you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

[Gorque]

I must say that I am not convinced that Bevin Alexander knows more than we : one exemple is the story of the importance of the Middle East Oil : Iran and Iraq did not produce much of the world oil,but only a small part of it and I don't see how this oil could benefit Germany as there were insoluble production,refinery and transport problems and as ( what will surprise a lot of people ) Germany was not short on oil .

The bolded above seems to contradict what Adam Tooze had written on the subject. Are you sure about this?

The disparity with respect to oil was most serious. Between 1940 and 1943 the mobility of Germany's army , navy and alr force, not to mention Its domestic economy , depended on annual imports of I .5 million tons of oil, mainly from Romania. In addition, German synthetic fuel factories, at huge expense, produced a flow of petrol that rose from 4 million tons in 1940 to a maximum of
6.5 million tons in 1943. Seizing the fuel stocks of France as booty In no way resolved this fundamental dependency. In fact, the victories of 1940 had the reverse effect. They added a number of heavy oil consumers to Germany's own fuel deficit. From its annual fuel flow of at most 8.9 million tons, Germany now had to supply not only its own needs, but those of the rest of Western Europe as
well. Before the war, the French economy had consumed at least 5.4 million tons per annum, at a per capita rate 60 per cent higher than Germany's. The effect of the German occupation was to throw France back Into an era before motorization. From the summer of 1940 France was reduced to a mere 8 per cent of its pre-war supply of petrol. In an economy adjusted to a high level of oil consumption the effects were dramatic. To give just one example, thousands of litres of milk went to waste m the French countryside every day , because no petrol was available to ensure regular collections. Of more Immediate concern to the military' planners in Berlin were the Italian armed forces, which depended entirely on fuel diverted from Germany and Romania. By February 1941 the
Italian navy was threatening to halt its operations in the Mediterranean altogether unless Germany supplied at least 250,000 tons of fuel. And the problems were by no means confined to the Reich's satellites. Germany itself coped only by dint of extreme economy. In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for the motor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chromc shortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotorizatlon' of the Wehrmacht. It is commonly remarked that the Luftwaffe suffered later in the war because of the inadequate training of its pilots, due in large part to the shortage of air fuel. But in 1941 the petrol shortage was already so severe that the Wehrmacht was licensing its soldiers to drive heavy trucks with less than 15 kilometres of on-road experience, a measure which was blamed for the appalling attrition of motor vehicles durrng the
Russian campaign. Shortages made themselves felt across the German economy. So tight were fuel rations that In November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at Its Brandenburg plant, Germany's largest truck factory, because it lacked the petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off the assembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to be arranged by the Wehmacht's econonuc office so as to ensure that there were no further Interruptions.

https://books.google.com/books?id=-h_Z_ ... il&f=false

I must disagree with Tooze when he claims that the mobility of the WM depended on the import of 1.5 million ton of oil a year : he forgets the crucial role of the railways,and his figures are not correct : Germany did not import 1.5 million ton a year, but more ,much more :1940 : 2.2 million, 1941 :2.8 million, 1942 :2.3 million and in 1943 :2.8 million .

Other point : he mentions shortages in the economy in 1941, but he forgets to say that there was no collaps of the economy and that in 1942 the economy produced more war materials than in 1941,although the fuel deliveries were only going up with some 4 % .As a lot of other people, he gives oil an importance it did not have in Germany (it didn't have also this importance in the SU .

THe total of oil deliveries to Germany (booty not included) was in

1939: 8.2 million

1940:6.8 million

1941 : 8.3 million

1942 : 8.6 million

1943 : 10.3 million

1944 :6.4 million

Thus there is no correlation between military successes and the available amount of oil .

I am also not convinced by the theory that the low quality of the LW replacements was caused by the decreasing amount of oil that was available for the training units : even with more oil,the quality of the replacements would remain low, because the problem was not the shortage of oil, but the fact that the duration of the training was shortened,because the front units needed more replacements and much quicker : if the training was shortened by a week, that means X less flight hours for the newcomers .And less flight hours means a lower quality .

Interesting theory and yet the Kriegsmarine heavy naval units were handicapped by the lack of fuel. Why was that if Germany had all of this oil available?

[Richard Anderson]

An example of the aviation problem. In February 1944, the Germans produced 458 metric tons (cbm) of aviation spirit. On average, a Bf 019 or Fw 190 could fly 262.5 sorties on 100 cbm. So 1,202 sorties for the month of February. In November 1944, 35 metric tons (cbm) of aviation spirit was produced. In 1944, Germany produced 3,319 metric tons of aviation spirit. The Allies estimated Luftwaffe annual consumption in 1943 was 6,536 metric tons, with 1,812 of that devoted to training.

