Strategic options after Hitler's death

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Strategic options after Hitler's death

#1

Post by jesk » 04 Aug 2017, 09:28

Capitulation of Germany in May, 1945 in historical literature is practically not considered, perceived as self-evident. Germans didn't have choice except capitulation. However irrespectively the result of war, the probability of continuation of war by Germany after falling of Berlin by contemporaries was considered as high. Several certificates in favor of it.

1. Churchill's letter to Stalin of March 9, 1945

I am very glad to see your approach to all the decreasing Nazi bag in East Prussia. It seems to me that after all North of Germany is taken, and the Russian armies will connect to us, Hitler will try to continue war by deadly fight in the Southern Germany and Austria against possible contact through the Alps with the army in Northern Italy. Ruthless and persistent battle in Budapest, and now at the Lake Balaton together with other preparations support this thought.

2. In April, 1945 Eisenhower has retargeted the main blow from the central regions of Germany to the south for what its many reproached, for the missed possibility of capture of Berlin before Russians. In a context war with falling of Berlin continues, the decision to turn in the direction of Bavaria, the Czech Republic looked correct. Because the flank stretched, exposed to risk of blow of significant forces of Wehrmacht. In intelligence information, and they were confirmed, 100 German divisions, from them 30 tank in the south have concentrated.

3. On April 20-23, when still Berlin hasn't been surrounded by the Soviet troops, Keitel, the Yodel yes practically all leadership of Germany persuaded Hitler to leave to the southern areas there to head resistance.

Now about a fighting situation in 1945. Before the Soviet approach on Vistula in a strip of 1 Ukrainian and 1 Belarusian fronts where the Red Army struck the main blow, at Germans were extended to the line 22 infantry, 6 tank and motorized divisions in a reserve. Not all these divisions have been attacked, or departed under the threat of an environment. The actual fire power of Wehrmacht on this sector of the front of 10-12 divisions, so many Germans at the same time shot at the coming Soviet parts. At the same time in the Baltics 32 divisions, in Norway and Finland 400 thousand soldiers sat. Absolutely 50 divisions on the northern flank didn't participate in defense of Germany. Transfer of 30 divisions to Vistula the number of at the same time shooting Germans by 3-4 times increased. Generally especially without straining Germans could stop advance of the Soviet parts. The same on the western front.6 tank army of the prisunut Hitler to Hungary if remained in a reserve beyond Rein, speeding up of a water barrier lasted for months. Both in the West, and in the east Germans perplexedly pretended that they have no opportunity as equals to battle against the opponent. And the small chest just opened... All this was from Germans a tribute to Hitler. He is our Fuhrer, has the right to lead the strategy of deduction of minor territories even at the price of risk of loss of Berlin. Occupation of the central regions of Germany by all involved was expected.

Now about why Hitler couldn't leave Berlin. The capital of Germany Berlin was the last similar on the imputed catch allowing to hold war in the previous form. While Berlin keeps, we will defend it, having at the same time kept presence in Italy, Norway other parts of "the fortress of Europe". With loss of Berlin, sitting somewhere in Salzburg, it would become difficult to Hitler to explain the importance of deduction of the same Kurland. After falling of Berlin war was rolled away on 6 years ago in 1939 when all German troops are brought together within Germany, including for liberation of Berlin. In conditions, new to himself Hitler couldn't be at war, need of evacuation of minor areas was meant by recognition of crash of his strategy. Actually for the sake of it war was also conducted. To hand over Berlin, having forced Hitler to commit suicide or to leave history, then to be at war really.

On April 30, 1945 there was the largest unregistered victory of Germany in World War II. At the price of the huge victims and efforts Germany has torn away a foreign matter of the Fuhrer. Stalingrad, Bagration, Normandy, other defeats all consequence of intervention of Hitler in military affairs. About it it is well known from history. Germany has stood and by May, 1945 has approached in a quite good form. Under a gun the new leadership of Germany had about 8 million soldiers, was given in captivity in May so much. Not some remains of troops, groups of armies in Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy have remained, in the same Norway 323 thousand Germans have given up in captivity. In 1945 Germans had even a good time war with Finland. I will repeat, not everything was as bad as could seem, watching succession of events on the Berlin direction.

