Oil war against CCCP

[ljadw]

2) Those fuel reserves were lost in Barbarossa.
3) Yepp, that's the remaining 30%.

2) : not correct : only a part was lost
3) not correct : during the war the oil production in Sakhalin and Kazachstan was going up and replaced a part of the Caucasus losses .

In 1940 the Caucasus produced 27 million ton on a total of 32,2 million . In 1945 13 million on a total of 19,5 million .

[jesk]

In 1945, another 2.8 million tons of oil was mined in other regions of the Caucasus. 14.3 out of 19.4, 74%

[ljadw]

As far as I know the Germans didn't make any attempt to destroy all the Caspian fuel tankers. The question is why?

Answers :
1) Is it so that the Germans did not try it ? Afaics Joel Hayward treated this subject in "Too little, too late "
2) Could they do it ?
3 ) Why should they do it ?
4 ) If they did it, the results would have been disappointing ,as after Stalingrad the Germans abandoned the Caucasus and the oil could again be transported by rail .

[Col_Kurtz_]

It's a well known fact, that the main limiting factor for every modern (mechanized) army is the amount of available supplies, especially fuel.

There is a big difference between the today armies and the WWII armies .The WWII armies were less dependent on oil and consumed thus less oil .

T34s and KVs ran on diesel, Ils, Yaks and MIGs ran on gasoline. Without them the Red Army would have been a WW1 army.

[Col_Kurtz_]

As far as I know the Germans didn't make any attempt to destroy all the Caspian fuel tankers. The question is why?

Answers :
1) Is it so that the Germans did not try it ? Afaics Joel Hayward treated this subject in "Too little, too late "
2) Could they do it ?
3 ) Why should they do it ?
4 ) If they did it, the results would have been disappointing, as after Stalingrad the Germans abandoned the Caucasus and the oil could again be transported by rail .

1) I read that article too. It was about bombing the oil fields & refineries which was a - so to speak - less than optimal idea. Sinking the Caspian supply ships would have been an easier & more effective move. (fewer targets, harder to protect them, difficult to replace the ships)
2) The Luftwaffe flew similar missions from Norway hunting the arctic convoys, thus yes, they could have done it. Fighter escort might have been necessary, but the range of Me 109s was around 1000 km (using droptanks), the Me 110s around 1300 km (using droptanks) the range of Me110s was (The distance between Stavropol (captured 1942.08.05.) and Krasnovodsk (now Turkmenbasy) is 1070 km as the crow flies.)
3) Is this question serious? Cutting the enemy's supply lines is not a good idea?
4) If they did it, the offensive capabilities of the Red Army would have been seriously limited, thus Operation Uranus might have been longer, the Soviets would have had more , the Germans would have had less casualties. Take note, that taking back the territiories between Stalingrad and Baku is one thing, reestablishing the rail connection, rebuilding all the necessary infrastucture (bridges, railway) is another. The Luftwaffe wouldn't have seen it idle for sure.

[Col_Kurtz_]

2) Those fuel reserves were lost in Barbarossa.
3) Yepp, that's the remaining 30%.

2) : not correct : only a part was lost
3) not correct : during the war the oil production in Sakhalin and Kazachstan was going up and replaced a part of the Caucasus losses .

In 1940 the Caucasus produced 27 million ton on a total of 32,2 million . In 1945 13 million on a total of 19,5 million .
If the Soviets had huge fuel reserves in '41, why did they make so many efforts to protect the azeri oilfields, to increase the oil & fuel production in other areas? Because they needed the azeri oil badly, the Red Army was greatly (~70%) dependent on azeri fuel. Cutting its way would have been an effective and efficient blow against them, especially compared to strike against other aviation targets (Stalingrad, oil wells and refineries of Grozny, troops on the battlefielde etc.).

[ljadw]

As far as I know the Germans didn't make any attempt to destroy all the Caspian fuel tankers. The question is why?

Answers :
1) Is it so that the Germans did not try it ? Afaics Joel Hayward treated this subject in "Too little, too late "
2) Could they do it ?
3 ) Why should they do it ?
4 ) If they did it, the results would have been disappointing ,as after Stalingrad the Germans abandoned the Caucasus and the oil could again be transported by rail .

