Strategic options after Hitler's death

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jesk
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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 26 Aug 2017 01:49

Polynike wrote:
jesk wrote:
Polynike wrote:
jesk wrote:
Michael Kenny wrote:
They were not 'undefeated'. They were the remnant of Armies that had been smashed and then fled into safe spaces to avoid advancing Allied Armies. Pockets bypassed and left until more important objectives had been taken. They knew that they would soon become targets and swiftly annihilated.
But why groups of armies in the Czech, Italy, Austria, Courland haven't been destroyed until the end of war?? These are not the remains, huge mass of the efficient troops which weren't defending Germany.
They were cut off from supply and reinforcement, pinned as you were and unable to affect the major battles on West and Ost Front.
It is your imagination on military history.
German army decisively defeated in all important and relevant theatres.
imagination
Norway troops could not move via air or sea such was the Allied superiority at the time.
imagination
Norway's terrain shall we say not helpful to quick massive troop deployments either.
imagination
The armies in Italy were spent and fighting an fighting withdrawal towards the Alps in the face of massive aerial superiority meaning LOCs and supply lines were effectively interdicted.
Imagination.You are sure that you know, but actually your assumptions from a lack of knowledge of history of World War II.
German armies holed in Czechoslovakia were literally caught between the Soviet hammer and the American anvil. Courland was bypassed because of the cost to reduce and annihilate the pocket. It was a self sustained POW camp as far as the Red Army was concerned.

One last thing to consider is the reason why the German soldier was fighting the war at this point. It was no longer a war of conquest but simply a war of survival and the survival of his kameraden. The choice was who to surrender too and the vast majority of the Wehrmacht wanted to surrender to the West for obvious reasons. The German army was beaten as proclaimed by its leading generals at war's end
Of course your knowledge is vast and immense. I bow to your superior knowledge or should I say 'imagination'
Read Guderian's memoirs for a start. On March 30, 1945 Hitler has dismissed him from a post of the chief of the General Staff for the fact that has once again demanded evacuation of troops from Italy, Kurland, Norway. You don't know and you think out that it seems to you logical. There now the aircraft has prevented. Let will be so.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Polynike » 26 Aug 2017 01:55

jesk wrote:
Polynike wrote:
jesk wrote:
Polynike wrote:
jesk wrote: But why groups of armies in the Czech, Italy, Austria, Courland haven't been destroyed until the end of war?? These are not the remains, huge mass of the efficient troops which weren't defending Germany.
They were cut off from supply and reinforcement, pinned as you were and unable to affect the major battles on West and Ost Front.
It is your imagination on military history.
German army decisively defeated in all important and relevant theatres.
imagination
Norway troops could not move via air or sea such was the Allied superiority at the time.
imagination
Norway's terrain shall we say not helpful to quick massive troop deployments either.
imagination
The armies in Italy were spent and fighting an fighting withdrawal towards the Alps in the face of massive aerial superiority meaning LOCs and supply lines were effectively interdicted.
Imagination.You are sure that you know, but actually your assumptions from a lack of knowledge of history of World War II.
German armies holed in Czechoslovakia were literally caught between the Soviet hammer and the American anvil. Courland was bypassed because of the cost to reduce and annihilate the pocket. It was a self sustained POW camp as far as the Red Army was concerned.

One last thing to consider is the reason why the German soldier was fighting the war at this point. It was no longer a war of conquest but simply a war of survival and the survival of his kameraden. The choice was who to surrender too and the vast majority of the Wehrmacht wanted to surrender to the West for obvious reasons. The German army was beaten as proclaimed by its leading generals at war's end
Of course your knowledge is vast and immense. I bow to your superior knowledge or should I say 'imagination'
Read Guderian's memoirs for a start. On March 30, 1945 Hitler has dismissed him from a post of the chief of the General Staff for the fact that has once again demanded evacuation of troops from Italy, Kurland, Norway. You don't know and you think out that it seems to you logical. There now the aircraft has prevented. Let will be so.
I have read Panzer Leader a number of times; Guderian does a really good job of making himself look great at the expense of others. Hitler's intransigence to stand fast and not give up territory meant the troops you mention stayed put. Germany had lost the game and Guderian was largely worried about the Russian advance into his Prussian homeland. Considering the Germans were well aware of their behaviour in Russia and the East, they fought double as hard to try to stem the Red Army's advance into Prussia and Germany. Ultimately Germany's internal lines of communication were interdicted by the Allied air forces making troop movements difficult at best. Yes some troops would have got through but with no infrastructure to support them the ultimate result was not in question