I approach the main thing in a subject now. Why Germans have given up right after Hitler's leaving, without having tried to be involved in fights without him. Being at war without Hitler, deception with weakness of Wehrmacht was instantly opened.
In the second half of day on May 1 Karl Dyonits has learned that according to Hitler's will, he becomes the president of Germany and the new Fuhrer. In a broadcast appeal to Germans on the same day Dyonits has declared wars about continuation. I tried to appoint Manstein the commander of Wehrmacht. At once it wasn't succeeded to find for him, then Dyonits quickly to him has lost interest. And already on May 3 Dyonits has made the decision on unconditional surrender. As he in memoirs has explained the acts

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/doen ... t.html#t22

I have assumed that Hitler appointed me because wanted to give the chance to the officer of armed forces to put an end to war. I have learned that the assumption isn't true much later, in Nuremberg where I have for the first time heard the full text of the will of Hitler — he demanded that fight continued.
Having received the telegram, I for a minute haven't doubted that my debt — to accept appointment. For a long time very much disturbed me that the absence of the centralized power will lead to chaos and senseless loss of human life. But now I believed that, working accurately and quickly, giving the orders obligatory for all, I will be able to help the country. Of course, I couldn't but understand that the most terrible moment in life of any military is when he is forced to capitulate unconditionally. And this moment approached. I also realized that my name forever will remain connected with this fact and subsequently there will be many hunters to blacken my reputation. But the debt demanded that I didn't pay attention to similar reasons and has immediately begun to work.
My policy was simple — to save as much as possible human lives. And the purpose remained the same, as all last months. If I have refused to assume responsibility, it would result in absence of the centralized power in the country. Through the whole country the wave of offers of immediate partial capitulation and statements for intention to continue war to the last, and often at the same time and in the same place would sweep. Disappearance of military discipline, disorder of armed forces, civil war and chaos will become result. And in these elements of the disorders and actions caused by the most various, but especially personal motives, the opponent who is sweeping away everything on the way up in arms will enter. Air raids will amplify, the cities of Germany will be ruined — in such situation there will be nobody to talk about general capitulation which will oblige the enemy to stop hostile actions. Chaos will extend also to the countries occupied by us — Holland, Norway, Denmark. The discontent of the population of these countries will be suppressed with occupational troops that besides will lead to bloodshed. It is clear, that it won't promote establishment of friendly relationship with these countries in the future.

And here if to ask the question which is what happened between May 1 and 3, sharp change of mood of Dyonits. At first his bellicose statements it would also seem, war is lost, he tries to appoint Manstein instead of Keitel and the Yodel, to change a pricker for soap a day before capitulation? And in this short period has really occurred terrible for Germans. The plot ripening in Italy headed by the general CC Wolf has shot at the moment, not most not suitable for Germans. A long time Wolf cajoled command of group of armies "Ts" in Italy with the offer to be given to allies. Those rejected harassments, but on April 28 the commander Fitingkhof has agreed. On April 29 capitulation, is signed with the effective date on May 2. The commander of the western Kesselring front, having learned about the preparing delivery, I have discharged Fitingkhof of command and on the night of May 2 Wolf's shelter was surrounded by army divisions to break the resistance conspirators, that in panic has requested the help of the British parachutists. And then Kesselring has for some reason called Wolf. 2 hours they stirred and have persuaded him to agree with capitulation. About all this it is in detail written in the book by the chief of CIA Allen Dulles "Secret capitulation".

Followed then Dyonits's reasonings on loss of management, impossibility of restoration of the centralized command and the fact that on behalf of Germany there will be nobody to sign capitulation could evolve from exclusively unauthorized capitulation in Italy. All other groups of troops have obeyed to the new management. Comparing the facts about the period of the end of April - the beginnings of May, 1945, I consider that the decision on capitulation of Germany has actually been made by Kesselring on the night of May 2. And he was simply chickened. There now have lost Berlin, Hitler has committed suicide where there still to be at war. The Kesselring has believed. Handing over group of armies in Italy, the commander of the western front categorically said about hopelessly to the lost war.

Events on April 28 - on May 3, 1945, finally have led to refusal of Germans to continue war without Hitler, have taken place accidentally. Were same improbable as well as for example on July 20, 1944 when Hitler by miracle has escaped. Following algorithm: after loss of Berlin and death of Hitler in him it is essentially important that Germans have given up without everyone manstein and attempts of retraction in further fight there at once. Otherwise deception with weakness of Germans is instantly opened. And this rather improbable scenario has happened. Even the invisible hand of history has interfered. For capitulation of Germany the highest forces have designed the plot in Italy which has shot at the right time.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#2

Post by jesk » 04 Aug 2017, 16:16

The situation map for May 1, 1945

Image

On the map the huge number of the German soldiers in the North and the South is visible don't participate in defense of Germany. Germans had to be at war and win without Hitler.
Treachery of Kesselring and only after that Donitz has decided to capitulate in the war won by Germans.