[ljadw]

OTOH , LW 3 Day Fighter sorties in february 1944 were 2142 (source : Hooton :Eagle in Flames P 283 ).and on P 284 :monthly LW Reich sorties in 1944 :4690 and for LW West :6952.

[ljadw]

From "LW flight training hours "(on this Forum) it appears that the problems started already in 1939 (before lack of fuel) when at the start of an offensive(later also if there was a crisis) the training units were striped of instructors and aircraft to reinforce the front units, and we know that the front units had the custom to not let get them back .

And ,from "WW2 Weapons" (pilot training of the LW) it appears that before 1942 a fighter/dive -bomber pilot had a training of 13 months and 150/200 flying hours, for a bomber/reconnaissance pilot it was 20 months and 220/270 flying hours .

In january 1944 (BEFORE the attacks on the oil industry) the number of flying hours for a fighter pilot was down to 160 and in the late spring of 1944 to 112 hours .

Thus my question :was the decrease of the number of flying hours caused by a lack of fuel for the training schools, or was the decrease of flying hours a result of the decrease of the training duration ?

[ljadw]

About the heavies of the KM : they were less committed, but was this because there was not enough fuel ? Or was it a strategic decision = was there not a decision to use them no longer as their use was useless ? = was there any need for the Tirpitz to leave its base in Norway ? And, if there was more fuel available for the heavies,would they have been more used ?

Was there not some one at the HQ of the KM who was arguing that it was better to use fuel for the Italian navy and merchant fleet than for the heavies of the KM,and that the amount of heavy fuel was not included ?

[ljadw]

Fr om "Die Luftwaffe im Kampf um die Luftherrschaft " P 221: The fuel deliveries were narrow but sufficient with the exceptions of the period from the spring till the autumn of 1942 and since the summer of 1944.

And on the same page (about the fuel deliveries to the training units) : the opinion of Kreipe (Co S of the training units ) and Seidel (QMG) :the big problem was the shortage of aircraft ,the importance of the fuel deliveries was minor .

And note 1237 gives the monthly fuel deliveries for the training units in 1944 ( in thousands of tonnes)

January : 3.3

february : 3.7

March : 4.1

April : 5.1

May : 5.1

June : 5. 2

July : 2.9

August : 1.5

September : 1.2

Oktober :O. 7

November : O.5

December : O.5

And on P 211 is mentioned the number of pilots/crew that was delivered by the training units :

1942 :5299

1943 : 12164

[Gorque]

About the heavies of the KM : they were less committed, but was this because there was not enough fuel ? Or was it a strategic decision = was there not a decision to use them no longer as their use was useless ? = was there any need for the Tirpitz to leave its base in Norway ? And, if there was more fuel available for the heavies,would they have been more used ?

Was there not some one at the HQ of the KM who was arguing that it was better to use fuel for the Italian navy and merchant fleet than for the heavies of the KM,and that the amount of heavy fuel was not included ?

I haven't read Zetterling's book on the Tirpitz but the results on pages 88 and 183 agree with a prior reading (from eons ago) on the same subject, that being that the Kriegsmarine heavies were hampered by sufficient supplies of fuel. To be fair, this could also be due to delivery problems.

https://books.google.com/books?id=y_gfn ... il&f=false

[Gorque]

From "LW flight training hours "(on this Forum) it appears that the problems started already in 1939 (before lack of fuel) when at the start of an offensive(later also if there was a crisis) the training units were striped of instructors and aircraft to reinforce the front units, and we know that the front units had the custom to not let get them back .

And ,from "WW2 Weapons" (pilot training of the LW) it appears that before 1942 a fighter/dive -bomber pilot had a training of 13 months and 150/200 flying hours, for a bomber/reconnaissance pilot it was 20 months and 220/270 flying hours .

In january 1944 (BEFORE the attacks on the oil industry) the number of flying hours for a fighter pilot was down to 160 and in the late spring of 1944 to 112 hours .

Thus my question :was the decrease of the number of flying hours caused by a lack of fuel for the training schools, or was the decrease of flying hours a result of the decrease of the training duration ?

In conjunction with your other reply on pilot training, if more fighters are added then there will be insufficient fuel if the fuel supplies are just sufficient. If more hours are expended in training, then once again, the fuel supplies will once again be insufficient. It appears to me that the number of hours allotted for training was reduced in order to meet a minimum standard due to an allotment among the services and then a rationaliztion within each service.

[OpanaPointer]

I wonder if the OP is convinced yet.

[Richard Anderson]

OTOH , LW 3 Day Fighter sorties in february 1944 were 2142 (source : Hooton :Eagle in Flames P 283 ).and on P 284 :monthly LW Reich sorties in 1944 :4690 and for LW West :6952.