1) I read that article too. It was about bombing the oil fields & refineries which was a - so to speak - less than optimal idea. Sinking the Caspian supply ships would have been an easier & more effective move. (fewer targets, harder to protect them, difficult to replace the ships)
2) The Luftwaffe flew similar missions from Norway hunting the arctic convoys, thus yes, they could have done it. Fighter escort might have been necessary, but the range of Me 109s was around 1000 km (using droptanks), the Me 110s around 1300 km (using droptanks) the range of Me 110s was (The distance between Stavropol (captured 1942.08.05.) and Krasnovodsk (now Turkmenbasy) is 1070 km as the crow flies.)
3) Is this question serious? Cutting the enemy's supply lines is not a good idea?
4) If they did it, the offensive capabilities of the Red Army would have been seriously limited, thus Operation Uranus might have been longer, the Soviets would have had more , the Germans would have had less casualties. Take note, that taking back the territiories between Stalingrad and Baku is one thing, reestablishing the rail connection, rebuilding all the necessary infrastucture (bridges, railway) is another. The Luftwaffe wouldn't have seen it idle for sure.

1 ) One can argue that attacks on the oil installations, on the harbour of Baku and on the harbour of Astrachan (if the oil was disembarked there)would obtain better results :fewer targets does not mean easier to find ;
2) The question is : did they have the needed bombers?
3) This is not the question ,the question is : why would the Germans attack the tankers ? There were other options (see point 1) , besides, if the Germans could advance from Stalingrad to Astrachan, there would be no longer a harbor to disembark the fuel ,thus Baku would be useless .
4) Here the problem is that we have only very partial informations while the Germans knew even less and that we don't know what the Germans knew or not knew or what they discussed or decided .
The importance of Baku was not the prewar 22 million ton of oil:we don't know how much was produced in the second half of 1942, we don't know hom much oil was transported by ships during that period .We don't know if the oil was crude or refined . If in the second half of 1942 6 million ton was produced and 5 million transported by ship ,that would mean some 30000 a day = 5 tankers . Even if the Germans succeeded to stop all oil transport during this period (which is very unlikely),after the fall of Stalingrad, these transports would start again , which makes the importance of the attacks on the tankers very questionable .
What would be the result if during 6 months the Soviets received less or no oil from the Caucasus ? I don't think that the offensive Soviet capabilities would be limited :how much oil was consumed by Uranus ?
Last point : already before the start of Fall Blau, the Soviets had started to dismantle Baku,which was decreasing the production and importance of Baku .The Soviet oil production was 31 million in 1940, 33 million in 1941 and only 22 million in 1942 :the Caucasus was the first affected . The Soviets were able to catch a production decline of 11 million in 1942,why should they not be able to catch a decline of 15 million ton ? The production of 1943 was only 18 million, and in 1943 they repulsed von Manstein to Romania .

[Col_Kurtz_]

1) The azeri fuel was shipped from Baku to Astrahan and Krasnovodsk (today: Turkmenbasy). Harbours are easier to defend and sturdier. The Caspian Fleet on the other hand couldn't have been too strong, a few corvettes and fregatts I suppose, thus only the fighters could have defended the tankers. Knowing the qualitative advantage of the German fighter pilots and planes back in '42 it seems pretty doable. If the Ju88s could make serious losses to the arctic convoys, they could do the job above the Caspian Sea too for sure.
2) They had enough bombers to bomb Stalingrad into ashes (pretty dumb idea), so yes, they had enough bombers.
3) Tankers are easier targets. Little to no flak defense, inferior red fighters. Astrahan would have been a very good goal indeed, but there was Krasnovodsk as a back up harbour.
4) We know the exact figures of the Soviet oil production, which show, that more than 2/3 of it was produced around Baku. The strategic importance of the azeri oil production is trivial. By the way I'm not talking about a mortal wound, I'm talking about a serious blow to the Red Army.

[BDV]

1) The azeri fuel was shipped from Baku to Astrahan and Krasnovodsk (today: Turkmenbasy). Harbours are easier to defend and sturdier. The Caspian Fleet on the other hand couldn't have been too strong, a few corvettes and fregatts I suppose, thus only the fighters could have defended the tankers. Knowing the qualitative advantage of the German fighter pilots and planes back in '42 it seems pretty doable. If the Ju 88s could make serious losses to the arctic convoys, they could do the job above the Caspian Sea too for sure.

