you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

[South]

Good afternoon Ljadw,

Agree as to the absence of accuracy involved in predictions. (We call them "forecasts" but you're still correct. They're not accurate.)

If, for example, you're running 100 PT boats or 100 MBTs, adjusting for weather (eg storms at sea), topography (eg Fulda Pass versua Ural Mountains), fuel consumption forecasts CAN be made. It's really the same/similar as for medical morphine, vacuum tubes for radios, artillery ammo consumption, aircraft fuel burn rates.

....

Off topic re Teapot Dome discussion ( not my initial reference) but besides the "sale", there was some "trading" involving the Elk Hills Naval Reserve, California. Harry Sinclair of Sinclair Oil Co. said his trade would help the Government. Can't continue because it's off topic but would love to where/when appropriate.


Warm regards,

Bob

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi South,

"Predictions" are a red herring here. One can respond to a prediction by altering one's priorities.

We appear to know (http://germanyinworldwar2.com/Germanfuelshortage.htm) that Germany was consuming 44.6 million barrels a year at the outbreak of war, but had reserves of only 15 million. This equates to about 4 months in reserve.

We don't need predictions, as we have the statistics, as the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (http://www.wwiiarchives.net/servlet/act ... e/149/87/0) shows. As it shows, the stocks available at the end of any given year for aviation, motor gasoline (petrol) and non-marine diesel were rarely more than a few months of current consumption.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

Would a stock of 4 months be enough, insufficient or exaggerated ? It would depend not on one's priorities,but on the outcome of the war

Exemple : the aircraft fuel :following Weltkrieg 2 de.rüstungsaufgaben, rohstoffe-treibstoffproduktion,at the end of 1939 the stocks were 511OOO ton,and in 1940,production/import was 966000 ,while consumption was 863000.

At the end of 1940,stocks were 613000 and in 1941 production was 910000 and consumption 1274000

At the end of 1941 stocks were 254000 and in 1942 production 1472000 and consumption 1426000

At the end of 1942 stocks were 324000 and in 1943 production was 1917000 and consumption 1825000

At the end of 1943 stocks were 440000 and in 1944 production was 1105000 and consumption 1403000

At the end of 1943 the stocks were higher than at the end of 1941,but notwithstanding the situation in the air was very bad .

Thus one should not use raw figures but look at the context .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

Clearly, 4 months wasn't enough because, for all the devices Germany used to create oil stocks, she took on new operations at a faster rate than she could sustain, and which were necessarily limited by the stocks available - which were always tight. Indeed, the last major German strategic ground offensive (in 1942) was dictated by the desperate need for oil. Germany was never burdened by oil stocks beyond her ambition to use!

To put the same figures for aviation fuel crudely, but more accessibly:

At the end of 1940, Germany had about 9 months of aviation fuel in stock.
At the end of 1941, Germany had about 2-3 months of aviation fuel in stock.
At the end of 1942, Germany had about 2-3 months of aviation fuel in stock.
At the end of 1943, Germany had about 2-3 months of aviation fuel in stock.
At the end of 1944, Germany had about 1 month of aviation fuel in stock.

(The figure for aviation fuel at the end of 1940 is far and away the highest for any of the fuels mentioned in the USSBS and is very untypical.)

Cheers,

Sid.

[South]

Good afternoon Sid,

You're right.

I present no arguments re the history under discussion.

I was "merely" introducing logistics planning doctrine and concepts.

For example, a post WWII gateway airport can work on a forecast of required deliveries of kerojet based on the last few years of consumption.

An example during WWII, ETO, a military field hospital can work on a forecast of selected pharmaceuticals consumption from looking at past patterns of consumption.

Warm regards,

Bob

[Chepicoro]

Usually the side who supports the option "Germany/Axis never had a chance to win" are close to historical determinism, the main argument for this determinism is the difference of resources between allies and axis, on the other side, the "Germany/Axis had a chance to win" can only talk about hypothetical scenarios.

Personally I think historical determinism is a shortsighted point of view since there are more factors than material and human resources, like leadership, personal choices or luck, that can not be measured, and there are examples of wars where the "poor side" win.

I am of the opinion that the only way to Germany to become the European hegemon and then dispute the hegemony of the world to the US, was to wage war or a series of wars in Europe, to destroy the polish state, break the alliance between Great Britain and France, make the last one a client and then destroying the last continental threat the Soviet Union. Most of you have to concede that by October 1941 Germany was close or at least appeared to be close to achieve these goals, then I believe Germany had a "window of opportunity".