Which tells us what? That the supply was inadequate to consumption. The fact the Germans could draw down stockpiles doesn't negate the simple fact that demand exceeded supply, that already stringent economy measures were in place, or that it all came crashing down around their ears by year's end.

[Richard Anderson]

I wonder if the OP is convinced yet.

[ljadw]

From "LW flight training hours "(on this Forum) it appears that the problems started already in 1939 (before lack of fuel) when at the start of an offensive(later also if there was a crisis) the training units were striped of instructors and aircraft to reinforce the front units, and we know that the front units had the custom to not let get them back .

And ,from "WW2 Weapons" (pilot training of the LW) it appears that before 1942 a fighter/dive -bomber pilot had a training of 13 months and 150/200 flying hours, for a bomber/reconnaissance pilot it was 20 months and 220/270 flying hours .

In january 1944 (BEFORE the attacks on the oil industry) the number of flying hours for a fighter pilot was down to 160 and in the late spring of 1944 to 112 hours .

Thus my question :was the decrease of the number of flying hours caused by a lack of fuel for the training schools, or was the decrease of flying hours a result of the decrease of the training duration ?

In conjunction with your other reply on pilot training, if more fighters are added then there will be insufficient fuel if the fuel supplies are just sufficient. If more hours are expended in training, then once again, the fuel supplies will once again be insufficient. It appears to me that the number of hours allotted for training was reduced in order to meet a minimum standard due to an allotment among the services and then a rationaliztion within each service.

Seidel (QMG of the LW) and Kreipe (CoS of the training units) disagree with you : for them the big problem for the training units was not shortage of oil ,but shortage of aircraft .

There is a comparison with the RAF in 1940 : there also new pilots arrived at the front units with a low quality of training and the reason was that the front units needed desperatedly new pilots ,and that thus the training period was shortened .Why could it not be the same for the LW ?The LW front units had not the luxury to wait for 13 months to have a new fighter pilot .This was a given and the amount of available oil was irrelevant .

The front demanded quickly more pilots, thus the training units concede the demands .

Later the same happened for the army when partially trained recruits were sent to the front .

If more fuel would be available, this would not prevent that the duration of the training period was shortened .If the traning duration was going down from 13 to 10 months, this meant that the number of flying hours also was decreasing .

[Gorque]

From "LW flight training hours "(on this Forum) it appears that the problems started already in 1939 (before lack of fuel) when at the start of an offensive(later also if there was a crisis) the training units were striped of instructors and aircraft to reinforce the front units, and we know that the front units had the custom to not let get them back .

And ,from "WW2 Weapons" (pilot training of the LW) it appears that before 1942 a fighter/dive -bomber pilot had a training of 13 months and 150/200 flying hours, for a bomber/reconnaissance pilot it was 20 months and 220/270 flying hours .

In january 1944 (BEFORE the attacks on the oil industry) the number of flying hours for a fighter pilot was down to 160 and in the late spring of 1944 to 112 hours .

Thus my question :was the decrease of the number of flying hours caused by a lack of fuel for the training schools, or was the decrease of flying hours a result of the decrease of the training duration ?

In conjunction with your other reply on pilot training, if more fighters are added then there will be insufficient fuel if the fuel supplies are just sufficient. If more hours are expended in training, then once again, the fuel supplies will once again be insufficient. It appears to me that the number of hours allotted for training was reduced in order to meet a minimum standard due to an allotment among the services and then a rationaliztion within each service.

Seidel (QMG of the LW) and Kreipe (CoS of the training units) disagree with you : for them the big problem for the training units was not shortage of oil ,but shortage of aircraft .

There is a comparison with the RAF in 1940 : there also new pilots arrived at the front units with a low quality of training and the reason was that the front units needed desperatedly new pilots ,and that thus the training period was shortened .Why could it not be the same for the LW ?The LW front units had not the luxury to wait for 13 months to have a new fighter pilot .This was a given and the amount of available oil was irrelevant .

The front demanded quickly more pilots, thus the training units concede the demands .

Later the same happened for the army when partially trained recruits were sent to the front .

If more fuel would be available, this would not prevent that the duration of the training period was shortened .If the traning duration was going down from 13 to 10 months, this meant that the number of flying hours also was decreasing .

And providing more aircraft requires more fuel. Lengthier training time also requires more fuel. While Seidel and Kreipe may have had enough fuel for the few aircraft that were available, I truly doubt that the same would be true had more aircraft been available.

I thank you for the facts you've provided for this discussion, however I believe your conclusions are wrong for the simple reason that fuels were always scarce in not only the Third Reich, but also in the German Großraum.