On April 30, 1945, the Germans won the war and ... surrendered

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Wolff
In 1945, Wolff under Operation Sunrise took over command and management of intermediaries including Swiss-national Max Waibel (de), in order to make contact in Switzerland with the headquarters of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, under Allen W. Dulles as to surrendering the German forces in and around Italy.[26] After initially meeting with Dulles in Lucerne on 8 March 1945, Wolff negotiated the surrender of all German forces in Italy, ending the war there on 29 April, before the war ended in Germany on 2 May 1945.[26] Wolff's capitulation of Italy to the Allies upset Admiral Karl Dönitz who had otherwise planned a staged series of surrenders designed to give the troops and refugees more time to make their way west.[27]

27. Nazi Germany At War. 1995. Martin Kitchen p. 294.


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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#3

Post by jesk » 04 Aug 2017, 16:34

https://life.ru/t/наука/971588/kto_vnio ... t_istoriiu

Germany was not defeated - it was immobilized

Recently, Russia has often been talking about how the West is engaged in revisionism - reviewing the historical results of World War II, declaring the USSR as an aggressor like Nazi Germany, and belittling the contribution of the Eastern Front to the common cause of the Victory. It is clear that even such a science as history does not stand still: many self-evident things (about the decisive role of Stalingrad and the Eastern Front in general) can be revised in the light of new facts and theories.

Perhaps the most serious attempt at such a fundamental rethinking of the "mechanisms" of World War II was the 626-page monograph of the director of the Scottish War Research Center Phillips, Paiston O'Brien - "How the war was won., Air and naval forces and the victory of the allies" (2015).

"In the Second World War there were no general battles," - the author immediately puts forward his main thesis. The bloody battles of the Great Patriotic War, the author is sure, were only a side storyline that did not affect the outcome of the war.

Battles there were deployed at the front of 1000-2000 kilometers in length and several tens of kilometers in depth. Yes, they affected a lot of the human resources of the USSR and Germany, but only a small part of the overall combat power of the latter. On the contrary, the main resources of the Third Reich, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan were thrown at the air-sea "fronts", which capture thousands of kilometers and have a third dimension (height: from the seabed to the stratosphere). There, the outcome of the war was decided.

O'Brien is not verbose: his book is based on many years of work in the archives and hundreds of volumes of secondary literature. In the first chapter, he compares the amount of material resources each of the great powers allocated to the needs of war in the air and on the water. With the exception of the USSR, at least two-thirds of the available funds were spent on this. Only the USSR spent one third of it on ships, aircraft and air defense, and the rest went into arming and supplying a huge army (tanks, infantry, artillery).

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#4

Post by jesk » 04 Aug 2017, 16:59

How did it work? The Germans could kill a million Russians in one week and win a war. But Hitler told the Germans: one division is fighting in Norway, a division in Italy, a division in East Prussia and only one division is fighting for Berlin.

In the photo Dr. Goebbels and "recent reserves"

Image

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#5

Post by gudcdn » 06 Aug 2017, 09:41

So with the German infrastructure under near total destruction you expect the Germans to hold out. There was no consistent supply of fuel. They were calling up 14-16 years olds for active duty with little or no training. With Silesia and the Ruhr no longer German soil where will replacement equipment come from?

Once Operation Bagration wiped out what was left of Heere Ost and the allies having total dominance of the skies the war was over in the fall of 44. It was just a matter of occupying territory.

Paul

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#6

Post by jesk » 06 Aug 2017, 20:25

gudcdn wrote:So with the German infrastructure under near total destruction you expect the Germans to hold out. There was no consistent supply of fuel. They were calling up 14-16 years olds for active duty with little or no training. With Silesia and the Ruhr no longer German soil where will replacement equipment come from?

Once Operation Bagration wiped out what was left of Heere Ost and the allies having total dominance of the skies the war was over in the fall of 44. It was just a matter of occupying territory.