The moment US was mobilized for war and Great Britain and the USSR were not defeated, a rational German leadership had to seek for peace terms. I have to add, I am very happy to live under US world hegemony, undoubtedly a better option than the alternatives.

[OpanaPointer]

Personally I think historical determinism is a shortsighted point of view since there are more factors than material and human resources, like leadership, personal choices or luck, that can not be measured, and there are examples of wars where the "poor side" win.

How often do you encounter people who claim that material and human resources are the only factors?

[doogal]

crazy post.

Thought Experiment about the original post

Obviously because Germany engaged in war there was a possibility for a successful outcome. As when you engage in a contest there are more than one single outcome.

But that possibly successful outcome decreased/increased at every relevant decision making point. And we know in essence when these happened (or we like to think we know..lol)

So we can say that (as they did lose the war) if Nazi Germany had 50 goes at WW2 would Nazi Germany repeat the negative/incorrect strategic operational economic decisions etc which affected its ability to produce a successful outcome in the original loss (and i am assuming that Nazi Germany would make the same decisions every time, this i reckon is fair when you look at the Nazi leadership) so then we can say that Germany could not have won this war as its leaders both military and political were locked into a thought process which would eventually lead to defeat..,...

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi doogal,

Germany wasn't the only one that could have taken different decisions. It had an extended run of success from 1935 to 1941. This run of success could have been derailed at multiple points even before WWII broke out, let alone afterwards.

Germany probably did about as well as could be expected until 1941.

I would suggest that if one were to rerun this period 50 times, as you suggest, the majority of outcomes would have been worse for Germany, not better, because Germany seems to have on something quite close to the optimal course on its real timeline.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

Most of you have to concede that by October 1941 Germany was close or at least appeared to be close to achieve these goals, then I believe Germany had a "window of opportunity".

The moment US was mobilized for war and Great Britain and the USSR were not defeated, a rational German leadership had to seek for peace terms. I have to add, I am very happy to live under US world hegemony, undoubtedly a better option than the alternatives.

1) Germany never had any chance and there was no window of opportunity in october 1941

2 ) There never were any peace terms : the war would end only by unconditional surrender


3 ) there is no US world hegemony .

[OpanaPointer]

3 ) there is no US world hegemony .

The US certainly has a large influence on the rest of the world. And that's one definition of "hegemony". (I had to look it up myself to make sure of the definition before posting.)

[pugsville]

in the first 2 years of the war the allies made some large blunders and in may ways up util dec 1941 Germany had really had the war go as well as it could unreasonably be expected to go without depending into complete fantasy,

[doogal]

sid wrote-Germany wasn't the only one that could have taken different decisions. It had an extended run of success from 1935 to 1941. This run of success could have been derailed at multiple points even before WWII broke out, let alone afterwards.

True

Germany probably did about as well as could be expected until 1941.

Better than expected i would say

I would suggest that if one were to rerun this period 50 times, as you suggest, the majority of outcomes would have been worse for Germany, not better, because Germany seems to have on something quite close to the optimal course on its real timeline.

I was simply suggesting a possible rationale for convincing the Original poster that Germany could not have won the war.

Obviously theorising about re-running Historical events and there possible outcomes in this instance is an illustrative tool to highlight, that while other outcomes existed prior to the actual (Historically accurate) outcome. Once that final outcome had been achieved we can say with a fair degree of certainty that Germany could not have won this war with the decision makers it had.


That Germany had a successful 1935-41 does not change that fact.

always appreciate the comments sid.

[doogal]

Chepicaro wrote -
Most of you have to concede that by October 1941 Germany was close or at least appeared to be close to achieve these goals, then I believe Germany had a "window of opportunity"

Germany appeared at the time in Oct 41 (and i will point to American and British opinion at the time which reflected the battlefield circumstances and the German advance) to be on the brink of defeat. The reality on the ground was entirely different, there was no "window of opportunity" the German advance gave the impression of success but this was illusory as they were to find out.
Quite frankly the German armies lacked the strength to conclude this campaign as the Historical record shows.

[ljadw]

In october/november 1941, Todt told Hitler that the war could no longer be won .