[Gorque]

From DRZW Vol VII:

162 1.11. Defending German Skies

an order from Hitler to give preference to tank manufacture, Saur, as head
of the armaments ministry technical office, made a drastic raid on aircraft-
manufacturing resources (there was as yet no overall direction of Wehrmacht
armament) and hauled technicians and engineers off the production lines at
Junkers and Daimler; at the same time Milch was working hard to have
Wehrmacht-wide planning in which the Luftwaffe would be given priority.10

Speer did nothing to help the Luftwaffe. With Hitler backing him, Saur
prevailed over Milch and a wavering Göring; moreover Hitler was, after the
heavy losses of transport aircraft at Stalingrad and in Africa, now also calling
for 'transporters, transporters, and more transporters!'11The demand seems
understandable in the light of the fact that in these two theatres, out of a total
of 1,176 transport aircraft held on 10 November 1942, 866 (74 per cent) had
been lost during the winter and spring of 1942/3.12 The question now was
whether one could have everything all at once.

The high losses of Ju 52 transport planes exacerbated the bottleneck in pilot
training that had already developed in the summer of 1942 because of a
shortage of fuel; they meant not only a loss of aircraft for training in blind and
bad-weather flying, but also of the precious instructors who were to teach the
pilots. However, the head of the Luftwaffe general staff, Hans Jeschonnek, was
so fixated on the war in the east that he swept aside the disastrous training
situation, saying: 'First we have to beat Russia, then we can get on with
training!'13 Of course Jeschonnek knew objectively what the situation was, but
he was in thrall to Hitler, who in 1943 was trying to retrieve the initiative in the
east; so he channelled part of the fuel that had been earmarked for training to
the frontline units, who were also in desperate need of it. 14 In spring 1943 only
40 per cent of the amount of fuel needed for training fighter pilots, and 20 per
cent of that for bomber pilots, was available.15 No use was made of one pos-
sibility for partially compensating for the fuel shortage, that of psychological
testing to pick out particularly well-suited pupils for training. Already at the
turn of the year 1941/2 Göring had, against the protests of many commandants
of advanced flying schools and of the head of air defence, abolished psycho-
logical suitability testing and handed the choosing of candidates over to the
field-unit and flying-school commanders, because testing was standing in
the way of turning out the required number of trained pilots. Attempts by the
General der Jagdflieger (general i/c fighters) in 1943 to have tests reintroduced

the general of fighters branch No. 673/43 g., 5 Mar. 1943, BA-MA RL 3/51, 974 ff., and LwFüSt la
No. 03300/43 g.Kdos.(op), 1 Aug. 1943, ibid. 906 ff.
10 GLM conference, 16 Feb. 1943, BA-MA RL 3/18, 4466ff.; statement by Walter Hertel, GLM
conference, 18 Feb. 1943, ibid. 4467; Irving, Rise and Fall, 198; Boog, Luftwaffenfiihrung, 296;
GLM conference, 24 Aug. 1943, BA-MA RL 3/24, 7041—2; see also Below, By Hitler's Side, 190.
11 Milch diary, 4 and 17 Feb. 1943, BA-MA Nachlaß Milch, N 179; Milch at GLM conference,
9 Feb. 1943, BA-MA RL 3/18, 4375—6; Irving, Rise and Fall, 198.
12 Murray, Luftwaffe, 155, 163; 'Operational availability of air units', BA-MA RL 2 111/721.
13 Gen. Hans-Georg von Seidel, text of talk in 1949, 52, BA-MA Lw 101/3, pt. 2.
14 See Galland, The First and the Last, 136.
15 Irving, Rise and Fall, 200, 403, n.23.

[ljadw]

OTOH From "The november 1944 battles between the Luftwaffe and the US Air Force ":


"The hastily trained rookis which were sent from the flight schools barely knew how to fly the aircraft,not to mention how little they knew of combat tactics .The negative effect of the shortened pilot training schemes was furher AGGRAVATED through a desperate lack of fuel ."

This indicates that the problems started BEFORE there was a fuel shortage

In 1942 5299 pilots and crew finished their training, in 1943 it was 12164. How was this possible ? Only by shortening the training period.The front units needed quantity ,this could only happen by sacrificing quality .

What was better? To have every month 100 new fully trained pilots or every month 200 new partially trained pilots ?

The B flight schools were disbanded in the spring of 1944,before the start of the offensive against the synthetic oil industry , this proves that the disbandment of these schools was not caused by a shortage of fuel .The training shools received in may 5100 ton of fuel,and in january only 3300 ton ,but the schools were not disbanded in january .