Planes bombing oil shipping cannot be, at the same time tactical bombing.
The trip around the arctic circle happened over many days (10 or so); 30 hours is the ferry ride Baku-Astrakhan; 2 overnights and one day-light interval. Of course if LW is too effective, overnight runs to Krasnovodsk can be arranged.
no UBoats in the Caspian, either; and no MIG3s flying from Svalbard.
Kirkenes-Murmansk 200 km vs. Taganrog-Baku 1500 km

so it seems pretty not doable.

[Col_Kurtz_]

Distance: if you take a look at the route of the arctic convoys (like PQ17) you can see that most of the airstrikes happened as far as Svalbard/Spitzbergen which is further from Kirkenes than Krasnovodsk from Stavropol.
U-boats wouldn't have been necessary.
Soviet fighters and pilots were inferior to their German counterparts, they would have been no match to Bf109s and FW190s using droptanks (range ~1000 km).
And the most important: there were no warships on the Caspian Sea! With no effective AA defense, those highly flammable tankers would have been easy prey for the Jus.
There would have been some losses to the LW of course, due to the red fighters, but they couldn't defend Stalingrad neither.

[ljadw]

Soviet fighters and pilots were inferior to their German counterparts, they would have been no match to Bf109s and FW190s using droptanks (range ~1000 km).

In 1942 ?
And, how would they find the Soviet tankers in autumn and winter ?
The results from the Mediterranean are not encouraging :the results of the attacks of the RAF on the Italian tankers going to NA were very meagre .

[Col_Kurtz_]

"One of the limitations of the earlier Bf 109Es was their short range of 660 km (410 mi) and limited endurance, as the design was originally conceived as a short-range interceptor.[23] The E-7 rectified this problem as it was the first Bf 109 subtype to be able to carry a drop tank, usually the standardized Luftwaffe 300 L (80 US gal) capacity unit mounted on a centre-line rack under the fuselage, which increased its range to 1,325 km (820 mi). Alternatively, a bomb could be fitted and the E-7 could be used as a Jabo fighter-bomber. Previous Emil subtypes were progressively retrofitted with the necessary fittings for carrying a drop tank from October 1940." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messersch ... te_note-24

Sinking those - few dozen? - tankers could have been done in the summer '42. By autumn the Caspian Sea would have been silent, the rail connections and oil pipes from Baku would have been taken/cut.

[ljadw]

We don't know the number of oil tankers, but,let's assume that Baku produced 12 million ton in 1942, but less in the second half of that year : 4,5 million ton,and let's assume that 3 million of this was leaving Baku by tanker = 500000 ton per month an d that leaving and returning took 10 days ,which means that one tanker could transport every month 20000 ton,which gives us a number of 25 tankers + 10 tankers as reserve : to say that the LW could eliminate them is an illusion : the RAF failed to stop the transport of oil to NA by the Italians: why should the LW be able to do better than the RAF ?
In 1941 the Italians lost only 10 % of the oil that was transprted to NA, in 1942 17 % .17 % of 3 million = 500000 : would this hurt the SU and how much ?
And, what would be the result if the LW stopped the transport of oil by tanker ? Oil could still be transported by pipeline : there was a pipeline from Baku to Batumi and from Grozny to Tuapse .

[Col_Kurtz_]

Honestly I don't know much about the RAF's Mediterranean operations, but I know something about the fight between the LW and the Allies' arctic convoys. The convoy PQ17 for example lost 24 of its 36 mercant ships in July 1942, thus I think there wouldn't have been any problem sinking some 3 dozen Caspian tankers. Yes the LW might have lost some bombers, but those planes were lost over Stalingrad anyway (for pretty stupid reasons).

Tell me, how would you have transported the fuel from Tuapse or Batumi to the Soviet troops, hmmm???

[ljadw]

Honestly I don't know much about the RAF's Mediterranean operations, but I know something about the fight between the LW and the Allies' arctic convoys. The convoy PQ17 for example lost 24 of its 36 mercant ships in July 1942, thus I think there wouldn't have been any problem sinking some 3 dozen Caspian tankers. Yes the LW might have lost some bombers, but those planes were lost over Stalingrad anyway (for pretty stupid reasons).

Tell me, how would you have transported the fuel from Tuapse or Batumi to the Soviet troops, hmmm???

PQ 17 is not representative for the Arctic convoys : there were in almost 4 years 78 convoys with 1400 merchant ships of which 103 were lost = some 7 %,or 1.3 ships per convoy of 18 ships .