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Polynike » 26 Aug 2017 02:02

Jentz Panzertruppen pp247/8

Operational strength of panzer units 15-3-45

Eastern Front 1410 (Russians had 6000+ AFVs Glantz When Titans Clashed p261)
Western Front 193
Italy 238

Reinforcements 15/3/45 - End

Eastern Front

41 Pz Ivs
82 Panthers
31 Tigers

West

31 Pz IVs
61 Panthers
34 Tigers

Numbers speak for themselves. Though the concentration in the East was obvious the Germans were soundly defeated and there is no questioning the ferocity with which the Wehrmacht fought in the last few months there can be no denying that it unconditionally surrendered because of the military and economic situation it faced at war's end. There are plenty of books out there on the subject and they make for very interesting reading.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 26 Aug 2017 02:06

Polynike wrote: Germany had lost the game and Guderian was largely worried about the Russian advance into his Prussian homeland.
Again you,with your thoughts replace Guderian's plans. He didn't consider war lost, demanded for counterattack on Oder to return troops to Germany.
Ultimately Germany's internal lines of communication were interdicted by the Allied air forces making troop movements difficult at best.
It is disputable, actually Germans until the end of war moved troops across Europe, at worst at night.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Polynike » 26 Aug 2017 02:10

jesk wrote:
Polynike wrote: Germany had lost the game and Guderian was largely worried about the Russian advance into his Prussian homeland.
Again you,with your thoughts replace Guderian's plans. He didn't consider war lost, demanded for counterattack on Oder to return troops to Germany.

His only thought was to stop the Russians, even at the expense of the Western Front. I would suggest that Guderian's attitude after Kursk shows he knew Germany had run out of time and that the war would be lost. But anyhow an argument in circles goes nowhere, and in answer to the thread title there were no strategic options after Hitler's death or even in the months before it left for Germany

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 26 Aug 2017 02:11

Polynike wrote:Jentz Panzertruppen pp247/8

Operational strength of panzer units 15-3-45

Eastern Front 1410 (Russians had 6000+ AFVs Glantz When Titans Clashed p261)
Western Front 193
Italy 238

Reinforcements 15/3/45 - End

Eastern Front

41 Pz Ivs
82 Panthers
31 Tigers

West

31 Pz IVs
61 Panthers
34 Tigers

Numbers speak for themselves. Though the concentration in the East was obvious the Germans were soundly defeated and there is no questioning the ferocity with which the Wehrmacht fought in the last few months there can be no denying that it unconditionally surrendered because of the military and economic situation it faced at war's end. There are plenty of books out there on the subject and they make for very interesting reading.
No. In the battle of Berlin only according to official figures "weak" Germans have killed and wounded 350 thousand Soviet soldiers. Could more and even intercept an initiative, but in addition at least 10-15 divisions for this purpose were required. And they were, in Norway, for example.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Polynike » 26 Aug 2017 02:15

Like i said no disputing the ferocity with which the German Army fought its last battles BUT there were no means of getting the units in Norway to Berlin. Hitler had always considered Norway (like Churchill and how wrong were they) a key battleground in the war; both in 1940 and as an invasion site (just look a the amount of coastal defences along the Norwegian coast for example) and thus it would not have been an option.