Paul
The actual arrangement of Wehrmacht demonstrates that they till May, 1945 have held on in Yugoslavia, Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Kurland, Holland. Do you haven't enough of it? As the same at them it has turned out. At the end of war under control of Germans there was the Czech industrial region. Germans could be at war and return Germany.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#7

Post by jesk » 06 Aug 2017, 21:22

I think the chances of course were

Pusan perimeter

Image

territories under control of Germans in May, 1945

Image

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#8

Post by jesk » 14 Aug 2017, 02:41

And what is operation "Bagration"? 300 thousand killed and captured Germans. But on January 1, 1945 Germany had an army of 10.2 million people. The problem was the dispersion of troops across Europe. Very few Germans simultaneously fired at the enemy. Having collected all the troops in Germany, the Germans could shoot all Russian soldiers in one week. Why the Soviet Union performed operations slowly, for example, in East Prussia. A proportion of losses in favor of Germans, they kept longer fighting capacity. 1 killed German on 10 killed Russians and it is considered "victory". And if all Russian army has battled against all German in one battle, fast and total extermination of the Russian soldiers.

But even with those modest forces it was possible to achieve local victories. Hitler forbidden the maneuver defense in favor of positional, from which even more divisions were tied to the territory.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#9

Post by maltesefalcon » 14 Aug 2017, 22:20

jesk wrote:And what is operation "Bagration"? 300 thousand killed and captured Germans. But on January 1, 1945 Germany had an army of 10.2 million people. The problem was the dispersion of troops across Europe. Very few Germans simultaneously fired at the enemy. Having collected all the troops in Germany, the Germans could shoot all Russian soldiers in one week. Why the Soviet Union performed operations slowly, for example, in East Prussia. A proportion of losses in favor of Germans, they kept longer fighting capacity. 1 killed German on 10 killed Russians and it is considered "victory". And if all Russian army has battled against all German in one battle, fast and total extermination of the Russian soldiers.

But even with those modest forces it was possible to achieve local victories. Hitler forbidden the maneuver defense in favor of positional, from which even more divisions were tied to the territory.
Not sure exactly how many troops Germany had, but its more than just a number. Lets assume they had the capability to transport them all in a meaningful timeframe while engaged in a fighting retreat. (Marginal at best)

They now abandon most of their resources for making new weapons and their major oil supply. For now they have greatly reduced overall quality of troops in terms of training, age, and physical fitness.

Couple this with vastly superior allied numbers of tanks, aircraft, artillery and medical aid. Add to the the allies greater mobility through higher degree of motorization.

Despite the number of fanatics who fought to the bitter end, most of Germany's remaining forces surrendered en masse quite quickly no matter where they were in the final weeks of the war. So there was not even the motivation any more.

The numbers may be there but the fighting ability and spirit are not.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#10

Post by jesk » 14 Aug 2017, 23:34

maltesefalcon wrote:
Not sure exactly how many troops Germany had, but its more than just a number. Lets assume they had the capability to transport them all in a meaningful timeframe while engaged in a fighting retreat. (Marginal at best)

They now abandon most of their resources for making new weapons and their major oil supply. For now they have greatly reduced overall quality of troops in terms of training, age, and physical fitness.

Couple this with vastly superior allied numbers of tanks, aircraft, artillery and medical aid. Add to the the allies greater mobility through higher degree of motorization.

Despite the number of fanatics who fought to the bitter end, most of Germany's remaining forces surrendered en masse quite quickly no matter where they were in the final weeks of the war. So there was not even the motivation any more.

The numbers may be there but the fighting ability and spirit are not.
Lyrical digression at you has turned out about new weapon and oil resources. And where those resources in 1945, nobody knows.
Actually what was. In Ardennes allies were attacked by 30 German divisions. In the Baltics 32, in Italy 26, in Yugoslavia and Norway on 10 divisions were. In total about 80 divisions. Hitler has forbidden to evacuate them. And here if in Ardennes attacked 100 divisions instead of 30, the result of battle could be essentially other. Especially it concerns east front. The Germans fought divisions, the Russians replenished for 1-2 attacks. The more Germans fought at the same time, the less opportunities for the enemy to make up for losses in a timely manner.

On a photo the American infantry in Ardennes.The Germans are fighting for 10% of their capabilities.

Image

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#11

Post by doogal » 16 Aug 2017, 19:39

The only Strategic option following Hitlers death were 1) 2)3) unconditional surrender: :idea:

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#12

Post by jesk » 16 Aug 2017, 21:29

doogal wrote:The only Strategic option following Hitlers death were 1) 2)3) unconditional surrender: :idea:
But why then did the Germans defend the Kurland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Norway until the end of the war? Was it necessary for them, instead of defending Berlin?


