The Wehrmacht's distinction of the 1943 model from 1941

[jesk]

In 1941, German divisions were allowed to move through the territory. In 1943, Hitler tied a number of divisions to the territories. To go on the offensive, need to regroup, gather strength. Hitler did not do this, explaining this, for example, by the need to keep the manganese ores of Nikopol under control or the Russians could use the Crimea against Romanian oil. Manstein wanted to regroup and attack, Hitler didn't allow to move divisions.

[jesk]

In France: do not move, stand still. Mobile defense in practice means the regrouping of troops and the transition to an offensive.



http://dlx.b-ok.org/genesis/905000/363c ... b6410/_as/

[jesk]

This is the nirvana of World War II. Absolute truth. Hitler immobilized the Wehrmacht. He deprived the Germans of the possibility of regrouping for the conduct of normal offensive and defensive operations.

[doogal]

Hitlers insistence on holding ground and creating Fortress cities without doubt shaped the nature of the defensive phase of WW2 for Germany. But In truth the majority of the German army wasn't that mobile. In the case of Normandy , to pull out all the armour and concentrate it away from Allied air power for an operational level mobile battle would have been difficult and it could have been a larger disaster than Avranches/Mortain.
And as Allied attacks are concurrent and frequent it places a massive strain on the infantry which replaces them.
I do agree that in the east this was a massive disadvantage, with such a large front it was ludicrous not to engage in some form of mobile defense. Although again due to the partial mobility of the eastern army any mobile defense would have neccessarily been based around its slower counterparts which outnumbered them.

[jesk]

Hitlers insistence on holding ground and creating Fortress cities without doubt shaped the nature of the defensive phase of WW2 for Germany. But In truth the majority of the German army wasn't that mobile. In the case of Normandy , to pull out all the armour and concentrate it away from Allied air power for an operational level mobile battle would have been difficult and it could have been a larger disaster than Avranches/Mortain.
And as Allied attacks are concurrent and frequent it places a massive strain on the infantry which replaces them.
I do agree that in the east this was a massive disadvantage, with such a large front it was ludicrous not to engage in some form of mobile defense. Although again due to the partial mobility of the eastern army any mobile defense would have neccessarily been based around its slower counterparts which outnumbered them.

Until 1989, Soviet military science did not share a positional and maneuverable defense.
It's more correct to talk about normal and abnormal defense. Positional defense is one that can not be broken for a long time. Mobile is a fast progress. As for the division of tanks and infantry, there is no difference, except that Hitler grotesquely contrasted them. Take the tanks and win. So it was at Kursk and in the Ardennes. The ratio of tank / infantry divisions is 20/80%. In battles 50-70% of tanks and 3-5% of infantry. Under the cover of the concentration of tanks, Hitler deduced inaction 80% of the Wehrmacht, as part of infantry divisions. Tanks, tanks Hitler shouted at every corner. But where the infantry. Hitler hid it.

[jesk]

Talks about the tank divisions in isolation from the infantry, this is all propaganda of Hitler. Used this trick for deception of generals.

[jesk]

What is normal war and abnormal, for example, in Ukraine. First, to withdraw all the troops beyond the Dnieper. But even in February 1944, eight divisions defended the "bridgehead" on the left bank in the Nikopol area and 13 divisions in the Crimea. After the breakthrough of the defense on the Dnieper, Hitler had to withdraw troops from the Nikopol arc. The Germans had enough strength to defend the territory of Ukraine above the Black Sea and without retaining protrusions.

[doogal]

Jesk wrote -In France: do not move, stand still. Mobile defense in practice means the regrouping of troops and the transition to an offensive.

No one stood still the Germans were pushed back bit by bit until they broke. They were mobile within there tactical defense zones which covered several to many kilometres.

Jesk wrote :- Talks about the tank divisions in isolation from the infantry, this is all propaganda of Hitler. Used this trick for deception of generals.

Not sure about the propaganda of deceiving Generals but you make my point mobility depended on all arms being regrouped moved and redeployed, but to do this across such a vast front in the East would have required massive withdrawals. In the face of constant pressure. With no real guarantee that a line could be held or operational level counter offensive could be mounted on a scale which could affect the strategic direction.
And in Normandy there were not enough units for such a riposte without again massive withdrawals. If you cant eventually hold them in Normandy what chance is there of holding them anywhere else without running terrible risks in the east so as to re inforce the west.

Jesk wrote-This is the nirvana of World War II. Absolute truth. Hitler immobilized the Wehrmacht. He deprived the Germans of the possibility of regrouping for the conduct of normal offensive and defensive operations.

I'm unsure is this a hypothesis that you agree with ??

Hitler over extended his Armies on more than one occasion.... each time they suffered a calamity.. His micro managing of operational and tactical level military operations without doubt hindered the proffesional soldiers from fighting in a style they deemed more suitable. It is a matter of conjecture though to imagine if this would have really staved off defeat.

[jesk]

No one stood still the Germans were pushed back bit by bit until they broke. They were mobile within there tactical defense zones which covered several to many kilometres.

Yes, but

viewtopic.php?p=2102392#p2102392
In November, Manstein demanded a) shorten the front (abandoning Crimea, the Dnieper curve (= Nikopol bridgehead and Zaporoshje) b) give us more mobile divisions (from the Army Group Center) c) place them in the northern wing (4. Pz. Armee)

Not sure about the propaganda of deceiving Generals but you make my point mobility depended on all arms being regrouped moved and redeployed, but to do this across such a vast front in the East would have required massive withdrawals. In the face of constant pressure. With no real guarantee that a line could be held or operational level counter offensive could be mounted on a scale which could affect the strategic direction.

It is easy to calculate mathematically. You have 10 divisions per 100 km, 2-3 can be allocated for a counterattack. If the divisions 30, strike can be 20, at points where the enemy's strength is less.

And in Normandy there were not enough units for such a riposte without again massive withdrawals. If you cant eventually hold them in Normandy what chance is there of holding them anywhere else without running terrible risks in the east so as to re inforce the west.

In August, they counterattacked, exposing the left flank. There the divisions were drained, if only a month earlier. it is clear about what I. New forces are coming from ships, the Germans are missing out on time.