You believe what you want but 75 years of scholarly work soundly disagrees with you

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 26 Aug 2017 02:16

Polynike wrote:
jesk wrote:
Polynike wrote: Germany had lost the game and Guderian was largely worried about the Russian advance into his Prussian homeland.
Again you,with your thoughts replace Guderian's plans. He didn't consider war lost, demanded for counterattack on Oder to return troops to Germany.

His only thought was to stop the Russians, even at the expense of the Western Front. I would suggest that Guderian's attitude after Kursk shows he knew Germany had run out of time and that the war would be lost. But anyhow an argument in circles goes nowhere, and in answer to the thread title there were no strategic options after Hitler's death or even in the months before it left for Germany
Disturbed Guderian that Russians in 60 km from Berlin.Wanted to reject them. Prospects were and it confirms the level of the Soviet losses. But for this purpose it was required to collect as much as possible forces for one operation. Hitler sprayed troops: East Prussia, Kurland, Yugoslavia, Carpathians.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 26 Aug 2017 02:21

Polynike wrote:Like i said no disputing the ferocity with which the German Army fought its last battles BUT there were no means of getting the units in Norway to Berlin. Hitler had always considered Norway (like Churchill and how wrong were they) a key battleground in the war; both in 1940 and as an invasion site (just look a the amount of coastal defences along the Norwegian coast for example) and thus it would not have been an option.
Do not fantasize. Trust Guderian, the possibility of evacuation from Norway was.
You believe what you want but 75 years of scholarly work soundly disagrees with you
Scientific work confirms the erroneousness of German tactics and strategy during the war years.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Polynike » 26 Aug 2017 02:26

Wehrmacht in 1945 is not the Wehrmacht of Barbarossa or 1942. Furthermore the quality of the Luftwaffe had dropped to such an extent that its presence in this supposed operation would have been negligible. Look at the Normandy campaign, closing months in North Africa or Wacht am Rhine once the weather clears to see what happens to mobile units fighting under hostile skies.

Furthermore an absolute mastery of the seas could have meant landings along the Baltic coast by either Allies or Soviets.

If you want a different perspective on Guderian I suggest you read this link: https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/r ... er-general and in the words of Clausewitz be wary of memoirs 'as few show the many threads that make a cloth'.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Polynike » 26 Aug 2017 02:29

jesk wrote:
Polynike wrote:Like i said no disputing the ferocity with which the German Army fought its last battles BUT there were no means of getting the units in Norway to Berlin. Hitler had always considered Norway (like Churchill and how wrong were they) a key battleground in the war; both in 1940 and as an invasion site (just look a the amount of coastal defences along the Norwegian coast for example) and thus it would not have been an option.
Do not fantasize. Trust Guderian, the possibility of evacuation from Norway was.

The Guderian that insisted on the drive on Moscow in Autumn 1941 knowing full well that the Wehrmacht was close to breaking point. FM von Bock advocated winter quarters and a renewed attack in the spring to let the troops recover and replenish. The Guderian who decided to leave his post and not fight it out with his troops.

You are the one in fantasy land.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 26 Aug 2017 02:45

Polynike wrote:Wehrmacht in 1945 is not the Wehrmacht of Barbarossa or 1942. Furthermore the quality of the Luftwaffe had dropped to such an extent that its presence in this supposed operation would have been negligible. Look at the Normandy campaign, closing months in North Africa or Wacht am Rhine once the weather clears to see what happens to mobile units fighting under hostile skies.

Furthermore an absolute mastery of the seas could have meant landings along the Baltic coast by either Allies or Soviets.
perhaps, but the order to troops to return wasn't
If you want a different perspective on Guderian I suggest you read this link: https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/r ... er-general and in the words of Clausewitz be wary of memoirs 'as few show the many threads that make a cloth'.
Guderian had to kill Hitler that at last an opportunity normally has appeared to work.
The Guderian that insisted on the drive on Moscow in Autumn 1941 knowing full well that the Wehrmacht was close to breaking point. FM von Bock advocated winter quarters and a renewed attack in the spring to let the troops recover and replenish. The Guderian who decided to leave his post and not fight it out with his troops.
Guderian furiously insisted to come in the summer on Moscow, to an impassability of roads. You have thought up with autumn. On March 30, 1945 Hitler has suggested Guderian to retire, he has agreed. But it was a request which it is impossible to refuse.
You are the one in fantasy land.
Why to dream. Germans didn't want to lose war. But Hitler has made hundreds of wrong decisions.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 26 Aug 2017 18:39