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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#13

Post by doogal » 20 Aug 2017, 18:49

I'm sure the separate commands carried out existing orders until those were superceded. Hitler died and Berlin fell, there would be no point defending it after it fell??. If you mean prior to this (Hitlers Death)would Germany have been better served commencing a strategic withdrawal from Northern and Southern Europe then yes, but that wasn't the posts question. And it would have created an even bigger bloodbath for both sides if they had.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#14

Post by jesk » 20 Aug 2017, 19:48

The Allies captured 8 million German soldiers. Of these, 5 million in May 1945. In May the USSR captivated 2 million Germans. Another one million captives of other nationalities - Russians, Croats, Hungarians. 8 million soldiers survived until the end of the absurd Hitler's strategy of retaining the territory. The capitulation in Caserta became the impulse of an unjustified general surrender. 8 million soldiers are a giant army and the Germans agreed to unconditional surrender.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_In ... _Surrender

German forces in Italy and Western Austria[edit]
German military commanders in Italy had been conducting secret negotiations for a partial surrender; which was signed at Caserta on 29 April 1945, to come into effect on 2 May. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, with overall military command for OKW-South, initially denounced the capitulation; but once Hitler's death had been confirmed, acceded to it.
German forces in Northwest Germany, Netherlands, Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein[edit]
On 4 May 1945, German forces acting under instruction from the Dönitz Government and facing the British and Canadian 21st Army Group, signed an act of surrender at Lüneburg Heath to come into effect on 5 May.
German forces in Bavaria and southern Germany[edit]
On 5 May 1945, all German forces in Bavaria and Southwest Germany signed an act of surrender to the Americans at Haar, outside Munich; coming into effect on 6 May.[4]
The impetus for the Caserta capitulation had arisen from within the local German military command; but from 2 May 1945, the Dönitz government assumed control of the process, pursuing a deliberate policy of successive partial capitulations in the west to play for time in order to bring as many as possible of the eastern military formations westwards so as to save them from Soviet or Yugoslav captivity, and surrender them intact to the British and Americans.[10]


https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kriegsgef ... gefangenen

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_pr ... est_Europe

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

#15

Post by Guaporense » 21 Aug 2017, 08:42

jesk wrote:https://life.ru/t/наука/971588/kto_vnio ... t_istoriiu

Germany was not defeated - it was immobilized

Recently, Russia has often been talking about how the West is engaged in revisionism - reviewing the historical results of World War II, declaring the USSR as an aggressor like Nazi Germany, and belittling the contribution of the Eastern Front to the common cause of the Victory. It is clear that even such a science as history does not stand still: many self-evident things (about the decisive role of Stalingrad and the Eastern Front in general) can be revised in the light of new facts and theories.

Perhaps the most serious attempt at such a fundamental rethinking of the "mechanisms" of World War II was the 626-page monograph of the director of the Scottish War Research Center Phillips, Paiston O'Brien - "How the war was won., Air and naval forces and the victory of the allies" (2015).

"In the Second World War there were no general battles," - the author immediately puts forward his main thesis. The bloody battles of the Great Patriotic War, the author is sure, were only a side storyline that did not affect the outcome of the war.

Battles there were deployed at the front of 1000-2000 kilometers in length and several tens of kilometers in depth. Yes, they affected a lot of the human resources of the USSR and Germany, but only a small part of the overall combat power of the latter. On the contrary, the main resources of the Third Reich, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan were thrown at the air-sea "fronts", which capture thousands of kilometers and have a third dimension (height: from the seabed to the stratosphere). There, the outcome of the war was decided.

O'Brien is not verbose: his book is based on many years of work in the archives and hundreds of volumes of secondary literature. In the first chapter, he compares the amount of material resources each of the great powers allocated to the needs of war in the air and on the water. With the exception of the USSR, at least two-thirds of the available funds were spent on this. Only the USSR spent one third of it on ships, aircraft and air defense, and the rest went into arming and supplying a huge army (tanks, infantry, artillery).
He apparently never looked at the German military expenditures data though. It is clearly shown that German expenditures on aircraft and ships were 6% of total military outlays. The bulk of German military outlays was on maintaining the 11-12 million strong armed forces which was mainly deployed in the Eastern front.

Therefore, the military expenditures data shows that the Eastern Front was the decisive front in WW2.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

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