and Hungarian, and Polish, and Italian) imports amounted to "only" 25% or 15% or 30% it was a poo-poo load.