What Hitler has made in 1945. Has dragged the Red Army to Oder. East Prussia, Silesia, the Carpathians were added to the troops which are cut off from the main forces in Norway and the Baltics. Receding to Berlin, the German troops "lost" in space.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by jesk » 29 Aug 2017 18:22

The structure of 9 and 4 panzer armies before the Vistula–Oder operation.

http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nations ... 36-9-armee

Order of battle (31 Dec 1944)

LVI. Panzerkorps
- 214. Infanterie-Division
- 17. Infanterie-Division
VIII. Armeekorps
- 45. Volks-Grenadier-Division
- 6. Volks-Grenadier-Division
- 251. Infanterie-Division
XXXXVI. Panzerkorps
- 337. Volks-Grenadier-Division
- Festungskommandant Warschau
- Sperr-Brigade 1
- 73. Infanterie-Division


http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nations ... anzerarmee

Order of battle (31 Dec 1944)

XXXXVIII. Panzerkorps
- 304. Infanterie-Division
- 68. Infanterie-Division
- 168. Infanterie-Division
XXXXII. Armeekorps
- 291. Infanterie-Division
- 88. Infanterie-Division
- 72. Infanterie-Division
- 342. Infanterie-Division
- Heeres-Pionier-Brigade 70

In reserve 24 and 40 panzer corps with 16,17,19,25 panzer, 20 motorized divisions.A total of 19 divisions.In two fronts 163 infantry divisions, 4 tank armies.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vistula%E ... _Offensive

In the large Baranow/Sandomierz bridgehead, the Fourth Panzer Army was required to defend from 'strongpoints' in some areas, as it lacked the infantry to man a continuous front line.[14] In addition, on Hitler's express orders, the two German defence lines (the Grosskampflinie and Hauptkampflinie) were positioned very close to each other, placing the main defences well within striking range of Soviet artillery.[15]

Two Fronts of the Red Army were directly involved. The 1st Belorussian Front, holding the sector around Warsaw and southward in the Magnuszew and Puławy bridgeheads, was led by Marshal Georgy Zhukov; the 1st Ukrainian Front, occupying the Sandomierz bridgehead, was led by Marshal Ivan Konev.
Zhukov and Konev had 163 divisions for the operation with a total of: 2,203,000 infantry, 4,529 tanks, 2,513 assault guns, 13,763 pieces of field artillery (76 mm or more), 14,812 mortars, 4,936 anti-tank guns, 2,198 Katyusha multiple rocket launchers, and 5,000 aircraft.[8]

The offensive commenced in the Baranow bridgehead at 04:35 on 12 January with an intense bombardment by the guns of the 1st Ukrainian Front against the positions of the 4th Panzer Army.[16] Concentrated against the divisions of XLVIII Panzer Corps, which had been deployed across the face of the bridgehead, the bombardment effectively destroyed their capacity to respond; a battalion commander in the 68th Infantry Division stated that "I began the operation with an understrength battalion [...] after the smoke of the Soviet preparation cleared [...] I had only a platoon of combat effective soldiers left".[17]
The initial barrage was followed by probing attacks and a further heavy bombardment at 10:00. By the time the main armored exploitation force of the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies moved forward four hours later, the Fourth Panzer Army had already lost up to ⅔ of its artillery and ¼ of its troops.[18]
Ratio in the infantry divisions 11:1. In total, the Germans on the eastern front have 135 divisions.
In the 6th Army in Hungary, 9 German, 2 Hungarian Panzer Divisions, including the 3rd and 5th panzer divisions of the SS sent from the Vistula to Hungary.

http://www.axishistory.com/axis-nations ... 32-6-armee

Order of battle (31 Dec 1944)

Gruppe Breith (III. Panzerkorps)
Kavallerie-Korps (subordinated to Gruppe Breith)
- 1. Panzer-Division
- 23. Panzer-Division
- 4. Kavallerie-Brigade
Gruppe Pape (subordinated to Gruppe Breith)
- 3. Panzer-Division (armored part)
- Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division
- 8. Panzer-Division (armored part) + 6. Panzer-Division (armored part)
- 271. Volks-Grenadier-Division
Gruppe Kirchner (LVII. Panzerkorps)
LXXII. Armeekorps (subordinated to Gruppe Kirchner)
- 6. Panzer-Division (less armored part) + Hungarian Szent-László Division
- Hungarian 2nd Armored Division (remnants)
- 3. Panzer-Division (less armored part)
LVII. Panzerkorps (subordinated to Gruppe Kirchner)
- 8. Panzer-Division (less armored part)
- Kampfgruppe Rintelen
- Kampfgruppe 357. Infanterie-Division (remnants)
IX. Waffen-Gebirgs-Armeekorps der SS
- Gruppe Schmidthuber
- Panzer-Division “Feldherrnhalle”
- 13. Panzer-Division + Hungarian 10th Infantry Division
- 22. SS-Freiwilligen-Kavallerie-Division “Maria Theresia” + Hungarian 1st Armored Division
- 8. SS-Kavallerie-Division “Florian Geyer”
- Hungarian 12th Infantry Division (remnants) + Gruppe Kesseoe + Hungarian 23rd Reserve Division (remnants)

11 panzer divisions in one army seem very much, but these are only 11 divisions. Without infantry. Hitler was criticized for aligning panzer divisions in the line of defense back in Normandy.On the Vistula there are 4 tank divisions against 2.2 million soldiers with 4,500 tanks.In Hungary 11 tank divisions against 400 thousand soldiers with 400 tanks in the 3 Ukrainian Front. This facilitated the advance of the Red Army to Berlin.At the same time, Hitler as much as possible did not effectively use 11 panzer divisions in Hungary.

Hitler fought against Germany. The Russians and the allies helped him in this. All the German defeats are the consequences of Hitler's mistakes.

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Re: Strategic options after Hitler's death

Post by Kelvin » 29 Aug 2017 19:04

jesk wrote:
maltesefalcon wrote:
Not sure exactly how many troops Germany had, but its more than just a number. Lets assume they had the capability to transport them all in a meaningful timeframe while engaged in a fighting retreat. (Marginal at best)

They now abandon most of their resources for making new weapons and their major oil supply. For now they have greatly reduced overall quality of troops in terms of training, age, and physical fitness.

Couple this with vastly superior allied numbers of tanks, aircraft, artillery and medical aid. Add to the the allies greater mobility through higher degree of motorization.

Despite the number of fanatics who fought to the bitter end, most of Germany's remaining forces surrendered en masse quite quickly no matter where they were in the final weeks of the war. So there was not even the motivation any more.

The numbers may be there but the fighting ability and spirit are not.
Lyrical digression at you has turned out about new weapon and oil resources. And where those resources in 1945, nobody knows.
Actually what was. In Ardennes allies were attacked by 30 German divisions. In the Baltics 32, in Italy 26, in Yugoslavia and Norway on 10 divisions were. In total about 80 divisions. Hitler has forbidden to evacuate them. And here if in Ardennes attacked 100 divisions instead of 30, the result of battle could be essentially other. Especially it concerns east front. The Germans fought divisions, the Russians replenished for 1-2 attacks. The more Germans fought at the same time, the less opportunities for the enemy to make up for losses in a timely manner.

On a photo the American infantry in Ardennes.The Germans are fighting for 10% of their capabilities.

Image
Hi, Transfer of other troop from other front would alert the allied forces and suprise is of vital importance in Ardennes offensive. And troop in Norway and Yugoslavia were mostly infantry units and contributed less in this battle.

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